Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Ordinary meeting
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LIBE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsMagnus Brunner
The proposal also brings Europol and EPPO closer together so that Europol's analytical capabilities can actually support investigations protecting the Union's financial interests also. We are therefore substantially reinforcing Europol's resources, enabling the agency to deliver on this expanded mandate. And then of course it comes to the money, to the MFF, where we see, at least in the Commission's proposal, more money there, more possibility, more possibilities for, as you mentioned, Chair, for more staff also, Europol staff, resources. And of course there I ask you for your support when it comes to the negotiations for the next MFF. And what as a last point, if I may, Chair, of course a stronger mandate with more resources and also greater responsibilities must be matched by a stronger accountability also.
And that is why the proposal reinforces Europol's governance framework. It aligns the governance rules with the approach that the Parliament and the Council had agreed for all EU agencies, which has proven effective across all the different policy areas. So the proposal actually strengthens oversight, it strengthens transparency, so that Europol of course remains, and that is a necessity of course, fully compliant with the rules and also maintains the trust of the Parliament, the trust of the Member States and also the wider public. So our proposal I think strengthens cooperation, common capabilities and the operational support that Europol provides to Member States. And I look of course very much forward to working with this Parliament to turn this ambition, I would say, into reality at the end.
Thank you very much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Commissioner, for your presentation. Now it's for the political groups to make their remarks and questions. So we start with EPP, Mr. Tomas Tobé.
Tomas Tobé
Thank you, Chair, and a warm welcome to Commissioner as well to the committee. We are all aware that the criminal networks operate across borders and they are becoming increasingly more sophisticated. And for EPP it's clear that we need a stronger European response. And I do think in general that this proposal is an important step in that direction. I would especially like to highlight the vision of Europol as an information hub, an operational hub and a technology and innovation hub.
But I do have two questions that we perhaps could consider together today. Firstly, on the question of initiation of investigation. I mean, of course I truly respect the treaty provision and the fact that coercive powers remain in the Member States' responsibility and powers. But however, I mean, we do know that Europol is sometimes, I would say, uniquely placed to identify criminal networks, connection between cases and emerging threats across several Member States. So my question is how could we make sure that this proposal enable Europol to translate this intelligence also into operational actions when it comes to the initiations of investigation?
Secondly, the question of hybrid threats. I do see that some elements are addressed in the proposal, but perhaps my question is why don't we see a higher level of ambition when it comes to the role of Europol when it comes to hybrid threats? Thank you.
Magnus Brunner
Yeah, thank you very much for these two questions now. First of all, on the initiation of investigation, and you rightly said, I think Europol is of course uniquely placed when it comes to that. Europol can suggest actually, and member states then have to provide the reasons if they refuse. So we turn it around a little bit, the whole approach. So Europol suggests and the member states then can, member states have to provide the reasons if they want to refuse to cooperate.
So it's still a member state sovereignty, I would say, on that question, of course. On the hybrid threats, hybrid threats, I think as you mentioned, are fully covered, I would say, by this new mandate, not as a new crime, but as a way of committing crimes. That's the difference, actually. And Europol will be able to support member states in combating these hybrid threats, also with the necessary technology, which is of course needed when it comes to hybrid threats, and that's where the innovation hub comes into play.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much, and thank you for the presentation. I think we all in general can agree that of course supporting member states, coordinate their work, we all can agree on that, even though, and we have to look into more details of the proposal, the devil is of course in the detail. And I would like to come back to what you mentioned at the end of your first answer, that Europol can suggest an investigation, and then member states have to explain if or why not they are doing it. Isn't that a little bit a first step to take over investigations? And what if Europol still believes it's of urgent importance to do that, but member states give some reasons why they are not doing that?
How do we deal with a possible conflict? So that's an interesting question for me. I'm also, I have a question on the automated data exchange. So I think and I hope we all agree we cannot exchange all kind of data with everybody. So are there already concrete ideas how to organize this automated data exchange in a more targeted way, and what would be the different aspects to have it more targeted to really reach the important people?
And a last question in all this area, I think it's important not only to have a cooperation with EPPO, but also to have a cooperation with Eurojust. And it may not be directly in your hands, but I feel as a matter of principle a little bit sorry if Europol is increasing ever more while Eurojust and some other agencies are lacking behind and are not really on the same level. How are your views on that?
Magnus Brunner
Yeah, thank you very much, Mrs. Sippel. First of all, maybe I start with the last part of your question. That's true, yes, the other agencies of course have to keep up.
But did you talk about the financial support also and...
Magnus Brunner
Yeah, of course. I mean, what we tried to do, I think, and of course Eurojust is in Commissioner McGrath's competence, but we are totally aware that, and of course I talk to the Eurojust executive director as well because we have to align that. I'm in charge of, in this case, of Europol, so I do everything to support Europol and Europol staff, but we're totally aware that we also there have to work together and align also the resources and possibilities. Totally aware of this, and now it's a question also of negotiation when it comes to the next MFF, the next budget altogether. But totally aware of this, that also the others, if the cooperation has to, if we want the cooperation to work, of course they have to keep up with Europol as well.
The first part of your question, what I always like to say, we don't want the Europol to become a European FBI. Of course not. That's what I always, because some member states always had the fear that we are working on that. Of course not. That's not the case.
You're right, the devil is always in the detail, but also the angel is always in the detail on the other side. And it's not a first step, definitely not, to take over, as you said. Definitely not, I have clearly always said that. So Europol supports the member states, of course. It has no own investigative competences also, that is still with the member states.
Investigations, arrests also, and coercive powers remain the exclusive responsibility of the national authorities. And there are also limits in the treaty actually, Article 88. Europol has of course these limits, and of course that doesn't change, of course not. On the, that's the agency cooperation, that's what I already mentioned. Ah, yeah, and then the data protection part and the automated exchange with the member states.
So what we are trying to do with this proposal is that we try to harmonize the rules also on data protection, because that of course has to go hand in hand with your question with the automation. Harmonizing the rules on data protection with the European Union horizontal data protection rules applicable to all the EU agencies, all the other EU agencies. Europol will finally actually be able to work under the same standards that apply also at a national level. So we want to align it there. And of course the proposal also preserves the core safeguards of the existing framework, including purpose limitations, for instance, proportionality, necessity also, proportionality requirements, and also the independent supervision by the European Data Protection Supervisor.
So there are a lot of safeguards in there. And I have the feeling and I think, and it's what the experts also tell us, that of course the safeguards are needed, but they are also there in the proposal.
Fabrice Leggeri
Merci Monsieur le Président et merci Monsieur Brunner, Commissaire européen d'avoir présenté le nouveau projet pour, pour Europol. Je crois qu'assez largement tous les acteurs en fait sont d'accord pour considérer qu'Europol est une agence très utile et qui effectivement remplit très bien ses, ses missions. J'avais une première question concernant le régime de protection des données personnelles. Je voulais vérifier si dans la nouvelle proposition de, donc pour Europol, il y a toujours un régime particulier puisque ce sont des données personnelles de nature opérationnelle, policière, éventuellement judiciaire. Et donc ce ne sont pas des données personnelles, je dirais de droit commun ou de nature commerciale.
Donc pour être certain qu'on parle bien de données personnelles d'un régime de protection des données personnelles de nature policière ou judiciaire et que c'est aligné avec les, les possibilités données dans les États membres pour échanger mais peut-être aussi avec d'autres agences avec Eurojust et quid aussi des données personnelles collectées aux frontières avec Frontex. Je sais que le EDPS avait, avait demandé à Europol d'arrêter cette coopération. Je voulais savoir si ce problème sera résolu avec la nouvelle proposition. Ensuite, et je pense que c'est effectivement une bonne proposition d'aller vers davantage de protection des échanges, protection donc assurer la confidentialité et la sécurité des échanges entre Europol et ses partenaires nationaux ou, ou autres agences. Et je voulais savoir si vous pouviez nous en, nous en dire un petit peu plus, est-ce qu'il y aurait un réseau sécurisé d'échange des données sans entrer dans des choses trop, trop confidentielles.
Et je voulais savoir aussi quels étaient les nouveaux éléments de gouvernance. Vous avez évoqué des éléments de, donc de responsabilisation d'Europol, accountability. Mais voilà, je voulais savoir un petit peu ce que ça peut signifier concrètement dans un domaine qui reste comme vous l'avez dit d'ailleurs très étroitement imbriqué avec la sécurité nationale qui est de la responsabilité de la souveraineté des États. Et donc je voulais savoir en termes de gouvernance mais pas seulement en termes de gouvernance administrative mais aussi en termes de gouvernance politique quelles étaient les nouveautés s'il y en a dans votre proposition. Merci beaucoup.
Magnus Brunner
In the beginning I'm, I'm always too optimistic when, when it comes to understand French and then I have to change it. Too optimistic, it's not that good so far, sorry. Thanks very much for these questions. For the first on the data protection part, personal data and the regime to protect. What we, what we try to do in this proposal also and, and partly it was also part of Mrs. Sippel's question.
The police, we have this police shared data space and this will be based on, on the European Union cloud sovereignty framework also. So we have the frameworks there already. Data security of course, data protection, cybersecurity and also the digital sovereignty.
And these will provide for the for security, for the highest security and also for the the highest data protection standards we have in the in the European Union. To the second part, Frontex and the obstacles there, yes, where necessary the framework is specific to Europol. So removing the obstacles is is part of the of the mandate as well. And the third part, governance, the governance part, here we try to align the governance framework with the common approach on EU decentralized agencies that the European Parliament and the and the Council have actually agreed on. The management board of course remains at the center.
The European Parliament can now participate as an observer also in there. And I think this strengthens the accountability, as I said in the beginning, the democratic accountability and also the the dialogue between between the institutions, I think. To support the management board, and that's also new, we propose an an executive board. And this executive board, I think, will will strengthen the oversight of of different matters, of budgetary matters, of administrative matters also. And these changes, I think, ensure and should ensure that a reinforced Europol has the necessary governance, the necessary stronger governance, the necessary oversight also and also a sort of mechanism, an accountability mechanism at the end.
So these are the changes in the in the governance structure.
Assita Kanko
Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Commissioner. I strongly welcome this proposal on behalf of ECR group and we will work constructively to to advance the the capacity of of Europol to help fight crime. I have I would like to stress that, for example, the idea of building out Europol's role as a hub for technological know-how is very important for us and Europol can play a crucial role for the member states here to offer and develop technological solutions. And second, the idea of building out the role of Europol at the center of a network of international agreements is also very appealing to us.
I've seen myself that cross-border crime a cross-border crime is better fought with better cooperation, stronger cooperation, as it is essential for the effective fight to protect our citizens against crime and terrorism. I have a question for you, though. You speak of the the Europol's support offices. What are the implications in terms of Europol internal organization, staffing and budget, and what problem is this going to solve in in your opinion? Thank you.
Magnus Brunner
Thank you very much. What we try to implement there is that at the end of their career at Europol, they could then go back to the member states in with in this office and help the member states there to with their knowledge, with their experience to to implement in within the member states and having an office there in the member states. So that that is sort of the change of the of the system or not change, but but actually having having a further possibility. First in in the past we always had the the policemen coming from the member states to Europol, working at Europol, and now we of course that stays, but on the other hand we had the feeling, and that's what we heard from from the member states, that it sometimes lacks the other way round. And that's what what this is about, that sometimes, mostly at the end of their career, then they could go back to the member states and support the member states with their knowledge and their experience from Europol.
So that is the the view behind behind that new suggestion.
Sophie Wilmès
Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Commissioner Brunner, for being with us today, presenting us your new strategy for Europol. You remember that you came nicely to an event that we organized on the future of Europol, where we structured it with the 6T. We are very happy to see that many of the priorities that we identified then are reflected in your paper. So I will focus on really specific questions today, if you agree.
First, on hybrid threats. You propose rightly to integrate the hybrid dimension across all centers of expertise, which is great. You might know as well that we have just voted in the commission the Democracy Shield report in the committee, where we call for the creation of an EU center for democratic resilience. So the question is, how do you see the articulation between these structures and Europol's growing role on hybrid threats? Second question is on Europol's scope of competence.
We know that it is really an issue, and you have spent a lot of time being very careful, reminding us how much Europol is not replacing member states' competence, and we know that member states are really eager to keep them, so great. But the annex has not been modified, right, with the list of crime. And the discussion that we had with the time is that there is an increasingly cross-cutting nature of threats. And so my question is, wouldn't it have been more future-proof if we had not limited ourselves in the nature of crime that Europol can tackle? Because the idea was indeed to be able to be more flexible, because this is something that we hear a lot.
The second point about flexibility is more broadened, is how do you see the puzzle between being indeed in a legislative framework but still allow flexibility on Europol to tackle real crimes? Because when you are speaking with professionals, this is what they say. Sometimes they are, as I say, there has been put a brake on their action because of so much legislation. I had a question on the balance with the member states' prerogative, but I think it has been covered already. Thank you.
Magnus Brunner
Thank you, thank you very much. And also thank you for your engagement. I remember very well our event, of course, and hopefully we took over a lot of these ideas. Of course, that's what I meant in the beginning, that we listened very carefully to you, to the member states. And because you mentioned that, yeah, that was one of the member states' biggest fears, in a way.
That's why I always stress it and still have to stress it. So not a new European FBI, of course not. The link to the Democratic Shield is important. I was taking part in the discussion, and that was very helpful also the other day in the Parliament. For the Democracy Shield, I think we need, of course, to prevent and to protect.
For the democracy shield I think we need to of course to prevent and to protect and there that's where the knowledge hub comes into into play and also the knowledge hub plays an important role against radicalization. That's a key a key role of the knowledge hub there so the the link between democracy shield and Europol or the whole revision and reform is is key there. The about the scope and the list of crimes Europol has I would say quite a wide a wide mandate. We can we have added to the list also for instance gender-based violence. We consider the list as how should I put it as workable I would say but there's of course a complete openness also and this complete openness makes the focus on serious and cross-border crime quite difficult I would say.
So yeah so we of course have considered that and have added to the list some other some other points and I think that's a good way forward but happy to discuss of course further further amendments there.
Saskia Bricmont
Thank you very much dear Commissioner for your presentation. In French we say jamais deux sans trois. We've had three reforms in a six-year time period. We don't have the time to get bored when it comes to Europol and I really much hope that this is the good one for for a while. I want to underline a positive note is that this reform is based on an evaluation on an impact assessment conducted by DG Home.
I've fought a lot to have it and so I have to stress that it's there and it's important because when we work on legislation it's also important to work fact-based and with analysis. This being said your presentation gives us a glance of the 141 pages that we now have to read so we have to look at the details of all this proposal. And my group already fully shares your concerns and objectives to make sure that police but also justice cooperation are efficient are effective. And in order to do so you propose to extend the powers of law enforcement. And my question even if you already touched upon it it remains a bit unclear and we need to see the details but how do you intend to extend also the safeguards in terms of fundamental rights and the oversight proportionally?
You said there will be a new structure of governance but how will that fit with enhanced scrutiny and accountability and also having independent scrutiny? I have a question related to for instance research and innovation including AI. Again I have to look at the details but it seems to me that the sky is the limit for the moment and that there's no limit to to the possibilities.
And maybe I'm wrong and I would like to have your view on this. Also on the police data space, can you ensure us that it's exchange related to investigation tools, but not exchange of personal data in this new police data space? And finally, I want also to stress what my colleague Sippel said, that if there are extended powers for Europol, more investigation, more cases, more files, it means that Eurojust has to follow. They have to follow up on the cases opened by Europol many times. So it means that in order to have an effective police and justice cooperation at EU level, Eurojust also needs further attention.
And I'm happy that you said that's also important for you in the framework of the negotiations. And I really much hope we can also push for a good balance there. Thank you very much.
Magnus Brunner
Yeah, thank you. Thank you very much. I'm sure we will have more time and need of course more time also to discuss all these topics. You're right, we have to look into it and then discuss. What I can support you with is we have a list on how Europol, what competences Europol has today and what the new mandate sort of, what the difference is.
So we can provide you of course with that list, so you'd have an overview, for instance, if I have a look at this, about the information hub and about the, and we can of course provide that, would make it, would make it a bit easier probably. When it comes to the fundamental rights, we have more rules now in there, we have clearer rules also in there. I think we also have a better structure now when it comes to fundamental rights, and this all together strengthens, in my view, the oversight also. So I think there's been a real improvement, I would say, when it comes to fundamental rights, but we can always of course discuss that. AI.
The AI part, we also have, well, we have clear rules in the AI Act, of course, how it can work, and we fully of course comply, fully comply with the rules in the AI Act also in here in the mandate. What I think is, I mean, the AI part, criminals are using more and more AI, and that's why we have to keep up there as well, definitely. And so I didn't quite get that, because did I hear that correctly, that you think we use too or put too much of a focus on AI? If that's the case, I don't think that's the case. I think we should do more in that respect, and that's what this police data space is actually also about.
It's also about operational data of course as well, and with full safeguards everywhere. Totally agree with you there, but we have the AI Act and we fully comply with the AI Act there. Eurojust, sorry, the combination. Yes, I do support it and I do support my colleague Michael McGrath there as well, because you are right, also the other agencies which are linked to Europol have to keep up. Yes, definitely.
And that's why I support Michael McGrath there totally.
Giuseppe Antoci
Grazie, grazie Presidente. Intanto grazie al Commissario. Ci siamo detti in questi mesi della necessità del rafforzamento di Europol, così come tanti altri temi che vedo con piacere la Commissione sta portando avanti. Diciamo che lei Commissario sta mantenendo le promesse che ci ha fatto durante la sua presentazione all'inizio del suo mandato. Colgo anche l'occasione per vedere con felicità che si parla molto anche dell'aspetto delle tecnologie.
Abbiamo necessità di supportare Europol, questa agenzia per noi importante e fondamentale, proprio su questo tema. E ovviamente con un alert importante sullo scambio dei dati e sulla tutto quello che implica la vicenda del ovviamente la privacy di tutti i soggetti coinvolti. Volevo chiederle qualcosa di più riguardo agli uffici di supporto che saranno poi inseriti negli Stati membri e che tipo di idea di organizzazione c'è su questo e mi piacerebbe comprendere in che modo si realizzerà un coordinamento efficace con le strutture già esistenti. Approfitto anche per portar seguito a quello che diceva prima la collega sui temi il collega sui temi ovviamente della massima attenzione, non è questa la sede dell'argomento ma se n'è trattato e quindi mi sento di dire la mia anche su questo riguardo ovviamente a usare la massima cautela sulla indipendenza e la massima collaborazione nell'indipendenza degli Stati membri e soprattutto per quanto riguarda le attività che portano avanti le magistrature soprattutto quelle che combattono il crimine organizzato nella fattispecie per esempio in Italia le strutture che riguardano la Direzione Nazionale Antimafia. Questo è un tema ovviamente che tratteremo meglio su Eurojust, ma mi sentivo insomma anche di portare questo tema per non dimenticarlo, l'importanza della collaborazione.
Grazie.
Magnus Brunner
Yeah, thank you very much. What we of course coordination is is key and coordination is key, cooperation is key there, that's what Europol is is actually about and what is Europol what Europol's task of course is. And the operational support is is actually embedded in the in the existing in the existing national units. So so this has to go has to go hand in hand and no no new structures on that. That's part of embedded as I said in the national in the national units.
And and if there is more support, it's always of course under the command of the Member States. So again, no European FBI, but it's always under the command of the Member States and it's always the support from that side. So we really strictly of course stick to that and have to have to stick to that.
Malika Sorel
Merci Monsieur le Président. Monsieur le Commissaire, alors tout à l'heure j'ai critiqué la Commission, j'attends que vous mettiez vos oreillettes. Tout à l'heure j'ai critiqué la Commission mais sincèrement nous sommes toujours contents de vous voir vous parce que vous répondez aux questions, que vous nous traitez avec beaucoup de respect et je souhaitais le préciser.
Je voudrais que vous reveniez sur un point. Vous avez dit Europol a saisi 2,8 milliards d'euros. Donc j'aimerais que vous détailliez un peu qu'est-ce qu'il y a dans ces 2,8 milliards. Est-ce que vous pouvez hiérarchiser ? Et puis je voudrais une focale sur le réinvestissement dans les pays tiers des produits de la drogue s'il vous plaît.
Quel est l'ampleur du phénomène ? J'ai entendu parler certaines choses, j'aimerais avoir votre avis. Quels sont les pays tiers qui recueillent le plus le produit des drogues ? Sur le transfert des données, quels sont les pays membres si vous pouvez le dire qui sont les plus réticents ? Et ce n'est pas du tout pour pointer les pays mais pour essayer de comprendre quelles sont les raisons des réticences des pays pour vous transférer à Europol les données.
Dernier point, les criminels agissent au-delà des frontières et les pouvoirs de police restent nationaux, vous l'avez dit à plusieurs reprises. Est-ce que vous ne pensez pas qu'il faudrait développer des brigades de coopération entre différents pays comme celle que nous avait présentée par exemple le capitaine Bertrand Loubet qui nous avait parlé d'une brigade franco-allemande qui donne de très très bons résultats ? Est-ce qu'il ne faudrait pas essayer de les aider ? Qu'est-ce que vous pourriez faire ? Donc trois points et le réinvestissement de produits de la drogue s'il vous plaît.
Merci.
Magnus Brunner
Yeah, thank you very much and starting with the cooperation part and the cooperation within groups and between member states. Yes, totally agree. I had the chance to visit the French-German cooperation with Madame Keller in Kehl a couple of months ago already and it was great to see how it actually works and what the positive effects actually are. So yes, you are right and I totally support that. But that should be possible also.
It's not that everyone has to, of course not all 27 have to work together. Sometimes it is groups because an organized crime or there were burglaries in one member state and then this person or this group of persons moved to Spain and France and then of course it was the cooperation between Germany, Spain and France. So totally agree and there should be more cooperation also within groups of member states definitely. But that depends on the sort of crime that actually existed. When it comes to joint investigations also as I said fully agree with that and there we are also strengthening this and the connection, there the connection to Eurojust actually comes in.
This is also important for then the follow-up of course. So between member states yes, but also between the agencies and then again Eurojust of course plays an important role. To the question of because you mentioned the 2.8 billion, that was, did you mean that what I mentioned in the beginning, the 2.8 out of these 4,000 investigations? That's in general. I mean I can give you a list, I don't know that numbers now but it was about the 2.8 billion is a seizure of 2.8 billion euros in criminal assets, in cash, in cryptocurrencies, so all together that's the 2.8 billion.
And when it comes to the reinvestment of that of that criminal asset, that is of course for the member states then to decide. That's not our decision and not the Europol decision, that's the member states who then decide what happens with that with these these assets. To your last the last part of your questions which member states are reluctant to use the data, please understand that I can't now just blame anything but we can have a conversation afterwards and I can tell you which ones I think are a bit more reluctant than others but please understand that I don't want to blame anyone here.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you Commissioner, we have some time left so we can open a second round.
I will group the questions together, starting with Signora Chinnici.
Caterina Chinnici
Grazie, Presidente. Anch'io voglio ringraziare il Commissario Brunner per la sua presentazione, ma soprattutto stavo ringraziando, Commissario, per la sua presentazione, ma soprattutto per aver concretamente dato seguito a quell'impegno di presentare una proposta volta a rafforzare l'attività di Europol che si trova a confrontarsi con una criminalità organizzata, ahimè, sempre più complessa che dà sfide sempre più difficili. E allora, a questo proposito, io volevo chiederle se lei, ecco, può entrare un po' più nel merito e dirci in che modo il nuovo regolamento rafforza le capacità di analisi e di contrasto di Europol sul versante della lotta alla criminalità organizzata finanziaria, che sappiamo essere la sfida forse maggiore che ci viene posta oggi a livello internazionale da una criminalità che lei stesso prima ha definito una sorta di impresa a dimensione globale. E poi, con riferimento alla cooperazione con le altre agenzie e in particolare con la Procura europea, lei ha usato un termine che almeno in italiano è stato tradotto come si riavvicinano le due agenzie in termini di cooperazione. E allora vorrei chiederle se può essere più preciso, cioè in che termini, ecco, si rafforzerà questa cooperazione fra Europol da un lato e la Procura europea dall'altro.
Grazie.
Kristian Vigenin
Thank you, Chair. Commissioner, I may say that the proposal that you have presented matches the expectations for a strengthened Europol mandate. In your proposal, you rightly recognize that the criminal networks are increasingly exploiting artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies. However, while AI features prominently in the threat assessment underpinning this reform, the operational response seems to be less prominent and less developed. How does the Commission intend to ensure that Europol is equipped not only to use AI, but also to combat the criminal misuse of AI across the Union?
And do you consider that the proposal for the mandate is sufficiently future-proof in this regard, or maybe do you foresee the need for further action as these threats continue to evolve? I would like to mention in that connection that we have already started our work on the related legislation on Union support for international security regulation, and there we intend to elevate the importance of AI-related crimes in the budgetary planning. So there is obviously a link, but especially on this issue, if you can elaborate a bit more. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Bignami. Any other member wishing to take the floor in the second round? Well, Mrs. Garcia del Blanco.
Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle
Yes, thank you, Chair, and thank you, thank you, Commissioner, for presenting this proposal. We don't always see eye to eye on things, but I want to compliment you. There are a lot of very positive things on this proposal, and I was really happy, to, like Mrs. Vilimsky said, to read some of the, some of the elements. A couple of things where I think that there is still a bit of room for improvement have to do with the governance.
We still see the approximately the same model of supervision or governance from the side of the European Parliament. We feel like that could be organized in a bit more efficient way. I have some reservations about the way that the joint scrutiny group is working and has worked up until now. So that's something that also from my delegation, from my group, we will try to bring some improvement in. And then a specific question about the cooperation with EMPACT.
According to the proposal, Europol would support EMPACT more structurally. So how do you see the future interaction of EMPACT as platform for operation and Europol as more operative agency? It seems to us that through this way Europol would actually become more operational on the ground, which in principle I would really very much support. So I would be curious to your views. Thank you so much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. And I give back the floor to the Commissioner for answering your questions and if he wishes to do so for his concluding remarks. Commissioner.
Magnus Brunner
Thank you very much, Chair. Starting with Madame Tinci, that was about, sometimes I mix it up, sorry, the EPPO, yeah, sorry, sometimes I mix it up, the Europol-EPPO cooperation, sorry. Yeah, I think what we try to do in this new mandate is that Europol will be able to support the EPPO's investigation with analysis. This is I think a good use also of resources. Otherwise the EPPO would have to invest in building the same tools and capabilities a second time.
And that's what we want to avoid. So in practice the EPPO will be able to check whether Europol holds data related to offenses falling within the EPPO's competence. So there is a link, I think it's a better use of the resources. And then the second part of your question about the data analysis and the better data analysis. What we try to do is that the member states will provide more data and that's where this automated upload comes into play.
And there will be a reinforced cooperation also between other agencies, new agencies like the AMLA, the Anti-Money Laundering Agency, and also the new customs authority. So this link to the new ones, to the new authorities, new agencies, I think is also key and that's also what we try to tackle there. The misuse of AI, also there I think innovation is key. That's why we are focusing so much on the innovation part and that's I think where Europol can support the member states because as I said in the beginning not every member state has the resources also to do that. So innovation is key and that's why we try to have this strong support for the member states in developing also technology, new technologies, existing technologies, further developing AI as well.
And then of course when it comes to the child sexual abuse part, also there together with AI, that AI-generated child sexual abuse is now criminalized also in the new directive, in the child sexual abuse directive. And I think the link there is also important and I'm very happy that this directive actually included that.
The EMPACT part and the the link to that, the EMPACT is is actually fully fully embedded also in in this new mandate. We can now start operational task forces for for certain cases also. And it's fully integrated into the new also into the new center of of excellence and expertise. So the link there is is totally is important of course and and is there. Overall, I think we we have a stronger operational support as a result then coming up.
So I think the link there and the well coordination also between EMPACT and the new mandate is is totally there and and really important. Closing remarks, if you want to do any closing remark. Not really. Thank you very much. I'm looking forward to really to the next weeks and months to come.
Hopefully of course we find a an agreement very soon, the sooner the better. But I'm totally aware that there are some details which we have to discuss of course. And as I said in the beginning, I'm very happy to to give you the overview and what changes from the existing mandate to the new mandate so that that we all have a better overview. Thanks very much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Commissioner. As you have seen, all groups are really willing to engage constructively in the discussion of the file in order to have a positive outcome. We are fully aware of the importance of the new Europol mandate as a one of the key legislative files that we'll have to deal with. So we do expect a close cooperation with the Commission and then with the Council in order to find a the best possible outcome. Thank you.
Thank you, Commissioner.
Well, dear colleagues, would you please take your seats so we can continue our session? Now moving on to point to item 18. We have just had the presentation of the new Europol's mandate. And now it's the turn to Eurojust that has been mentioned in the previous debate in a number of occasions. So I would like now to welcome Ms. Ana Gallego, Director-General of DG JUST at the Commission.
This will be a first exchange of views on three additional major pieces of legislation which the Commission has just adopted: the revision of Eurojust Regulation, the Directive on European Investigation Order and the Regulation on the processing of personal data by EU institutions. They're all complementary instruments and we decided to have an exchange on all of them together. First, let me emphasize that we have been closely following the evaluation and review process of Eurojust Regulation with numerous exchanges in our committee.
We have therefore strong expectations about the strengthening of Eurojust mandate also by making it a more proactive player in the cross-border criminal justice cooperation. Furthermore, we are aware that the agency needs further means to strengthen its international outreach. Another essential point is to improve its internal functioning, governance and streamlining the priority setting. Eliminating the data sharing bottlenecks is another horizontal issue, also closely connected to the reform of the regulation on the processing personal data by EU institutions and agencies. And second, we welcome the fact that the European investigation order provides an efficient and comprehensive framework for simplifying and accelerating cross-border criminal investigations.
Available data indicates a steady rise in use of the investigation order since it was introduced. It has been working well, nevertheless recent reports have shown the need to address several additional aspects of cross-border investigations. This means mainly improving cross-border gathering of evidence and facilitating a remote participation of suspects, accused persons and victims in court proceedings. Third, the revisions of the EUDPR is relevant to justice and home affairs agency cooperation because cross-border criminal justice increasingly depends on lawful, secure and interoperable exchange of operational personal data between Eurojust, Europol, EPPO, Frontex via eu-LISA linked system. The Commission's EUDPR review already identify Chapter IX as the horizontal law enforcement data protection framework intended to reduce fragmentation between EU agencies' operational data regimes and the legislative framework for national authorities based on law enforcement directive as implemented by Member States.
So, Ms Gallego, welcome to LIBE and with no further delay, I'm glad to give you the floor to introduce to us all these three initiatives. We have also some limited time, but I think you could start by having an initial presentation for ten minutes. Okay?
Ana Gallego
Dear Chair, thank you very much, honourable members. It's a pleasure to be in LIBE committee today for this exchange of views. As you know, just yesterday and the day before, the Commission has adopted the package of legislative proposals that encompasses the proposals for the revision of Europol regulation, which you have amply heard from Commissioner Brunner just now, the revision of Eurojust regulation and two, one targeted amendments to the regulation 2018/1725, the EUDPR, and the recast of the European investigation order directive. So, it's the entirety of the package pursues a coherent and complementary objective, which is to strengthen the Union's capacity to prevent, to investigate and to prosecute serious cross-border crime in an increasingly complex security environment as we live in. By modernising the legal frameworks that govern cooperation between law enforcement, judicial and other relevant authorities, the package is seeking to reinforce the effectiveness, the coherence and, most importantly, the interoperability of the Union's internal security infrastructure and architecture.
I understand that indeed Commissioner Brunner has exchanged on Europol, so I will present on the proposals from within the remit of Commissioner McGrath, Eurojust revision and the other two revisions of existing legislation.
Back in 2025, the evaluation of Eurojust along with subsequent stakeholder consultations and internal analysis has highlighted the strong added value of Eurojust, but also it identified several key challenges that the agency faces and which are addressed in the proposed reform. The strengthening of Eurojust mandate comes in parallel with the reform of Europol and the two proposed revisions aim to strengthen cooperation and complementarity between the two agencies as well as with other relevant Union actors. Okay. As well as relevant with other Union actors in the justice and home affairs and anti-fraud architecture areas, including of course European Public Prosecutor's Office and OLAF. This is with a view to to ensuring a seamless continuum between law enforcement action and judicial follow-up across all stages of the criminal justice chain.
And of course the DNA of Eurojust will be untouched and is a precondition to to the work we are doing with the revision. Eurojust will keep its role to support and to strengthen coordination and cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in the fight against serious cross-border crime. The proposal aims to strengthen both the internal dimension and the external dimension of Eurojust mandate to better respond to the evolving criminal landscape through some very concrete modification. And let me highlight at least some of them. For example, it seeks to reinforce Eurojust's proactivity and update its tasks and competences so that the agency will be better equipped to support member states in increasingly complex cross-border criminal cases.
Secondly, it also aims to reorganize Eurojust's governance with a view to streamlining decision-making processes within the agency. The new model that is in line with the 2012 joint statement on decentralized agencies, what we call the common approach to decentralized agencies, would amend Eurojust's current governance structure by refocusing the college on operations and relieving the college of administrative burden and introducing a management board and a revised executive board to increase efficiency and to establish a clear division of tasks. Furthermore, the legislative proposal would foster closer and more institutionalized cooperation with EU partners and third countries, reflecting the agency's growing role in the external dimension of judicial cooperation. In particular, the legal framework for operational exchanges with representatives from third countries will be clarified in the new regulation and enhanced in order to create more stable channels for international judicial cooperation. And finally, the proposal aims to strengthen Eurojust's mandate to address emerging cross-border threats by extending the competences of the agency to additional forms of serious crime.
A key example here is the violation of Union restrictive measures. Bringing these offenses within Eurojust remit will enable the agency to support judicial cooperation for member states more effectively in sanctions-related cases, which often involve complex cross-border financial flows, asset tracing and cooperation among multiple jurisdictions.
Another example of this renewed mandate will be gender-based violence, particularly the online and inherently cross-border dimension that this phenomenon has. The proposal also covers cyberattacks. This reflects the growing threat posed by malicious cyber activities that increasingly target critical infrastructure, public institutions, private entities all across several jurisdictions, often simultaneously. Let me now move on to another of the proposals included in this package, the EU Data Protection Regulation. And here the proposal is targeted and limited in its scope.
It focuses primarily on the rules governing the processing of operational personal data, mainly under the current Chapter 9 of the EUDPR. The objective with this reform is to streamline the data protection rules that are applicable across Union Justice and Home Affairs bodies, agencies and offices, while preserving specific rules that are applicable to each of them where necessary. The current fragmentation not only undermines legal certainty, but also creates practical obstacles to effective cooperation between Union Justice and Home Affairs bodies, offices and agencies when they are sharing data and they have to comply with a different legal framework for exchange of data. This is also one of the reasons why the proposal is being presented as part of this wider package, which allows to look simultaneously at the data protection framework and the institutional mandates and operational aspects of the Union Justice and Home Affairs bodies, agencies and offices. Among others, the proposal will streamline the EDPS powers in line with the 2022 Europol model, and it will standardize the provisions on international transfers by aligning these transfers with the Law Enforcement Directive.
And finally, let me move on to the European Investigation Order and the targeted amendments that this package is also proposing. The final instrument amended under this package is indeed the European Investigation Order Directive, which now also covers or will cover the European Remote Participation Order. In this case, the revision responds directly to the recommendation arising from the 10th round of mutual evaluations and other relevant stakeholder consultations and introduces a number of carefully targeted improvements to strengthen the effectiveness of the instrument. With this proposal we aim to improve and modernize judicial cooperation in cross-border evidence gathering by clarifying existing rules and addressing operational challenges, and also by adapting the rules to the increasing use of digital tools in criminal investigations, including remote participation by videoconference of suspects, accused persons and victims of crime in criminal court hearings from another Member State. These new rules will definitely help improve access to justice, strengthen procedural rights in the case of remote participation and reduce the need for trials held in absence of the accused while ensuring that criminal proceedings can be conducted efficiently across borders.
I look forward to your views on these proposals and would be pleased to answer any questions or provide further clarifications within the limits of my ability or come back to you if necessary. Thank you very much, Chair.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you very much, Mrs. Gallego, for your presentation. And now we open the round of political groups, starting with EPP, Signora Chinnici. Floor is yours.
Caterina Chinnici
Grazie, Presidente. Grazie, dottoressa Gallego, se pronuncio bene il suo nome, per la sua presentazione che riguarda appunto le modifiche, io mi soffermerò soprattutto su questo aspetto, delle modifiche al regolamento di Eurojust necessarie. Necessarie, dicevo, per rafforzare l'attività dell'agenzia che ricopre un ruolo fondamentale nella cooperazione tra le autorità giudiziarie e ovviamente nella lotta alla criminalità organizzata dentro e fuori, direi, l'Unione Europea. Lei stessa ha fatto riferimento alla valutazione di Eurojust del 2025 fatta dalla Commissione, nella quale appunto viene riconosciuta la importanza della operatività dell'agenzia a fronte di una criminalità organizzata che evolve, ahimè, in termini di complessità, di carattere transnazionale, di attività illecite, ovviamente, soprattutto nel settore economico-finanziario. E allora lei ha fatto già un cenno a queste modifiche che vengono apportate al regolamento dell'agenzia di Eurojust.
Però io le vorrei chiedere, ecco, come concretamente le modifiche al regolamento contribuiranno a potenziare il supporto che Eurojust fornisce sul piano operativo, strategico, logistico, accrescendone il livello di proattività nella risposta alla evoluzione delle minacce poste dalla criminalità grave transnazionale. E ancora le vorrei chiedere come vengono potenziate le capacità analitiche e di investigative in settori specifici che richiedono competenze e specializzazione. E mi riferisco anche a quanto ci è stato detto ieri dal presidente Schmidt, che ha sottolineato la necessità di un tale potenziamento sotto il profilo, appunto, del follow the money, cioè la capacità di ricostruire e di tracciare i flussi finanziari illeciti, perché oggi la criminalità finanziaria organizzata, ahimè, occupa veramente tanto spazio ed è davvero una sorta di impresa criminale globale che opera nel settore finanziario in danno, ovviamente, dei paesi europei e non solo, dell'economia dei paesi europei e non solo. Grazie.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much for that question. Indeed, it touches directly upon the main aim of the proposal, which is to increase the efficiency of the agency and to provide the agency and its national members and the college as a whole with the necessary tools to focus on operational work. And this is why, on the one hand, the governance of the agency will be streamlined in order to allow them to focus on operational work and set aside more administrative or bureaucratic tasks that will be attributed to the management board and a reinforced executive board so that the college can focus on operational capacity and more strategic vision of the operational needs of the agency.
By strengthening the powers of the national members, because they will be able to take measures that will be very important in these cases where chasing the financial flows of very complex financial crimes takes urgent measures and bold action that sometimes is not compatible with the procedures of a coordinating agency. So we will strengthen the powers of the national members so that they can better support Member States in their investigations. And finally, also by increasing the interoperability among the agencies. What you described as one of the indeed most compelling and pressing phenomenon in criminal activity, which is financial crime, requires input from every agency and every actor and stakeholder that can provide input. And here, ensuring that the information coming from all these sources is interoperable and is compatible and is made available to all of them is extremely important.
So the reform aims by these measures, aims at providing this reinforced framework so that they are better equipped to address these criminality challenges, not in isolation, but together with the other agencies and of course, without defeating the purpose of supporting Member States' authorities in their investigations, which is the DNA of Eurojust and will continue to be so.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much. I understand that one of the aims on the Eurojust is to make the agency stronger, even proactive, and I really support this approach. On the other hand, also looking into extended competencies, and you mentioned some of them regarding cyberattacks, GBV and restrictive sanctions. I think this could lead to the necessity to have an update in the use of your technologies, maybe additional staff, maybe different staff with different expertise. So I wonder if with the current foreseen increase in the budget, this will really be enough to serve all these objectives of the agency and the update of the agency.
I also have a concrete question regarding the European Investigation Order to improve and facilitate cross-border gathering of evidence. Could you a little bit elaborate what precisely is foreseen, what changes are foreseen in this area and how we could reach that? I have an open question regarding remote participation of suspects and accused persons in a court case. Because I think it makes a big difference if you are sitting in the room, having a monitor in front of you and you are not aware what is happening in the room with all the other people. So maybe it will not guarantee a fair proceeding if you are there.
I also have the question if that would also be there for the lawyer who will be with me in front of this monitor or the lawyer will be in the room. So I'm not convinced it may facilitate some procedures, but I'm not convinced this will really be in line with fair proceedings. Maybe you can also elaborate on that. And the final question, you mentioned EUDPR. So I'm a little bit confused because I know we are just talking about EUDPR in the digital omnibus.
So obviously in parallel we have another legislation to again make changes in GDPR. How can we do that in a parallel proceeding?
I would like to know how this could work in practical terms. Thank you.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much for these questions, Ms. Sippel. Starting from your first remark on Eurojust capacity, financial capacity to address these challenges, of course this leads us to discuss the next MFF. Of course, under the current MFF the margin is very limited, if not inexistent. But of course we are looking into the possibilities that the next MFF will offer to Eurojust concretely and of course to address these new challenges. To the extent that the next MFF is under negotiation, of course all this is said with a very big caveat, but we have in the Commission proposal identified Eurojust as stable in financial terms, maintaining the same level of resources allocated under the current MFF, but at the same time the financial and digital statement identifies proportionate reinforcements that are needed to allow Eurojust to deliver on its revised mandate.
Of course, the mandate is still to be confirmed and the MFF as well, but we have anticipated this need in the legislative financial and digital statement. And of course part of these needs, which is around 36 million, that's 5.1 million per year of the course of the next MFF, so seven years, would be covered within the EU financial programming through the reallocation of existing resources. That this concerns in particular incorporation into Eurojust regular budget of certain contribution agreements, funding tasks which have become stably embedded into the agency's mandate. But in addition, the proposal identifies around 83 million in total in need on top of the current financial programming. So of course with very big caveat on ongoing negotiations, but always keeping in line with stable financing, but we would like to address of course the needs for Eurojust in the next mandate to fulfill the mandate, to fulfill the new tasks.
Your next question was on EUDPR, if I'm not mistaken. Indeed, the no, it was yes, on European Investigation Order, indeed. Exactly. On the European Investigation Order, indeed I can be a bit more detailed on what is the directive, the proposed directive aiming at and what is it doing. As I said, there are two main objectives: first to fill in the identified gaps in the cross-border gathering of evidence and then to provide common rules for suspects and accused persons to participate remotely.
As for the proposal on the first chapter, it provides, first of all, for procedures for cross-border surveillance for evidence gathering and the use of technical devices like GPS trackers. This has been a long-standing request from national authorities, from Member States, to address this investigative measure and to include it in the European Investigation Order. It also addresses other legal and operational deficiencies to provide for clearer rules on issues where ambiguities have arisen and the Directive remained silent, for example on definitions, on the purposes for which the evidence can be used, and on the form of the European Investigation Order. Cross-border surveillance will be a very important addition to the European acquis on criminal justice, on criminal law, because today it is insufficiently addressed together with the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, but it will be completed and regulated in its entirety in the European Investigation Order. On the remote participation, this is in line with the digitalization of judicial cooperation.
We have been creating consistently a body of provisions and instruments that allow for using digital tools in gathering of evidence and use in criminal proceedings, and remote participation is one of the last measures that was needed. Indeed, as you very well point out, there is a very strong angle to protect procedural safeguards in remote participation. And we have been carefully analyzing how the right to participate remotely in a trial is not in contradiction with the right to physically participate in a trial. So the European remote participation order does not create an obligation for the suspect to attend hearings remotely. There will always be the right for participation physically.
So it fully preserves this right to be present in the court. It's a cooperation instrument between the issuing Member State where the proceedings are taking place and the executing Member State where the person is located and may not have to travel for different reasons to the executing Member State. But of course, the decision to issue the remote participation order remains subject to very strict conditions and, of course, to the assessment of the judicial authority who, of course, from their part, will be attentive to safeguarding the procedural rights of the suspect or accused. And in this regard, a safeguard is the condition that the person concerned needs to give their free and informed consent to participate remotely.
This is key in the architecture of this of this instrument. The consent requirement is essential to ensure full respect for the fundamental rights, including the right to be assisted by a lawyer, of course, and the proposal allows the person to revert in any moment to in-person participation if they so wish. So, so we have grounded the the proposal in established EU acquis on procedural rights and of course reflect the case law of the of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. And of course, to your question on the defense rights, to strengthen defense rights, the proposal indeed requires the presence of a mandated lawyer in the courtroom whenever the suspect or accused person is participating remotely. And of course, the proposal also foresees legal remedies in both the issuing member state and the executing member states that ensure that the procedural safeguards are respected throughout the process.
On on the EUDPR, indeed, the digital omnibus is dealing with some aspects of the GDPR, but when it comes to the EUDPR, which affects the the bodies and institutions and agencies that that we are addressing in this criminal law package, is a lex specialis as you as you know, and it is included in this in this package. But it's a different it's a different scope, it's a different dimension. This is the... Exactly, it's in the context of the Law Enforcement Directive. Here is the the instrument, the provisions applicable to EU institutions and the the place to to address this is the package where the institution the agencies are are being revised.
But in any case, we will ensure the coherence of the two reforms throughout the legislative process. And and there was a last a last question on there was a last question on the... No, I think I addressed all your concerns, Ms. Sippel. Yeah, okay. Thank you very much.
Fabrice Leggeri
Merci Monsieur le Président, merci Madame la Directrice Générale Gallego pour cette présentation de la réforme d'Eurojust. Bon, je crois que c'est encourageant de voir que, comme nous l'a dit le Commissaire Brunner, la DG Justice, enfin le côté justice et le côté affaires intérieures s'efforcent de faire avancer ensemble la réforme d'Europol et la réforme d'Eurojust. Je crois que nous le voyons dans nos États membres également, lorsque la police et la justice ne peuvent pas travailler ensemble correctement, ce sont les citoyens qui sont victimes et malheureusement on le voit bien en France, pays où je suis élu. Alors ma question porte davantage sur le régime des données personnelles opérationnelles, qui est un concept effectivement très intéressant, qui existe et qui montre bien, et je pense que tout le monde l'aura bien compris, que lorsqu'on est en matière de police et de justice, on n'est pas en matière commerciale. Alors ma question porte sur la définition et quel est le degré et quel est le champ d'application de la notion de données personnelles opérationnelles.
Il y avait depuis 2018 trois agences, trois entités de l'Union européenne, Europol, Eurojust et Frontex qui étaient autorisées à collecter et à procéder au traitement de données personnelles opérationnelles dans ce sens-là.
Est-ce qu'aujourd'hui, d'abord, vous allez pouvoir, par cette réforme, faciliter les échanges là où c'est nécessaire entre Frontex et Eurojust, entre Europol et Eurojust ? J'ai compris que c'était l'objectif principal. Mais je pense aussi à la nouvelle agence européenne des douanes qui, peut-être, même si elle n'est pas dans le champ justice, affaires intérieures, va avoir un impact important sur les enquêtes. Et donc je voulais savoir essentiellement quel était le champ d'application, les bénéficiaires, les destinataires de ces données personnelles à caractère opérationnel. Et puis peut-être une dernière question, mais très rapidement, sur la gouvernance nouvelle d'Eurojust.
Vous avez indiqué que vous voulez donner au collège des, disons, plus opérationnels, lui permettre de se concentrer sur ses missions de coopération judiciaire. Est-ce que vous pourriez nous dire en quelques mots quelles seront les autres missions confiées au conseil d'administration et à l'executive board ? Merci beaucoup.
Ana Gallego
Merci beaucoup, Monsieur Leggeri. Let me address your questions in English. Indeed, the notion of operational data, personal data, is key to address criminal investigations. And streamlining this definition and the extension of the UDPR regime on operational personal data to all EU justice and home affairs agencies and bodies is key to ensure interoperability in the use of this data and to ensure that the data coming from all those agencies can be used by all of them and can be streamlined and feed into investigations. So currently, as you know, these agencies operate under a separate data protection regime.
So the proposal aims to extend the regime on operational personal data to all of them, including, by the way, the EPPO, which of course is part of the criminal justice chain when it comes to crimes against the financial interests of the Union. So streamlining this regime into one will allow them to operate under the same set of rules and will allow the operational personal data to flow seamlessly, or more seamlessly than today in any case, between them. This is a precondition to ensure full interoperability in the use of this data by these agencies. So I hope that, and to your question on whether or not the customs agency can also be part of this, of course not for me to address that question today, but indeed it goes in line with the possibility to not leave any blind spots when it comes to the use of data in criminal investigations in the member states. So hope that answers your question.
Then turning to Eurojust governance.
Indeed, the evaluation addressed and identified some governance inefficiencies that in practice could hinder the capacity of Eurojust to operate in a more complex environment than before, than when it started. Twenty-odd years have passed since Eurojust started operations, and not only the agency has grown in capacity, in skills, and in expertise, but it has also become a standing tool for national authorities in an evolving criminal landscape and with more complex investigation challenges. So it has to adapt to this new reality. And the trend observed in practice has been that the college was entangled somehow in not fully efficient procedures that were mostly administrative, and that occupied some work to focus on operational capacity. So we will ensure that the management and administrative decisions are taken by the bodies that are best placed to take those decisions and handle them efficiently.
So we will establish the management board to deal with strategic oversight, budgetary and programming decisions, and only this is expected to generate efficiency gains and strengthen also the involvement of member states in the daily operation of the agency and improve alignment also with EU priorities in line with the common approach. So it will also allow the college to focus on, as I said, on operational capacities and strategic definition of and working with the member states' authorities in addressing and supporting their judicial cooperation needs. But it will also allow them to better cooperate inter-agencies, because when we liberate the college from administrative burden and work, it will be easier also for them to establish strategic cooperation with other agencies, and notably with Europol, because it is very important that the work of both agencies is streamlined.
Assita Kanko
Thank you, chair. Thank you, madam. And I would like to say that ECR strongly welcomes this proposal, of course. It's timely and necessary, especially the willingness to expand Eurojust's mandate to strengthen its involvement in emerging areas of crime, such as cybercrime, the violations of EU restrictive measures, or gender-based violence. Yesterday, I hosted a round table here together with law enforcement people.
Eurojust was present, Europol was also present, and businesses from the private sector who are invested in technology that can help in such cooperation and in tackling this kind of new forms of crime. And what is striking is the level of deepfake, the number of deepfake of criminal activities that are actually supported using AI to manipulate evidence or to make it very difficult for law enforcement but also for judicial cooperation to work on that. So I think with these new types of crimes and the new challenges linked to knowing what is even credible evidence or not, and the new skills that need to be built, the new forms of cooperation and the level of high technology that needs to be involved, this proposal is going to be one of the most challenging and the most exciting. And I'm looking forward to work constructively on that.
I don't have a specific question for you. I'm just looking forward and I welcome this proposal on behalf of ECR group. Thank you.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much, Ms. Kanko, for this for this support. Indeed, we are very much looking forward to to engaging with the co-legislators in this in this negotiations and and we count on on the support of of this house and and the Council as well to to come up with a coherent and and efficient legal framework for addressing the the challenges that you very well described just now and that need to be tackled at at EU level and with all the all the tools at the disposal of the of the agencies and the national authorities to do so in an efficient way. So thanks a lot and looking forward to working with you as well.
Malik Azmani
Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Also thank you very much, Ms. Gallego, for the presentation of this very important proposal for enhancing Eurojust. In the previous mandate, I was the rapporteur on the JIT, and I was also a little bit wondering about the Eurojust mandate expansion so to cover emerging threats. And it's critical to also understand how its operational approach to JITs will evolve. Specifically in the relation to the more proactive role, I would like to ask the following: will Eurojust take also a more proactive stance in initiating or even leading JITs, or will it remain primarily focused on support and coordination of it?
It's not quite clear for me at this moment reading the first the text. And how will this enhanced role complement also Europol's operational role in JITs? And could you tell us more about the growing use of JITs and the accompanying workload? And Ms. Sippel mentioned it also in relation to the MFF, but I was also a little bit wondering what will be the impact for the size of of Eurojust. Is that plus plus 10% or plus 20%?
Are there indications? I was a little bit wondering also on that. The proposal references also the creation of a semi-permanent operational platforms to support JITs. And what will these platforms look like in practice? I was wondering, will they be organized around specific theme priorities, like you mentioned on hybrid threats and gender-based violence and on drugs trafficking, etc.?
Is it more thematic or is it different? And how will they support also the operational cooperation between national authorities? I was also a little bit wondering on the own initiative towards national investigations. How is this streamlined also to prevent, for example, that there's a national investigation and a proactive stance from from Eurojust, and sometimes it could be also not helpful for for clearing the case. Then the I had a question, Mr. Chair, if you allow me, on the on the on the consequences for the systems.
In the JIT proposal in previous mandate, it was also a huge workload for eu-LISA. So what are the effects of this proposal towards the systems and in also in especially, of course, the interconnection between the different systems and how big is that challenge? I was wondering. And then third, maybe the external dimension aspects, as you already mentioned also with investigation with third countries.
I was a little bit wondering how to build also safeguards in that cooperation because, yeah, I don't need to explain a difference of course and with which country, with which regime you are cooperate and how are things protected also in sharing information and sharing the data. Yeah, this for now. Thank you very much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Azmani, for this thorough question. Mrs. Gallego, back to you.
Ana Gallego
Thank you, thank you very much for these, for these very detailed questions. I don't know if I will be able to, to address all your concerns, but of course, we take note of, of some of them and can come back to you. But on your first concern on the JITs and whether or not the national members will have a more proactive stance in, in creating JITs, indeed, with the new set of powers, we want that the national members are able to sign the constitution of a, of a joint investigation team so that it can be done in a, in a very efficient way and if, if there is urgency. Of course, this goes without saying that it doesn't, these more proactive powers of the national members cannot be in contradiction with the fact that Eurojust is a, is a judicial cooperation, is a supporting agency for judicial cooperation and that the investigations are within the national authorities of the member states. So all this has to be, of course, in line with, with the national investigation and supporting this.
But of course, it's important that when the, when the needs arise and, and the cooperation between the national members creates the, the possibility for a JIT, that, that also the national members can have a proactive role and, and indeed intervene, intervene actively on that. It cannot, and your reference to national investigations is, is indeed very spot on because of course, this is done in order to reinforce the capacity of national authorities also to prosecute crime cross-border and to establish connections with other, with other national authorities within the, within the European Union, within the member states, but also with third countries. So it cannot in any, in any way undermine the capacity of national authorities to, to lead their investigations, to, to continue the investigations. On the contrary, it will reinforce the possibility of the capacities of national authorities because of the possibilities that are offered and, and are open to, to them through the cooperation with Eurojust. On, on your question of, on the implications that this has on information systems, indeed this is absolutely very important.
Let me check. Yes, this is, Eurojust participants, participates already in the majority of, of joint investigation teams and this was reinforced indeed by the, by the revisions that we adopted last, last year and the involvement of, of Eurojust is, is linked also to the establishment of the JIT collaboration platform, which is, will be a very important tool in order to allow for the, for the JITs to operate more seamlessly and to incorporate more authorities and, and including of course Eurojust.
As you remember, even in the last in the past years, even third countries have in some cases intervened in in a in a joint investigation team for the first time and and also international courts. So this is this was a very big step and it shows that joint investigation team is an important tool that has to be exploited and has to has to still yield a lot of a lot of possibilities and a lot of of impact. Of course, this creates an an issue on the interconnection of the systems and it is it needs to be addressed and I was mentioning before the need to streamline also and to ensure that the flow of information works works well and the the data gathered by all the agencies and bodies is interoperable so that it can be used. So all this will of course have an impact on the on the capacity of those systems and and it will need to be factored in. Of course, this this reform that we are putting forward right now is not a reform proposed in isolation.
It takes account of the instruments adopted in the past mandate as well and on the whole legal architecture of where Eurojust and the other agencies operate. So it is a challenge as you very well know because technological solutions are always challenging as they as they evolve more rapidly than than we can we can follow. But but it is the coherence of the of all the systems will be ensured. And on the external dimension, just to to finish with your third question, on safeguards, of course, the the international agreements for the cooperation with Eurojust are international agreements that need to first of all follow a mandate from the Council. We will ask the the Council for a mandate on a list of priority countries that have been identified on the basis of on the basis of consultations including with Eurojust but also more broadly on the geopolitical needs and and perspectives.
And and then are negotiated by the Commission on the basis of very strict safeguards that in in when it comes to the protection of the information that will be exchanged with with these third countries. So I would say that in order to safeguard the integrity of of the information that will be will be exchanged to with third countries, first of all, the choice of the of these third countries is is carefully made to to factor in all the all the necessary criteria to to engage with with more with closer cooperation with a third country. And then of course it has to respect the EU acquis when it comes to data protection and privacy and and the use of of this data.
Javier Zarzalejos
Okay. Thank you. We have still two speakers. For the group of the Greens, Madame Bricmont, floor is yours.
Saskia Bricmont
Thank you very much. Thank you for your presentation, Madame Gallego. We really much welcome from the side of the Greens the Europol the Eurojust reform. Lapsus, but wait, I'm coming back to it. The Eurojust reform, this will really help we think to further develop the competencies and activities of the agency.
Of course, judicial cooperation is key to justice and home affairs architecture, but while Europol gets a lot of attention, Eurojust may be sometimes overlooked despite its essential role and crucial importance for police cooperation as well. We just heard from Commissioner Brunner on the Europol reform and he was saying that yes, he would aim with Commissioner McGrath to a balanced budget also for both agencies. So I really much hope, and please convey him the message, that Commissioner McGrath will put all his weight in the negotiations in order to reach that ambition. And in that sense, one key point will also be to mirror Eurojust's and Europol's reforms and resources in order to ensure that judicial cooperation does not lag behind police cooperation. Maybe you can tell us a bit more about this interlink, these connections that are important to understand for us.
We see many welcome changes also in international cooperation, you already touched upon it, but we understand at present that several cooperation agreements have yet to be practically implemented in spite of legal framework being in place. Can you explain us why and how it can be fixed in a near future? And I also share the concern expressed by my colleague on the EU DPR and the parallel legislative procedures going on amending the same law. So even if it's, as you said, on different aspects, nevertheless there are two procedures going on. So we have to make sure, and you have to make sure also, that this process goes well.
Thank you.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much, Chair, and thanks for your question. I'll try to address them briefly, I'm mindful of the time. Indeed, the whole purpose of the reform is to ensure that the criminal justice chain is preserved and that we mirror the capacities and the powers of Europol and Eurojust to the extent possible to the highest degree. Because this is the very purpose of the reform and we do that first of all ensuring interoperability of the data that they can exchange and also by strengthening the mandate of Eurojust to align it further with Europol's and to strengthen also the powers of the national members so that they can have a more proactive role in supporting Member States in criminal investigations. So I would say that that is precisely the whole purpose of the reform and we very much appreciate the support that this stance has in this House.
On international cooperation, indeed, as you know, there was a mandate to negotiate issued by the Council to the Commission for a list of third countries. This mandate has to the extent possible been exhausted because we have addressed the negotiations with a number of Member States and of course in those cases where we cannot go any further is also because of circumstances in the third countries or for different reasons. But we are reflecting again precisely on a new mandate with a renewed, with new countries, new third countries to negotiate.
So so we would continue to to extend the the the network of of Member States of of sorry of third countries with which Eurojust can establish close cooperation based on on an international agreement. And on the on the coherence between the modifications of the Digital Omnibus and the EUDPR, of course they are happening simultaneously, but we are we will ensure the coherence of the of the of the outcome because precisely this they they refer from different angles perhaps to the same to the same instrument, but they they are different in scope and and of course we take note of the need to ensure the coherence of the final outcome. Thanks.
Thank you. Now, Signor Antoci, floor is yours.
Giuseppe Antoci
Grazie Presidente. Grazie grazie per la sua esposizione, dottoressa. Stamattina abbiamo parlato parlando anche di Europol di quanto è importante ovviamente Eurojust per per il coordinamento delle azioni con i Paesi membri e per la lotta anche al crimine organizzato transnazionale. Ho letto alcune parti del regolamento, precisamente la parte in cui si dice che che si può chiedere alle autorità nazionali competenti di avviare indagini o azioni penali per atti specifici o di adottare qualsiasi misura giustificata ai fini di un'indagine e di un'azione penale. Sembra un po' un ampliamento rispetto alla precedente versione.
E poi c'è anche un passaggio dove si parla che nei casi urgenti ci sono alcune possibilità ove il membro nazionale può adottare autonomamente le misure di cui ai vari punti con l'informazione all'autorità competente per poi l'indebito ritardo. Questo unito anche alla all'accesso dei dati dei database, cioè la mia domanda è: siamo sicuri che venga salvaguardata l'autonomia degli Stati membri e soprattutto di strutture che all'interno degli Stati membri, mi riferisco per esempio all'esperienza italiana sulle direzioni nazionali antimafia e sulle procure distrettuali antimafia che sono presenti nel territorio, che non ci siano come dire che non possano nascere fibrillazioni dovute a incomprensioni poi nelle attività da svolgere? Cioè possiamo essere sereni che questa esperienza poi vada avanti attraverso il nostro percorso legislativo e si concluda con uno strumento che sia forte, efficace nell'interesse di tutti e che non crei ovviamente destabilizzazione? Lo dico ovviamente nell'interesse soprattutto di un'agenzia importantissima qual è Eurojust. Quindi ecco la mia domanda serve più a rassicurarci considerato il testo importante e per i quali per il quale comunque faccio i complimenti.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much, grazie per la domanda. Indeed, this this will be ensured because the the ownership of of the data still with with the national authorities is a and and the fact that national members are part of of Eurojust, but they they are also cooperating with national authorities and supporting their investigations requires that that this is ensured.
So of course we have in mind the need to ensure this coherence and to ensure that the integrity of the access to the data and we will see to it that throughout the legislative process this provision remains consistent with this goal. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you Mrs. Gallego for your detailed presentation and the answers you have provided to the questions by members. And we then conclude this point. As you can see all the groups are expressing their will to engage constructively in the discussion of these proposals and we hope that there will be a very positive outcome. And now we move on to our last item on our agenda. We kindly ask Mrs. Gallego to stay with us as we are going to have an exchange with Mrs. Gallego with another important issue for our committee which is the upcoming EU anti-corruption strategy.
This non-legislative initiative is expected to be released by the Commission by December this year. So prevention and fight against corruption is one of the essential tools to uphold EU values and make EU policies more effective. The strategy will therefore aim to take a comprehensive EU approach in combating corruption and is closely connected with other legislative and non-legislative initiatives which are important to our committee such as the implementation of the newly adopted directive on combating corruption, the annual rule of law cycle, EU anti-fraud architecture and the European Democracy Seal. So the Commission is currently carrying out public consultations on this initiative and our committee has natural interest in contributing to shaping this initiative. So I give the floor back to Mrs. Gallego for her initial presentation for up to eight minutes and then we will proceed with the interventions of the groups.
Mrs. Gallego, the floor is yours.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much chair again for giving me the floor and for giving me the opportunity honorable members to exchange views with this committee on the preparation of the forthcoming EU anti-corruption strategy. Indeed you would agree with me that corruption is one of the most serious threats to democracy and the rule of law, our security and the prosperity of our societies.
Javier Zarzalejos
Yes, hold on a second Mrs. Gallego.
Yes, please go on, Mrs. Gallego.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much, Chair. I was, I was saying that corruption is indeed one of the most serious threats to our democracies and the rule of law because it creates the perception that some people are just above the rules, that public resources are wasted and it distorts the competition and also discourages investment in corrupt societies because of the unpredictability of the functioning of the institutions. Corruption undermines public trust, public trust in the functioning of the institutions, in the justice system and in the democratic processes. So trust is very difficult to gain but very easy to lose and very quickly lost and rebuilding it takes a lot, a lot of effort. So corruption has also become an enabler of serious and organised crime.
It feeds in corrupted structures. It is used to gain access to power, to obtain information and shelter illegal activities. And corruption is not only an internal challenge. Hostile foreign actors rely on corruption to advance their strategic interests. Their objective is not only to influence the decision-making but also and even to undermine trust in the democracy itself and the credibility of our societies and the European Union as such, and it feeds and flourishes in this very environment.
This means that in today's geopolitical context, corruption is much more than just a governance issue or a security issue, it's an existential threat. It is a direct challenge to democracy, to the rule of law, security and prosperity. This is why the EU needs a comprehensive and strategic approach closely aligned with the Protect EU strategy, with the European Democracy Shield and the review of the EU anti-fraud architecture, as the Chair very well pointed out in his introductory words. To achieve this, political commitment is indispensable as citizens demand that the political leaders first of all lead by example and then provide consistent rules and responses to corruption. The scope of the strategy will encompass corruption challenges at Member State, at EU and at international level.
It recognises also a whole-of-society approach and this is required to fight corruption because corruption affects all angles of society, from public authorities to law enforcement to civil society actors and media, not just through periodic consultations but through constant engagement. And while the Commission can only commit itself and its own actions, our ambition is that the strategy will help strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability across the board. This is just a stepping stone, this is one initiative but we trust that it will trickle down and have an impact beyond our own actions. The strategy will build on the significant progress that was achieved since 2023 with the joint communication on fighting corruption. Of course, the anti-corruption directive is a major milestone in strengthening the Union's anti-corruption framework and I would like to thank, in particular use the opportunity to thank this committee for the consistent support throughout the legislative process in this file that was successfully adopted recently.
Another significant achievement was the establishment of the European Network against Corruption because the network provides a platform for cooperation which is so important when fighting this complex phenomenon and exchanges experience and sharing of good practices across the Union is very unique.
Looking ahead, the strategy will seek to develop a comprehensive approach against corruption, building on this foundation, on the instruments that I just mentioned, and complementing other tools such as the annual Rule of Law Report, which as you know has a pillar on the progress made by Member States in the anti-corruption area. While it is too early to share details on the substance of the anti-corruption strategy, because we are working and reflecting on this internally, I would like to already give you an overview of some of the topics that the strategy might very likely cover. First of all, prevention. The best way to fight corruption is to avoid it from happening. Corruption prevention is essential to foster a culture of integrity.
It's the only guarantee to prevent corruption. We are reflecting on how best to support the implementation of the preventive provisions of the new directive and complement it with the strategy. We might also explore how to better identify and address sector-specific corruption risks and further support the work of competent authorities in doing so. Another element that will be in that is in our minds when preparing the strategy is repression. Another focus is detection, of course, investigation, prosecution, and asset recovery.
This is the repressive part. When prevention has failed, we have to prosecute corruption by detecting corrupt behaviors, investigating, prosecuting, and eventually recovering the asset. So we will support the transposition of the directive to ensure there are minimum standards for the criminalization of corrupt behavior. As a concealed crime, detection remains one of the greatest challenges. We therefore need very robust systems that encourage reporting and protect whistleblowers, because they are a main source of detection.
At the same time, investigations and prosecutions continue to face significant challenges, particularly in high-level cases. Effective enforcement also requires independent institutions that can act really independently from power, adequate resources that have the capacity and the muscle to exercise their mandates, and the capacity to investigate allegations thoroughly, impartially, and without undue interference. This makes it a priority to continue to support and to reinforce the independent role of the European Public Prosecutor's Office. Equally important is cross-border cooperation. Europol and Eurojust, of which we just discussed the new challenges and the revision of their founding regulations, already play a vital role in facilitating operational and judicial cooperation between Member States and the EPPO, and their contribution will become even more significant as their mandate will be revised and strengthened.
Finally, the strategy will also focus on asset recovery. Citizens expect, and rightly so, that proceeds derived from corruption are identified, are located, confiscated, and returned. Because crime should not pay, and corruption in particular should not pay, because this is the main deterrence to corruption.
The main source of prevention is the certainty that it will not pay in the end because assets will be recovered. The strategy also highlights the international dimension of combating corruption cross-border because corruption does not stay within the EU borders and it uses all international capacities and possibilities to to extend its impact. The European Union has there an important role to play globally in promoting integrity, transparency and accountability. And the focus will range from law enforcement and judicial cooperation to cooperation with enlargement countries or international partners. And of course here the reinforcement of the mandates of Eurojust and Europol will be also key to prosecute corruption also cross-border.
Honorable members, we value the views of this committee also in this and particularly on this topic. LIBE has consistently demonstrated engagement in the fight against corruption and your input will be essential as we shape the next phase of our work. I would therefore be very interested to hear from you. As regards the next steps, my services are continuing to collect input from stakeholders until mid-July. We will then work on the drafting process over the summer with the aim to present the strategy indeed before the end of the year, probably December.
So I look forward to continuing this cooperation and working together to strengthen the integrity, transparency and accountability across the European Union. At this point I'm I'm open to to your comments, not so much to your questions because on content there is not so much to to disclose at this point, but of course your views and and suggestions will be very appreciated. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Gallego, and I'm sure the groups will be willing to provide the input in this process of consultation leading to the release of the strategy next December. So we start EPP, Signora Chinnici, floor is yours.
Caterina Chinnici
Grazie Presidente e grazie di nuovo a lei dottoressa Gallego anche per questa presentazione. Effettivamente la corruzione è una delle principali minacce alle quali siamo sottoposti ahimè perché ha delle conseguenze che si ripercuotono sui bilanci pubblici, sul livello di prestazione dei servizi, sulla libertà di iniziativa economica, ma anche sui diritti dei cittadini, sulla fiducia delle istituzioni. E purtroppo ahimè sempre più spesso la corruzione rappresenta lo strumento direi quasi oggi principale con cui le organizzazioni criminali si infiltrano nelle pubbliche amministrazioni per asservirle ai propri interessi. E allora ecco lei ha toccato diversi aspetti della necessità di intervenire su questo tema. Intanto la prevenzione che è fondamentale.
E allora ecco io vorrei chiederle se può già anticiparci in che modo la strategia intende promuovere una prevenzione efficace. Per esempio si pensa ad una formazione di una cultura anticorruzione tanto a livello nazionale ovviamente quanto a livello europeo. Si prevede la formazione in questo senso del personale delle pubbliche amministrazioni ma anche probabilmente occorrono delle iniziative per accrescere la consapevolezza dei cittadini stessi su quanto in realtà la corruzione vada poi a violare i loro diritti. Poi lei ha toccato un altro aspetto, non possiamo che condividere ma l'aveva già ne aveva già fatto cenno il presidente Zarzalejos.
La strategia anticorruzione non è, non può essere uno strumento a sé, una sorta di monolite, ma deve inserirsi e coordinarsi con tutte le altre iniziative, dallo scudo europeo per la democrazia alla strategia per la sicurezza interna e la revisione dell'architettura antifrode, giusto per fare alcuni esempi. E allora proprio perché, appunto, la corruzione intreccia vari aspetti delle attività criminali. E allora io le chiedo se può già anticiparci come la Commissione intende garantire questo coordinamento, questa cooperazione per rendere efficaci tutte le iniziative nel loro complesso. Poi ancora, e lei già anche a questo ha fatto cenno, in realtà nelle linee guida politiche la presidente von der Leyen aveva già indicato la corruzione come un fenomeno che incide sui fondi europei come area nella quale potrebbero attribuirsi anche maggiori, diciamo, poteri, maggiori competenze alla Procura europea. Anche a questo lei ha fatto cenno, però volevo anche qui chiederle se può darci qualche indicazione in più.
E il recupero dei beni, anche questo è fondamentale perché, e lo dico anche sull'esperienza italiana, recuperare i beni, restituirli alla collettività aiuta a ricostruire la fiducia dei cittadini nei confronti delle istituzioni e far comprendere che l'azione di contrasto alla criminalità organizzata ha una reale concretezza, una realtà. Quindi io la ringrazio intanto per quanto lei ci ha già detto, le chiedo se può darci qualche specifica in più su questi punti e le assicuro la massima collaborazione di questa commissione e ovviamente attraverso il mio lavoro, mia personale. Grazie.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much, signora Chinici, for your support on this and for your questions. Indeed, the prevention will be, as I explained at the beginning of my presentation, a key pillar of the strategy because we believe that the best fight against corruption is to prevent it from happening. And for that, we need a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach. We need coordination at all levels and all the elements that you indeed mentioned: awareness-raising and training and creating a culture of integrity. This is a very subtle approach because it has to trickle down to all levels of government, all levels of society, and all the stakeholders.
And for that, the main instrument will be to, first of all, use the existing structures, and the network against corruption will be an important forum to exchange best practices, to address common challenges, because of course, when exchanging on the challenges that national authorities face and public authorities face, they can learn from each other and to coordinate internally the responses that are most effective. So creating awareness and fostering a culture of integrity will be key because this is a very specific type of criminal activity that feeds in an environment, in an enabling culture that doesn't condemn corruption enough. So condemning corruption from every angle of the government and society is indeed crucial to deter the crime itself. Of course, engaging with civil society will also be an important part of the strategy because they are the watchdogs, they are the stakeholders that remain independently monitoring the functioning of the anti-corruption structures in their respective countries and societies, and they are the voice of the society that claims for bigger engagement against corruption.
As we have mentioned at the beginning, there are instruments already in place that have to be brought together, and the strategy is precisely the tool to bring all these tools together, of which the Rule of Law Report is a very important element because indeed it reflects the dynamic evolution, it's a dynamic photography of the situation of the different Member States in their effort to fight corruption. So this yearly exercise brings important evidence of what the Member States are doing. On access to funds, very quickly, indeed, as you very well know, on the negotiations of the MFF, an important part of the proposal of the Commission is indeed to embed the conditionality on Rule of Law, and of course corruption is an integral part of this into access to funds, so it will be of course very important to keep in mind. And on asset recovery, I can agree more with you on the need to ensure effective recovery.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much. We heard a lot of very nice storytelling, and we all agree that corruption is endangering our society, not only the budget. We also know that corruption very often is linked to other forms of crimes like money laundering and many other things, and I totally agree that in addition to investigation, of course, prevention is very important. And we have to be aware that all the different forms of corruption on a lower level, on a big level, can be found everywhere, not only in all of our Member States, also in institutions, authorities, in private companies. Having said this, yes, it's very often civil society organizations, investigative journalists, whistleblowers who are aware about this and try to inform.
But it's also true that at the same time one could get the impression that not everybody is interested to fight back corruption because the same people, NGOs, journalists, whistleblowers are under threat. They may lose their job. They take away money. So I think we have a double fight here against corruption, but also against destroying civil society, and only a strong civil society is a resilient society against corruption but also against other forms of crimes. So I hope that we can create all together a strategy that is really working, that we can spread all the awareness-raising information, the promotion, and that we also can encourage and strengthen all those actors who are willing to be focused, to be aware, and also to report back when they believe things are going wrong.
So it's not that much a question, but I would like to encourage everybody to do his or her own part to make the strategy work.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much, Mrs. Sippel. Indeed, I cannot agree more on the crucial role that civil society plays in the fight against corruption and the need to address the threats and the challenges they face in fulfilling this role. So, just to mention a few tools that we have put in place in order to address this, the anti-SLAPP directive aims exactly at curtailing one of these strategies of silencing the voices of journalists and activists that, among others, are fighting and identifying corrupt behaviors. And then this goes, of course, together with strengthening civil society as such. And the civil society strategy aims precisely at enabling civil society organizations to operate in an environment that allows them to fulfill this important role.
So, thank you very much for that suggestion, for that support, and we will include, of course, this angle in the anti-corruption strategy as well.
Jorge Buxadé Villalba
I would like speak Spanish. Muchísimas gracias por la presentación. En mi opinión, no necesitamos ninguna estrategia europea de luchar contra la corrupción. Lo que necesitamos son políticos decentes. Y para que haya políticos decentes, los políticos indecentes tienen que estar en prisión y mucho tiempo.
Mal empieza esta estrategia si se basa en una directiva como la que aprobó aquí la coalición Von der Leyen, que permite indultar y amnistiar a los políticos corruptos por parte de los políticos corruptos. Evidentemente, el futuro no es muy bueno. Una directiva que permite no considerar delito de malversación coger el dinero público destinado a un fin como la sanidad, la seguridad, la defensa o las infraestructuras y desviarlo a los bolsillos de terceros. Miren, en España en poco más de tres meses, condenado el fiscal general del Estado por revelación de secretos. Condenado el ministro de Transportes, secretario de organización del Partido Socialista, mano derecha de Pedro Sánchez, a 24 años de prisión por cohecho, tráfico de influencias y pertenencia a organización criminal.
El hermano de Sánchez pendiente de sentencia por delitos de corrupción. La mujer de Sánchez pendiente de juicio por delitos de corrupción. Decenas de cargos del Partido Socialista y del Gobierno en más de 15 causas judiciales. ¿Qué estrategia evita esto? ¿Qué estrategia evita que un cuando un gobierno como el de P.S. Pedro Sánchez en España se ve acorralado por la corrupción y promueve una red de extorsión y desestabilización de las causas judiciales atacando a jueces, a fiscales, a periodistas, a guardias civiles, policías y a la propia oposición?
No hay más estrategia que perseguir al corrupto hasta el final y lo siento, no hemos oído a nadie decir nada aquí en Bruselas. Lo lamento. Lo lamento mucho y lo lamentan millones de españoles. Quizá porque hay que esconder el Qatargate o el Moroccogate o el Huaweigate. Hay que esconder que dos comisarios son perseguidos por la justicia belga, que decenas de diputados están encausados y que los grupos políticos solo se movilizan para pedir a los otros diputados que no voten a favor de levantar la impunidad, la inmunidad cuando afecta a alguien de su propio grupo político.
Lo dicho, menos planes y más políticos decentes. Yo incluso le ofrezco dos ideas para esa estrategia.
Una, que se promueva la responsabilidad civil de los partidos políticos por los delitos cometidos por sus afiliados en el ejercicio del cargo. Si se cogiese por parte de un juez la sede del Partido Socialista en Ferraz y se vendiese en subasta pública para pagar las responsabilidades civiles, quizá alguien en ese partido empezaría a poner un poquito de orden. Y en segundo lugar, que seamos muy cuidadosos porque ayer se o anteayer se aprobó la propuesta de euro digital aquí en la Comisión de Economía del Parlamento Europeo y se rebajan las exigencias para el control de la lucha contra el terrorismo y el blanqueo de capitales si quienes adquieren euro digital son asilados o inmigrantes ilegales. Seamos un poco serios. Si luchamos contra la corrupción, luchemos también aquí.
Gracias.
Ana Gallego
Well, thank you very much for your question. Let me refer very briefly to to the to what the strategy will will do to raise awareness and and bring together all the tools. As I have just said, of course, I won't comment on particular cases or on the need to indeed fight corruption at at national level through the appropriate means and all that the the anti-corruption strategy and all the tools that we put forward to to provide with the necessary tools to to national authorities aimed at that that very end. So, the the implications of the the strategy will build on the directive, on the anti-corruption directive that provides a solid and robust legal framework to to provide for a harmonized approach in all Member States in the fight against corruption. And of course, the operation of of investigators and and investigating judges and and law enforcement will be strengthened by this by the legal framework first of all.
And then the strategy aims at fostering this culture of integrity rather than implementing the directive. It will build on the directive but but not not legislate because it's a non-legislative a non-legislative instrument. But thanks for your suggestions in any case.
Mariusz Kamiński
I will speak Polish. Szanowna pani dyrektor, niedawno zakończyliśmy prace nad dyrektywą antykorupcyjną. Po kilku latach prac przyjęto mało ambitny dokument. Dyrektywa z całą pewnością nie będzie żadnym przełomem w zwalczaniu korupcji. Podstawowym brakiem dyrektywy jest to, że nie odnosi się ona do instytucji unijnych, tak jakby problemu korupcji w tych instytucjach nie było.
A jest wręcz przeciwnie. Co chwila europejska opinia publiczna wstrząsana jest korupcyjnymi skandalami z udziałem czołowych unijnych polityków i urzędników. Mamy nierozwiązaną aferę Qatargate, w której pojawiają się ciągle nowe wątki. W tych dniach dowiedzieliśmy się, że belgijscy śledczy chcą w tej sprawie aresztować byłego komisarza Avramopoulosa. Mamy haniebną aferę byłego komisarza do spraw sprawiedliwości Reyndersa, oskarżonego o pranie brudnych pieniędzy, do czego miało dochodzić w okresie pełnienia przez niego funkcji w Komisji Europejskiej.
Mamy sprawę korupcyjną byłej wysokiej przedstawiciel Mogherini, aferę Huawei. Jestem przekonany, że obywatele Unii Europejskiej mają dość tej degrengolady i oczekują zdecydowanych działań antykorupcyjnych. W tym kontekście chcę zapytać, czy przygotowując strategię antykorupcyjną, Komisja zleciła badania europejskiej opinii publicznej dotyczące postrzegania korupcji w instytucjach unijnych? Takie badania Komisja systematycznie zleca w ramach Eurobarometru w odniesieniu do korupcji na poziomie krajowym, regionalnym i lokalnym. A od 2017 roku przestała pytać Europejczyków o postrzeganie korupcji w instytucjach unijnych.
Dlaczego tak się dzieje? Pytałem o to komisarza McGraffa, nie potrafił odpowiedzieć. Instytucje unijne potrzebują wprowadzenia nowych, twardych mechanizmów antykorupcyjnych. Strategia powinna przewidywać wprowadzenie obowiązkowych, składanych pod odpowiedzialnością karną, jawnych oświadczeń majątkowych. Wysocy urzędnicy muszą ujawniać swój stan majątkowy i źródła jego pochodzenia.
Dzisiejsze deklaracje o braku konfliktu interesów składane przez komisarzy są absolutnie niewystarczające. Należy uderzyć w nielegalny lobbing, wyeliminować zjawisko drzwi obrotowych. Pani dyrektor, czy strategia antykorupcyjna przygotowana przez Komisję zajmie się tymi sprawami? Czy strategia w ogóle zajmie się korupcją w instytucjach unijnych?
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much, Mr. Kamiński, for your questions. And indeed, the threat that represents corruption affects also is a threat also to EU institutions. This is clear. We need to continually ensure that there is a solid framework in place to prevent corruption and to ensure integrity and to foster this same culture of integrity also among the EU institutions. We've we have a solid framework in place to prevent and detect irregularities, and indeed those cases only show that there is the is evidence of an overall working system.
We have to, of course, look at the gaps and address the remaining gaps, but but at the same time, we are in touch with all EU institutions and stakeholders to to collect their views. Indeed, as you say, the directive cannot address EU institutions, but the strategy will look into integrity also and fighting corruption within EU institutions. That it is part of the of the overall problem and of course it will not be overlooked in the strategy. To your question on whether there is a survey on the perception among citizens of corruption in EU institutions, traditionally the Eurobarometer does not include this this aspect because citizens are less exposed to direct contact with EU institutions. But of course, the impact assessment that that that led to the to the directive conducted a thorough analysis and assessment of the overall situation.
So of course, we will look into in the strategy to the phenomenon in its complexity and address this address all these these matters from a non-legislative perspective, of course. So lobbying, revolving doors, etc. are expressions of potentially corrupt behavior and and can be covered by the strategy, but from a non-legislative perspective. That's part of a different process.
Thank you.
Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle
Gracias, presidente. Gracias, señora Gallego. I will speak in English as you are also replying in English today. I just noticed, or someone told me, that there was a bachelor party coming into the room. Maybe we could have some entertainment at some point here.
I would like to give a compliment to Mr. Kamiński because I think that all of his points were very valid. And I know, I know that we have had disagreements about the level of ambition of the anti-corruption directive. I'm very grateful that he voted in favor at the end. And I think that that's a good start to keep working together because I do believe that the Eurobarometer should cover EU institutions. I don't agree with the analysis that citizens are less exposed to what happens in Brussels, in Strasbourg, in our institutions.
As a matter of fact, I think that it's really bad that when they're exposed to it, it's often because it's because a corruption case. And that has hurt trust in our institutions a lot. That is what I hear from citizens in different throughout the throughout the Union, in different member states. So I really would encourage to follow this idea and include this as a question, not to leave aside other questions about corruption perceptions in their own countries, not instead of, but as an addition to. I also agree that the issue of illegal or illicit party financing is something which unfortunately, because of the legal base, we could not include in the directive.
But I do think that that is something that should be addressed properly. And I understand that there are no common rules for party financing throughout the European Union, and that's why we cannot harmonize criminal measures. But I think that that is the next step because to me, that's the mother of all problems, is what happens with illegal party financing and aside from personal enrichment. So I would hope that the strategy addresses the possibilities that we have there. And if we look at the whole-of-society approach, I also think that we should pair this with an all-of-institutions and all-of-agencies approach.
So I'm trying to connect the dots here. Of course, we have the implementation provisions of the anti-corruption directive. Those have to do with the implementation in member states. I would also encourage the Commission indeed to look at sector-specific recommendations. You will see that, for example, in the Netherlands, where people have or institutions have the perception that corruption might not be such a big problem as in other member states, but we do have sectors which are very big and very sensitive to corruption.
Think, for example, of the healthcare sector. That has been established in reports of the Commission. So it's very good that the Commission informs member states proactively about which sectors in your specific countries are more sensitive to corruption. I would definitely encourage that. Then when we come to repression, then we have the role of Europol.
Europol, according to the new mandate which has been presented today, just just before, it still doesn't have the right of initiative. And and to be honest, I think that in corruption cases, that might be a problem because we do see that national police agencies sometimes react to political instructions. And it's very good when we have something above them which can surpass that political interference. So I would encourage also to see what the limits are there, particularly in high-level cases. And then when it comes to EPPO, we do see some member states at the moment, as we speak, trying to to tamper with the mandate of EPPO and with the application of EPPO.
I would encourage the Commission not to wait to the next rule of law report, but also to take immediate action when that happens. And and lastly, sorry, OLAF, don't forget the role in asset recovery.
Ana Gallego
Thank you very much, Ms. García Hermida, for for these questions. Indeed, note-taking of the your suggestion to include the this in the Eurobarometer.
So far it has indeed a national focus on national level, but that doesn't mean that the perception of the citizens towards EU institutions is not important. Sometimes it's often ambiguous, but we definitely have to pay attention to that. On the sector-specific corruption, indeed, we are looking into that for the strategy. This is a very important element and we would foster a study on risks in sector-specific areas that are more vulnerable to corrupt activities. On the role of Europol, EPPO and OLAF, of course, this is the good moment to discuss all this because we are not only revising the mandates and powers of Eurojust and Europol now, but there will be also a revision of the regulation of EPPO and OLAF where of course the question of the role of OLAF in asset recovery is very much present and how to streamline and to reinforce, mutually reinforce both the functioning of both bodies because they can work to mutually reinforce each other and of course use all the tools at our disposal to strengthen our capacities to fight corruption and to address corrupt behaviors.
Of course, the illegal party financing, note taking of this observation, it is indeed a very present, unfortunately very compelling element in the fight against corruption because it is very often the aim of corrupt activities when it touches public authorities, namely high-level corruption. So, very good points and of course all this is in our minds and will be followed up as well in the elaboration of the strategy. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Well, we have exhausted the agenda we have for this committee meeting. We do thank Mrs. Gallego for the input. We look forward to having the anti-corruption strategy and there will be the opportunity to discuss the concrete terms of that strategy. I hope that all the comments made by groups will be useful in this process of consultation that you have.
And so the meeting is, our session is concluded and committee will reconvene on the 13th and 14th of July. Thank you.