Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting
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SEDE European Parliament
Ihren Sitzungen folgenMarie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstention? Rejected. Amendment eight.
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstention? Rejected. Amendment nine, who is in favor?
Against? Abstention? Rejected. Amendment 10. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstention? Rejected. Amendment 16. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstention? Rejected. Amendment 17. Who is in favor?
Against? Abstention? Rejected. Amendment 18. Who is in favor?
Against? Abstention? Rejected. Amendment 19, who is in favor? Who is against?
Abstention? Adopted. Amendment 20, who is in favor? Against? Abstention?
Adopted. Amendment 21, who is in favor? Against? Abstention? Adopted.
Many thanks. This was the next round. Just a minute. Step by step. So, colleagues, let's now proceed to the vote on the draft opinion in the form of a letter.
This is a single roll call vote and the vote is open. And the vote is... I know. Okay, then the vote is closed. Okay, we have 26 for, seven against, and five abstention, so the vote is adopted.
So, congratulations and thank you very much. So, dear colleagues, the next point on the agenda is the exchange of views on the role and priorities of Geneva Call. And now our guests are coming.
Okay, dear colleagues, please take a seat again. Be so polite, we are here. And maybe there is somebody we could see his back. It's a nice one, without no doubt. Excuse me.
Okay. Dear colleagues, the next point on the agenda is the exchange of views on the role and priorities of Geneva Call. It's my pleasure to welcome Monsieur Alain Deletr3z, Director General, and Mr. Artie Hamed, Director of Operations of Geneva Call. Geneva Call works for many years to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict. What makes it works particularly interesting is that in promoting international humanitarian law, Geneva Call engage with armed groups and de facto authorities.
Mr. Délétroz and Mr. Hameed, we would be interest to hear more about your work, in particular about its experience of engage, engaging with such actors, including the challenge and opportunities this entails. Given Geneva Call's presence in crisis areas, we would also welcome our, your assessment of how the nature of conflict is evolving and your insights on the impact of new methods of warfare on the protection of civilians would also be welcome. So, the floor is yours for fifteen minutes, Mr. Délétroz.
Alain Délétroz
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It's a pleasure for me to be here. It's a pleasure to and an honor to be invited to speak into this chamber and to give a field perspective of all the conflicts and the armed conflicts that we can witness today in the world. Let me start maybe with the point underpinning Geneva Call's 2024-27 strategy. Conflict is changing and with it the security environment in which Europe operates.
We see increasingly fragmented and protracted conflicts with armed groups and de facto authorities, the acronym for us is AGDA, armed group de facto authorities, exercising growing control or influence over civilian populations, alongside a wider range of security actors, including private military and security companies. And climate change and competition for increasingly scarce resources, such as grazing land as we can see in the Sahel or water, are also becoming significant conflict multipliers, particularly in the hard-to-reach areas where Geneva Call works. Today around 204 million people live in areas where armed groups have either full or contested control. 30 million more than in 2021. And 81% of these groups have held territory for four years or more.
How to prevent armed groups from gaining influence is a question for states and obviously also for the EU. Geneva Call's work on a very practical issue: to protect civilians already living under the control of these groups. Our role is to engage those who exercise it and influence the best we can their behavior. We see six interconnected trends. First, warfare is increasingly urbanized.
Second, the boundaries between armed groups and communities are more and more blurred. Third, military and political objectives are increasingly intertwined. Four, armed groups and de facto authorities are multiplying and diversifying. A wider range of actors is shaping the security environment.
And fifth, conflicts are increasingly regionalized and cross-border. At the same time, new technologies are changing the character and geography of warfare. Drones, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence are becoming increasingly accessible beyond states, changing who can exercise military power, how quickly conflicts can escalate, and the risks faced by civilians and international actors. The entry barrier to aerial warfare has clearly collapsed. Armed groups now acquire strike capacity off the shelf, sometimes faster than states, and the frontline moves closer to civilian life.
These are not only humanitarian trends. These are security trends, increasingly central to the EU's own agenda, from the EU's common security and defense policy and early warning to hybrid threats, defense readiness, and new systems of warfare. The growing interaction between state and non-state actors, political influence, territorial control, and military capabilities also makes the distinction between conventional and hybrid threats more complex. This is where Geneva Call has a specific contribution. We engage these armed groups, mainly those that affect civilian security, through sustained and principled dialogue.
Let me underline that we do not legitimize them, negotiate any of their political status, or replace diplomacy, mediation, or military engagement. In 2025, for instance, we engaged 186 armed groups and de facto provisional authorities, trained more than 6,500 of their commanders on international humanitarian law and their obligations as weapon carriers to protect civilians in the areas where they're fighting. We mobilized 126 local NGOs and secured from armed groups or de facto authorities 15 signed public commitments to protect civilians. Our capacity building is not about military effectiveness, it is about translating international humanitarian law and human rights law into behavior, including, for example, guidance to how you use the drones and what kind of international humanitarian law components you have to keep in mind when you're using a drone. But our principal asset is not the numbers, it is the sustained access and trust that we have to build with actors considered extremely difficult to reach.
This can complement diplomatic, political, and military assessment with insight into who has influence, how relationships are changing, and where risks or opportunities for de-escalation lie. Reducing the scale of disruption at source is also a far less costly investment than addressing the humanitarian regional instability effects once they spill over. For the EU and its actions, it is particularly important to understand who actually exercise influence on the ground. It is also relevant for the EU's integrated approach to external conflicts and crises and to the implementation of CSDP, where such insight can strengthen early warning, operational planning, and the assessments of risks and opportunities on the ground.
Finally, we would underline that Geneva Call teams on the ground are open to direct exchanges to you when you have delegations of this committee visiting these zones of conflict where we work. This this could provide a complementary perspective on local security dynamics and actors who may not feature feature in normal security dynamics or structures. Thank you so much. Let me now ask Atif Hamed, who is our director of operations, to illustrate what I said with a few concrete field examples. Atif, please.
Atif Hameed
Thank you, Alain. Excellencies, ladies, gentlemen, and friends. I will start with a very concrete example of what this engagement that Alain has elaborated can mean on the ground. As you all know that Sudan is in the middle of atrocious war for last few years. So earlier this year in Sudan, having a sustained engagement by Geneva Call helped secure the security guarantees that enabled a UN aid convoy to travel through routes that were previously considered highly dangerous, and the convoys managed to reach around 130,000 highly vulnerable people, especially in the areas of Kordofan, which is still in the middle of warfare.
And this kind of significance at this scale is quite marvelous. It's not only humanitarian, it has a lot of engagement and dialogue and negotiation. Based on that, I would like to say that in fragmented conflicts, access to civilians depends on security relationships. Geneva Call engages those exercising influence on the ground. We build trust and negotiate the conditions for safe passage on sustainable basis.
This clearly demonstrates that civilian protection and security are not separate agendas. In this background, in fact, a changing security condition for civilians can begin with a dialogue with those who control the territory through which people and assistance must move. I will further delve on how this plays out across some of the other environments in which Geneva Call operate. In the context of Middle East, where the current theater of war showcases that how rapidly evolving security dynamics can move across borders. Geneva Call does not work in Iran itself, but we work with armed groups and de facto authorities and communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, giving us a very unique perspective on how regional confrontations translates into local security security dynamics.
For example, Lebanon is particularly illustrative, the way things have been happening for last few years, given the confrontation involving Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran, and the wider question of armed actors' role in Lebanon's security architecture. Our engagement does not stop with armed groups' leadership or their respective commanders on the ground. We also work through trusted community and religious actors who can influence the behavior and help create spaces for civilian protection. These local channels can be important for containing escalation and maintaining safer humanitarian access. In the case of Iraq, which portrays a different challenge with multi-layered security structures on the ground, combining formal state institutions with armed actors holding significant political, military, and social influences, Geneva Call engages these actors on civilian protection and humanitarian access, as well as safer and dignified return and reintegration of the displaced populations within Iraq and outside Iraq, as well as including practical measures to ease checkpoints and remove barricades, military barricades, which is highly complementing the the work of the European Union's advisory mission in Iraq.
And basically they work with the security institutions, but Geneva Call, we engage by maintaining dialogue with actors outside those structures who nevertheless also influence the whole security environment. In the case of Syria, which has been very much in the news for last few years, it clearly shows that why security analysis cannot stop when the nature of a conflict changes. Geneva Call's long-term engagement with Syrian armed actors demonstrated the value of building relationships before a major transition. During the fall of the Assad regime, previously engaged armed groups by Geneva Call categorically referred to international humanitarian law and the protection of prisoners and civilian infrastructures when they were on the move to capture Damascus. The lesson is that sustained relationships can become operationally relevant when circumstances change rapidly, including when such armed actors enter into political or security architectures.
Well, in the case of Sudan, where I started with an example, also illustrates the wider challenge of territorial control. For example, armed actors can act not only as combatants, but in certain cases where the armed actors are holding specific territories, they also act as a security providers and gatekeepers, which is sometimes also a challenge. Conflict control of roads, checkpoints and territory can determine whether humanitarian organization can reach civilians. Geneva Call in essence therefore combines dialogue with communities, armed actors, local leaders with a specific focus on international humanitarian law engagement and humanitarian access negotiations. Sahel, where the whole scale of dynamics is quite critical, it presents yet another dynamic where protracted insecurity is embedded in everyday's life of the civilians.
Geneva Call engages armed groups on practical civilian protection issues, including child protection, education and the distinction between civilians and combatants, while working with communities and local actors to strengthen protection and social cohesion. Lastly, I would like to say that armed actors are adopting drones faster than states, and artificial intelligence will follow the same suit. Yet the regulatory conversation is being built almost entirely around state militaries, which is not where the risk sits in the conflict where we operate. On this note, I will now return the floor to the Director General.
Alain Délétroz
Thank you very much Atif. To conclude that, I would have four recommendations for this committee. The first one is obvious and I know you already do it, but it's always good to repeat: integrate the problematic of armed groups and de facto authorities into the EU conflict analysis, early warning and CSDP planning. The second is to operationalize international humanitarian law and the law of human rights through the EU's human rights and international humanitarian law due diligence policy, common security and defense policy and the European Peace Facility through risk assessment, monitoring and accountability. The third recommendation is in my view central because of the issues that you just heard, how things move quickly and ignore all state borders.
Make better use of humanitarian diplomacy and sustained field-level engagement as practical tools to reduce civilian harm, facilitate humanitarian access and contribute to sustainable security. This should be supported by substantial and flexible funding in the next MFF for conflict prevention, civilian protection and principled engagement, ensuring that the peace component of the humanitarian development peace nexus does not become residual. Funding should allow sufficient flexibility to seize preventive opportunities as they arise. And the last one, ensure that Europe's development of drones, counter-drone and AI capabilities incorporate civilian protection and IHL requirements for the design stage.
Thank you very much for your attention, for the time given for us. On the 5th of October, we will organize next door with the Swiss mission also a discussion on protecting civilians through inclusive engagement in the area of high-tech warfare, particularly with inputs from our teams in Ukraine, as you can guess. Thank you, Mrs. Chair.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. Good to know, the 5th of October, the whole day?
In the afternoon.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
In the afternoon. Okay, but we could inform the colleagues that... Okay, that's good. So, I will now give the floor to the members for a first round of questions, starting with the coordinators in a ping-pong format, so you have the possibility to answer immediately. I will give two minutes for questions, two minutes for each reply, and we start with Nicolas Pascual de la Parte from EPP.
The floor is yours.
Nicolás Pascual de la Parte
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you very much, Mr. Deletroz and Mr. Hamed, for your very interesting insight in the operations and priorities of Geneva Call. I think that now that we are witnessing a general disregard of international law in all the conflicts, now that we are seeing a violation of human rights in international relations, which are not based anymore on rules shared by everybody, now that we see that we are weaponizing our international relations and diplomatic relations, it's more needed than ever associations and organizations as yours, as Geneva Call. I think that you are doing a pretty important and commendable role. You are doing something that many should be doing.
You are protecting civilians in conflicts, you are fostering dialogue without any kind of proper agenda, private agenda, I mean. You are trying to factor in human rights and international law in conflict prevention and crisis management. And you are trying to live up to the expectations in the new nature of conflicts, which incorporate artificial intelligence, drones, unmanned vehicles, and artificial intelligence, and how to factor humanitarian law, international humanitarian and human rights in this. I think that here we can have a landing pad for both of us to engage with you and you with us on a regular basis. I think that I have taken good note of your recommendations, Mr. Deletroz.
It coincides very much indeed with the spirit and the doctrine of this committee. And I think that we can cooperate closely in the future. And I only urge you please to continue doing your job and to keep in contact on a regular basis with this committee. Thank you very much.
Alain Délétroz
Thank you, Mr. Pascual de la Parte, for these strong words. Indeed, I think that the fact that states right now, if you look at the states' army fighting in the world, states are showing an incredibly low level of respect for international humanitarian law. And I will not hide to you that the fact that states and official armies misbehave will not, will indeed is making our work more difficult. But this is why we appeal to the local culture. And as you are representative of Spain here, I'm happy to tell you that we are working closely with the Spanish mission in Geneva to have a discussion on this at the next UNGA in New York in September.
Thank you so much.
Sven Mikser
Thank you very much. Sven Mikser, S&D.
Yes, thank you, thank you very much for the presentation. A couple of questions. First, on the new technologies. We hear a lot about the possibilities of the use of AI in minimizing potentially collateral damage and humanitarian destruction by precision strikes and everything.
But on the other hand, obviously the use of artificial intelligence and remotely controlled systems also lowers the threshold of intervention and leads to sort of gamification of war. What is the general trend in your observation? Is it making things better or worse for you? Secondly, I understand that over 90% of your funding comes from public sources. How do you sort of protect your political independence in such a situation as a humanitarian actor?
Thirdly, you have spoken about non-state actors and armed groups, but we know that some of the armed conflicts that lead to most devastating consequences for civilian populations are actually perpetrated by state actors. I'm mostly talking about the situation in Gaza, for example. How do you work with these in these situations, if you do at all? And fourthly and finally, I read with some surprise from your annual report of 2023 that you carried out in 2023 nearly 100 targeted and adapted training sessions for 2,000 combatants on both sides in Ukraine. How did that, is it something that you are still continuing to do?
What was the experience and how did you manage to work on both sides of the battle lines in that situation, potentially also in other similar situations? Thank you.
Alain Délétroz
Thank you so much, very important questions. First, the easiest is on funding. 100% of Geneva Call's funding is coming from Europe. The biggest donor is you, the European Union, then EU member states, then you know the usual suspect, of course Switzerland as we are Swiss, the Norwegians and others. None of these governments, none of the Commission members have ever tackled us politically on what we do.
There was one case with one armed group where the donor, not the EU but a concrete European government, was nervous that it would come out in their public opinion, in their press, the fact that they are funding Geneva Call to engage a group which is behaving very badly. And from the 186 that we are engaging right now, I can tell you this group is not changing behavior, but we are not dropping, we're still trying. So there is for funding. Now for, I will go to Ukraine and Atif maybe Middle East and the influence of Gaza. Indeed, you know, all the commanders open their TV in the evening, they see Gaza and they tackle us on that.
I will leave Atif to that. On Ukraine, at the beginning of the conflict, we were on the two sides. On the Ukrainian side, we were working with these self-defense groups like Azov, the most well-known, Kraken around the city of Kharkiv, Pravyi Sektor in the area of Dnipro. And on the other side, if you remember, Luhansk and Donetsk were self-proclaimed republics. So they had their own troops.
For us, they were clearly in our mission. They were what we call de facto authorities and we were able to engage them and to have a series of approaches on IHL exclusively for them. The Russian army, the Russian military, as you understand, is not our mission, right? On the Russian side, we wrapped up our work at the end of 2024 as, you know, Putin declared that these territories would now be part of the Russian Federation.
Authorities there, but they all moved into the Russian army. On the Ukrainian side, at the beginning of the full-fledged invasion in 2022, President Zelenskyy incorporated in the army all the groups that we were engaging, that I named. But they, they asked us to continue working with them because they wanted them to to still be able to work as battalions having their own ideology and, you know, recruiting. So it was a bit of an exception for us because de jure this they are not groups anymore, they are they are battalions of the Ukrainian army and it is clear if they commit any crimes, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will be responsible for that. But it was an exception they asked us to continue and we have continued and we are we are pretty happy with the results.
There is on that part of the frontline a very clear, I would say, at least these new battalions that were former self-defense groups, at the level of the commanders there is a clear will to avoid any war crimes. And this is there where we have first started working on drones. On drones, the first work we did was what we call first first-person view, that is a drone going, but the guy making the decision to kill with the drone is still a human. Now the next stage is AI, when you have drones with AI on it, which creates absolutely new ethical questions here. And you've probably seen last week, the Secretary-General of the UN and the the President of the ICRC made an appeal to stop this, not to give to artificial intelligence the power and the decision-making to kill a human.
This is a new complete new area for all of us. What happened to us in Ukraine, we've been very much capable of advancing on integrating IHL into the the way the drones are being used. But what surprised us this year in 2024 as we speak is how quickly many of our other, if I can say, customers, particularly in the Sahel, have been already using drones and how quickly the use of drones has spread across the globe. So this is for us a new challenge. We are adapting for the other regions what we do in Ukraine.
On Gaza, please Atif.
Atif Hameed
Just on drones, in terms of the impact of drones on the civilians. Definitely in Ukraine the the warfare is quite high-tech, but when you go to Africa or other locations, it's not that high-tech. They are still, I would say that, armed actors and other forces, they still get drones in different parts. They assemble it, then they use it. But the main issue comes when it comes to the element of distinction, that where the civilians and the armed actors, sometimes the armed actors find safe spaces in in the vicinity of the communities.
So when the opposite forces they try to hit the armed actor, the civilians becomes a kind of a collateral damage. This is where we have observed that most of the damage comes to the civilians where armed actors if are if are close to the vicinity of where the civilians are, or the other side from the government side as well. And the second element is that when the drones are massively used, a lot of reports comes about the debris that they fall on different infrastructure. But the important thing is that earlier if the drones used to be like one or ten drones, but now it is 50 to 100 drones, which creates a state of fear and panic among the civilians. So this is where the things are happening and developing.
When it comes to the Gaza, definitely like that war changed the whole dynamics in the Middle East. It started in Gaza, but we saw what happened in Lebanon, in Syria, in Iraq, things happening in Yemen. We were questioned a lot that if the state actors are not fully respecting provisions of international humanitarian law, why the armed groups should respond to that, why they should respect it. It's a difficult question. Basically they said, oh, why first talk to them.
So in the end, like we we always talk when it comes to the cultural norms, that how to work within the framework of cultural norms so that parties they respect within their within their own cultural parameters the key provisions, which are most of the time also in alignment with international humanitarian law.
Thank you.
Reinis Pozņaks
Yeah thank you very much for for your presentation also for all the the work you are doing international laws and and protection of civil society it's quite important thing and it becomes I assume more and more difficult those times and because you know when the active war is going on that quite often like international law stays behind and there is I think one reason also for that because there is also like international unwritten law that winners doesn't get judged. So in in some cases like the aggressors are are going like all in because they know that winners doesn't get judged and that was the case also with Russia. And so from your view is it even possible like or what can be done that that international laws are brought back into like reality of of war and especially actually in context of okay now it's a bit quieter this talks about peace peace deal between Russia and Ukraine but when we talk about this we like quite often like say okay let's don't talk about war crimes and and all that thing. So what's your from your perspective what you think about that?
Alain Délétroz
Thank you so much. Well there are two aspects to your question. First the first one is strictly legal. You know the Geneva Conventions international humanitarian law are are the most ratified conventions in the world. You take all the P5 they have all of them have ratified them.
So they have obligations not only to respect that but to ensure that their soldiers and military guys respect it and if they don't to judge them. So history teaches us particularly recent history that it rarely ends without any discussion and any trial. So we will see how this one will finish but Geneva Call's mission is to make sure that people know. Because sometimes particularly as we engage we don't engage state actors as you understood we engage non-state actors. But even in that conflict in Ukraine in a way the two republics of Lugansk and Donetsk were not recognized state actors and on the Ukrainian side I explained to you whom we have engaged.
There is little knowledge of their obligations and the dangers they face for after the war if they don't respect. But I think we have to be very careful. I would I would consider you know these Geneva Conventions the Hague Conventions as the minimal legal issues that humanity has agreed upon not to fall into into barbarism. And I think it will be upheld. And what we can see in the work we do is that international law is being implemented sometimes after the wars.
That is the perpetrators are brought to justice at some point. And let us see what will happen.
But, you know, if we, if we become, if we let this go down, then I think this is the first brick of our international life, common life, that will, that will crumble. And we have to defend it.
Nathalie Loiseau
Yes, thank you for this very interesting presentation and congratulations for the work you're doing, going to some places and meeting some people that others don't, and there's a need to carry the message even to the most reluctant ones. You mentioned that you have been working in Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad and now. I would like to know, especially in current times, whether you're still working in that country and especially in two places, Northeast Syria, where there are changes in the way military are getting organized, the Kurdish militias are getting included in the national army, but there are still challenges, especially about camps and prisons imprisoning jihadists. I'd like to know whether you work there and also in the south of Syria, in the Druze region, where there have been and there is still violence between, I would say, clans, militias, non-state actors. Are you able to try to do something there?
Thank you.
Atif Hameed
Well, thank you so much. It's a very important question based on the current dynamics. In fact, a few days ago, the SDF, the Syrian Defense Forces, have been fully integrated into the overall military architecture of Syria. Definitely there are some challenges because other than SDF, there were also other forces, YPJ and YPG as well, which are still not yet there, and there was also a strong contingent of women fighters. Although there are talks going on that if the women fighters could also have been integrated into maybe internal security forces.
So it's, it's, it's moving forward, things are advancing, but still there are a number of issues. Because Syria is a very tribal society, everybody has a gun or a weapon, and at the same time, it's not only the military but also the internal security forces, that how the internal security forces system, the policing and everything will be done, and thirdly, the, the governance architecture. These things are still in the making and people are also worried on the ground that how it may look like, but definitely if we see in the span of last 18 months, the, the dynamics are moving forward positively. But they need much more support in terms of capacity building and most importantly that how all these different forces who used to fight against each other a few years ago, how they're going to work together. For me, that's the biggest challenge in the case of Syria, whether it was former, like, elements of Northeast Syria, Kurdish fighters, or Syrian National Army elements, or HTS, or other groups.
The second issue is that still, I think, the point that you raised, the Al-Hol camp or a number of other locations where the prisoners were, how the handover is going to take place from the Kurdish to the other side, from the Damascus. And this is a concern. We are also looking into it and as Geneva Call, we have our footprints, I would say also in Northeast Syria, we are in Damascus, and now we are working basically through the government of Syria, interim government, coordinating with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, as well as Ministry of Justice. Our focus is primarily right now that how we can enhance the capacities when it comes to the new forces, how they can coordinate, collaborate, especially on IHL basis as well as civilian security at the checkpoints.
When it come to Suwayda in the south, still it is a bit challenging for international organizations to operate there. So it situation is tough and I think the the kind of support especially the European Union is providing to CDI is quite commendable, but they need much more when it comes to the capacity building and especially the like supporting on rule of law as well as how to bring the forces together and if the Syrian government can also support international organizations to to operate more freely, that would be helpful.
Mārtiņš Staķis
Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for all your work and thank you for your courage. I believe to deal with non-state military groups, this is quite dangerous mission and this takes a lot of courage. But my question is based on your experience, how can European Union engage with non-state armed groups to improve civilian protection without, you know, legitimizing them politically? Because what we do believe that, you know, if you negotiate with war criminals, you actually legitimizing them.
And the second question is maybe you can give a comment about the private owned armies like Wagner, like Russian the group. Do you see the growth of the influence of of those groups or vice versa, the decrease of the influence of those private armies? Thank you.
Alain Délétroz
Thank you so much. Well, I think on the on the first part of your question is what we consider important is that you as the European Union remain engaged the way you can, but it is sometimes very difficult for your diplomats to sit down and speak with people who are on the the, you know, the terrorist group of the European Union. So I guess your diplomat cannot speak with them. But let us look at the borders of the EU, particularly the south, the the Sahel. In the Sahel today, if you look at the the geography there, there is a clear need to speak with other actors than only the state because you see these other actors in terms of the territories they control being being extremely big.
But okay, the EU, where you're lucky is that you have a panoply, if this is an English word, in panoply of actors within the EU and even like the Geneva Call that you fund and they have a lot of contact. And so you can work on these levers also. Now when it comes to Wagner, in many places, not the only place where it is still Wagner to my knowledge, it's the Central African Republic. In the other places where they are, like mainly the three Sahel countries, that is, you know, Mali, Burkina Faso and and Niger, they are called the what are they called? Yeah, the Africa Corps, the Africa Corps.
So well, we have proposed several times to engage with them. For the moment, there is no positive, you know, answer. Their status is a little bit legally unclear, but for Geneva Call, we consider that yes, it would be good for us to engage with them and to make sure that they are exposed also to their obligation as weapon carriers to international humanitarian law.
Do you want to add something?
Atif Hameed
If there's a time, I would like to respond on the legitimization of armed groups as well. Although Alan explained that as in the start, Alan mentioned that there are more than 200 million people who live in the areas controlled by armed groups and de facto authorities, this is a limited estimation. The challenge is that if you don't engage these groups, you know, you will find more cases of sexual gender-based violence, you'll find cases of child recruitment, you'll have cases of civilian infrastructures occupied by these groups, and there's a massive challenge when it comes to humanitarian access. So engagement is vital, that how you have a minimum engagement or credible engagement on the basis of international humanitarian law so that pathways could be established how to work with them when it comes to ensuring protection of civilians. So Geneva Call, when it focus with the groups, it focus within the parameters of all this different spectrum of humanitarian access, protection of children, education, civilian access, civilian infrastructures.
And at the same time, for example, like there are cases, as we also mentioned the case of like Syria before, we work with the groups and the groups when they were moving towards Damascus, they respected international humanitarian law. So sometimes there are cases that when you engage with the groups, if there are ceasefires, they are well prepared how to respond to the ceasefire as well as a responsible actor. But definitely as Geneva Call, we're not involved in any kind of political processes. Our focus is always on protection of civilians while ensuring that the fundamental provisions of IHL, IHRL are respected by the groups. Thank you.
Marc Botenga
Thank you very much and I'm gonna benefit from the interpretation as I don't think we should all speak English. Donc merci tout d'abord évidemment pour les éléments que vous nous avez donnés et pour le travail important que vous fournissez dans différents théâtres et endroits de conflit. Merci aussi d'avoir rappelé la responsabilité des États et de l'Union européenne. Je pense que c'est essentiel parce qu'aujourd'hui malheureusement, ça a été dit, le respect des États pour le droit international humanitaire en particulier baisse en force. Et je ne me priverai pas de rappeler vos mots aussi à mes collègues quand à huis clos ils s'opposent à des mesures contraignantes dans les textes législatifs de l'Union européenne par rapport notamment au développement et financement de drones ou d'autres armements parce que que ça soit pour l'intelligence artificielle ou ailleurs, on est tous conscients, je pense, que ça soit de Gaza à ce qui s'est passé aussi au sud de l'Iran à Minab, l'impact que ça peut avoir même par des acteurs qui invoquent le droit international dans leur politique étrangère.
J'ai deux questions un peu pratico-pratiques peut-être. La première, c'est évidemment dans ce genre de contexte, la question de la confiance est essentielle. La question aussi des incitations. Donc quels sont les mécanismes qui font que vous arrivez à construire de la confiance avec ces groupes et de le faire du côté de part et d'autre ? Vous avez mentionné l'Ukraine, mais moi je voudrais parler peut-être de la RDC où il y a notamment à l'est la question du M23, il y a aussi la question nouvelle de Wazalendo.
Est-ce que vous arrivez dans les deux cas à construire cette confiance, à trouver les incitations pour parler, pour les mettre ensemble ? Et quid alors, et là je rebondis un peu sur la question de mon collègue écolo, les sociétés militaires privées dans quelle mesure en général parce que là aussi en RDC ça sera une question qui va se poser de plus en plus avec Eric Prince et d'autres, comment quand même dans ce processus d'une manière ou d'une autre vous les prenez en considération ? Merci.
Alain Délétroz
Merci beaucoup. Ben du coup je vais répondre en français aussi, peut-être avec un petit accent genevois qui sait. Mais d'abord, je pense que effectivement la baisse du respect pour le droit international humanitaire est une grosse grosse question. Chaque année lors de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies à New York nous sommes invités à prendre la parole et nous la prenons de manière très directe sur la responsabilité des États. Comment nous, Appel de Genève, pouvons exiger de groupes armés qui n'ont jamais signé aucune convention que ce soit, dans le meilleur des cas ils ont signé avec nous l'un de nos actes d'engagement, qu'ils respectent les bases du droit international humanitaire quand on voit les grandes armées de grands États en faire fi complètement?
C'est une décadence humaine ce à quoi nous assistons aujourd'hui. Vous prenez l'ensemble des armées nationales impliquées dans des conflits armés aujourd'hui, ça fait des années qu'on n'a plus vu un seul commandant jugé pour enfreinte au droit international humanitaire. Alors par rapport à la question que vous avez posée en RDC. En RDC nous avons signé un memorandum of understanding avec le M23 en mars de cette année. Alors ce qui est en RDC nous engageons beaucoup de groupes armés depuis très longtemps, dont certains qui étaient connus par exemple pour violer les femmes de manière absolument généralisée et presque systématique ont changé de comportement de manière assez radicale.
Avec le M23 notre engagement a commencé seulement l'an dernier depuis qu'ils ont occupé ce grand bassin de population qui comprend entre 12 et 15 millions de civils. Et leur volonté de s'engager et de respecter les bases du droit international humanitaire a été augmentée. Donc on continue de travailler avec eux et c'est un exemple aussi de ce qui peut arriver. Vous avez parfois dans les zones de guerre des groupes qui sont relativement fermés à notre engagement et tout à coup lorsqu'ils occupent, ils contrôlent un bassin de population très élevé, ils se rendent compte qu'ils doivent changer de comportement. C'était le cas aussi en Syrie, c'est le cas maintenant en RDC.
Alors après sur la question de la confiance, pour nous la confiance, nous sommes encore très jeunes, l'Appel de Genève a fêté l'an dernier ses 20 ans. La question de la confiance maintenant elle est aussi établie par groupe. Ces groupes sont très interconnectés. Avec les moyens modernes de communication ils se parlent entre eux. Et dernièrement on a pu être introduit auprès de certains groupes par d'autres groupes.
Et pour nous la question de la confiance elle est bâtie sur une chose très simple, c'est qu'ils comprennent assez vite que nous ne représentons aucun État, que nous sommes une organisation qui lutte en fait pour une chose, pour que l'humanitaire reste présent dans ce monde et dans les endroits où ils se battent. Et nous avons été de plus en plus introduits à des groupes armés par d'autres groupes armés. Mais c'est toujours la première introduction un moment très très délicat et je dois le dire très dangereux. À partir du moment où la confiance a été établie, chaque fois que nous allons dans ces zones-là, et vous avez nommé le M23, moi j'étais récemment à Goma, ben nous mettons notre sécurité dans leurs mains. Et pour mettre la sécurité de nous-mêmes et de nos collègues dans leurs mains il faut avoir un certain niveau de confiance avec eux évidemment.
Merci.
Christophe Gomart
Merci beaucoup de vos explications et bravo pour ce que vous faites. Votre organisation traite aussi la problématique des mines antipersonnel. Or il s'avère que de plus en plus de pays en acquièrent pour protéger leurs frontières par exemple face à la Russie.
S'ils ne le font pas officiellement, certains passent par des sociétés militaires privées pour le faire. Quel genre d'action menez-vous éventuellement dans ce sens-là ? Ça c'était ma première question. La deuxième question, vous avez commencé à l'aborder à propos des pays du Sahel avec les groupes armés djihadistes qui sont de plus en plus présents, de plus en plus offensifs et qui détiennent, qui contrôlent de plus en plus une large partie du territoire. Est-ce que vous avez des contacts avec eux ?
Parce que évidemment les premières victimes sont les populations civiles. Vous avez parlé tout à l'heure effectivement d'Africa Corps. Est-ce que vous avez des contacts avec eux ? Et ma dernière question sera au sujet du Sud-Soudan. Quel genre d'action menez-vous au Sud-Soudan ?
Parce que c'est un endroit en Afrique où malheureusement les populations civiles sont sans doute le plus impactées de manière grave. Merci.
Alain Délétroz
Merci Monsieur Gomart. Alors sur la question des mines antipersonnel, effectivement c'est pour nous une grande priorité de nos actions. Nous avons même un de nos fameux actes d'engagement qu'on fait signer aux groupes armés qui porte exactement là-dessus. Et il y a, vous avez raison, il y a en ce moment un retour en arrière à la fois des États. Vous voyez des États qui sont signataires et parties de la convention contre les mines qui sont en train de faire marche arrière et on voit de plus en plus de mines partout.
Alors je dirais que notre succès là-dessus a été à un moment donné avec les groupes armés assez élevé. Il s'est amoindri ces dernières années, je crois qu'on peut le dire, du fait aussi de la frilosité des États et de certains États signataires de la convention contre les mines qui sont en train de faire marche arrière. Par rapport aux groupes djihadistes, alors pour l'Appel de Genève, et là je vais prendre mon petit accent suisse, nous essayons de rester bien neutres et de ne pas qualifier les groupes. Alors dans le Sahel, vous le savez certainement beaucoup mieux que moi, c'est une question énorme. Il y a un certain groupe, un certain nombre de groupes armés qui ne veulent même pas entrer en contact avec nous, ceux qu'on appellerait vraiment les djihadistes purs et durs.
Après ce que je peux vous dire, c'est que ce qu'on voit lorsqu'un groupe armé, même s'il avait une idéologie très très dure, lorsqu'il commence à contrôler un bassin de population d'une certaine importance, et dans le Sahel malheureusement si vous regardez les frontières et les zones contrôlées par des groupes armés c'est le cas, il y a généralement plus de volonté d'entrer en dialogue parce qu'ils se rendent compte qu'ils ne peuvent plus gérer une population civile importante comme ils géraient leurs combats dans la brousse ou dans la savane. Donc effectivement dans le Sahel pour nous, pour l'Appel de Genève, il n'y a aucune restriction. Nous avons de la chance d'être basés à Genève. Vous savez que la Confédération helvétique a une liste de groupes terroristes qui est beaucoup moins longue que celle de l'Union européenne, mais nous tenons évidemment tous nos partenaires en Europe au courant de manière discrète sur les groupes nous engageons lorsque l'un d'eux peut être sur l'une ou l'autre liste. Après sur le Sud-Soudan peut-être Atif tu...
Atif Hameed
Well in South Sudan we have been working for quite some time and like right now we are engaging with opposition forces although we had DOCs also with now the current government before when they were armed groups. And our focus is primarily when it comes to community safety and security, especially the areas where there is a threat of violence, the areas exposed to violence. So we are working with groups on the ground. Very recently a number of armed groups whose military bases were in the close vicinity where the civilian populations were, we negotiated that they move out their military bases from the villages or close to the civilian areas which they respected. There are many multiple examples on that one.
And secondly there were cases of like sexual gender-based violence as well as cases of some recruitment. So we are working with those groups so that they respect those provisions. In fact we have one of the tools, it's called unilateral declaration, where armed groups have signed four unilateral declarations to respect sexual gender-based violence, not to recruit children as well as not to have their bases close to the civilian populations. We are trying to see that how there are reports that it may escalate in future, so we are positioning as well that in case there are violations in future how the groups can respect provisions of IHL in the long run.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you.
Okay, colleagues, please short questions. Costas Mavrides and afterwards Pedros, and then please, Costas, the floor is yours.
Costas Mavrides
Thanks, Madam Chair. Short question. First of all, I'd like to also to express my praising. Every sensible person in this room, and I guess all of us, appreciate your work and your good intentions. Now, I do understand that there are open wounds and open conflicts around the world, but I would like to turn our attention on my specific question with one frozen, so to speak, conflict in EU territory.
I'm referring, of course, to the continued occupation of part of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey. The crimes under ICC, International Criminal Court, committed as we speak now by Turkey in Cyprus are very specific: illegal settlement connected with the usurpation of Greek Cypriot properties. And the last few years, we had also the instrumentalization of illegal migration in a form of hybrid attack against the Republic of Cyprus. Two specific questions. Did you ever have any contact to Turkish authorities about those issues?
Two, did you have any contact with the illegal regime established by Turkey in Cyprus? And third, do you plan to get engaged in that area in a way of preventing such crimes in the future? Once again, my congratulations.
Alain Délétroz
Thank you very much for your compliments. So to your questions, no, we are not working in Cyprus. Our analysis showed that this is typically a conflict in which you have state actors engaged, and Geneva Call has been created to engage non-state actors. Second, we have contacts with Turkey. We have contacts with Turkey mainly about the conflict in Syria, and positive contacts, I must say, but never about Cyprus as we are not in that conflict.
And we are not planning for the moment to get engaged in this conflict for the reasons I mentioned. We are not aware of any non-state armed groups active there. But thank you for your compliments. They are good to take.
Petras Auštrevičius
Thank you. Thank you, Chair. Thank you for your presentation. And coming back to the most bloody war on European continent, Russian aggression against Ukraine. So military structures are very vertical.
All right? I mean, they are not amateurish. They have commands and they have command structures, everything goes top-down. So once you've been in touch with the so-called Russian paramilitaries, militaries, whatever, who commit a lot of war crimes, executing POWs, all right, having sexual violence against civilians, massively, massively, well-recorded, against children and so on and so forth.
To what extent your contacts go to the, let's say, upper, upper part of those command structures? Because certain units, military units, for example, military brigade 155, Bucha, all right, I mean, they are, they are war criminals. And those commands were given from the top down. I mean, to what extent you reach out not just those carrying out Kalashnikov, but, you know, in charge? And my final question is what happens to your reports?
I mean, to what extent your reports and evidence is provided and what is the feedback from the governments, for example, from the war criminal Putin?
Alain Délétroz
Thank you so much. Well, I mean, that's what you said is a very good question. How, how high do we go in the hierarchy? So usually the highest we go are the field commanders. This is, this is the people to which we appeal.
In the case of Ukraine and Russia, of course we appeal to the two sides. On the side of Kyiv, the answer was as I said before, extremely positive. You feel on the side of Kyiv that they are, they are very preoccupied about none of their troops, particularly these groups that Geneva Call engaged before 2022, committing any war crimes. On the side of Russia, I keep repeating that we are ready to engage. For the moment this engagement has stopped in 2022.
Before 2022 we were engaging, we were engaging in Moscow and as I said we were engaging in the field. That's, that's all I can say. The question, I mean, Geneva Call is not writing reports about war crimes. If we were to be doing that there are many other organizations, particularly here in Europe, doing that. If we started doing that we would not be accepted in the zones of conflict anymore.
So the way we point fingers is by talking with the parties and also by talking once a year at the UN General Assembly where usually we say what is going on on the field. But to your question, what I want to tell this Parliament very clearly is that the level of engagement we could have on the Ukrainian side of the frontline was not matched by the other side. I mean, on the Ukrainian side we were all the support, all the, you know, the fields open, we could talk with, I mean, any battalions that we consider to be sufficiently independent from the center to have a, to be a focus of our attention. On the other side it was much more limited and to the point that as I said in 2024 we decided that we wrapped up this mission on the other side. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. It was really very impressive and as Kostas said, thank you very much doing this, how could I say, strange job in this really strange times with this really complex situation. So thank you very much for your time and you are always welcome to explain everything and 5th October we are waiting for the invitation and as colleagues have time, I'm sure that they will come. Thank you very much.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Dear colleagues, we move to the next item. It's reporting back on the kick-off trilogue on military mobility. The inter-institutional negotiations on the military mobility regulations were formally launched on 16th July with the participation of Irish Ambassador, Defense Commissioner and Transport Commissioner. Along with myself, the EP team was represented by SEDE co-rapporteur Michal Šerba and TRAN co-rapporteur Robert Zīle. Work is now underway with the first technical meeting held yesterday and the second one to take place tomorrow.
Further meetings are already scheduled. So now I give the floor to Michal Šerba to report back on the main elements discussed at the kick-off trilogue. Michal, the floor is yours for 10 minutes.
Michał Szczerba
Good morning everybody, dear Maria Agnes, dear chair, dear colleagues, welcome back to school. So let me begin by thanking co-rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs, our coordinators and all colleagues involved for their work on the military mobility legislative package. The constructive engagement demonstrated throughout this process has allowed us to establish a strong basis for the international inter-institutional negotiations. In accordance with the agreed timetable, following the adoption of Parliament's position during the July plenary session in Strasbourg, the first trilogue took place on 16 of July. This meeting enabled the three institutions to present their respective position, establish the structure of the negotiations and agree on the organization of the work ahead.
After the summer recess, we resumed negotiations at a full space. Yesterday, on the 1st of September, the first inter-institutional technical meeting was held. A further 17 technical meetings have already been scheduled together with two additional trilogues. This intensive calendar reflects the shared determination to advance the negotiations effectively and to deliver this crucial legislation by the year-end deadline. This work is progressing smoothly.
During yesterday's technical meeting, we discussed the second negotiating cluster concerning military transport permission procedures and cooperation and interoperability with NATO. More specifically, the discussion covered articles 4, 5, 6, 8, 8b, 9 and 17. The technical discussion allowed the institution to clarify their respective positions, identify areas of convergence and determine which question will be require further work. Although a significant number of technical and political issues remain to be addressed, the current pace of negotiations is encouraging. I would also like to express my appreciation to the SEDE committee secretariat and to political group advisors.
Preparing for trilogues and technical meetings require an exceptional amount of detailed work, coordination and legal analysis. The secretariat commitment and professionalism have been essential to ensuring the Parliament entered these negotiations thoroughly prepared with a clear understanding of its priorities.
I remain optimistic. Provided all institutions maintain this level of engagement and continue to work constructively, we will be able to respect the agreed timetable for concluding the negotiations by the end of the year. Military mobility is not merely a transport or administrative matter. It is a fundamental component of defense readiness, of Europe's defense readiness, deterrence and capacity to respond effectively in times of crisis. We therefore have a shared responsibility to deliver an ambitious, coherent and operational framework.
Thank you, colleagues.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. So we continue with the shadow rapporteurs if they are here. So Elio Di Rupo, no. Jaroslava Pokorná, no. Alexandr Vondra, no, but Pedras.
Petras Auštrevičius
Madam Chair, I simply support the point of view expressed by our rapporteur. I'm very happy with the technical meeting of yesterday and I'm looking forward to reporting final results as soon as possible. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. Martins, it's not necessary, okay. Mark, maybe for your colleague?
Marc Botenga
Oui, deux paroles peut-être juste pour exprimer l'inquiétude continue de la part notamment de syndicats par rapport à l'impact de ce dossier sur les droits syndicaux et la sécurité et la santé au travail des personnes concernées. Merci.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. So colleagues, we continue now in camera. The next point on the agenda is about the initial findings of the coordinated annual review on defense and defense data publication 2024. I know, I know. That was the reason why I just said this is the reason why we are in camera.
So please leave the room if you are... Ah, even we need time for, yes, yeah, that's true. So we have also to take out the electronic devices.