Committee on Foreign Affairs Ordinary meeting HEARING
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AFET European Parliament
Follow its sittingsMatteo Bonomi
And we look at the past from, from the Northern enlargement to the Southern enlargement to the enlargement to Central Eastern Europe, the EU has always moved to adapt to external, changing external condition and always also had a merit-based approach. It was always the European Union asking to candidate country to adapt and to apply its own acquis and never on the other way around. So the history of enlargement policy has been really a history of how this model has adapted to changing condition. And this changing condition that emerge from our comparative study are mainly three. First, the changing profile of candidate country that has become over time more complex and heterogeneous.
The nature of the European integration that become more complex and probably less permissive towards further enlargement. And third, contextual element is the international situation that became more and more complex and probably also more antagonistic. And this story of enlargement has been exactly the story of an adaptation of this policy through these changing contextual factor. And our comparative analysis show how basically enlargement adapted to this changing condition becoming longer, more with more step, with more gradual phases before accession.
If at the beginning enlargement was basically a procedure where the candidate country adapted EU law after accession, over the years to adapt to these changing conditions it became much, much longer process. And as we can see for instance Central Eastern Europe where it became a fully-fledged policy requiring a lot of steps before accession. Our assessment in this study is that probably this trajectory for the Western Balkans over the last 20 years went a bit too long. And this graduality and a lot of different pre-enlargement steps that were implied in the several pre-accession framework applied to the region somehow came at the loss of the credibility of the enlargement policy and at the credibility of the prospect of membership. And this is exactly the background against which we try to evaluate the relaunch of EU enlargement after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
After that fact, the enlargement came back as a geostrategic imperative and it meant basically two different things for the European Union.
On the one hand, the European Union has tried to invest again on the credibility of enlargement that this was a new move after at least 10 years of enlargement fatigue after the accession of Croatia. But at the same times, invested on new instrument of gradual integration to somehow to strengthen cooperation with all candidate country, not only in the Balkans, to to somehow respond to the also the geopolitical urgency of of the moment. And these two things, of course, we try to assess especially how they play out in Albania and and Montenegro. And there our assessment was that the main factor was really the credibility of membership perspective that made the difference in the last few years that really allowed for rapid progress in in negotiation after many years of stagnation. And we have seen how, I mean, suddenly chapter were and cluster were open and you and that correspond to real legislative alignment of this of this country that suddenly became possible in a very short time.
And this of course it's not about the credibility only, but it was probably the trigger given probably the foreign policy alignment of these two countries that were already in NATO for instance, so probably are easier than others. And also another element that highlights the study was this strong domestic ownership. Despite all the trouble that domestic policies in both country went through, there was a strong commitment towards the enlargement and there was a strong social support for that among the population. And this is a crucial factor of course. Of course not everything is gold and we see how this and I think we can fairly say that now these two countries have showed that they have the technical ability to align to EU acquis, but of course having fully functioning institution it's much more difficult story and of course require much more time probably.
But still I think this is the right direction and it's not through the exclusion that you can help this process to consolidate. If we look at the broader region, of course the picture is less rosy probably.
They are still in a very much in a wait and see mode as the EU accession perspective have been missing some credibility for so long that many of the leaders in the region probably are still betting in the fact that this process will not deliver at the end and that they can play a multi-vectoral policy to do something with the European Union, something with others. But it's really I think now up to the European Union show that the political calculation that probably was a winning one for the last decade has changed, the maths has changed. And of course even if Albania and Montenegro succeed to become the next member, of course a positive spillover effect for the rest of the region cannot be taken for granted neither. I mean we have seen how the accession of Croatia created a pause effect to the rest of the region. So we have to be extremely careful also to do not give the idea that once maybe one country enter the other have lost their opportunity.
And of course this is difficult especially in the Western Balkans because for many years all the EU has been doing there has been very much framed with this regional cooperation approach.
And of course some country moving steadily towards the European Union require changes also in this kind of approach and how maybe this measure that were first imagined as a main driver of the integration can be used maybe for mitigate the shortcoming of some country entering and some others not. Having said this I'm reaching my conclusion. I mean we reach some I mean some recommendation for the for the for the Parliament in the study there are there are much more details so if you are interested please look at the study but now I will try to synthesize mainly in in four points. First I think the the Parliament can play an important role in in protect the merit-based approach of enlargement that require the Parliament to really be able to signal where progress are are are obtained or not obtainance and because of whom. I mean if it's up to the so it's a fault of candidate country that do not deliver reform it should be stated clearly but if it's because of European Union own issue it's also it should be state quite clearly.
Second gradual integration it's a useful tool but cannot in any way substitute a credible membership perspective that is the only real incentive for tough reform that are needed and that we want to see in this country. So for the rule of law media freedom and all these things. Nothing can substitute this and I think the the Parliament can play an important role in ensuring that this connection do not get lost and maybe also to move towards maybe involving more the parliamentary of these country and to somehow to open as much as possible as much the current legislation allow their participation to committee and to to the to the debate in this house. Third one other things that clear emerge from the study is that despite all this gradual integration what is really missing in the pre-accession framework is the ability to drive economic convergence. This this has missing and because simply the resource provided to candidate country and to member state are so hugely different that the main driver of economic catch-up of new member state is simply missing.
How to solve this, it's not easy. I mean, I would just say put money, but we know how much is difficult that discussion. But I think in the discussion for the next multiannual financial framework, it will be important of course to have this merit-based approach, but also to somehow protect the predictability of funds. That this is very important and that has been a little bit outside of the discussion and I think is crucial to plan especially long-term investment that can drive development. And development in this country is should be a key goal despite also all the rest.
And fourth point is that of course the Parliament can have much more proactive role in preparing the Union for enlargement. This is the big elephant of the room coming out also from the from the from the study.
I mean, of course, keeping the silence of this debate within this house, but also cooperating probably with with national parliament and probably also having a much more tailored approach to different national sensitivities because we know how much different are are these debate in different EU capitals. And in doing so, maybe a good way also to frame this could be have a proactively engage with the EU Council presidency and and to try to shape this next year with the with the I mean in in some windows of opportunity. Thank you.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Grazie, grazie signor Bonomi, la presentazione è stata molto interessante nel complesso. O invit acum pe următoarea noastră vorbitoare, doamna Krisela Hackaj, director executiv al Institutului pentru Cooperare și Dezvoltare din Albania să ne ofere mai multe detalii despre procesul de aderare al Albaniei. Doamna Hackaj este de asemenea membră a Consiliului Național al Albaniei pentru Integrare Europeană și a îndeplinit funcția de consilier al Comitetului Economic și Social European în cadrul elaborării avizelor acesteia privind mecanismul de reformă și creștere economică pentru Balcanii de Vest. Doamna Hackaj aveți cuvântul pentru 10 minute. The floor.
Krisela Hackaj
Thank you, chair. Thank you for the invitation and the possibility to contribute to this today's public hearing, distinguished members of the AFET committee and participants of this event. For my country, Albania, EU membership remains key for developing our domestic institutions and reforming the state.
As you know, citizen support for joining the EU remains in a very high percentage, 92% of the population supports this ambition. 2024 is without doubt the most dynamic year for enlargement since 2003 Thessaloniki promise. Montenegro is advancing towards the finishing phase of negotiations, while Albania has moved with an unprecedented speed through the opening phase and has already started to close chapters. While Montenegro has experienced a gradual intensification of efforts over the negotiating period, Albania, on the other hand, has engaged in intensive preparation before opening negotiations, requiring the completion of significant reforms before beginning the process. Our experience confirms that enlargement works when the prospect of membership is sufficiently credible to generate the needed political push to adopt and implement reforms.
For my country, emerging from a very different historical starting point, accession is much more than a technical process of aligning legislation or adopting standards. It is fundamentally a long-term process of state transformation that ends with embedment in the European family.
In one generation, we must not forget Albania has had to build institutions from the scratch that took other European countries decades or even centuries to build, all while reforming its economy and dealing with profound social transformation dynamics. And it is progressively aligning the institutions' performance and legislation with the EU. But building European-class institutions and making them work is just the first part of the challenge. The next, and I think perhaps the most difficult, task is to ensure that they remain independent, inclusive, professionally governed, and resilient against political interference, corruption, and undue outside influence. Recent civic mobilization in Albania are a reminder that institutional progress cannot be measured only through the laws adopted, through the number of chapters opened or closed, through the benchmarks met, but they also reflect the rising societal expectations about how our institutions should work, how decisions should be taken, and how power should be held accountable.
This underlines the need for the accession process in the future to deliver the quality of governance, democratic accountability, but also standards that citizens associate with EU membership. Chapter 27 has now become common knowledge in my country.
So, the legitimacy and societal support for the accession process depends really whether the citizens can see that the reforms are improving their life and their work. This is where gradual integration, as was already mentioned by Matteo, if properly designed and implemented, can connect the progress of negotiation with the everyday life and work of citizens and business actors. Explained otherwise, the more Albania reforms, closes chapters, and proves that it can implement the European standards properly, and of course reforms, the more our citizens, businesses, and institutions should be enabled to participate in the European ecosystem. Building on our accession before membership work at CDI, early access to the EU instruments and policy tools can also accelerate convergence, Matteo mentioned the importance of it, strengthen preparedness, but also lock in the frontrunner candidate in the EU's governance system. This also generates tangible benefits for the EU in terms of cohesion, resilience, and competitiveness.
We therefore believe that the September European Commission proposals and of course the October's Council should give gradual integration a very clear operational definition, while fully preserving of course the merit-based principle of the enlargement policy. This credible framework should answer three specific questions: which sectors can be opened, should be opened to earlier integration, under what conditions and safeguards, what EU policy and instruments precisely can citizens, businesses, and institution of a candidate country access before membership and at what cost? This gradual integration framework should be applied in proportion to the candidate's verified readiness in the provisionally closed chapters. This could mean moving beyond granting eligibility in certain European programs towards participation in the respective operational structures and abstention of observer status or structure participation in the relevant EU bodies as it was proposed by some member states' non-papers. Gradual integration will make a difference for the candidate countries only if it improves governance and if it brings the benefits, standards, and accountability of European integration closer to the citizens and business.
I'm coming to an end of my intervention and I think to also to a topic which is key for sustaining further the enlargement momentum. We have welcomed and we are following a lot the work that the European Parliament is currently doing with regard to the MFF and of course when it comes to the candidate countries to the Global Europe instrument.
We welcome the European Parliament's position that the next MFF should prepare both the EU and the candidate countries for accession. It should strengthen Global Europe to support future enlargement and should make pre-accession funding more predictable, transparent, and accountable, with dedicated allocation and clear budget lines for each candidate countries. This is about making enlargement credible, predictable, but also financially manageable. Albania has demonstrated an exceptional negotiating pace. All 33 chapters have been opened.
In July 26, the EU and Albania have started, have provisionally closed three chapters. This followed of course the EBAR framework assessment approved regarding the fundamentals clusters in May. Albania is also a frontrunner when it comes together with Montenegro when it comes to the implementation of the performance-based instrument, the Reform and Growth Facility, which actually provides to our countries a useful test as it is the model that will be implemented in the next MFF.
The RGF, so the Reform and Growth Facility, is also preparing our institutions' capabilities to plan, coordinate, but also implement and report on measurable EU-linked results, similarly as member states have with their Recovery and Resilience Facility. Albania has set a clear political objective and work plan for the accession by 2030. If this target is maintained, accession would fall in the midst of next MFF, making Albania's financial transition relevant for the next budget. On the assumption that Albania sustains the negotiations momentum and pace and in line with the merit-based principle of enlargement, we believe that the Commission should start preparing for a financial package as well for our country, as already has started, as done with Montenegro. This package should be conditional, of course, on continued progress in negotiations and reform delivery.
It should also clearly set out the financial and budgetary implications of accession, including the transition from Global Europe to the internal policies budget headings, but also Albania's future contribution to the EU budget.
To conclude, an ambitious pre-enlargement review, and I mentioned the autumn agenda and expecting the pre-enlargement policy review by the Commission and as well the Council conclusion in October, which is anchored to the next MFF, can turn the EU budget into a strategic instrument for accession. And beyond the amounts, so the sums, what matters is how pre-accession support is redesigned, particularly the current imbalance that we have between loans and grants. We must say that grants account almost to one third of the overall pre-accession support, but also on how their different governance, oversight, and conditionality arrangements should be improved. A better balanced and more accession-oriented model would sustain the reform momentum, will further support building institutional capacity in Albania, but also ensure a smoother transition from pre-accession assistance to full participation in EU policies and instruments. For Albania, this would mean sustaining its frontrunner position, deserving it on a daily basis through stricter oversight by the EU, including the European Parliament of course, continued reform performance, and stronger engagement, and this is above all with its citizens, businesses, and society as a whole.
Thank you.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you very much, Ms. Hakaj.
În încheiere, pentru a completa tabloul, o invit pe doamna Jovana Marović, expert în relațiile dintre Uniunea Europeană și Muntenegru, să-și expună punctul de vedere cu privire la parcursul Muntenegrului către aderarea la Uniunea Europeană. Doamna Marović a ocupat funcții de diplomat de rang înalt și consilier guvernamental, a condus importante centre de reflecție în domeniul politicilor publice și a deținut posturi de cercetare postdoctorală. În plus, a ocupat funcția de viceprim-ministru și ministru al afacerilor externe europene al Muntenegrului. Ms. Marović, you have the floor.
Jovana Marović
Thank you very much for such introduction, also for inviting me and for organizing this public hearing on Montenegro and Albania. It's really nice to see that European Parliament is more and more involved into enlargement policy and it's actually contributing to the process, and I would like to see it even more active when it comes to the concrete steps towards Montenegro's integration into European Union.
Since my colleagues already explained what is the background and what is the most important part with the EU enlargement policy and how the EU should act in that sense and how merit-based approach should be in the core of the process, I will focus on the challenges of the process and in order to see Montenegro as soon as possible into European Union, hopefully 2028, but 2029 is still a good year for our accession. Let me start with the fact that the Iceland's no actually is putting even more pressure on the European Union to deliver. It's not about success story, it's about how the European Union sees the new members. In the case of Iceland, I have to say that the European Union was just an observer, just, you know, waiting and seeing what will happen with the referendum in Iceland. And it's becoming more and more challenging to explain what is the full benefit of the full membership in the European Union.
It's really easy to explain why one country wants to be part of the single European market, to be part of the Schengen zone, but it's becoming more difficult to explain why one country should be member of the European Union and especially if that country is fully developed democracy.
So it's not just about the countries which are not living the democracy, it's about the European project, why it's still attractive, why it should be presented in a different way. So instead of explaining that the Western Balkans and the other candidate countries are forced to be part of the European Union because there is no other alternative, I have to say that the European Union should also present this membership as a strategic investment, and especially when it comes to Montenegro, because it's not just a small country, just a country which is most advanced in the European integration process, it's not just the country which is fully aligned with common foreign security policy, it's also the only and last hope for the Western Balkans that it's possible and we actually can join the European Union. It's the country which really serves as an example, it's possible to achieve certain level of democratization and reforms in the short period of time. It's a country who is really delivering in the last two years and which so far temporarily concluded and closed 18 chapters with 15 left. It's the country which the whole Western Balkans is also, you know, looking and all eyes are on Montenegro.
It's the way how the European Union should punish the autocrats in the Western Balkans. Let me just recall that Montenegro is facing the hybrid threats in the recent weeks just because autocrats would not like to see Montenegro in the European Union. So that's the way how you are also fighting, supporting democracy and also fighting hybrid threats in the Western Balkans. Montenegro is also the easiest case, it's the easiest geopolitical win for the European Union.
It's the highest payoff for the rest of the candidate countries and for the European Union. So it's strategic investment. And how to act? At the moment Montenegro wants to join the European Union, but is still not sure whether the EU member states would like to see any of the countries in the European Union in next two or three or four years. And then the European Union also would like to see the new EU member states, but the current EU member states are, you know, strengthening the, they are, the rules are even more stricter and the European Union is changing the rules in the very last moment.
So how we can get off from this catch-22 situation? Not by changing the rules, not by introducing the second-class membership, not by lowering the standards, not by grouping the countries where the most advanced country is waiting for the other in order to have better position for ratification, not by restricting the rights. The way forward is to use the accession treaties as development tools. So how to do that?
We have many cases of the safeguard mechanism in the past because the goal is of course to safeguard democracy and to prevent backsliding once when the country is in the European Union. How to do that? Well, link the conditionality and link the rule of law reforms with the financial instruments. You have the growth plan as an example how to do it. And the most important part is of course that European Commission is assessing progress and not the EU member states who can put the veto and who can, you know, decide in each case whether to block the funds or not.
Let's see just the case of Serbia and how it's at the moment even impossible, you know, to block some of the funds for it. So use this example of accession treaty. Why I'm saying this at the European Parliament? Because under the Article 49, the European Parliament is not just the gatekeeper of the accession treaty, it does not just vote at the very end to ratify Montenegro's accession treaty, it also has possibility to monitor the preparation and drafting of the accession treaty. So it's possible to influence how the safeguards mechanisms are defined and how they are helping the democracy and the whole process.
I think that the way forward for the rest of the Western Balkans is also to use the same model. We have so many initiatives at the moment, the Berlin process, the growth plan, we have many other regional initiatives, but the way forward is to use the conditionality umbrella, the clusters and the chapters and to link it with financial incentives. It's okay to have gradual integration, but solely if you have membership at the end of the story. That's the only incentive mechanisms for all the countries, if the membership is inside, they are willing and they are able to reform, otherwise they are not interested in the other kinds of benefits. Then the other role of the European Parliament is helping to build the public support in the skeptical EU member states.
I have to say that it's not just about far-right rise in political parties, it's it's also endangering the the future of the European Union. So in order to have majority in France, where is current support 35 percent percent for Montenegro's or any other country's membership, there should be debate initiated from the European Parliament. It should be the core of the of the debate during the elections in France, because so far the all arguments when it comes to enlargement process were extremely negative coming from the side which is anti-European and not from the European side. So who is defending the enlargement policy in France and the other skeptical EU member states and why does European European Parliament is not leading the debate in order to have this public support? Then the other part is about how European Parliament is preparing for this normalizing the new EU member states.
We have two different voice and especially when it comes to Montenegro, because usually from some public officials Montenegro is usually praising reforms in Montenegro and usually they are mentioning 2028 as a possible date of of enlargement and then the integration of of the country.
But there are more pessimistic voices coming also from all the European institutions and especially waiting for the European Council in October and waiting which kind of framework the European Union will actually choose to go forward. I think it's really necessary to have clear message from that European Council that Montenegro is really able to join European Union in two or three years. And for the other of the countries we will use the same model actually to have this membership at the end of the story. And then I think that the European Council in October should send the message that only full membership is on the table because any other scenario is failure of the EU enlargement policy. It's not how you're getting stronger.
It's not how you are attracting the new member states. It's not how you are exporting democracy. It's not how you're getting bigger and stronger. It's not the way forward if you have the European Union as political project. That's really important to highlight.
And then to conclude with really clear message that if Montenegro delivers the EU also has to deliver. So it's quite simple, you know, because if it's merit-based approach then if you are fulfilling criteria you are becoming member states. It's simple as that. So let's stay with that. If Montenegro delivers the EU has to deliver.
Thank you.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you very much. Let us now move on to the debate. EPP, the first group. Michael Gahler is not here. Mr. Stier.
You have the floor.
Davor Ivo Stier
Yeah, thank you very much, Chair, and thanks to all the speakers. I have one question for Ms. Marrone. La ringrazio per il suo intervento. I fully agree on the finding that we need to have a gradual integration just to fill the gap, but that should not be a replacement for membership. That should be the final goal.
And I think that is probably the most important finding in this study. Nevertheless, I do disagree with some other aspect when it comes to the sequence that you explained about the multi-vector policies.
And I guess you were referring mostly to Serbia because it's the only one in the Western Balkans that that has a multi-vector policy as a strategy that was approved not by this government but by the previous government of Boris Tadić, but continued and implemented now under Vučić. I think it's not that the sequence is not that there was a EU fatigue and then they went for a multi-vector policy. The multi-vector policy actually is far more embedded in the internal structural composition of the Serbian society, the history, but also the present political circumstances. And I think that the ambition in Belgrade is not to change the multi-vector policy once eventually gets EU membership, but actually bring that multi-vector view and policies in the EU, which will be of course celebrated by by some circles in the EU from AfD to to General Vannacci, I guess. But that is important to know because you rightly pointed out to the geopolitical aspect, but that geopolitical aspect does not correspond only to the EU's views, but also the geopolitical alignment of the candidate countries.
And that is the moment where we need to see how are they aligning.
Why I'm saying this and I'm concluding, because it has an effect not only in one country. And Madam Marović mentioned of course the case of Montenegro. Both Albania and Montenegro took advantage of the new geopolitical moment to show alignment with the EU, and that proved then very fruitful to make progress towards the EU for both countries. Nevertheless, continues to be a danger, for example for Montenegro, what is this situation with the multi-vector policy of Serbia. Just the last development, the military honors to Ratko Mladić.
And then you have the speaker of the Montenegrin parliament also going into that direction, creating an internal destabilization of Montenegro, because now you have a motion to replace him, which of course will have an effect on the ruling coalition. And if he's not replaced, of course the foreign minister that belongs to the Bosniak party will be in a difficult situation or will leave. In any case, a destabilization of the situation in Montenegro. And you see how that situation with the multi-vector issue in Belgrade can very easily destabilize neighboring countries. I will not explain for the others, but I think that this should be far more precisely described also when we talked about these issues and the geopolitical implications of enlargement.
Thank you very much.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Second group, S&D, Mr. Nacho Sánchez Amor is not here, Mr. Picula.
Thank you, Mr. Stier.
Tonino Picula
Thank you, Chair, and thanks esteemed panelists for their presentation and welcome to the European Parliament. I would like also to reflect on the issue we are talking about. In the post-Cold War period, the European Union's political and economic influence expanded as its neighbors adopted its norms and standards and became increasingly integrated with the European Union. EU enlargement transformed the European political and security landscape between 1998 and 2013 as the European Union grew from 12 to 28 member states. But it's my opinion golden age of EU enlargement is over.
The enlargement can only remain success if we protect the standards and make our Union stronger. Today the waiting room for membership is more crowded than ever in the last 22 years. But this must never be reason to lower our criteria. Every candidate country must be assessed on its own merits, achievements and commitment to the European values. The seven main waves of enlargement show that throughout its history, the Union has used enlargement as a tool for stabilization and integration.
But today, this logic is changing. Enlargement is no longer just a question of norms and standards, but also a question of security and counter-influence. Nevertheless, rule of law, democracy and respect for institutions are not boxes to be ticked. They are foundation of the European project. Membership must therefore be based on genuine and sustained progress, not political convenience.
We must also recognize the changing political environment within the Union itself. Growing pressure from the far right and euroskeptic forces across Europe ahead of key elections next year show that we have many challenges ahead. This is why we need an enlargement process that is both credible and measurable. In these days of particularly heightened tensions concerning the past, we all saw footage from the Belgrade, good neighborly relations are under high pressure again underlining the need to address outstanding bilateral changes. But in today's turbulent and deteriorating geopolitical environment, candidates must demonstrate not only formal alignment, but consistent and sustainable implementation.
My questions. Is the CFSP a conditio sine qua non for European enlargement as such, as shown in the case of measurable progress of these two countries, Montenegro and Albania?
And second, what about state of play regarding announced accession treaty with Montenegro? How do you see perspective right now? Thank you.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you, Mr. Picula. The first group, Patriots for Europe, Mr. Antonio Tânger Corrêa is not here. ECR, Mr. Adam Bielan or Mr. Sturdza? Okay, Mr. Sturdza, thank you. You have the floor.
Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza
Vă mulțumesc, domnule președinte. De la începutul mandatului meu am fost foarte implicat în ceea ce privește aderarea Balcanilor de Vest, țărilor din Balcanii de Vest la Uniunea Europeană. Mi se pare esențial, nu putem lăsa o zonă gri în mijlocul Europei în care dacă Uniunea Europeană ezită, ceilalți factori statali nu o vor face. În acest timp putem constata cu ușurință că sunt multe țări din Balcanii de Vest care și-au manifestat dorința lor de a deveni membre ale Uniunii Europene cu mult timp în urmă.
Dacă luăm cazul, de exemplu, al Republicii Macedonia de Nord, aceasta și-a manifestat această dorință încă din anul 2005. Oamenii sunt obosiți, au făcut foarte multe eforturi, inclusiv prin acceptarea schimbării denumirii țării după lungi dezbateri cu Grecia. Astăzi chestiuni bilaterale dintre Bulgaria și Republica Bulgaria și Republica Macedonia de Nord blochează sau cel puțin încetinesc acest proces. Pe de altă parte, da, mi se pare, v-am ascultat pe toți cu foarte mult interes și mi se pare esențial ceea ce s-a spus până acum, că în sensul în care dacă noi arătăm cu degetul mult prea des aceste țări sau unele dintre ele ca nefiind complet decise în a parcurge drumul acesta către integrare europeană, ei bine trebuie ca și noi la rândul nostru să dovedim un minimum de coerență, aș spune. Așa cum s-a spus mai devreme, da, regulile trebuie să fie foarte clare, regulile și standardele nu mai trebuie să fie schimbate în ultima clipă, cum prea des, din păcate, se întâmplă.
Evident, orice aderare trebuie să fie bazată doar pe merit, dar trebuie să știm exact de la bun început, de la începerea acestui joc, aș spune, care sunt regulile jocului. Trimiterea de experți în țările candidate, așa cum se întâmplă în cazul Muntenegrului, cazul cel mai, aș spune, fericit în ceea ce privește aderarea acestor state la Uniunea Europeană, trimiterea de acești candidați ar trebui să se facă și către celelalte state candidate din Balcanii de Vest. Sunt foarte bucuros să știu, să constat că Muntenegru nu are decât un plan A și nu dorește să întrevadă o altă posibilitate și sunt foarte respectuos în ceea ce privește dorința lor fermă de a face maximum ce depinde de dânșii pentru a adera la Uniunea Europeană, pentru a fi al 28-lea stat în 2028.
Sigur că în opinia mea este un test, va fi un test important cel al aderării Albaniei. Sunt foarte, sunt destul de optimist și în ceea ce privește aderarea acestui, să zicem, al doilea stat din Balcanii de Vest în ordinea de așteptare, aș spune. Însă consider că va fi un test important. Într-adevăr, cum s-a spus mai devreme, există printre noi, printre colegii noștri din Parlamentul European, există țări ale Europei de Vest care au ezitări serioase în ceea ce privește binefacerile unei asemenea extinderi. Încă o dată, dacă Uniunea Europeană, dacă anumite state europene ezită, alți factori externi nu vor ezita.
Vedem foarte bine investiții chineze în Serbia, vedem foarte bine achiziții de armament extraordinar de important în țări precum, precum Serbia. S-a spus mai devreme că Serbia are o politică multivectorială. Da, este adevărat, nu putem contesta acest lucru, dar mă întreb dacă doar Serbia, dacă nu cumva și Albania, nu sunt aici să critic, ba dimpotrivă, să susțin, însă lucrurile astea trebuie spuse cu sinceritate și privite cu sinceritate. Vă mulțumesc.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you very much, Mr. Sturza. Renew Group, Ms. Hilde Vautmans is not here. Mr. Auštrevičius. You have the floor.
Petras Auštrevičius
Thank you, Chair.
And let me to thank the authors of this paper analytical paper. We really need more like this I mean focused doesn't matter on single countries of the region or overall enlargement because much of prejudice prejudice about enlargement dominate public sphere. I'm speaking on behalf as standing rapporteur on enlargement in AFET as well as the former chief negotiator of my country Lithuania to EU accession. I know it by by deeds what enlargement is about. And indeed in spite of same repeated criteria principles for enlargement but we have to understand that overall discussion and understanding about enlargement policy differs much because of geopolitics of because of economic growth stages in in EU and globally and many factors in between.
But what really matters is not just a commitment for political commitment for enlargement itself, but in particular implementation. Implementation. So at time of 2000-2002, so on my desk I had a pile of papers concerning the harmonization of EU law, but on the right side implementation. So here I come to your study and your findings. What comes to Albania, the line is as a moderate stage of preparations to address capacity gaps in line ministries.
On Montenegro, the governance practice leaving a persistent gap between accession-related compliance and effective implementation. Believe me, there is nothing more important than stable and competent institutions. Otherwise new member states become a burden, a burden for EU and non-compliant, non-performing for itself. You pay more than you get, I mean frankly speaking. So what does it mean?
I mean having those findings, I mean how these things are addressed both in Albania and Montenegro?
Is there enough of political understanding? It's an issue for the Prime Minister, not for the only line ministers or heads of the departments in the line ministries. To what extent this is a political priority? And the second point you mentioned in your conclusions, that the growth plan didn't provide enough of results for Balkans. Balkans are exceptionally given six billion.
What is missing? It's loans and grants, six billion, it's a big money for relatively small population-wise region, economies as well. What is really missing in order to provide and give back additional impetus for an kind of promotion for economic growth? Have you analyzed more in details? Thank you.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you, Mr. Auštrevičius. Group Greens/EFA, Ms. Hannah Neumann is not here. Mr. Waitz.
Thomas Waitz
Thank you, Chair, and I thank the speakers and the authors of this analysis. Let me build on something colleague Marović said. Welcome here to the European Parliament, by the way, once again.
You talked about Iceland, which is not really the topic today, but it's very much linked to the enlargement. Well, usually I wouldn't consider the Trump administration being smart, rather being full of personal greed and egoism. But in that case, unfortunately, they were smart enough to publish the all-American map including Canada, Greenland, and Iceland and Mexico just a few days or weeks after this referendum in Iceland. Would they have published this map before the referendum, I tell you the result would be different, unfortunately. Here they seem to be, it seems that they were partially smart.
I would like to build on the statements of my colleagues Davor Stier, Tonino Picula, and colleague Auštrevičius because it spares me some of the interventions I wanted to do. Well, let me start with Montenegro. I mean, the difference between Montenegro and Albania is that Montenegro has shown quite a vital democratic development. So multiple parties, different governments, the country and the political actors have learned that cooperation is key, is the key ingredient of democracy.
And this is a bit of a, no, it's actually a substantial difference than what we see in Albania, also when it comes to dealing with the, let's say, obstacles and difficulties of implementation, as colleague Osterrieth just said. We're having a situation where Montenegro is really far in deciding on legislation. On the implementation side, we still have a lot to do, but there is a movement into the right direction. So you can see implementation speeding up, you can see implementation more and more taking ground on the floor, and this is also perceived by population. That's also why population is more supportive also of the political actors in the country.
But this is the opposite what is happening in Albania now. And I mean, you mentioned it with one or two sentences, but what I see is that in Albania, unfortunately, more and more decisions are taken that are perceived by population to be against the wish of population, to be against the national interest. We're having investors all around the region that try to seek the opportunity and grab the best bits and pieces of the country. But the difference is how is society, but also how is politics dealing with the resistance.
And if you compare, I don't know, the investors on Velika Plaža in the very south of Montenegro, which is by the way the same investors that we're seeing in Vjosa-Narta Delta and Sazan, but the way the country is dealing with, let's say, also the question marks that arise around that is substantially different. And seeing a situation in Albania where there's a proposal to privatize, or to allow privatization of big parts of the country, including nature protected areas, in a country that has no cadastre, where there's still a lot of disputes on who actually owns the land, where Ottoman documents go against Albanian documents from the communist times, against Italian documents. But privatization seems to go pretty fast, while people that claim, want to claim their land are blocked in a seven-year procedure because there's still a lack of courts and so on and judges. So, so we have to be aware, and also Albania has to be aware, that in the last month you have lost a lot of public support. And we can talk about implementation, we can talk about, you know, legislation, constitutional amendments and so on, but at the end of the day you will need the votes of member states.
And if you create even the impression that there's impunity for corruption, and if you only create the impression that there is the possibility for shady investors that are on sanctioned lists, that are allegedly suspected to be close to organized crime, you are really risking the good image that you have been building and you're substantially risking that member states will finally give you a yes. And unfortunately, and this is my question, you say it's geopolitical objectives always and merit-based conditionality. I have the suspicion that Albania thinks that geopolitical objectives are so strong in the moment that it doesn't matter anymore so much whether we really implement European legislation, whether we really follow the rule of law, because they will anyway want to take us because of geopolitical threats that we all share. Please give me a feedback on that question, whether you share this opinion or whether I'm on the wrong track here and I might misunderstand something happening on the ground. Thank you very much.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you, Mr. Waitz. The Left group, Mr. Marc Botenga, it's here? He left. He left. S&D, Stanislav Stoyanov, Mr. Stanislav Stoyanov?
He's not here. Sorry. Standing rapporteur on Albania, Mr. Andreas Schieder, it's here? No. No.
Okay. Marjan Šarec? Yes, it's here. The standing rapporteur for Montenegro, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Thank you.
Marjan Šarec
Firstly, thank you for this timely and important study. I particularly welcome that it gives fair and honest credit to Montenegro's progress because recognizing real progress is essential in the enlargement process if it is to remain credible. The study also makes an important point. The economic cost of Western Balkans enlargement is often exaggerated. In Montenegro's case, this argument is especially weak.
Thank you.
With a population of around 630,000, the economic and migration concerns usually raised in enlargement debates simply do not apply in the same scale. The remaining obstacles are primary political. Montenegro has opened all 33 negotiating chapters, 18 are provisionally closed, and the pace is accelerating. I therefore agree that closing the remaining chapters by the end of 2026 is realistic, but only if there is genuine political commitment on both sides. Candidate countries must deliver reforms, but the European Union must also remain engaged, consistent, and ready to act when conditions are met.
There is also a geopolitical geopolitical urgency. Montenegro's Adriatic position has attracted sustained interest from Russia, China and Gulf states through investment, infrastructure and political influence. Every delay creates more space for actors who do not necessarily share our interests or values. And the wider region is watching closely to see whether the European path truly delivers. As rapporteur, I also strongly support deeper parliamentary engagement.
My work is not limited to government contacts, I regularly engage with parliament, civil society, journalists and local authorities. Having served as a mayor myself, I also try to bring practical experience to cooperation at local level. Finally, credibility must work both ways. We rightly demand consistency from candidate countries, but the Union must apply its own conditionality fairly and consistently. Montenegro matters now because it is the country where the remaining obstacles are closest to being cleared.
This study gives us a strong basis to act accordingly. Thank you. Sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry. Let us give the floor back to our experts for the answers. The first is Jovana Marović, Ms. Jovana Marović for the answer.
You have the floor.
Jovana Marović
Thank you very much. Let me start with the recent, let's say, affair in Montenegro regarding the Speaker of the Parliament who was involved in this praising of the war criminal. I think that the European Union is acting same as our ruling Europe Now party at the moment. So it's really important to highlight that no country can join the European Union if it's not respecting the decision of the international courts. No country can join the European Union if the far-right parties are in the government, which are not sharing the European values.
And that's the way how you are helping us to have the clearly pro-European government after the elections in 2027.
But that's not the way how the European Union is acting. There were double standards even in the case of Serbia where it was quite clear what happened during the funeral of convicted war criminal. It was one statement the day during the funeral day from the European Commission and tomorrow there was completely different statement but without consequences. So we are still waiting to see what will be the reaction from the European Union. And the way Serbia is using this situation to destabilize chances of Montenegro to join the European Union are really high because they are allies in the government even though they are pretending now to be more pro-European than they are clearly on the European path, which is not the case.
Because they are allies of Aleksandar Vučić and that's we have to fight together regarding this biggest enemy of the regional stability and our European perspective. The other part is about common foreign security policy. And thank you for that question because that was the topic of my postdoc thesis.
I have to say that I don't see that the common foreign security policy is condition when it comes to progressing towards the European Union. There is lots of pressure on the countries to deliver and to align the legislation and sanctions and all the decisions with the European Union, but without clear incentives and sanctions if you are delivering or if you are not delivering. Because the European Union introduced, European Commission introduced the incentives and sanctions with the revised enlargement methodology, and the first tool to be able to actually punish country was the growth plan, but the common foreign security policy is not the part of the package. It's not the part of the reform agenda. And Serbia is the clear example how the European Union is tolerating if you are not aligned with the common foreign security policy, because Serbia is the only one which is around 50%.
All the other countries are around 100%, with Albania and Montenegro fully aligned. And Kosovo is the country which is also fully aligned, and the European Commission is even not including this in the annual report. So that's the way how you are not helping the country to be on European track.
I see it as it should be one of the conditions in order to become a member of the European Union, but at the moment I don't see that the European Union is using it as a clear incentive for the countries. And in the case of Montenegro, it was not easy actually to have these sanctions towards Russia, especially because Russia was one of the first places when it comes to direct investment. And Russia was at the first place when it comes to buying properties at the seaside. Our tourism is also was highly dependent on tourists coming from Russia. So it wasn't an easy decision to have all of these packages implemented in Montenegro, but we are following the rules and that's how we should be, there should be incentives when it comes to the common foreign security policy.
When it comes to accession treaty, I have to say that in, for example, in March when I was in Paris, it was a completely different situation when it comes to perspective of our and our chances to join the European Union. The messages were really negative. And then just one month after that, this conclusion came coming from the ambassadors of the EU member states to establish ad hoc group. It was really one of the biggest milestones when it comes to our accession process. It's good that the group has regular meetings, but we still don't have any results coming from that.
I think that it's really important to have public statements how the work is progressing. It's really important not just to focus on technical matters because the political part is most important part. And I don't see that, for example, the session of the European Council in October should be about safeguards. It should be about the message that they will be fair and they will be based on how to protect the rule of law and not how to downgrade the membership. I think that maybe this group is one of the tools how to delay the whole process, but it should not be.
The results should be as fast as possible and they should be presented to the public. I yes, I agree that safeguards are an important part of the whole process, but the most important part is to have concrete results. Then about whether Montenegro has a plan B, it does not have. And I also agree that's good because we want to be part of the European Union.
We want to be part of the European Union by 2028. I also think that there is no plan B and that's good actually because there is no alternative when it comes to the European Union and the rest because there is no other framework which is providing democracy for the countries which are, which want to strengthen democracy. But we should have better advocacy and lobbying plan when it comes to ratification process. And that's something that should be also clearly highlighted in the public what we are planning together to do in order to secure this majority in all EU member states. And that's in my opinion also part of the internal reform of the European Union.
That's how you are becoming stronger. Then about implementation gap, I agree of course, but that's mainly how the conditionality work because so far all the pressure is about delivering legislation, about delivering and preparing and adopting the laws and strategies and the other regulation. It's still not on implementation.
We are still waiting for this pressure on the institutions to deliver when it comes to track record and when it comes to clear independency of the institutions. But I also have to say that the same problem is is recording in the European Union, when it comes, for example, to safeguards and the rule of law reforms which are now presented and prepared by the European Commission. The way how the European Commission was trying to punish, for example, Hungary or Slovenia in the past or or Poland because of not protecting the human rights or not safeguarding democracy, the enforcement was the biggest problem, because all the instruments are there, but there is no clear political will to implement it and to punish EU member states.
So I see it as a part of the of the bigger project and the it's not just about political will in Montenegro because there is lack of political will, but it's also how the European Union is providing framework to to to put pressure on the institutions because so far it's not that pressure is not enough to to provide results. Then about yes, I agree with Mr. Waitz that the democratic development that Montenegro cannot compare with any other country in the Western Balkans when it comes to democratic development, even though we are not happy in the country, but comparing to the rest, we are far better, that's that's for sure. And I have to to really highlight this agreement between opposition and the ruling coalition. At the moment, out of 81 MPs, we have 77, I think. Just four members of the far-right political party is not cooperating because of the other interests and because of of Serbia's involvement.
But I have to say that public support is still high. It's of course there is a great disappointment when it comes to the economic standard, when it comes to level of democracy, but when it comes to the European Union, support is always around 70%. And let me remind you that we are 14 years in the process. There were lots of ups and downs and there was never clear whether we will join at all the European Union.
So I have to say that the support is better in the country which is still uncertain whether will be inside comparing to the rest of and comparing to the EU member state. But I'm afraid that after this momentum, after this euphoria that we are joining in 2028, I'm afraid what will be the outcome of the next elections if we are not getting closer. And then finally, yes, I agree with the biggest issue is ratification in the EU member states. But I also see it as a joint project. We have to work together on it.
It's about whether the European Union is getting bigger, getting stronger. I think that it cannot be stronger if it's not bigger and that's how it is. Thank you.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you, thank you very much, Ms. Marović. Ms. Kiselah-Haxhi, please, you have the floor.
Krisela Hackaj
Thank you. So shortly on CFSP, Albania is fully aligned, as Mateo has mentioned as well in the study. So my answer here is short, Albania has since many years aligned fully with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. No plan B as well, only plan A, as Montenegro.
But we should be careful in exploring more and more as the finish, so to speak, at least target line for Albania nears, to understand the implications if there is a rejection by certain member states to ratification of a treaty with Albania, what happens? So we, I don't know, provisionally have closed all the chapters, so we are technically okay for EU to join, but there is no political decision. What happens? What is the treatment that comes after? What is the relationship between the EU and Albania be like?
What form it would take? What kind of oversight, what kind of monitoring mechanism will be put in place if this happens? So we should, experts, European Parliament, but as well many stakeholders that work on enlargement policy should already think of that. When it comes to implementation, this is very dear to our daily work because we work a lot on monitoring implementation, especially when it comes to the financial instruments which we have under implementation in Albania, currently IPA still, but also the reform and growth facility.
And I think we can do more, especially when it comes to the future instruments in the moment of design of the instruments themselves. Because it's there in the regulation where you already include certain safeguards that do protect us, the Commission, so the Union, in ensuring that those instruments do really deliver when it comes to the standards and when it comes to the implementation and when it comes to the support that those instruments provide our country in terms of developing our institutions, in terms of developing the life of our citizens. It also is a matter of, especially the implementing, the regulation are very general. So it's a lot depending on the Commission implementing decision. So we know in practice the enlargement policy works as a direct relationship between the Commission and the government.
All the other stakeholders, including here businesses, media, civil society organizations, etc., should be involved in this process of design since the very beginning. It's very important in order to safeguard and to protect the interest of the money that it's coming and it's being invested in the region. Now there is more and more focus on implementation compared to before. Of course, there is a time pressure when it comes to adopting legislation. And we are seeing it this every day in terms of legislative agenda of the parliament, of our parliament, adopting legislation.
As a civil society, but also other stakeholders, especially businesses, complain about having not sufficient time to consult, to read, to go through all the pieces of legislation that are being adopted. So we acknowledge this gap that we have right now in terms of being fully informed of all types of legislation that will affect in the short term, but also of course in the medium term and long term our lives, our businesses, our life and so on. So it is also about trying to match the speed of the process that it has right now with the on-the-ground work that is being done by the government and the shortage of of course human capacities that we have in the public administration dealing with all the reporting exercises, starting of course with the negotiation which is top priority, but as well with the regional agendas. Jovana mentioned Berlin Process, we have others as well. Of course, the reporting on the Reform and Growth Facility is also very intensive and time-demanding and this is a lot to to...
But here we can help, civil society can help, but should be much more involved. But also the local and regional authorities. This one was... their inclusion in the Reform and Growth Facility, for example, in the reform agendas was neglected in the very beginning of this facility.
And now we see that they are far away from understanding how this instrument works in practice, what eventually delivers for the citizens in their territories. And I think in the design of the future instrument, there is much more that we can do. And of course, this house and the Parliament can do in terms of involvement, of hearing, of consultation with the parties on the ground to absorb and to embed as much as possible, of course, their comments and their lessons learned on a daily practice in the future regulations. One thing about which is also connected to implementation, but it's the oversight by the European Parliament. Because this is something, I mean, we have the oversight of the Commission on a daily basis when it comes to reforms, when it comes to the legislation that we are adopting, but we need more and more oversight also by the European Parliament.
So much more focus on the governance, let's say, mechanisms that will be part of the new instruments, because the current ones are, let's say, designed. Much more emphasis on a dialogue that should happen, for example, on the new instruments, not once per year, but much more intensive, bringing in the voices of the civil society, bringing in the voices of businesses and of the local and regional authorities. And this is very, very important.
We have this, this kind of concerns we have tried to, to include as well in the opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee. Now, when it comes to the protest, I see them as a maturity of our democracy, that we have more and more voices coming out, being there. And it's a test for our society, it's a test for our institutions, it's a test for our leadership to hear, to articulate responses, to implement mitigation measures of the concerns that are there. Some of them are not new. You mentioned the property rights, property rights issue where it's an old issue in Albania.
It's not something that came with this protest. It's very old. And currently, I think the government has issued certain pieces of legislation on reforming the institutional, let's say, system when it comes to the property institution, I mean the institutions that deal with the properties in Albania. We will see whether those institutional changes are enough to ensure that actually the problems are being addressed and the citizens receive right, receive their, let's say, their concerns an answer by the new institutions. It's one thing establishing new institution, it's another thing having them implement, exactly, having them implement the rules, having the integrity.
And that's why I mentioned in my intervention, starting intervention, that once we have institutions that do care and do have integrity rules and are showing that they respond to the citizens' concerns, we must protect them from the interferences of the political establishment, but as well from others, let's say. And there is also one document that I wanted to mention, which is part of the enlargement, let's say, package, which is we have a roadmap on the functioning of the democratic institutions, part of the fundamentals cluster. In this document and this action plan, we should see whether we have an evolution, a good evolution and good, let's say, improvement when it comes to the institutions in our country and the way they are responding to and they are delivering services and they are responding to the citizens' concerns. That document, for example, it's only laws adopted, changes in the institutions, but it's not really focused on the impact. That's why it's very important to include since the very beginning the real indicators that do measure the professionality of all the changes that will be incurred, because we need not just one act or bylaw or a law to be adopted, but actually we need how the institution is, you know, changing and it's improving eventually the life.
So it's also about how we, on a daily basis, basically implement the enlargement policy. There was, I think, four other questions on Montenegro. Yeah, I think I covered, but if I didn't, I mean, happy to add.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you, thank you, Ms. Hakaj. Dottore Bonomi, ora ha la parola. You have the floor.
Matteo Bonomi
Thank you, thank you very much, and thank you for the word of appreciation of the study, they're very welcome. I got several questions, the study starting from the one on Serbia and its the origin of its multi-vectoral foreign policy. I mean, I think we are a bit in a kind of chicken and egg discussion. We are both right to a certain extent, and of course Serbia provide different starting position condition that the other country, and probably is a more different case.
At the same time, if we look for instance at opinion polls in the country in 2001, we would be surprised how much the orientation of the country was much more pro-West and a much better perception of NATO than they have today. So the place where they stand now is clearly the product of many years of also our policy towards the country. And I think to a certain extent, if we look at other political elite in the country, the current political elite made very realistic calculation that the EU probably was not much serious about their engagement with the EU. And if you look at politicians in other countries that bet all their political eggs in one basket, the EU, they are probably out of politics, look at North Macedonia for instance. So I think this is really the product of also of years of engagement that have reinforced this attitude that probably was already present in the country, but we provided the wrong incentive to change this attitude.
And of course, you mentioned also the different political color of government in Serbia, and I think exactly on this, also on this nationalistic rhetoric, we got certainly an acceleration in recent years. Probably it was after the big financial economic crisis when Vučić came into power. And as we have seen also in other European countries, we have seen this mix about somehow neoliberal economic policies at home, keeping salary low and using very strong nationalistic rhetoric to justify why they had to do that. I mean, we have seen something similar in Hungary, probably. I mean, it's really a product probably of a complex policy basket that we offer to the region that probably provide greater incentive to do this kind of politics rather than try to change and to have a different path.
So I think we have our own big responsibility for that. Of course, Serbia is more difficult case than Albania for this issue, but it's history and we cannot forget different history of different countries. Second, the gap between legislation and implementation. Of course, I mean, it's one thing that emerged from the study and, I mean, of course you cannot have a perfectly functioning system of democratic system in overnight.
The time since somehow the accession process was relaunched, since there are more credible incentives for asking for core reform in the rule of law is relatively recent. And so I think we should invest in this process, not to step back because there might be still some lack in implementation. And we have seen how exclusion and stigmatization does not produce democracy or good governance. So I think inclusion should go on. Of course, we need to be smarter in use our safeguard mechanism for candidate countries, but also for member states.
And I think in that direction should go the cautious that of course comes together with once observing that maybe implementation lack a bit behind the legislative work. And this somehow it was linked also with the question on such persistent socioeconomic gap, if we have not done enough and the growth plan was mentioned.
The reality, if we compare just the amount of resources provided to candidate country and neighboring EU member state, this gap remain huge. And if you look at Southeastern European country receive like from seven to ten time more EU funds per capita than candidate country. And of course this provide a huge divergence in growth rate. And we have seen every time a new country access the European Union, you had a new divergence between those that were in and those that were out. So the growth plan was not an effective move to bridge this gap, as it was not the economic investment plan of Varhelyi.
They signal the problem that convergence has not happened and that probably much more should be done even in the pre-accession phase. But then they never touch the taboo that is providing more resources even before accession because it's a very difficult topic, but this is the result. You have divergence or stagnation instead of convergence in socio-economic terms. And of course, this helps construct these socio-economic fabrics that also feed into nationalistic rhetoric that help also those that do not align with the West. And finally, about my last comment about protest, and I mean, I'm very much in line with Grizela.
I think the fact that you can have protests that they appeal to the European framework, it's a good sign that and can reinforce EU conditionality. It's not a negative sign, it's a sign that of course each country has its own different story and different street towards democracy and to consolidate democracy. But still, I think this very strong social support for also for the vetting, for the SPAK, for all these anti-corruption measures that were pushed by the EU, were possible because in Albanian society there is a huge support for them. And this is and so Albanian people are the best ally for European condition in asking for tough reform. Thank you.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you.
Thank you very much. În încheierea discuției de astăzi, doresc să le mulțumesc invitaților noștri, doamna Jovana Marović, doamna Cristela Hakaj, domnul doctor Matteo Bonomi, distinșilor mei colegi eurodeputați, pentru perspectivele oferite care contribuie la eforturile noastre mai ample privind extinderea. Extinderea rămâne unul dintre cele mai puternice instrumente strategice ale Uniunii Europene, însă credibilitatea sa depinde de angajamentul politic al ambelor părți și de rezultate concrete în materie de reforme. Albania și Muntenegru au demonstrat că este posibil să se înregistreze progrese semnificative. În viitor, alinierea continuă la standardele Uniunii Europene și angajamentul politic susținut vor fi esențiale pentru integrarea regiunii.
Comisia AFET va continua să sprijine ambii parteneri pe parcursul procesului lor de aderare. Vă mulțumesc foarte mult. Trecem la punctul 9 al zilei de astăzi în Comisia AFET, situația dreptului internațional și riscurile la adresa multilateralismului, democrației și Uniunii Europene.
Stimați colegi, să trecem la examinarea proiectului de raport privind situația dreptului internațional și riscurile la adresa multilateralismului, democrației și Uniunii Europene. Într-un moment în care rivalitatea geopolitică și revenirea la o politică bazată pe putere exercită o presiune din ce în ce mai mare asupra sistemului internațional, este mai important ca niciodată să ne intensificăm eforturile de apărare a dreptului internațional și a ordinii multilaterale bazate pe norme. Acest raport ne oferă ocazia de a prezenta modul în care Uniunea Europeană poate răspunde acestor provocări într-un mod mai coerent și mai strategic, de a-și reafirma angajamentul ferm față de dreptul internațional și de a contribui la consolidarea capacității Uniunii Europene de a apăra principiile și instituțiile multilateralismului într-un moment în care sistemul multilateral este din ce în ce mai amenințat. Aș dori să-l invit pe raportor, pe Mr. Elio Di Rupo, să-și prezinte proiectul de raport. Sir Di Rupo, you have the floor.
Elio Di Rupo
Dear chair, dear colleagues, our Parliament and in particular our committee has already extensively analyzed the major changes in the geopolitical context. The draft report of multilateralism, therefore, does not seek to repeat what we already know. Given the gravity of the situation, I have chosen to focus on internal reforms of the EU that could enable it to become a more influential actor on the international stage. Given the complexity and importance of the issues at stake, choices and compromises must be made. I want to insist, let us focus on the reforms that the Union could implement internally, reforms that we as Europeans could successfully carry out.
Thank you, Chair.
Let us start with the United Nations.
We have to recognize that reforming the Security Council currently seems impossible. Why not establish strategic coordination between EU Member States within the different United Nations bodies through the EEAS? This would at least help address the lack of coherence between Member States, and it would strengthen the visibility and effectiveness of European messages. Furthermore, why not use France's permanent seat on the Security Council to promote not only its national positions, but also European positions? The draft report also responds to the constructive call made by the Canadian Prime Minister.
So, the draft report calls for the High Representative to be given a mandate to launch a diplomatic initiative and, above all, to present a communication setting out a roadmap to bringing together middle powers.
This diplomatic initiative should also seek to involve regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN, CELAC and/or Mercosur, as well as countries from the Global South. Mr. Chair, to be credible, the Union needs to uphold the rule of law within its own borders, in particular by strengthening and extending rule of law conditionalities. The Union's international credibility also requires us to firmly support justice against those who attack and threaten it. I propose that we firmly protect one of the few multilateral institutions created by states from the European continent, the International Criminal Court and its members. I must also express my concern about the use of extraterritorial measures by non-European powers.
As you know, such decisions can have serious consequences for our companies and European citizens. So, should we not urge the Commission to make use of the EU blocking statute?
We should also insist that our member states strictly comply with the decisions of the International Court of Justice. The draft report also calls on the Council to establish an annual session of the Foreign Affairs Council dedicated to multilateralism and international rules. The objective would be to regularly assess the situation, identify new multilateral initiatives and improve coordination ahead of major international negotiations. We could also argue that this reform should be accompanied by a move towards qualified majority voting in the Council for decisions on common foreign and security policy that fall within the Union's competence. The draft report also calls for a stronger European External Action Service.
The EEAS should become the genuine strategic center for all the European Union's external instruments. The aim is to ensure greater coherence between all these instruments of the EU currently at the Commission or in other bodies.
Naturally, the treaties must of course be respected. Dear colleagues, the many different faces and institutions speaking for the Union internationally undermine our credibility. Our draft report calls for a clearer system of external representation for the Union to put an end to the cacophony at the top. The world needs one, only and only one face representing the EU. To conclude, the rules-based international order is facing a profound existential crisis.
Clearly, we have returned to a world where might makes right. My conviction is that the EU has the tool to help bring about change this situation. This is the objective we are invited to pursue through our amendments. I look forward to working with each shadow rapporteur and with all of you, dear colleagues.
Thank you very much.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Ah, sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry. EPP is not here, Mr. Beke. Mr. Patriots, Mr. Tanger Correa is not here. ECR, Mr. Kools.
Rihards Kols
Mr. Kools is here. You have the floor.
Thank you. Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you very much, Mr. Ruoppo, for the draft report. And obviously, the subject could hardly be more timely. International law, democracy, democracy in particular, has been in decline for the past two decades and multilateralism are under sustained pressure. There is no illusion about that.
The question before us is whether this report will merely describe that pressure or whether it will identify those responsible and propose a response equal to the challenge. The diagnosis is partially there. The draft refers to the geopolitical rivalry, the paralysis of the UN Security Council, and the growing influence of China.
Yet the operative text still avoids a plain political conclusion. International law is not eroding by accident, it is being broken deliberately. Russia wages a war of aggression against Ukraine, violates its neighbor's sovereignty, commits war crimes and uses its Security Council veto to shield itself from consequences. China increasingly uses economic coercion, political pressure and technological dependencies to reshape international rules in its own interests. These are not abstract pressures on multilateralism, these are deliberate actions by states that benefit from a weaker international system.
We should also call conduct by its proper name. Sabotage is sabotage. Foreign interference is foreign interference. Coercion is coercion. War is war.
Hiding these realities behind the convenient label of hybrid threats does not make Europe safer. It makes our language less honest and our response less focused. Our amendments from the ECR will therefore seek to strengthen the report where it matters. More direct language on Russian aggression and China's coercive conduct, concrete demands for accountability and a stronger focus on resilience against sabotage, foreign interference and strategic dependencies. We should also remain grounded in the treaties.
Europe needs stronger defense capabilities and a stronger European pillar of NATO.
Yet defense remains first and foremost a responsibility of competence of the member states. So this report will be judged by simple test. Does it name those breaking the rules and does it demand consequences? And Europe, to tell you bluntly, cannot defend international law through euphemisms. Thanks.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mr. Kools. Renew Group, Mr. Dan Barna, please, you have the floor.
Dan Barna
Thank you. Thank you, Chair. This report is of course more than timely. We have never seen such a disturbing deterioration of the liberal world order. The fundamental rules and agreements are being broken every day and it feels like the ground is shaking under our feet.
We find ourselves in the completely, completely new global environment. This is of course presented immense risk for the EU, both immediate and long-term. But more than anything else, such changes require a major revision of our strategy on engaging with the rest of the world. In my view, this report allow us to shape the vision on what is the role of the EU in this new reality.
Not as a passive perceiver of changes, but as an actor that can be, that can and must make a difference. This report reinforces the messages that we as the Parliament sent in our January resolution on the implementation of the EU common foreign and security policy, as well as in the report on the UN General Assembly that we vote this May. We have largely agreed on our perspective on these situations. Now the questions remains what we are going to do about it. As Renew shadow, I will submit amendments that stress the global role of the EU and suggest steps and bold decisions that we need to take to be strong and effective in defending ourselves and the rule-based global order.
Thank you, sir.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you very much, Mr. Barna. Group Renew, Ms. Nela Liel, please, to give a floor.
Nela Riehl
Thank you, Chair. I want to start by warmly welcoming this draft report. Thank you, rapporteur. It comes at a moment when international law and also multilateralism are under real pressure, we all know that, and this text rises to that moment. Every element in it, from the citations to the substance of the articles, reflects issues I consider generally important and I look forward to working together with you constructively to even strengthen it further.
On defending international law, I fully share the framing that the EU's credibility rests on our consistency within the UN system and international law.
That said, I do believe that the language on our support for the ICC and the ICJ needs to go even further. Given the moment we're in, it has to be unambiguous. On rebuilding multilateralism, excellent that we highlight middle powers, regional cooperation, and also flexible issue-based partnerships. Alongside international law, reliability, partnerships, sorry, reliable partnerships are the backbone of global stability. If we don't build genuinely attractive offers all around common interests and issue-based cooperation, the EU risks to lose its seat at the table in the decades ahead.
On democratic resilience, I'll be proposing additional language on education, also active citizenship, and on inequalities' effects on social cohesion as core components of resilience. And finally, on the EEAS and HRVP, any reform must strengthen their capacities and toolbox, not to weaken their autonomy, and I think that's clear. So I really much look forward to the negotiations, and thank you very much again.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
The Left, not here. ECR, Tomasz Froelich is not here.
And thank you, thank you very much. Now let me give the floor to Ms. Ester Orsini-Rosenberg, Deputy Head of Division for Multilateral Relations for two minutes. Give the floor, Ms. Ester.
Ester Orsini-Rosenberg
Thank you very much, Chair, Rapporteur De Lupo and honorable members. Thank you for the opportunity to address your committee. We appreciate the engagement of the European Parliament in the work on this timely report. We're just a week ahead of the start of the 81st UN General Assembly and at a critical moment for multilateralism, as many of you have pointed out. We share much of the draft report's assessment, which coincide with the work we are currently undertaking at the EEAS.
Defending effective multilateralism is both a matter of principle and a strategic European interest. As we reconfirmed in the Council conclusions on EU priorities during the 81st UN General Assembly, EU action remains firmly anchored in respect for international law and the UN Charter, including the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Accountability for violations of international law remains central, which is why the EU will continue to strongly support the ICC and the ICJ and defend their independence and effective functioning. We remain firm in the commitment to human rights for everyone and everywhere. But defending multilateralism also means reforming it, which is a clear necessity and why we are strongly supporting the ongoing UNAT reform initiative, a unique opportunity to advance towards a more effective and cost-efficient United Nations able to deliver for the people it serves. Our political commitment is also backed by predictable and reliable resources. We remain by far the largest financial contributor to the UN system, paying in full and on time, and the world's largest provider of development assistance.
Close to 50% of global ODA allow us to contribute to sustainable development of resilient societies. While others disengage, we remain present and are working on strengthening partnerships across regions and with and through CELAC, ASEAN and the African Union, reaching beyond our traditional like-minded partners to build broader coalitions and around areas of convergence. As a last point, our collective weight is of course most efficient when we stay united respecting the principles of sincere cooperation and mutual solidarity, and as the HRVP underlined after the Gymnich discussion last week, we ought to look more seriously at constructive abstentions and other tools the treaties provide. So we look forward to continued close dialogue as work on this important report progresses and thank you for the opportunity to address you. Thanks.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Orsini-Rosenberg. Finally, the floor goes back to the rapporteur, Mr. Elio Di Rupo, for these final remarks for two minutes. Please, you have the floor.
Elio Di Rupo
Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Indeed, I'm open to improve the draft report, especially that it's very, very short for technical reasons. I would like just to stress a few points. Indeed, we can speak for many years the reasons of the difficulties of international law and multilateralism institutions. But the reasons are external, but also internal.
And indeed, we can speak a lot about external reasons, but I'm not sure that here we are able to change something for the next few years.
So I suggest to our colleagues to focus our attention to try to use our tools in the EU to be more credible on the international stage. And I would say once again that I will have a contact with each shadow rapporteur, also with the lady. But I stress, I insist, indeed I need a majority, but I insist that if we can focus on what we are able to do concretely, it would be better than many, many words, many pages saying the same thing since ten years without any effect. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan
Thank you very much, thank you Mr. Di Rupo. Thank you colleagues. The deadline for amendments is set on 24 September and 17. The vote in AFET is foreseen in 25, 26 January 2027. Thank you for this day and good luck and have a nice weekend.
Bye, thank you.
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