Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Ordinary meeting
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ECON European Parliament
Follow its sittingsMarkus Ferber
Wir haben als EVP-Fraktion ebenfalls eine Reihe von Änderungsanträgen eingereicht, die darauf hinzielen, den Kommissionstext zu erhalten oder aber, was die Koordinierungsrolle der ESMA oder was die Vorgaben zur Auslagerung von Dienstleistungen betrifft, ein pragmatisches Regime zu schaffen. Wir sind dabei als EVP offen, bei den zentralen Fragen aus dem Kommissionsvorschlag, ESMA-Koordinierung, Auslagerung, Pass für Verwahrstellen, tragfähige Kompromisse zu finden. Ich hoffe, dass uns das auch gelingt, das wäre dringend notwendig, wenn wir hier Fortschritte erzielen wollen. Es gibt aber auch einige Elemente, wo ich wirklich keine Kompromissbereitschaft habe, ich sage das in dieser Deutlichkeit. Die Streichung der Nebentätigkeitsausnahme trifft Energie- und Rohstoffunternehmen, die weder Kundengelder halten noch Zugang zur Zentralbankliquidität haben, aber sie wären mit Eigenkapitalanforderungen in Milliardenhöhe betroffen.
Das hat mit Marktintegration nichts zu tun.
Die Kommission hat selbst im Rahmen ihrer eigenen Überprüfungen keine belastbaren Erkenntnisse gefunden, die eine solche Streichung rechtfertigen würden. Das Ergebnis wären am Ende höhere Energiepreise für die Wirtschaft und für uns als Privatverbraucher, mitten in einer Phase, wo wir auf Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und bezahlbare Energiepreise angewiesen sind. Auch schärfere Positionslimits bringen nicht mehr Marktintegrität, sondern ziehen Liquidität aus den betroffenen Märkten zu Lasten der Preisstabilität. Das sind Dinge, die wir als EVP auf keinen Fall mittragen können. Und lassen Sie mich zum Schluss noch ein paar wenige Sätze zur Settlement Finality Regulation sagen, zur Verordnung.
Hier stellt sich die Ausgangslage anders dar. Der Berichtsentwurf ist bereits sehr, sehr gut und ausgewogen gegenüber mit Verbesserungen gegenüber dem Kommissionsvorschlag. Es ist ein sehr technisches Dossier. Das Ziel, maximale Rechtssicherheit über den Zeitpunkt der Abwicklungsendgültigkeit hinaus sowie die technologische Offenheit zu erreichen, wird damit gut erreicht. Gemessen an diesem Maßstab sind die meisten der eingereichten Änderungsanträge hilfreich und tragen zur Klarheit des Textes bei.
Viele greifen genau diese Logik auf: Technologieneutralität, einheitlicher Zeitpunkt der Abwicklungsendgültigkeit, praktische Ergänzungen wie ein Bestandsschutz für bereits benannte Systeme, damit die bestehenden Zentralverwahrer und zentrale Gegenparteien nicht unnötig durch ein neues Benennungsverfahren müssen.
Ich denke, das ist ein gutes Signal für das Dossier. Ich glaube, da ist es sehr, sehr gut möglich, hier eine gemeinsame Basis zu finden. Wir hatten ja jetzt schon zwei Treffen und treffen uns nächste Woche wieder als Verhandlungsteam. Ich bin da sehr zuversichtlich, dass wir am Ende eine gute und starke Position in allen drei Bereichen erreichen werden. Wir haben einen ambitionierten Zeitplan.
Der Rat will Mitte Oktober oder Ende Oktober ja schon seine allgemeine Ausrichtung formulieren, und deswegen sollten wir als Parlament da zeitlich nicht hinterherhinken. Ich hoffe, dass uns das auch mit gutem Willen gelingt. Vielen Dank.
Eero Heinäluoma
Thank you, dear colleagues. I have tabled some important amendments of this package, and for my group, it's really essential that we put the bar of ambition enough high. This is the main question here: are we really going forward, or are we just making some small corrections to the structures as they are now? From my point of view, we just cannot afford to be satisfied with just another small step forward.
We have been walking for 40 years with a completely fragmented market as result. We therefore all know that sticking to the status quo or some cosmetic changes, this will not do the trick. Today we need more a quantum leap. And that is where my group comes from and how we will assess also the compromises. MiSP is of course a key package consisting of three pillars and we should keep it as a package.
Last time I have outlined the priorities around the master directive: we need direct supervisory role of ESMA on significant asset management firms, we need a depository passport, a group concept with the necessary safeguards. Furthermore, we need changes around the remuneration rules, strict macroprudential rules and clear rules around security lending. Now some key points on the master regulation. The draft report is a good start for our discussions and but should be improved on some points. First the ESMA regulation.
For S&D absolutely key to strengthen the role of ESMA in terms of competencies, tools, governance, resources, without forgetting the expertise of national competent authorities.
ESMA should supervise all significant players, be it asset management companies or stock exchanges. In the field of crypto, this supervision should be extended to all players. This is an important point for my group and we should ensure a consistent approach with the master directive. ESMA has not just a supervisory task, but should also investigate market abuse and enforce the rules. ESMA should play a key role in the registration, authorization, and recognition of financial market participants.
Further, ESMA should have the power to take suspension decisions. A strong procedure around collaboration platform is also needed. I welcome the creation of the executive board and its role. Then on MiFID/R, the Commission proposal is only a first step. For my group, it's essential that all trading venues fall under the supervisory scope of ESMA.
We cannot afford to start to play with significant criteria. In terms of credibility, European Union cannot end up with the biggest stock exchanges remaining under national supervision.
Furthermore, S&D fully supports more transparency in the trading field. Therefore, we could be open towards measures to increase transparency in the so-called dark trading segment and to look at the issue of SIs. At the same time, this should go together with a stronger and more ambitious consolidated tape. What the Commission has proposed in this respect is not enough. We want an ambitious pre-trade tape with full attribution and order depth, and we should also look at bringing the timeline forward.
Then on the DLT pilot project, it's an important part of the package. However, we prefer a cautious approach and do not think it's appropriate to increase the thresholds by multiple orders of magnitude. We believe the distributed ledger technology pilot regime was conceived as a temporary, bounded sandbox designed to test the application of DLT in market infrastructures. It was not intended to create a permanent parallel regulatory framework. To prevent competitive distortions and regulatory arbitrage, EU financial regulation must strictly adhere to the principle of same activity, same risk, same rules.
Then the MiCA reform, my amendments here focus on three elements.
First, scope of ESMA. If there is one sector by nature which does not know national borders, then it is the crypto sector. Allocating the supervision of certain CASPs to NCAs is therefore not the best solution and rather an invitation for forum shopping as we can see already today. Therefore, it's absolutely essential to put all CASPs under ESMA supervision. Furthermore, it's essential that ESMA undertakes in this sector a market surveillance role as spelled for example in amendment 1412.
Finally, it's also positive that the rapporteur brings the discussion around multi-issuance of stablecoins under this package. We do not have the luxury of time. Given the financial stability concerns associated with multi-issuance, we firmly believe that we should follow the ESRB recommendation in order to make it clear that such schemes should not be permitted under the MiCA framework. Then to conclude, there are some changes we would really like to see in the regulation.
As said, this is of course a package and for consistency reasons we should keep it as a package. I expect this house will take a strong European Union approach looking beyond pure Member State interests and I look forward to work with colleagues towards a strong Parliament text carried by I hope a big majority. A strong European Parliament mandate is the only way to tackle regulatory barriers effectively to support the EU economy.
Damian Boeselager
Thank you, Mr. Heinäluoma. Now we go to Mr. Crosetto for seven minutes.
Giovanni Crosetto
Grazie Presidente, colleghi, vorrei condividere brevemente alcune considerazioni a seguito degli emendamenti presentati alla mia relazione. Innanzitutto credo che vi sia un ampio consenso sull'obiettivo fondamentale di questo regolamento. Abbiamo bisogno di un quadro moderno e armonizzato sulle finalità dei regolamenti, preservando al tempo stesso la certezza giuridica e la stabilità finanziaria che l'attuale quadro ha garantito per oltre venticinque anni. Al tempo stesso il nuovo quadro deve essere proporzionato e concretamente applicabile. Dobbiamo evitare oneri amministrativi non necessari, duplicazioni negli obblighi di reporting e ove possibile evitare di chiedere alle infrastrutture di mercato informazioni già disponibili presso le autorità competenti o le autorità di vigilanza europee.
Accolgo quindi con molto favore gli emendamenti presentati in tal senso dai tanti colleghi. Un secondo tema fondamentale è la neutralità tecnologica. La DLT e le altre nuove tecnologie devono poter essere ricomprese nel regolamento, ma dobbiamo evitare di creare un regime regolamentare separato semplicemente perché viene utilizzata una tecnologia diversa. Attività equivalenti devono beneficiare di una protezione equivalente in materia di settlement finality, indipendentemente dalla tecnologia sottostante, naturalmente nel rispetto delle condizioni giuridiche e prudenziali applicabili. E anche qua sono felice di riscontrare una forte convergenza da parte degli emendamenti dei colleghi.
Questo mi porta all'articolo 21. Abbiamo bisogno di un principio europeo sufficientemente chiaro e armonizzato sul momento in cui il regolamento diviene definitivo. Al tempo stesso dobbiamo riconoscere che sistemi diversi possono funzionare secondo modelli tecnologici e organizzativi differenti. Per questo ritengo che dovremmo stabilire principi comuni nel level 1, lasciando però al quadro tecnico la necessaria flessibilità per tener conto delle caratteristiche e dei meccanismi specifici di ciascun sistema.
In particolare la discussione sui modelli deterministici, probabilistici e layered nei sistemi DLT merita un'attenta riflessione. Qualunque sia la tecnologia utilizzata, il momento della finalità deve essere in definitiva identificabile e giuridicamente opponibile. Un'altra area importante riguarda i sistemi di paesi terzi. Dobbiamo facilitare la partecipazione transfrontaliera e l'integrazione con le infrastrutture finanziarie globali, evitando al contempo il forum shopping e garantendo livelli equivalenti di protezione. Sarà quindi importante la discussione sul corretto equilibrio tra ruolo delle autorità nazionali e quello di ESMA.
Infine dobbiamo garantire una transizione ordinata verso il nuovo quadro, i sistemi esistenti non devono perdere la protezione della Settlement Finality semplicemente a causa di ritardi amministrativi o nell'attuazione della nuova normativa. La transizione deve evitare effetti cliff-edge e consentire alle infrastrutture di mercato di avere tempo sufficiente per adeguarsi, e anche in questo caso ho apprezzato gli emendamenti presentati dai colleghi. Passo ora in qualità di relatore ombra ad alcune considerazioni sulla direttiva e sugli emendamenti presentati.
In primo luogo condivido gli emendamenti presentati dai colleghi che vanno nella direzione di facilitare l'allocazione di risorse e funzioni all'interno dello stesso gruppo UE di società di gestione e di gestori di fondi alternativi.
Mr. Casotto, can you slow down slightly for the interpretation? Thank you.
Più divisiva invece risulta l'introduzione di un passaporto europeo per i depositari. A nostro avviso, considerata la persistenza di divergenze regolamentari e nelle prassi di vigilanza, condivido gli emendamenti che limitano lo spazio di introduzione di un passaporto europeo per i depositari. Restiamo tuttavia aperti a facilitare l'operatività transfrontaliera nei servizi di deposito in attesa dell'armonizzazione delle normative nazionali applicabili ai depositari. A tal fine proponiamo da un lato la possibilità per gli Stati membri di consentire la nomina di depositari in altri Stati membri, il cosiddetto opt-in, e dall'altro l'introduzione di una clausola di revisione che imponga una rivalutazione nel quadro normativo, così da garantire che una futura introduzione del passaporto sia preceduta dalla creazione di un effettivo level playing field. Numerosi emendamenti sono stati presentati in merito alla supervisione dei grandi asset manager.
Condivido quelli che vanno nella direzione di un framework di coordinamento della vigilanza per i grandi gruppi transfrontalieri. L'obiettivo deve essere evitare la creazione di livelli aggiuntivi di supervisione e di preservare l'attuale ripartizione delle responsabilità di vigilanza.
L'autorità competente dello Stato membro d'origine deve rimanere al centro della vigilanza con la partecipazione delle autorità ospitanti e di ESMA in qualità di coordinatore. Arrivo infine alla verifica annuale, l'annual review di ESMA. Appare condivisa l'idea di eliminare tale meccanismo che introduce un livello aggiuntivo di supervisione che duplica attività analitiche già svolte dalle autorità nazionali competenti e genera costi di compliance in assenza di una chiara giustificazione. Per concludere intervengo ora per conto dell'onorevole Van Overtveldt per condividere alcune considerazioni sugli emendamenti presentati al regolamento. Sosteniamo l'impostazione generale del relatore pur ravvisando ulteriori margini di miglioramento su alcuni punti specifici.
In materia di trading sosteniamo una maggiore flessibilità nell'allocazione infragruppo di risorse e funzioni all'interno dello stesso gruppo europeo a condizione che tale flessibilità sia accompagnata solamente da un obbligo di notifica ex post. Questo regime dovrebbe applicarsi in modo coerente a CCP, CSD, CASP e non alle sole trading venues.
Sul tema delle interconnessioni, che rappresentano uno degli strumenti fondamentali per una reale integrazione dei nostri mercati dei capitali, riteniamo che stabilire collegamenti bilaterali obbligatori come regola di default vada oltre quanto risulta necessario e vantaggioso. I collegamenti relayed assolvono alla medesima funzione, evitando duplicazioni infrastrutturali e complessità operative. Proponiamo pertanto che i CSD hub mantengano in via predefinita un collegamento standard o relayed con i CSD spoke, istituendo un collegamento bilaterale solo qualora venga richiesto l'accesso a strumenti emessi nell'hub. Tale approccio preserva altresì la sostenibilità dei modelli di business dei CSD di minori dimensioni. Per quanto riguarda il DLT pilot regime, la soglia rilevante dovrebbe essere fissata a un livello sufficientemente elevato da offrire agli operatori un genuino incentivo a sperimentare il potenziale della tecnologia a registro distribuito, senza tuttavia creare un regime parallelo permanente a CSDR o MiFIR.
Infine, in materia di supervisione, concludo, Presidente, solo le infrastrutture di mercato significative dovrebbero essere sottoposte alla supervisione centralizzata di ESMA, anche per quanto riguarda i CASP. Al di là di tale soglia, ravvisiamo un considerevole merito nell'introduzione di un opt-in volontario alla supervisione per le infrastrutture che intendono espandere la propria operatività senza soddisfare ancora i criteri di rilevanza, in modo analogo al regime di opt-in già previsto per le trading venues. All'interno di ESMA, adeguati meccanismi di bilanciamento tra l'Executive Board e il Board of Supervisors sono essenziali e le autorità nazionali competenti devono restare strettamente coinvolte attraverso solidi accordi di cooperazione. Grazie.
Damian Boeselager
Thank you for your intervention. And just in general, let's try to slow down a bit so that the interpretation is able to follow and get your message fully. Now, Mrs. Győri wanted to speak on behalf of the shadow rapporteur from the PfE.
Enikő Győri
Yes, exactly, Mr. Chair. Thank you very much. I'm replacing Mr. Knothe, who couldn't make it today. Thank you for colleagues. And what you will hear from me will be practically what we said at the presentation of the report and just translated into amendments.
And let me concentrate on three major issues concerning the supervision, which is really the core of this legislative changes, simplification and legal certainty.
So, first on the master regulation, we support simplification, the removal of cross-border barriers, and stronger European capital markets, of course. But market integration should not automatically mean transferring more supervisory powers from national authorities to ESMA. This is particularly visible in the amendments we tabled on trading venues and other cross-border entities. For trading venues in particular, size, cross-border activity, or group structure should not automatically trigger centralized supervision. These factors do not in themselves show that national supervision has failed.
Any transfer should require a clearly demonstrated supervisory need, and this is what I don't find neither in the Commission nor in the EP's texts. Cooperation between ESMA and national competent authorities must remain a cooperation and not a hierarchy. NCAs must retain their statutory responsibilities, operational authority, and knowledge of local markets and legal systems. Where both levels remain involved, the framework should also avoid duplicated supervisory work and double charging.
We are also skeptical of a blanket transfer of the supervision of crypto-asset service providers to ESMA when MiCA is only now being implemented and its national supervisory framework has not yet been properly tested. Any direct ESMA role should remain limited and proportionate, rather than replacing national supervision across the board. Second, on simplification. The Master Directive offers several areas where cross-border activity can be simplified. Easier distribution of funds, simpler notifications, and the removal of unnecessary local barriers can reduce costs and make the single market work better.
So this is fine. That should not weaken the balance between home and host supervisors, however. Investor protection and national legal responsibilities still require effective powers at national level. Any additional ESMA review or intervention mechanism should be risk-based, proportionate, and justified by objective risk indicators or a demonstrated supervisory need and should not become a permanent second layer of supervision. Common procedures and deadlines must also be workable in practice, and we should avoid repeatedly reopening rules that have only recently been amended or are still being implemented.
Regulatory stability is part of competitiveness.
Third, on legal certainty. On settlement finality. The priority is legal certainty and stability. The existing framework has worked for many years, so changes should remain targeted at identified technical problems. We need clear rules on finality and insolvency protection, technological neutrality for the DLT-based infrastructure and now the application of requirements already covered by sectoral legislation.
Cross-border and third-country arrangements also need legal certainty, but solutions must respect the role of national authorities and national insolvency and property law. Transparency requirements should remain proportionate and protect sensitive operational information. A lot has been said on the consolidated tape. Don't forget that the last reform with MiFIR was 2024, entering into force only recently. So I think not even the sector will be very delighted that we come up with newer and newer proposals, changes, without knowing how something we decided about then can work in practice.
So across the package, and that's my last word, our position is the same. Integration should remove barriers, not transfer supervision unnecessarily from national to European level.
Thank you so much.
Damian Boeselager
Thank you, Mrs. Győri. And for Renew, Mr. Kelleher, also for five minutes.
Billy Kelleher
I'm pleased to see from the vast number of amendments that have been tabled and obviously from the discussion and the comments here this morning that the majority of groups recognize the importance of MISP proposal and the need to move quickly. Draghi, Letta, Noyer have all indicated and identified that the EU has a huge investment gap, but in order to fund this gap, we need to have far more integrated and competitive markets. And this should remain the primary objective of our discussions and our focus on MISP. MISP is not a macroprudential package in response to a market failure or an investor protection package in response to shortcomings. They are already existing complementary frameworks there.
And if we want this framework to be effective and to move swiftly on it, then we must keep in mind the single objective, which is making our markets more attractive and competitive.
Turning to the amendments tabled by my group, as I mentioned during my intervention in this committee in July, our amendments are guided by four principles: one, improving the effectiveness of supervision; two, reducing administrative barriers to cross-border business; three, providing greater business certainty; and four, delivering deep market integration and greater investment capacity. On the regulation itself, we support centralization where there is a clear European rationale, not centralization for its own sake, and should avoid, we should avoid duplication. Significant, systemic, and genuinely cross-border market infrastructures should be directed, directly supervised by ESMA, while smaller and predominantly domestic entities should remain under national competent authority supervision with the ability for entities to opt in to central supervision.
Billy Kelleher
In order to address market fragmentation, ESMA needs enhanced powers; however, there need to be clear safeguards and accountability. We have therefore proposed amendments to ensure that ESMA can only use these intervention powers when clearly merited and justified, and that the Board of Supervisors retains its ability to truly hold the executive to account. We support greater competition and integration in EU market infrastructure.
This means we need to break down some of the ingrained silos that have developed in the market, to bring down the barriers to new entrants and to stimulate competition. My grouping, as Liberals, we don't usually intervene in decisions on who does business with whom, but in some instances we may need to nudge the market infrastructure in the right direction to ultimately give the end investor greater choice. Renew Europe feels that greater market transparency not only contributes to the integrity of the markets, but also helps attract investors to EU markets and facilitate them doing business. Therefore, we fully support the further expansion of the consolidated tape. However, we have heard the concerns of the industry and so have proposed a trigger mechanism to allow the Commission pause the extension if it deems that the market is not ready for it.
On DLT pilot, we fully support the concept. We consider the use of DLT in financial services as a trend that cannot be reversed and so instead should be embraced. Therefore, there needs to be a clear timeline for integrating the pilot regime into existing regulatory framework. The pilot participants need certainty and business confidence to move forward with investing in these technologies.
Moving to the master directive itself, we share the intended outcomes of the Commission's proposal: addressing market fragmentation, improving supervisory convergence, removing barriers to cross-border business. However, we feel some of the measures they proposed to reach these outcomes are counterproductive. We propose replacing the Commission's annual review with a more systematic data-driven approach. Rather than focus on a handful of large asset managers, we want to give ESMA the tools to address supervisory divergence across the industry while also being able to identify entity-level risks. Simplification needs to be a real driver behind this proposal to revive market activity.
Therefore, we are of the view that the report-once principle should be a priority. Finally, we saw some logic behind the Commission's introduction of a Eurogroup definition. However, it doesn't seem to align with business reality in a way that would make it useful, so we have deleted this definition. Finally, on the words on the settlement finality, the Commission proposal provides a sound basis and the rapporteur has taken a pragmatic approach in his draft report, so our amendments are limited and mostly of a technical nature. We look to tighten a few of the definitions proposed to ensure clarity, business certainty, and to ensure alignment with other regulatory frameworks.
We've also made target amendments to ensure that the regulation is technologically neutral as the market develops, settlement may take place on different technologies and the regulation should remain neutral to this. We've also proposed amendments to ensure the EU participants in third country settlement systems are afforded the same protections in those as those in EU settlement actions. We consider this important to ensure that there are no gaps in protection in the EU financial markets. So they're my thoughts and look, I really hope that we can work quickly, effectively, and efficiently. The purpose of this is to incentivize and develop a deep, liquid capital markets using private investment to complement public investment, and I hope that we don't get tied into ideological views and debates on this very important proposal and that we end up with a capital market that works for our economies and for investors and savers alike.
So thank you very much.
Damian Boeselager
Thank you, Mr. Kelleher. Now I'll pass the floor to myself for an intervention for the Greens/EFA group. You said that you're quite enthusiastic.
I have to say I'm also quite enthusiastic because if you think about the fact that this mandate is supposed to be about competitiveness, at least from the European Commission's side, the Capital Markets Union is one of the key drivers of that competitiveness, at least when you listen to national leaders. And I think we all had sufficient events with the people in the back here who have all underlined the need for more centralization, more harmonization, a Capital Markets Union. And I find it interesting that as soon as you go into the detail, then national interests come forward. And I think it's also fair, and Mrs. Goulard said this, that there is a cost to harmonization and to centralization. But I think it's important to understand that there is a common ambition to harmonize and to centralize supervision because we believe it makes it easier for market actors to go ahead and build a deeper Capital Markets Union.
So I think it's really important that we hold ourselves to this high level of ambition, even though there might be individual member states, including my own, who might want to stop progress on some of these elements. Let me go into some of the priorities for my group in this aspect. I mean, it's absolutely clear when we look at the ESMA governance that there are again attempts to undermine the direction that the Commission has proposed. We would go even further and say that there has to be real European supervision without any veto powers for member states.
When it comes to the scope of ESMA supervision, our position is quite simple. We would like for the maximalist application, so that we get all the instruments possible under ESMA supervision. That means CCPs, CSDs, all trading venues, all crypto-asset service providers, and of course significant asset managers as well. And the second level of priority is for us the market transparency. Mr. Ferber has mentioned the consolidated tape and the reforms that have been done over the last years, or the one.
And here our view is that more information helps efficiency in a market design and therefore we would like to have a very transparent consolidated tape with information about the trading venues, the location, as well as the price of the trade. In addition, we support enhancing the transparency requirements for systematic internalisers to make sure that they have the same transparency requirements. The third priority is about the fair functioning of the market. And here it is clear that we have a direction in the SAU to be less dependent on banks, but that cannot mean that the non-banking financial institutions who might play a bigger role then can have less of an oversight on the important matters.
And that means that we need to set a macroprudential framework for asset managers basically in relation to their size and importance. And then finally, the Green Group believes that the energy and food crises have basically reminded us that speculation in these areas is very dangerous for citizens and that we therefore need to limit the review of the ancillary activity exemption as also recommended, by the way, by Draghi. So looking at all of this, I think we have to be ambitious. Yesterday there was an article in the Financial Times that we only have 15.7% of the Draghi recommendations implemented so far. We have a huge challenge of making sure that in this geopolitical context where we lost our cheapest energy supply from Russia because they attacked our neighbors, we have our largest demand market imposing tariffs on us, and we have our biggest supplier in China becoming more and more of a competitor, that we do the necessary steps to drive European competitiveness, and this includes also finally delivering on the Capital Markets Union.
So with this, I end my intervention and I would now pass it to the Left if we have Mr. Pidula is here, perfect, for five minutes as well.
Gaetano Pedulla'
Grazie, presidente, cari colleghi. Prima di tutto vorrei ringraziare anch'io i rapporteurs di questo pacchetto legislativo per il lavoro che è stato svolto finora. Come Movimento 5 Stelle, gruppo The Left, l'armonizzazione dei mercati è un obiettivo condiviso, ma abbiamo particolarmente a cuore la tutela dei risparmiatori e la stabilità finanziaria. Su questi due punti principali si sono concentrati i nostri emendamenti su questo pacchetto MISP. Siamo favorevoli, ripeto, a un mercato finanziario che sia più integrato a livello europeo, ma questo non può significare una deregolamentazione che acceleri la concentrazione oligopolistica a favore di pochissimi colossi finanziari globali, soprattutto extraeuropei.
Gli emendamenti di The Left si sono concentrati principalmente sul regolamento Master e sulla direttiva Master. Riassumo in particolare alcuni punti. Per quanto riguarda il regolamento Master, prima di tutto serve equilibrio, equilibrio tra rapidità decisionale, controllo collegiale e trasparenza.
L'Executive Board non può agire isolato. Con i nostri emendamenti chiediamo il controllo effettivo del Board of Supervisor a maggioranza semplice su decisioni chiave e accordi di cooperazione. Per quanto riguarda il trasferimento graduale di competenze a ESMA con un periodo transitorio di cinque anni, comprendo perfettamente le ragioni di chi vuole accelerare questo processo, ma guardiamo con realismo la realtà, anche la necessità di ESMA di organizzarsi, crescere, acquisire gli strumenti e le competenze per lavorare correttamente. Per questo periodo di cinque anni, quindi, proponiamo una vigilanza congiunta con coinvolgimento preventivo delle autorità nazionali, rinviando l'eventuale supervisione diretta di ESMA solo ai giganti sistemici oltre i 500 miliardi di euro di attivo.
Non siamo contrari poi alle criptovalute, ma vogliamo garanzie effettive. Poniamo quindi un freno globale, un freno totale all'offerta retail nell'Unione Europea per stablecoin estere le cui riserve non siano almeno il 60% in banche dell'Unione Europea. Così sosteniamo un vero sovranismo europeo, sotto diritto europeo quindi e costantemente verificabili on-chain e off-chain. Una licenza unica non deve indebolire la capacità di individuare e fermare tempestivamente gli abusi di mercato. Con i nostri emendamenti chiediamo quindi che ESMA assicuri regole comuni e vigilanza coerente, mentre le autorità nazionali mantengano poteri concreti per ricevere dati, accedere agli order book, monitorare gli abusi e adottare misure d'urgenza, compresa la sospensione temporanea delle negoziazioni.
Passiamo ora alla direttiva Master. Prima la protezione dei risparmiatori, poi la liberalizzazione. Nessuna apertura frontaliera a distanza senza una disciplina ex ante sulle responsabilità e sulle crisi.
Il passaporto non potrà essere utilizzato prima dell'entrata in vigore delle regole vincolanti europee RTS per la gestione dell'insolvenza dei depositari. Contrasto poi alle società schermo: l'uso delle risorse infragruppo non deve consentire di svuotare le società autorizzate nell'Unione Europea. Imponiamo capacità decisionale reale in loco, notifica preventiva all'autorità nazionale e garanzie stringenti se la capogruppo finale risiede in paesi terzi. Monitoraggio poi su commissioni per i risparmiatori antitrust. Proponiamo una vigilanza graduale con squadre composte da ESMA ed esperti nazionali CST e chiediamo che la vigilanza monitori l'impatto antitrust su commissioni e barriere all'ingresso segnalando le anomalie alla DG Competition.
Concludo, anche perché il mio tempo finisce, con l'auspicio che procederemo con un confronto costruttivo per un miglioramento del testo proposto dalla Commissione tenendo al centro gli obiettivi della tutela dei cittadini e di una concorrenza reale. Grazie.
Damian Boeselager
Thank you, Mr. Bizzotto. And now we have time for a few catch-the-eyes if there are any, any interest?
Okay, that doesn't seem to be the case. Then I would give the floor to the European Commission, Mr. Barrigan, you have the floor for three minutes.
John BERRIGAN
Thank you Chair, honorable members. I'd like to thank you all for the work you are doing on this really important file. As you know, this package is a cornerstone of the savings investment union and indeed of the European competitiveness agenda. And that's why the political momentum behind the file matters so much. And I'm really delighted to hear that the Parliament recognizes this.
Indeed, in several important areas, the draft reports tabled by the rapporteur go beyond the Commission proposal, and that's notably by extending ESMA's direct supervisory role and by strengthening ESMA's governance. In certain areas, it will be important to ensure that amendments remain fully aligned with the proposal's core objectives and are workable in practice. These amendments include suggestions for a competitiveness mandate, which must not weaken ESMA's core mandate. Amendments to the consolidated tape, which should not result in a suboptimal tape. Proposed macroprudential tools for asset managers, which should not and should remain in line, I think, with competitiveness objectives.
The depository passport should not be weakened, as it can promote greater competition and scale in the asset management market. And amendments aimed at focusing the scope of centralized crypto supervision must in any case lead to a sufficient number of entities being scoped in, so that ESMA's role will be vital, sorry, as ESMA's role will be vital in avoiding supervisory fragmentation and forum shopping in this area. And then lastly, on data and reporting, efforts at simplification, of course, should not create unintended costs and inconsistencies. Speed will also be vital here to the success of this reform, and we count on the European Parliament to keep to its timetable and allow for trilogues to start as soon as possible. And of course, the Commission, as ever, stands ready to help the Parliament and work constructively with the Parliament on all of these matters.
Changes to the ancillary activity exemption should avoid negative impacts on the real economy.
Chair, as I may not be given the floor again, I want to take the opportunity to tell you and inform you, those who don't know, that I will not be on this occasion with you to get this one over the finishing line. As of the 1st of October, I will step down as Director General of FISMA and I will retire.
So in all likelihood this is my last visit to the committee as a Commission official. I have to say that in my six years as Director General and five years before that as Deputy, I have had the opportunity to discuss many topics with this committee. In all those discussions, I have always been impressed by the depth of understanding of the issues among committee members and even more by their evident commitment to EU economic and financial integration. So let me say it has been my privilege to speak before you. I want to thank the committee for always treating me and maybe more importantly my FISMA team with respect, even when we've had our disagreements, and let's face it, we've had a few of those over the years.
But I hope that my respect for this committee and for this house in general has never been in doubt. And I wish you all the very best for your future work. Thank you.
Damian Boeselager
Mr. Berrigan, then let me on behalf of the ECON Committee also thank you for your great expertise and for your availability to speak with us about these important matters in your field of competence, be it the Banking Union, Capital Markets Union, or the adoption of digital finance regulations. I think we all very much valued your work and we want to thank you for your long public service.
Thank you so much. So now the agenda says I give the word back to the rapporteurs, so you can use this either to thank Mr. Berrigan or to make concluding remarks on the file. Mr. Ferber.
Markus Ferber
Yes, thank you very much. As a free elected member, I decide what I'm speaking about, I don't need advice for that. Let me begin by thanking John Berrigan for this fruitful cooperation we had over the years, personally and on behalf of the EPP Group. I couldn't agree more that we sometimes disagreed, but we always found common ground. And I think that is most important because we are all here fighting in the interest to have progress on a European approach, and especially capital markets are vital as real economy suffers for European solutions in a lot of areas, and we have to overcome that.
We will not overcome that by strengthening national competent authorities, we will overcome that by a really European approach.
And on the other hand, and that are outside the responsibilities of John Berrigan and DG FISMA, of course we need competition rules and we discussed it last week with the new appointed General Director, which aim deliver for the same aim. And of course we need DG GROW who delivers for the same aim as well because strong single market and strong capital markets are vital in a good cooperation. So therefore there's a lot of work to be done in the years to come. But I really want to thank John personally. I will do it later when the official meeting takes place which you have invited a lot of people already, what I heard.
And really on behalf of the EPP group, thank you very much for this good cooperation we had over the years. For the colleagues, we have seen that we have still some disagreement and there's still some need to bring us together online. And I hope that, and I take up what John has said, that the Commission can play a pivotal role to achieve that as we need some advice to bring the things together. Otherwise we are not able to deliver as well. But I'm very optimistic after having the first exchange of views in the shadow meetings that we are able to deliver.
Thank you very much.
Eero Heinäluoma
Thank you indeed. And this time I can say this is perhaps the first time during my service here in the Parliament that I can totally agree without any, any problems what EPP has said before me. Totally agree. I would also like to thank Mr. Bergen for excellent cooperation and, and really fruitful cooperation during these years. And I really appreciate and also my group your style of doing business, which is always very respectful to, to all of the participants taking part to the discussion.
And it has been a privilege to, to work with you. And it's also very important that Commission is taking seriously the opinions of, of Parliament. You have always done it. And at the same time, we are ready to acknowledge that we really need the competence and information of the Commission in our decisions.
And then of course I can say that sometimes S&D has been I would say a little bit more courageous and sometimes a little bit more ambitious than the Commission but still what is important that we are on the same road. And also I would like to agree what my colleague Marcus said just before that concerning this file I would say that we have the same aim and this is a good thing because we all want to have better financial markets and we all see the importance of it and we all see that we don't have the time to be spent and we have to have the results as soon as possible and I'm pretty sure that we can dissolve the small problems in the differences between our groups.
Giovanni Crosetto
Sì grazie desidero anch'io ringraziare il lavoro del direttore Berrigan e in particolare il modo in cui ha diretto l'importante lavoro di DG FISMA in particolare per quel che riguarda questo mandato e le importanti proposte legislative che sono state fatte in questo breve periodo di tempo quindi a nome mio e in particolare del gruppo che qui rappresento un sentito grazie per il suo lavoro.
Velocemente per quanto riguarda gli emendamenti e i commenti che sono emersi sul mio rapporto, sul terzo rapporto SFAR, ho riscontrato, così come avevo già fatto per quanto riguardava gli emendamenti presentati, una forte convergenza, un'attenzione alle tematiche anche da me evidenziate, come quella della stabilità, della certezza giuridica, il riconoscimento del fatto che il quadro attuale funziona, l'importanza di una neutralità tecnologica, in particolare per quanto riguarda l'apertura alla tecnologia DLT, l'attenzione a non raddoppiare regolamenti esistenti che si tradurrebbero in un aumento sostanzialmente dei costi e più che altro un'attenzione al rispetto del diritto fallimentare. Quindi sono contento di aver riscontrato una certa convergenza anche in questa sede e quindi andremo in fase di shadow meeting con un approccio sicuramente positivo e costruttivo e per questo ringrazio sinceramente i colleghi. Grazie.
Damian Boeselager
Thank you. Okay, and with this, I can only say that the ECON vote is scheduled for the 1st of December this year. And we will close this agenda item now and I will make room for the chair and the commissioner. Thank you.
Aurore Lalucq
So good morning everyone. I am pleased to welcome Maria Luis Albuquerque, Commissioner for Financial Services and the Saving and Investment Union.
The focus of today exchange of views is twofold and for that we have foreseen a longer than usual slot in our agenda with a longer list of speaking slots. The first item being a regular exchange of views across your portfolio in the context of the structured dialogue between the Commission and the Parliament. And then a presentation of the Commission communication on competitiveness of the banking sector and the single market in banking, which the Commission adopted and published in July 17. So you will have the floor for 15 minutes to make sure you have some time. And then of course there will be the Q&A session with the member of the ECON committee.
So welcome and the floor is yours.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and good morning everyone. It's good to be back and see you all again. Just a question, would you prefer that I did not address immediately the banking competitiveness report and leave it to the second part? Oh, I can do it all and then we... Okay.
Thank you very much. Okay. So, Madam Chair, honorable members, I am delighted to have the opportunity to discuss with you today on our shared effort under the Savings and Investments Union, as well as to present to you our recent report on the competitiveness of the European banking sector. Since we spoke last in this format, we have made significant progress in delivering on the SIU.
New proposals have been published, important files have reached the negotiating table, and we have collectively begun the next phase of work to deepen Europe's capital markets. The next focus of the SIU is about delivery. At our previous meeting, I spoke about the geopolitical risks facing Europe. If anything, those risks have become more acute, with developments beyond our control increasingly impacting Europe. This only reinforces the need to build a stronger investment ecosystem here at home.
I am pleased that political support for the SIU agenda has remained exceptionally strong. In March, the European Council called for rapid progress on key measures, recognizing the mobilization of private capital as essential to Europe's competitiveness, resilience, and strategic autonomy. That political momentum was reinforced in April by the One Europe, One Market roadmap, reflecting the shared ambition of all three institutions, including this House, to deliver on our common objective. It sends an important signal of our collective determination to make progress. For the Savings and Investment Union, that commitment is particularly concrete.
We aim for political agreement on the market integration and supervision package, supplementary pensions, and securitization by the end of this year. Before presenting our recent report on the competitiveness of the European banking sector, let me briefly look at these key files. As members of the ECON Committee, you are very familiar with the barriers that continue to fragment our markets and prevent us from achieving a true single market for capital. Our cornerstone package on capital market integration and supervision, known as MISP, was meant to remove unnecessary barriers, make market infrastructures work more efficiently across borders, and ensure that supervision keeps pace with increasingly integrated European markets. Parliament has already made substantial progress.
I welcome your ambition and encourage you to maintain the momentum while preserving the core objectives of the proposals and ensuring that amendments are workable in practice. If we agree that European companies need greater scale, then our markets must also be able to operate at European scale. Time is of the essence and the challenges we face demand decisive action. We have also taken an important step forward on supplementary pensions. At its core, this work is about citizens.
It is about helping to close the growing pension gap and giving people greater financial security in retirement. This is a generational challenge and one that requires action today if we are to avoid much greater pressure tomorrow. Crucially, our work on supplementary pensions is designed to complement, not replace, strong public pension systems. Supplementary pensions remain very unevenly developed across Europe and this is a missed opportunity both for citizens and for our economy. Our non-legislative work aims to enhance retirement income adequacy and monitor coverage gaps across the EU.
In this respect, our recommendations for auto-enrollment in supplementary pension schemes, pension tracking systems and national pension dashboards aim to help Member States in designing policies that identify and tackle the pension gap. Our legislative reforms on the IORP Directive and the PEPP Regulation are intended to make supplementary pensions work better, improve outcomes for savers, enabling more efficient and diversified long-term investment and making the European market for pensions more effective. The Council has already reached positions on these files.
And while I fully respect the legislative process, I also note, sorry, that ambition has unfortunately been scaled back. If the end result is too timid, we will once again miss the opportunity to provide something of true value for European citizens and the future generations. I am counting on this House to hold on to the ambition in the text and to move forward so that negotiations can begin, and I am sure we can count on the European Parliament to help us deliver an ambitious outcome. I also want to take this opportunity to say a few words about securitisation, where we now have a real opportunity to reach a positive outcome in the negotiations. A well-functioning securitisation market can free up bank balance sheets and support more financing for households and businesses across Europe.
As we finalise this file, that objective must remain firmly in sight. But any agreement will not do. We need a framework that works in practice for banks as originators, is attractive for investors and preserves the financial stability that Europe has worked so hard to strengthen.
I therefore hope that we can work together towards an agreement that is genuinely capable of reviving this market. We also proposed the revision of SFDR, so Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, to help investors channel more investment into Europe's economy and its transition. We listened to the market, and this revision is about addressing the shortcomings in our existing rules. The revised framework will be simpler for market participants to use, with significantly reduced disclosures. The review also aims at increasing the credibility of our rules and to better protect investors against greenwashing.
I warmly welcome the broad alignment between your draft report and the Commission proposal. This proves our shared ambition, and it gives us a strong basis to move forward together. I am optimistic that today's vote and the upcoming plenary vote to come will reaffirm this shared ambition and bring us closer to delivering a clearer and simpler framework for sustainable investment. Now turning to our important work on banking. On the 17th of July, the Commission presented one of the remaining key deliverables under the SIU strategy, the report on the competitiveness of the banking sector and the single market in banking.
The Commission's report starts from a simple assumption: banks are essential to the EU economy. They are the main source of financing for households and companies, including small and medium-sized ones. They also help channel savings into productive investment, support access to capital markets, and play a key role in financing strategic sectors. EU banks are today more resilient, better capitalized, more liquid and sustainably profitable than they were before 2008. They have proved their strength through the pandemic, energy shocks, the international banking turmoil of March '23, and the multiple geopolitical tensions we are experiencing.
But resilience alone is not enough if we want to ensure that EU banks remain competitive domestically and internationally to the benefit of the EU economy. The assessment presented in the communication is the most comprehensive analysis of the competitiveness of the European banking sector in several years.
We consulted banks, supervisors, investors, businesses, academics, consumer organizations and many other stakeholders across Europe. We also benefited from the expertise of the European Central Bank, the European Banking Authority and the Single Resolution Board, and we carefully read the papers that a number of parliamentary groups have produced in the last months. Based on the above, the Commission has identified three main challenges. First, fragmentation. Cross-border banking activity in the EU remains limited.
We need to foster the single market and complete the banking union, also establishing a third pillar for deposit insurance. Second, the implementation of international standards must be better tailored to the specificities of the EU economy and make sure we keep an adequate international level playing field. Third, the prudential framework has become unduly complex in some cases or in some areas, calling for simplification for all banks and increased proportionality for small and less risky banks.
These are the key issues that our extensive consultations have raised and will be the basis for a comprehensive legislative package in the first quarter of 2027. Only by tackling all these issues we will be able to achieve effective simplification. One that is sustained and growth competitiveness enhancing. Half measures or measures that do not address the structural issues will get us not far from where we are. Fragmented markets, insufficient financing, fading and feeble growth.
Until then and to help shape our work, we are encouraging stakeholders to challenge our assessment. Today's dialogue provides such an opportunity and I am looking forward to our discussion. But before we get there, let me conclude with one final point. We have collectively set a high level of ambition, not least through the one Europe one market roadmap. Progress now has to match that ambition.
That means advancing the legislation on the table but also ensuring that what we agree is implemented fully and enforced consistently across the Union. Our success will be measured based on what works in practice, not based on words on a page. The barriers standing in the way of a truly European banking system or a genuine EU capital markets are well known and many are deeply entrenched.
Overcoming them will require sustained political determination, particularly where established interests continue to favor the status quo. We therefore need to work on all fronts: removing barriers, simplifying where necessary, and ensuring that our common rules are applied effectively. This will take a collective effort. The ambition is shared, and so must be the determination to deliver it, so I count on this house to help us get there. Thank you.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you very much. Q and A session, we will start with Markus Ferber from EPP.
Markus Ferber
Ja, vielen Dank, Frau Kommissarin. Mit Ihrer Gestattung würde ich gerne in meiner Muttersprache sprechen, in Deutsch. Ich habe zwei kurze Fragen, im Wesentlichen auf der Grundlage der Mitteilung zur Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Bankensektors. Zum einen haben wir ja festgestellt, dass wir mittlerweile in den USA, im Vereinigten Königreich, in der Schweiz sogenannte Kleinbankenregimes haben, also Banken, die nicht den Basel-Regeln unterfallen und in unserem Fall auch nicht dem Single Supervisor unterliegen, keine grenzüberschreitenden Aktivitäten haben, keine Handelsaktivitäten haben, ein einfaches Geschäftsmodell haben, in ein eigenes Regelwerk zu fassen. Ist es eine Überlegung, die die Kommission auch anstellt?
Und das andere: In Ihrer Mitteilung verweisen Sie auch darauf, dass es Probleme gibt beim externen Rating für Mittelständler, für den klassischen Mittelstand. Ich habe da selber in meinem Wahlkreis auch viele davon, die alle nicht geratet sind und aufgrund auch der Eigentümerstruktur überhaupt kein Interesse haben, sich einem Rating zu unterwerfen. Das würde ja mittelfristig dazu führen, wenn sie nicht geratet sind, dass sie höhere Kreditkosten zu bezahlen haben. Sie weisen in Ihrer Mitteilung darauf hin, dass man das Thema angehen muss, weisen dann aber gleich schon wieder darauf hin, dass man trotzdem die Unternehmen motivieren sollte, sich raten zu lassen. Haben Sie da schon quasi die Überprüfung abgeschlossen, bevor sie begonnen ist, oder sind Sie da offen für andere Lösungen?
Vielen Dank.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you, Mr. Ferber, for your questions. So I'll go straight to the point and I'll start with the small bank regime. We have identified in our assessment the need to significantly increase the proportionality. So we're talking about small, non-complex institutions. So it's not just about the size, it's also about the business model, because that is that should be what determines the rules that should be applied.
We know that in other jurisdictions there are even different supervisors, completely separate regimes. We do have some challenges within the Banking Union, which is the fact that the single supervisor also supervises smaller banks because they happen to be big in their own Member States. So this is an additional layer of challenge given our current infrastructure, which in our view does not prevent us from doing that. So we are preparing a small bank regime, let's call it like that, where, and this is still work in progress, but where basically we will have we will see which rules of the full framework need to be applied to small and non-complex institutions and probably and likely not all of them need to be applied. So the core can continue to be the same, but rules will be applied depending on the need, which stems from scale, from size and from the complexity of the business model of such banks.
So to put it simply, yes, we are preparing what we can call a small bank regime to deliver significantly increased proportionality compared to what we have today and avoid unnecessary burdens that are not justified from a financial stability and risk management perspective. For the external ratings for SMEs, well, we all know that SMEs is a concept that goes from a company with five employees to another one with 999, and I think we can all agree that we're not talking exactly about the same thing. The issue about ratings and the incentive to get ratings also stems from the fact that we want the capital markets to be developed, we want companies to depend less on debt and have more equity, and the rating is an essential element of that access to capital markets. So the case for incentivizing ratings is still there. But not necessarily for all and very small companies, we understand that could be a disproportionate burden and not necessary.
We do have, despite the regime for unrated corporates, we do have the SME supporting factor which alleviates very significantly the capital requirements for small companies. But we are looking into that and see what other changes should be made in that framework to deliver a balanced outcome and also taking into account the feedback we got from the consultation. Thank you.
Jonás Fernández
Thank you, Chair. Welcome back, Commissioner. I will speak in Spanish. Abordando directamente el resumen que ha hecho usted sobre la comunicación respecto a la competitividad del sector bancario y el orden de prioridades o el establecimiento de esos tres desafíos a los que usted ha hecho referencia, mi grupo parlamentario fundamentalmente está centrado en el primero de ellos, en la necesidad de reducir la fragmentación. Los otros dos los entendemos, estamos dispuestos a discutirlos, pero entendemos que la prioridad para elevar la competitividad del sector bancario en Europa, y no solo en el sector bancario sino en otros sectores, es claramente acelerar la consolidación del mercado interno.
Thank you. For the S&D, Jonás Fernández.
Y aquí me gustaría hacerle una una pregunta en referencia al elemento que yo creo que ha venido distorsionando la confianza necesaria de todos los agentes, fundamentalmente de los supervisores, pero no solos, para facilitar las actividades cross-border dentro de la de la Banking Union. Cuando discutíamos la Banking Union hace años había muchos problemas encima de la mesa, algunos de los cuales se mantienen, pero hay uno nuevo que ha ido empeorando, que es la desconfianza entre los supervisores de los Estados miembros, entre los responsables públicos que de alguna manera haciendo uso de esa, en fin, entendiendo ese mal alineamiento entre responsabilidades y costes a los que hace referencia su propio informe, pues en fin, dificultan en alguna medida el funcionamiento del Banking Union y no acaban de ver en qué medida, ¿no?, podemos aliviar los costes y las ventajas de de mejorar el la Banking Union. Y yo creo que aquí la ausencia del tercer pilar al que usted ha hecho referencia es clave. Y termino. Hay distintas propuestas, distintas ideas, rumores en esta ciudad.
Hay una propuesta que este comité ha aprobado la legislatura pasada solamente con liquidez, pero introduciendo a todas las entidades bancarias. Hay otras propuestas. ¿En qué medida o cómo vamos a resolver ese problema de desconfianza? Sorry.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Muchas gracias and good morning, Mr. Fernández. The the way I have presented our identified priorities is not by accident. It's actually in that order. Fragmentation is the biggest and most salient problem we have to address when it comes to banking competitiveness.
So even if the other two elements are also very important and we will be tackling all of them, I would tend to agree with you that fragmentation is the biggest challenge. And yes, not just on banking, it's a more, a broader problem than that. You are right when you talk about the lack of trust among supervisors, and this is not just about the banking sector. We also see that when it comes to capital markets, and a number of the proposals we have put on the table under CMU also try to address that issue and improve. So we have a combination of lack of trust among supervisors, but also protectionist instincts and behaviors.
And also the fact that for some incumbents, it is not desirable to introduce changes. And those incumbents lobby to preserve things as they are. And we know about this reality, and it is our job to try and overcome it. On the third pillar of the banking union, yes, things have changed very significantly. So the EDIS proposal that we have tabled in 2015 can now be considered a placeholder.
We will be replacing it for something else which is in our view more adequate for today's circumstances because we have evolved a lot. And we will, and about with not much detail because we are still hammering out the details, we will try to replicate the logic we already have. So when you look at the big institutions in Europe, there is already a single fund, the single resolution fund that effectively mutualizes the responsibilities for these banks. And there is a mechanism. So we are looking at a two-tiered approach, if I can, if I can put it like that, where the bigger banks would extend the already existing mutualization to also cover deposit insurance and the smaller banks would remain under the national DGSs with a possibility to opt in and a liquidity support mechanism between the two which in the future, if that is the decision of the policy makers, could lead to a full-fledged common deposit insurance.
So we believe that with this approach, we find it, we will be able to deliver it politically because this has to be accepted by the co-legislators and we will create the necessary confidence and support to talk about a complete banking union. And we do believe that this is something key to overcome home-host issues, to improve supervisor confidence and most importantly, to give the same guarantees to our citizens wherever they are, whatever bank they choose to leave their savings on. Thank you.
Enikő Győri
Thank you.
Thank you, Commissioner, for being with us. Two remarks concerning the CMU and then on the banking competitiveness communication. First, I think and I agree that we need, of course, we need a much better working capital market in Europe. But I'm not convinced that all that centralization efforts you are investing in every and each piece of legislation which has already on our horizon or we are already working in it, including MiFIR, we have just had a discussion on that. So I'm not convinced about the efficiency of more centralization in supervision, for example, and I don't see any clear proof for that because local authorities know better the local ecosystems.
And why don't we, you go for a better cooperation among national supervisors and why do you think that it will be much more efficient at a higher European level?
My second remark is more like a recurrent that I think it's an illusion to think that financing the market, the shift towards a capital market instead of banking financing will be so significant in Europe that we have to change all our rules to that direction. So there I really have a serious doubt. On the banking competitiveness, first, I think everyone has to admit, even in this room, that simplification will not be enough. We need even deregulation. And I agree that some deregulation should be done even at national level, but let it to the national authorities to deal with that.
Second, on the home-host issue, you started to touch this issue. But in the communication, the Commission proposes to remove current capital and liquidity requirements at subsidiary level and place greater responsibility at the parent level. And knowing the experience from the 2008 crisis, well, I think it's a very dangerous move. So what is the guarantee for the host member states not to suffer significant problems? And finally, again, there is a lot of increase in the Commission powers, with even concerning EBA taking over some responsibilities and some national authorities again.
What's the proof of its being a good move?
Thank you so much.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Kyure, for your questions. And thank you particularly for your questions because I think it's probably the core of our debate. Why do we think it works better to move some things to the central level? I think that is the key debate we should have.
Well, I would start by arguing, and you know I've been following this from the very beginning, immediately after the great financial crisis, the cooperation has not increased enough and the tools are there. So I think that relying only on cooperation has had more than a decade to prove that it's not enough. So we do believe that if we move part, and it's only part, we are not suggesting to move everything to the center. It's moving, centralizing some competencies on areas and businesses or structures which are mainly cross-border, where in order to really make it efficient to have a European dimension, we cannot ask the same institution or group to continue to report to multiple supervisors with multiple perspectives who ask for different questions.
That is money being spent for no good reason. It is very, very inefficient and is also the reason why many of our companies needing money search it outside the EU where the markets have the scale and the efficiency that they cannot find here. So I think we have given a long time for cooperation to deliver results and it hasn't. And in any case, I should highlight that this is not taking the local supervisors or local authorities out of the equation. On the contrary, they are part of the decision-making bodies.
There is a proportionate distribution of powers and competencies that combines the need to be more European with the knowledge and the understanding of some local specificities. What we must avoid is using the so-called specificities to actually be a red line against moving forward and delivering better results for us collectively. And on the banks, the home-host issue.
I take very, very seriously the host's concerns, and I know exactly why they exist, and I remember very well what happened in the past. So what we intend to propose is a situation where we do not waste resources, because capital and liquidity trapped at local level to be used in the case of a crisis amounts to resources which are idle and are not put to work to the benefit of the European economy. But that can only be done with very robust guarantees which give the host member states assurances that they will not be left alone. So it is a combination of the two. We are not proposing to release those elements without the necessary guarantees, and this is something that I hope we can solve in a dialogue with you.
It is embedded in our proposals. On the more powers to the center, well, it is this balance. We do believe that it will work better if we do it like this. Thank you.
Giovanni Crosetto
Thank you, Vice-Chair Giovanni Costetto.
Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you, Commissioner, for being here. Let me say that in the communication on the competitiveness of the banking sector, we very much appreciate the overall approach and in particular the proposal to allow small and non-complex banks to be more clearly identified within the regulatory framework, regardless of their legal and organizational structure.
At the same time, we recognize, as highlighted in the report, the need for large banking groups to be able to compete internationally. In this context, we understand that revisiting the current criteria and threshold to better reflect the reality of EU banking sector with less adapted and simpler requirements brings the completion of the banking union back to the center of the debate, in particular the achievement of the third pillar for the deposit guarantee scheme. And given also the improvement achieved in the recent years in the European banking sector, I think about the common equity tier 1 and the NPL ratios, you already in part replied if you think that there are conditions to address this issue, but I would like maybe to ask you if you could elaborate a little bit more. And I also ask you if you think that it is necessary in order to have and go towards lower requirement to achieve the third pillar, if you see a connection between these two things.
Thank you very much.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you, Mr. Cassetto. Maybe I'll start exactly with your question. So everything is actually connected. So let's, why do we talk about a banking package? Why do we need look at this as something which needs to be addressed in a comprehensive way?
There is a lot of debate on whether we could find some speedboats that would deliver simplification faster or something like that. On reporting and other issues, we are already acting and we are already delivering. But when it comes to the core of the framework, we all agree that financial stability is non-negotiable. We know that the risk environment around us is not moving in the right direction, if anything risks continue to increase. So that element of anchoring financial stability is as important or maybe even more important than ever.
But we also acknowledge that the competitiveness of the European economy is not going, is not moving in the right direction.
We need to do something to improve our competitiveness, to increase our autonomy, to be more sovereign collectively. And that requires an ability to go to take more risk on new activities, on the growth of our companies. This is all about risk-taking. So we should have a framework that allows for appropriate controlled risk-taking. And this is what we need to do.
And we understood we we our assessment is that actually the fragmentation is the main problem. That is what we are trying to address. But given that we want to preserve the financial stability, if we allow some more risk for more risk-taking for the banks, we need the the the reduction of the fragmentation and the integration of the market because that itself is also a protection against risk. So we can let banks take some more risk because we will have this layer of protection which comes from being more integrated and risks being better distributed.
Mind you, the capital market also plays a very important role here because efficient capital markets allow for a much better distribution of risk and risk-mitigating tools. So if we address this in this holistic perspective, we will be able to finance the activities we need to finance that some of them mean more risk, but at the same time, we will make our whole system more robust. And this is what justifies and actually calls for this integrated approach. It is not easy, obviously, but everything is interconnected and the results we absolutely need to deliver, in our view, do require this integrated approach. And it is not about taking time to discuss.
I mean, we've been discussing this for what, 15 years? It's not a matter of time, it's a question of will. If you want to do it, we can do it.
Gilles Boyer
Renew, Gilles Boyer.
Merci Madame la Présidente et Madame la Commissaire. Merci de cet échange sur cette communication qui était très attendue et merci pour ce travail qui est sérieux, détaillé et courageux.
Je voudrais vous poser deux questions que vous avez abordées en partie, mais peut-être avec un petit peu plus de détails. D'abord, est-ce que vous pensez que nous serons en mesure de mettre en place une législation européenne qui permettra véritablement d'encourager le développement de banques transfrontalières qui soient capables de concurrencer les grandes banques de pays tiers actives dans l'Union européenne, face notamment aux réticences d'un certain nombre d'États membres à permettre à une banque d'un autre État membre de fusionner avec l'une de leurs banques nationales ? Et ma deuxième question, je voulais savoir quelle méthode et de quels outils vous disposez pour convaincre les États membres d'avancer sur les éléments qui, depuis des années, bloquent le développement d'un véritable marché unique bancaire, comme par exemple l'harmonisation du droit de l'insolvabilité. Et en quoi l'année qui vient, 2025, sera à votre avis différente des années précédentes face à ces réticences ? Je vous remercie.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Merci beaucoup, Monsieur Boyer. On to how do we try to encourage cross-border banks. Well, let me tell you that I think the regulatory framework should allow banks to be, to have the scale and the business they see fit. Regulation should not stand in the way.
So, cross-border bank mergers, large-scale banks, I do think, we do believe they make sense. That it is that scale that allows other non-European banks to be truly competitive both in their home countries and abroad, but there needs to be a business case. Regulation should not stand in the way, and it goes without saying political interference should also not stand in the way. This is particularly true for investment banking. It is an area where the scale and the cross-border dimension is the only way to make it truly efficient and capable to serve also our objectives about deepening the capital markets.
But we do not ignore, and it is fine that we have a diverse banking system. So, we think we should have a few big cross-border banks that have the scale and the capability to compete with our main competitors from across the Atlantic, but there's also room for smaller banks serving different having different types of business models and regulation should be such to accommodate them all, including the neobanks, those who are fully digital, we are innovating in the market, which are cross-border by design. We should cater for all of them.
How do we overcome resistances? I will repeat something that I've been saying for a long time. I hear everyone saying they support the savings and investment union and acknowledge the need to do better. So I am truly hoping that this is not just lip service and will translate into effective support on the measures. Of course, I'm not saying that I expect everything to be approved exactly as we table it.
But I do expect that both co-legislators, when proposing changes, assess and justify whether their proposed changes still reach the objectives, because if not, they should not be tabled. Our proposals have been prepared, studied, and assessed to deliver those outcomes. If they are replaced by others, they should guarantee in the same way that they deliver the same objectives, unless we don't agree on the objectives, and that is something I haven't heard from anyone. So if we agree on the objectives, there must be a way to agree on that.
One final note on the insolvency issue. Not that long ago, the Commission tabled a proposal to go further on the harmonization on insolvency laws. And Council basically, well, didn't fully reject it, but in practical terms, that's what it did. So, Mike, I know there are many barriers beyond the financial sector remit that are impacting on fragmentation. But they cannot be an excuse not to move forward.
Because if we say we don't move on the financial sector because we don't have uniform taxation or insolvency, we will be stuck and we will be doing nothing. So, let's move ahead where we can move ahead and continue to work on the other areas and move there as possible. Let's not let that be an excuse to stay still. And I have the impression that often it is exactly how it's used. It's an excuse to do nothing.
Aurore Lalucq
Merci, Madame la Commissaire, et je rappellerai à la Commission européenne que le Parlement européen a toujours été pionnier dans le domaine de l'Union des marchés de capitaux, puisque nous avons publié un rapport dont j'ai été rapporteure il y a plus d'un an de cela, de mémoire. Et puis Madame Benjumea avait publié un rapport excellent également sous le précédent mandat. Donc les colégislateurs que vous avez autour de vous, ici vous en avez un qui a été bien en avance sur le Conseil et même sur la Commission européenne. Je donne tout de suite la parole for the Green, Damien Boeselager. Il n'est pas là.
OK, José Gusmão for the Left.
Jussi Saramo
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Madam Commissioner. It's always good to listen to you here in the ECON Committee. As you very well know, the banking regulation framework was put in place after the financial crisis 2007-2008 to protect financial stability and most importantly, European citizens from reckless financial alchemy and risk-taking. Now, however, it seems that the Commission is willing to weaken essential parts of that framework, even though the Commission itself acknowledges that regulatory capital changes have not been a crucial factor in banks' lending conditions. Is the Commission about to alter capital requirements despite there being no evidence that lower standards would help to fund the economy?
I think taking risks is of course necessary, but shouldn't that belong in other parts of the financial sector than banks? Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Saramo.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Just, yes, Madam Chair, I do know that the European Parliament has been very supportive, but we will be touching some very sensitive topics where the position of the European Parliament might not be as unanimous. So I just wanted to leave that there. Thank you. I'm really counting on you. So, Mr. Saramo, yes, the current regulatory framework was set after the great financial crisis, and it has served us well.
I think we all acknowledge that. And actually, it's part of my introductory remarks. We have a more stable, resilient, better capitalized, even more sustainably profitable banking system than we had before the crisis. And we are not about to dismantle the framework. But more than ten years after starting to implement, it is time to look at it and think whether recalibration is not due.
And this is what we are talking about. It's not about the fundamentals of the framework, it's adjusting the parameters of the framework to the reality we have today. Because today we don't have the same situation. We don't have the massive NPL stock we had before.
Many of the problems have been addressed, but also unintended consequences, namely on complexity, have come. And yes, there is no credit crunch and there is no hard evidence that actually the capital requirements are constraining lending capacity. But I think we can all recognize that they have an impact on cost. So if lending, even if available, is too expensive, that equates to actually companies having fewer opportunities. And it merits a proper assessment.
But as I said before, preserving financial stability. So how do we do this? I have none of our objectives is about lowering capital requirements. We will be assessing the framework. The outcome could be that some capital requirements would be lowered, maybe potentially with different effects on different banks, because that is not the objective.
It might be an outcome, but that is not what we are trying to do. Is trying to make it reasonable. We want to preserve financial stability, but having higher and higher capital requirements do not necessarily deliver that. Because if we stifle the economic activity due to too high costs for lending, then we will destroy financial stability. It's the stability of the graveyard.
No one wants that. So we need to assess that properly and we share your concerns about financial stability. So we don't want to weaken the framework. We want to improve, we want to adjust, recalibrate the framework to take into account our reality today and also give room for the capital markets to take their role, but that requires also a solid banking sector. We need them to support each other.
So that's why the SAU has this holistic view to the whole financial ecosystem. Thank you.
Rada Laykova
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Commissioner, for your presentation. My question is on the method that the Commission plans to employ to achieve the outcome of the SAU that you said everyone agrees on. So recently, the President of the Commission stated in Paris that the EU wants to mobilize the, I quote, lazy savings of the people to finance businesses or to rechannel them into the financial markets to close the various alleged investment gaps.
For that matter, securitization or asset-backed security papers are to be employed and insurance, possibly also pension money, is to be redirected. And since the solutions are most likely institutional and would not give the individual citizen much say what is indirectly happening to their savings or insurance and pension situation, on behalf of the citizens and taxpayers, I would be particularly interested in how securitization is exactly to be employed, what concise financial legal constructs are planned to mobilize the savings with securitization, and how insurance or possibly pension money is to be re-channeled and by what financial and legal constructs. And even if this is not your particular statement, it is Ursula von der Leyen's, I presume this was discussed with you and you probably have an idea what designs are envisioned. And let me just reiterate that I'm not interested in the general layout of the idea or the design of the SAU or investment gaps, but concise ideas of how the savings and the insurance money are to be re-channeled via securitization and new legal and financial constructs.
And as we're scheduled to bilaterally meet next week, I look forward to building on your answer and discussing this in greater detail. Thank you.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you very much, Ms. Lackova, and thank you for the opportunity to again clarify something that we've been repeating from the very beginning. We do not decide where private money goes. Be it insurance companies, be it banks, pension funds, retail investor money, that is for those private entities or citizens to decide. What we see, what we acknowledge is that we have a significant part of the savings of the European citizens in bank deposits. And those savings in bank deposits are idle in the sense that a lot of that is not actually being used for intermediation and it's actually losing out to inflation.
So people are saving and their money is losing value.
And we find that a missed opportunity first and foremost for those citizens, but also for the European economy, because we need funding in the European economy, which could give a much higher yield, both direct and indirect. The result of the investments increases the yield of the returns of such savings and at the same time, improving the circumstances of the European economy allows us to grow more, to pay better salaries, to have increased tax collections. And that reverts to the benefit of all of us. But again, and to state it as clearly as possible, we are not redirecting any private money anywhere. We are just adjusting the frameworks so that that is made possible if that is the decision of those managing and owning those resources.
And there continue to be rules, namely for insurers, about the prudent person principle and on pension funds as well. We need, we know that they have obligations to guarantee returns. But if many of them continue to put all the resources of the pensioners on treasury bonds and on deposits, the result will be that those pensioners will actually find themselves with very, very low pensions and returns in the future.
And that is not good for people. But again, to clarify, we are revising the frameworks to allow for that possibility in full respect of the decisions of those who own the money and also full respect for the necessary caution and responsibility that any of these entities must observe when managing other people's money. Thank you.
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Muchas muchas gracias, presidenta. En primer lugar, agradecerle, comisaria, el elevado nivel de ambición en resolver los problemas que han afectado al sistema financiero europeo en las últimas décadas, los problemas de falta de escala, de fragmentación. Y yo creo que las nuevas estrategias, la Savings and Investment Union, Banking Union, todo lo que ha puesto sobre la mesa, pues trata de resolver esto con un nuevo nivel de ambición. Pero permítame que le diga que me temo que esto no es suficiente, porque el mundo no está esperando a que resolvamos nuestros problemas, el mundo está evolucionando. Y sinceramente, creo que tenemos que pensar más grande, tenemos que pensar en el mundo del futuro.
Y en ese sentido le quería pedir que para cuándo la Comisión va a poder sacar una estrategia sobre activos digitales, el nuevo mundo, nuevas formas de hacer clearing, de hacer settlement, tanto la parte de los activos como la parte del efectivo. Me temo que esa es la batalla del futuro y por lo menos y sin perjuicio de lo que estamos haciendo hasta ahora, creo que tenemos que empezar a pensar sobre el futuro. Muchas gracias.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Muchas gracias. Yes, we know the SIU is not enough and even if we deliver fully on our ambition, there will be plenty of problems to continue to address. This is the nature of things. That being said, we want the frameworks we are building now to be as much as possible, as much as we can anticipate, prepared for the future. Of course, our ability to anticipate is being challenged every day because things evolve very, very fast.
We actually run the risk to find a different landscape by the time we finalize our negotiations because six months is a huge amount of time for some AI developments and is only a very short time to begin conversations among ourselves for anything. So we do have that challenge. What we think we should have is a regulatory framework which is technology neutral.
So that is what we are trying to do. When changing the acquis for whatever reason, we want as much as possible to make it technology neutral because technology itself does not change the fundamental concerns about regulation. It's about guarantees, it's about having legal certainty, it's about efficiency, it's about being prudent, not taking risks which should not be taken. Those principles are both applicable in the physical and the digital world. So there is no reason why we would need to have a whole set of new legislation for new technologies.
What we should try to achieve is a regulation which is technology neutral because that's what prepares us best for the future. Some specific parts of our legislation, like the distributed ledger technology pilot regime, we have already proposed changes in the MiFID. But we might have to do that on some other parts of our legislation, but our approach to the issue is, in any change we make, see if we can make it technology neutral so that when the new technology emerges and is used in the market, the rules are still there.
Because as I said, the principles, the concerns are exactly the same, whatever technology we use. But there is a huge promise in terms of efficiency and also even in risk reduction if we use these new technologies. Thank you.
Thank you. For the S&D, Lara Wolters.
Lara Wolters
Thank you for being here, Commissioner. I suppose I have a general question, and that is: what does banking competitiveness really mean for the Commission? To me, it seems clear that focusing merely on the profitability of European banks or their share evaluation, that on their own is pretty much irrelevant for the well-being and the dynamism of the European economy, which is of course what we're really after. And that at the same time, resilient banks, especially in a time of AI revolution, urgent climate crisis, that that is absolutely crucial.
That genuine competition between banks and the fragmentation my colleagues talked about, that that is crucial. And so, do you share this view and if so, how come that it seems that the Commission report on banking competitiveness seems mainly inward-facing rather than outward-facing? I see measures aimed at boosting profitability and the short term, but outward-facing, so resilience, the fragmentation, real economy lending, those things there seems less attention to. Could you tell me more? Thank you.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you, Ms. Walters. Well, bank competitiveness, yes, well, I think we have it in the report, but if not, I know I've said it. This is not for the sake of banks. This is not the objective of our work. It's not for the sake of banks.
It's because we recognize banks are essential for us to achieve our collective objectives. And the more efficient, the more capable they are to actually provide the necessary funding in the most efficient possible way with lower costs, the better it is for the economy, that means for the businesses, but also for the citizens. Because citizens need funding, but also have money that they want to save and get returns, and many, if not most of them, do use the banks to do that. So this is the objective. And we also talk about autonomy.
We know, for example, in investment banking, that we are have no real competitor to the big American banks. So we need to make sure that we don't depend on them. It's not about closing our market, it's about having European options and having a true competitive landscape. Yeah, profitability is clearly not enough, even because it only works if it is sustainable, if not, it will bring the banks down and we all know and remember what that means. So we don't want to go back to that for sure.
So I don't think that we are inward looking, but we this is a strategy that has objectives in terms of what we will be changing or proposing to change on the rules which apply to banks. But if you look at the main challenge of fragmentation, we are talking about something which is going beyond the banks. It's about integrating our markets, it's about facilitating cross-border activities, it's about addressing the home-host issues. This all goes beyond the banks.
It's pure political decision about European integration. I have this firm belief that if we want to remain sovereign, we need to share more of our sovereignty in some key elements. Because the alternative to sharing sovereignty more in some areas is losing sovereignty. If we don't address and overcome the competitiveness challenge, we will all be poorer. And the poorer we are, the less sovereign we will be.
And that is what we are trying to avoid. So I don't think we are inward-looking and again, it's not for the sake of banks. It's for the sake of the European economy and the European citizens and we believe it does require some changes to the banks and allowing those businesses also to flourish because I don't see the two things as incompatible and actually they are doing well. So obviously that is not the main source of our concern or the main driver of our proposed changes. Thank you.
Lídia Pereira
Thank you very much, Chair. I will proceed in Portuguese.
Senhora Comissária, bem-vinda. O tema de hoje acho que também não deve ser dissociado do impacto real que as decisões de política monetária têm na vida das famílias. Segundo o Eurostat, a taxa de inflação na zona euro subiu para 3.3% em agosto e 3.6% em Portugal, afastando-se da média europeia. O Banco Central Europeu deverá anunciar ainda hoje uma subida das taxas de juro e as consequências são claras. Os cidadãos vão sentir o efeito nos seus bolsos, com prestações a subir dezenas de euros.
E isto numa altura em que o poder de compra já está sob pressão, em particular pelo que se passa na geopolítica mundial. Ora, os consumidores não podem ser os últimos a beneficiar das descidas e os primeiros a pagar pelas subidas. E assim pergunto, no quadro desta reforma para a competitividade no setor bancário, que instrumentos é que prevê a Comissão assegurar ou desenvolver para assegurar um mercado bancário mais competitivo e que se traduza em condições justas e simétricas, independentemente do sentido em que as taxas de juro se movam? Muito obrigada.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Obrigada, senhora deputada.
Yes, we are indeed going through very difficult circumstances as I said very early. Risks are increasing, the situation is becoming more difficult and the pressure on prices is taking a toll on all our citizens because interest rates increase and in many member states mortgages are variable rate, so people feel immediately the impact of changes in interest rates, which is something that we probably also should reflect collectively if this is the best way, but again, it's beyond the remit of the discussion we are having today, but all the other prices are also increasing. This all comes from factors, most of them beyond our control. We do have rules which are monitored by our supervisors both at local and European level that banks do not disrespect such rules to guarantee that they are not disproportionately impacting the users of their service, those who take the credit. But there is a market element here as well.
If this is a movement that happens to the whole market, even with competition, we will feel that impact. What we need to guarantee through supervision, and those measures already exist, is that there is no one using this to actually overburden the users of bank services and reflecting more than they should. Those rules exist. It is the job of the supervisors to monitor the actions of banks, but there are also other frameworks linked to consumer protection, which are mostly at member state level, that also look into this. And as the situation we are in now is a reflection of market tensions, again, beyond our control.
And yes, I think that we will be seeing more challenging circumstances, which will also call for other policies to support the most vulnerable, but that will be mostly at the national level and not so much related to the banking sector. What we guarantee in the banking sector is that there is no taking advantage from these changes and preserving the compliance with the rules. Thank you.
Tomáš Kubín
Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Commissioner. Thank you for being with us here and for your answers, which I really appreciate today. Thank you for the report.
As we don't have much time, so I will stay shortly. Your report states, among other things, that three quarters of covered deposits in the Banking Union now fall under direct European supervision and the Single Resolution Mechanism. However, member states outside the Banking Union are in different position, yet the report deals with them in one sentence, lacking any detail. How will the Commission ensure that the planned changes to banking regulation take due account of their needs and specific circumstances?
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you very much. It's a very valid question because yes, there's there are 21 member states in the Banking Union, but there are six member states outside the Banking Union and they deserve our concern and attention as much as the the 21.
We know, and this is just a statement of fact, yes, because 21 out of 27 is a big proportion, so it's not surprising that it's reflected also on deposits. But our approach to the banking framework, of course, we expect a higher level of integration within the banking union for self-explanatory reasons, I would say, but we are not forgetting about those member states who are outside the banking union, even if we hope you can all join, even if some have opted out and have the right so, but we do hope everyone will join eventually. I think that despite the fact that they are outside, the links between the banking union banks and the non-banking union banks are very, very tight. So whatever we do in the banking union per se will have an impact. And here, as I said before, I think the home-host issue is particularly relevant.
Being outside the banking union but as part of a group which is headquartered in the banking union makes this link even stronger. We will obviously be paying attention to whatever impacts of our measures or our framework are for the non-banking union member states and banking systems, guaranteeing that they benefit from the same opportunities.
And this is very much linked to the home-host debate, but also making sure that the proportionality also applies to them, so that we have a consistent banking framework, also even to facilitate the transition from non-banking union into banking union when the time comes. Thank you.
Giovanni Crosetto
Thank you. I would like to come back to the consolidation and the promotion of larger European financial group and I would ask you if in your view the reverse Danish compromise could effectively help to address fragmentation along national borders in the banking and insurance sector, giving the same incentive also to that sector and establish a more effective level playing field for insurance firms. By the way, a very recent ECB decision demonstrates that this mechanism could unlock significant amount of capital and create a concrete incentive. And could you give me please your opinion about this very important topic? Thank you.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you, Mr. Crosetto. This is an issue I am well aware of. And about the question, this Danish compromise was the result of the compromise in Council back in 2012.
We think that the appropriate setting to look into this and eventually address it, so I'm not committing to any outcome in terms of proposal, should be on the Solvency II review, which we are, we need to make next year. So we think that is the most appropriate framework for assessing this, not exactly the banking package we have now. There is, there are always links between different files, but we need to cut it somewhere, otherwise we will be coming out with something which is too big to manage. So we do believe that for this particular topic, which we are looking into and will look into more carefully, we should better address it next year when we put forward the Solvency II review. Thank you.
Anouk Van Brug
Yes, thank you, Chair, and thank you, Commissioner, for being here today. In the interest of our strategic financial autonomy, Europe needs banks that can finance the largest investment and funding projects. In other words, we need European banking champions, as you also say in your report. How confident are you that the upcoming banking package will help deliver this important objective? And do you foresee a wave of mergers and acquisitions that could overcome the fragmentation of the European banking landscape?
Thank you very much.
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you, Ms. Van Sparrentak. Well, we do hope that clarifying some elements, making the regulation more business model neutral and guaranteeing that the powers to interfere on some decisions remain where they should be. So there should be an assessment when it comes to prudential requirements to make sure that financial stability is not at risk and also for competition reasons. This is already the framework we have, but we intend to make it clearer. So what we again, what we expect is to improve our framework to make it even clearer that banks should be able to choose the business models they prefer and they should follow the business opportunities when they exist.
So we will not be pushing anyone to merge with anyone. Obviously, that is a purely business decision. We want to stand out of the way.
And we think that if we facilitate this, if we allow bigger banks to have more synergies, to be able to have a more efficient supervisory framework where they have more certainty and fewer interlocutors and a more consistent and harmonized application of the rules, that we are providing the right incentives. But ultimately, it will depend on the banks to find the business case which will make them move or not. It's ultimately a market decision. We just want to be sure that the right conditions are there and that in itself can be perceived as encouragement. And we hope it works.
Eero Heinäluoma
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks, Madam Commissioner, for your presentation and for your valuable work. As you mentioned, we really have a problem that still after 40 years, we have fragmented financial markets. It's a real problem. This proposal here is a really important thing. However, I have to say that the Commission proposal was, could you say, quite cautious.
It was not very, very high ambitious in the proposals from my point of view.
But one thing is sure, if we want to really have these integrated financial markets, we have to have European-wide, European-wide solutions on the supervision sector. And here I'm a little bit surprised because I have noticed that there are still on the table ideas that we could exempt the real big players, significant players, from direct supervision by ESMA and to leave the supervision for smaller players. How do you evaluate these ideas that we would leave the big players out of the scope of the European supervisory bodies?
Maria Luís Albuquerque
Thank you, Mr. Heinäluoma. Well, I was smiling when you said that the MIS was cautious. It's not a unanimous opinion, as I'm sure you understand, as others find it actually too bold. I would say that it is regretful if we curtail the level of ambition because we really believed, I really believed, it is necessary.
And big players being exempted means that our message and our push to have this European approach and the European interest at heart may be somehow diluted or watered down. We have full respect for the co-legislators, both Parliament and Council, obviously, but I do regret that some big relevant players would have an exemption as if they were small because this is not going to allow us to deliver in what in our view needs to deliver. That being said, we will continue to explain why we think it's important not to exempt such big players. In the end, we will have to accept and implement whatever the co-legislators agree, but we will continue to fight to preserve as much as possible the scope and the ambition of our original proposals. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chair. Just to conclude, I want to thank all honorable members for the questions asked, to reiterate that it's always my pleasure to be here and to be able to continue this dialogue with you. I will see you again in Strasbourg next week. I will meet many of you and, as always, me and my team, we remain available to answer any questions you may have and I hope we can have continue our very productive engagement. Thank you very much and have a nice day.
Aurore Lalucq
Merci Madame la Commissaire et vous pouvez compter sur le Parlement européen effectivement pour continuer ce dialogue. Et puis nous allons adopter un rapport peut-être même avant avant vos votre proposition législative parce que comme je le disais, le Parlement européen, contrairement des fois à ce que peut dire la Commission européenne, c'est délivrer on time et même souvent avant tout le monde. Merci infiniment de votre de votre venue. On fait pas de catch-the-eye parce qu'on va procéder au vote. On est déjà en retard sur les votes.
So let's go back to English. If you can go back to your seat to proceed to the vote. As always, we will start with a test vote. And I open the vote. Okay, don't forget to vote.
This is a test vote. Okay. That's fine. Okay, everything is working well. Okay, we now pass to the vote on the amending regulation on sustainability-related disclosure in the financial services sector, SFDR, regulation on key information document for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products, PRIIPs, and repealing Commission Delegated Regulation.
By showing of hands, compromise A, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. Compromise 2, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted.
Compromise 3, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 4, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 5, who is in favor? Who is against?
Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 6, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains?
Adopted. Compromise 7, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Compromise 8, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 9, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 10, who is in favor? Who is against?
Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 11, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains?
Adopted. Compromise 12, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
No, you decided otherwise. Compromise 13, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Compromise 14, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 15, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 16, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 17, who is in favor? Who is against?
Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise 18, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains?
Adopted. Compromise 19, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Compromise 20, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Final vote by roll call vote, I open the vote.
Close the vote. And it is adopted, congratulations to the rapporteur. Next vote, we vote on the mandate now. So I open the vote on the mandate. And I close the vote.
And the mandate is also adopted. Merci beaucoup. Okay, we are now passed to the vote on the EU approach to corporate tax policy in a changing international environment. The rapporteur is Kinga Gál. By showing of hands, compromise A, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. Compromise B, who is in favor? Who is against?
Who abstain? Adopted. Compromise C, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain?
Adopted. Compromise D, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted.
Compromise E, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted. Final vote by roll call vote.
I open the vote. I close the vote. And it is adopted. Congratulations to the rapporteur. The next meeting of the ECON Committee will be on September 28th.
Thank you.
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