Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting Joint meeting Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly
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SEDE European Parliament
Ihren Sitzungen folgenSalvatore De Meo
Here in this chamber, we continue to emphasize the need to strengthen NATO's European pillar and the Union's capacity for action, which is distinct from but not separate from the alliance. My questions is this. In your view, what are the key challenges facing NATO-EU cooperation? And what should European Union and NATO do to reinforce this cooperation? Can Europe, in addition to its budget and its rules, contribute its own capabilities to the alliance operational planning?
Thank you for your availability and I look forward hearing your presentation.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Salvatore. General, now the floor is yours. And afterwards, the colleagues have the possibility to ask you and then you could immediately answer. So the floor is yours.
Alexus Grynkewich
Well, thank you, Madam Chair and members of the European Parliament. I really appreciate the opportunity to address you this afternoon and I'm looking forward to your questions and our discussion. And sir, thanks for your initial comments and questions as well. What I'd like to do today is start with a brief overview of how I'm viewing the broad global security environment. In short, it's unsettled and it's complex.
And I assess it's likely to become even more so over the next several years. We were reminded of this again this past weekend in the United Kingdom, where five men were arrested on suspicion of committing offenses under the Explosives Act in preparation of a terrorist act at near RAF Fairford.
Increasingly, around the globe, we see China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea collaborating in ways directly counter to all of our global interests. And of course, we've seen the return of large-scale combat with conflicts in Ukraine and in the Middle East. In these conflicts, when you look at them closely, we see not only a changing character of warfare, but also a sobering preview of how future simultaneous and potentially protracted conflicts might look: multi-theater conflicts, multi-domain conflicts, and highly autonomous conflicts. In addition to these trends, of course, we do face growing instability across NATO's periphery, including the southern flank in the Mediterranean, and there's been an increase, as you both noted, in hybrid activity targeting our critical infrastructure, our societies, and our resolve. In fact, state-directed sabotage is growing increasingly brazen.
The recent hybrid attack in Leipzig, Germany, is another stark example, where drones carrying military-grade explosives were discovered targeting a large cargo aircraft. We've also seen incidents like the Russian frigate that recklessly fired flares at a Danish helicopter. These are clear examples of attempts to instill fear and fracture our unified support to Ukraine. It isn't working, as evidenced by the Danish response when they fast-tracked a major military aid package worth 1.8 billion kroner to Ukraine following the flare incident. Fortunately, none of us face these challenges alone, and together we can handle these threats, and we are handling them.
Our information sharing and our coordination mechanisms are growing stronger every day, and while we can't talk about everything we're doing, I can say we are detecting, attributing, and responding as these hybrid threats arise. So to meet the broad set of challenges in today's global security environment, NATO recently undertook its most significant transformation in a generation. Through the deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area strategy, or DDA as we call it, we've enhanced our warfighting readiness and developed a family of plans designed to deter and, if necessary, defend every inch of alliance territory. Our plans synchronize and integrate effects across all domains, and they account for the reality that today, cyber, space, and the information domains are just as critical and just as contested as air, land, and sea. The requirements we derive from these defense plans also help us understand the critical roles that industry and society play in deterrence and defense.
Industry must not only produce the capabilities we need to seize the initiative, but it must be ready to sustain the fight in the event it goes on longer than we would like. Meanwhile, our societies must build the resilience needed to withstand manipulation designed to weaken our resolve from within. Here, in both society and industry, I see tremendous opportunity for deeper collaboration between NATO and the EU. Our transatlantic alliance, which remains the bedrock of European security, brings military heft. We bring the command structures, the operational and military expertise that we need to deter high-end conflict or to fight that high-end conflict in defense of our territory and our peoples.
The European Union, meanwhile, brings powerful economic, regulatory, and financial instruments that can build societal resilience, fund dual-use infrastructure, and protect our critical supply chains. So in the complex environment in which we find ourselves today, it's more important than ever that we align ourselves, including our messaging, synchronizing our efforts and complementing each other's strengths.
In this environment, my message that I constantly emphasize is that NATO is a defensive alliance. We have no ambitions, no plans, and no intention beyond the defense of our territory and the protection of our citizens. NATO does not seek conflict with anyone, and this aligns perfectly with the EU's aim to promote peace and the well-being of its citizens. 96% of those citizens who live in states that are also NATO members. Thus, as an alliance, we communicate our strength, but without unnecessary provocation.
But our defensive nature should not be mistaken for a lack of will or a lack of resolve. While we do not seek conflict, we will meet any attack against our alliance with overwhelming combat power, ensuring any attack will fail. To ensure this, NATO is relentlessly focused on warfighting readiness. Every exercise, every deployment, and every bit of money we spend increases our strength and our ability to deter and defend. We are rehearsed and we are ready now.
And we'll keep improving so we'll be more ready tomorrow and even more ready the day after that. As part of enhancing our readiness, we're building a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO. European and Canadian allies are assuming more responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe, while the US remains committed to providing critical but more limited support. This is the definition of NATO 3.0, and we're seeing the results every day. Significant increases in allied defense spending, increased commitments to the NATO force model, which is how allies signal the forces available to execute our plans, and growing defense industrial capacity across the alliance, in both EU nations and non-EU allies.
Our industrial base is key, as increased spending means little if we can't transform that money into real military capability. Fortunately, the EU's financial and regulatory instruments, like the European Defence Fund, complement national investments, helping nations meet NATO's capability targets. EU industrial programs like EDIRPA and ASAP also work alongside NATO's procurement frameworks to scale ammunition and weapons production. And while the EU drives these vital funding and procurement efforts, NATO provides the technical standards and military requirements that ensure capabilities are synchronized and fully interoperable on the battlefield. It's a perfect example of the EU bringing the financial tools and NATO bringing the military expertise to defend this continent.
At the NATO Summit Defense Industry Forum in Ankara, we saw even more progress in the commitment of funds toward defense requirements. Hundreds of companies announced a flurry of deals exceeding 50 billion euros, including contracts for strategic airlift, high-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and contracts for strategic airlift and the Saab GlobalEye program. We're also witnessing the Made in NATO or Made in Europe initiatives. This is important for American, Canadian, British, Norwegian, and Turkish firms, and this is an area where, in my view, cooperation between the EU and NATO must grow. Today, NATO enjoys technological superiority over our potential adversaries.
Unfortunately, our adversaries are procuring advanced capabilities, they're battle-testing them, and they're closing this technological gap. The superiority of our weapons enables us to win decisively if we're forced into conflict, and so to sustain this, I do caution against codifying preferences as to where military hardware is made. A focus on where something is made, rather than how well it performs in combat, how well it performs on the battlefield, only benefits our adversaries. So keeping the EU and NATO moving in sync toward procuring the best equipment for our men and women in uniform must be our ultimate goal.
Now don't get me wrong, it is in our collective interest to have a strong European defense industry. We welcome the 1.5 billion euros for the European Defense Industry Programme and 115 million euros for agile and rapid defense innovation, but we should be looking for more opportunities. Increases in co-production, co-development, and licensing agreements would further expand capacity and build defense industrial base resilience. And just as a rising tide lifts all boats, the dramatic increases in defense spending across this continent and in North America will energize the defense industrial base on both sides of the Atlantic. Another great example of NATO-EU cooperation is our work on military mobility.
Projects funded through the EU's Connecting Europe Facility and coordinated with NATO are using 1.74 billion euros to upgrade railways, improve roads, and enhance dual-use infrastructure in maritime ports, airports, and inland waterways. Additionally, our collective support to Ukraine remains a clear and powerful area of cooperation between the Alliance and the European Union. NATO welcomes the EU's 90 billion euro Ukraine support loan. The recent agreement by EU member states allowing Ukraine to fund Patriot air defense components and the 3.5 billion euro disbursement from the loan represent monumental milestones. This critical funding brings total NATO ally allocations toward Poland and US foreign military sales to over 10 billion euro in the last year.
So in conclusion, let us recognize we're exponentially stronger when NATO and the EU work together. Therefore, we must choose pathways that deepen our cooperation, not constrain it. With the EU driving financial regulation and NATO driving defense requirements, we can leverage increased defense spending to maximize our readiness and build all of our defense industrial bases. We can procure the best military capability from the best companies while expanding production capacity. We can modernize our critical infrastructure and we can maintain or even expand the technological superiority we rely on to defend our people and our territory.
Neither of our institutions can secure Europe alone, but working together, we can ensure our nations remain safe and at peace. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, General. I will now give the floor to members for first round of question, starting with the coordinators in a ping-pong format. So I give for the questions two minutes and we will start with Riho Terras from EPP.
Riho Terras
Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you, General. Thank you for your job done in the last years in shaping the things have changed significantly. In my times as a Chief of Defense, I remember that the state-sponsored terrorism was one of the issues we worked with. After 9/11, we were starting operation against Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan.
Today, we respond to the state-sponsored terrorism with closing cultural center in Berlin. My first question would be, what would be your recommendations, how European nations should respond to the wave of Russian sabotage, how we could organize it? And the second question is about more strategic and about future of Ukraine. Assuming that one day the war in Ukraine stops, I don't know whether we can call it peace, but then Ukraine needs significant security guarantees to maintain this peace. And the question is, what should be the content of these security guarantees?
Should we start to prepare for them already now, knowing that the primary burden of this will lie on European allies? Thank you very much, General.
Alexus Grynkewich
Well, sir, thanks for those questions and thanks for your prior service as well, and truly an honor to have a conversation with you. I think on the state-sponsored terrorism and the hybrid attacks that we see, a couple of recommendations for how nations can respond. The first is, in this environment with the amount of activity that we're sensing, it's really important that we share intelligence and information about these threats so that we can all have the same common operating picture of what it is that state adversaries are doing and propagating across the continent. We have built a network that we're using to do this under one of our subordinate commands in SHAPE that connects to national capitals and to their military commands and to their law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well. And while I can't go into the details, we've already seen some of the information and intelligence sharing from that effort result in the attribution of some of these events.
So that's kind of step one is make sure we've all got the same picture and we're helping each other to understand what's happening and attributing it. While speaking of attribution, I also will say once we have confidence in the attribution, we do need to make that public. The bringing that attribution out publicly will let state sponsors know that we understand what they're doing, and that increases costs on them. They will realize that their networks are ineffective and that they have to modify their behavior, and that in of itself has some deterrent effect. So I recommend attribution in almost every case.
And then the last question on how to respond, you know, there's a number of different ways that nations think about responding, and most of this falls in their own sovereign decision space. But again, this is a place where I do think it's important that nations consult with each other prior to any response. And I just use an example of if there were three or four hybrid attacks, say in a given week, and each nation chose its own sovereign response without consultation, we could find ourselves presenting a different picture to the state sponsor, the adversary, than we would want. It might be a more escalatory picture, or it might be something more muted. And so only by having a discussion about what that response looks like can we make sure that it's tuned appropriately to the threat that we see across the continent.
And sir, on your question of Ukraine, you know, if the war stops, I think the Ukrainians have made it clear that they would want and need robust security guarantees. The I was honored in my US hat, not as a NATO officer, but in my US role, to participate in some of the negotiations that looked at what those security guarantees might look like. And we were able to craft a set of those that included, you know, the prime concept being a strong Ukraine is the best security guarantee for themselves, similar to kind of Article 3 commitments in the North Atlantic Treaty where you invest in your own defense first. But then there were European and US support to those security guarantees, not just helping make Ukraine strong, but certain triggers on when all of our nations might come to Ukraine's aid. So I won't go into the details of those.
Obviously, those have not been signed, they have not been approved, but I think everyone has recognized that that is an essential element of any emerging peace that we're able to achieve.
Tobias Cremer
Thank you very much, General, for your very clear words and also for reference in particular the not-so-hybrid attack anymore that we've seen, for instance, in my home country in Germany with the Russian attack on Leipzig. And my I have two questions. My first question goes exactly also in that direction. We see these attacks becoming much more blatant in concerning manners. But at the same time, we are also seeing that in parts of Europe, even including in Germany, we see some pro-Russian parties, very often far-right pro-Russian parties, who might even gain power.
In Germany, there's a big discussion now how to security-proof also Germany's integrity and our national security, especially when it comes also to operational issues with regards to NATO deployment.
Is there much debate at the moment in NATO as well how to NATO-proof these plans if there are potentially people in positions of responsibility who might support the Kremlin or might even leak information to the Kremlin? The second question is more specifically directed to the EU, and I'm glad that you mentioned the complementarity between NATO providing, for instance, the standards and the EU both financial and regulatory power. But one issue where I think we underuse EU regulatory power is, for instance, to enforce NATO standards. We can't do that at the moment because we don't have a NATO-EU cooperation agreement. So I would like to hear whether you favor the establishment of such a cooperation agreement and really leading to a level of cooperation here where we can use the strength of both alliances and both systems.
Thank you.
Alexus Grynkewich
Thank you very much, Senator. Thanks for those questions. I certainly agree with you that we are seeing many more attacks and that they are much more blatant. There's been a qualitative and a quantitative increase recently. On your question regarding pro-Russia parties, I think I'll leave that to the political level to really dive into.
But what I would say is we do know that some of the hybrid attacks that Russia does center on influence operations where they are trying to drive a certain narrative, for instance, a narrative of NATO aggression, which again, we're trying to counter by saying, "No, we're just a defensive alliance, we always have been." So that is something that I think goes into the societal resilience that nations need to be thinking of, how do they make sure that the facts as they bear out about different activities and what countries are doing make it to their populations so that they're well-informed. And obviously, a well-informed populace is important to the healthy function of any democracy or republic out there. So being aware of those Russian influence operations is kind of step one and can inoculate our populations from the pernicious effects of them. But I'll leave the deeper question beyond that to the political level.
On the complementarity between the EU and NATO, you know, I don't know all the legal ramifications of an EU-NATO cooperation agreement. So but what I will say is I think stronger EU and NATO cooperation is always going to be a good thing. The more alignment we have, the more we're all going in the same direction. Again, with a number of states that are members of both organizations, it's essential that we maintain that alignment moving forward while still bringing those who are either outside of the EU or outside of NATO along with us as well. So whether a written agreement is the right thing, I'm probably not the one to answer, but I'll take that back to the office of SecGen.
Thanks.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
Merci, Madame la Présidente. Je poserai ma question en français. Mon général, l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie en 2022 a replacé la défense collective au sommet des priorités de l'Alliance en Europe. En effet, la Russie est bien la principale menace continentale d'ordre militaire pour nos États européens. Principale ne veut cependant pas dire unique.
Or, ici au Parlement européen, l'attention portée au flanc est a tendance à effacer les autres enjeux et à faire oublier les autres théâtres.
C'est le cas notamment du flanc sud, de la Méditerranée et de l'Afrique. C'est pourtant un flanc essentiel pour la sécurité, l'énergie et l'économie de l'Europe, et c'est un flanc qui a des ramifications avec le flanc est. Je voudrais donc vous demander, mon général, comment intégrez-vous le flanc sud en relation avec le flanc est dans vos préparations et vos planifications ? Comment vous préparez-vous à faire face à d'éventuelles manœuvres de contournement ou à des surprises stratégiques qui pourraient venir du sud ? Enfin, il est beaucoup question de guerre hybride dans les débats récents.
Nous savons que les flux migratoires peuvent être utilisés par un État pour déstabiliser un autre État et mettre sa sécurité et même sa souveraineté en péril. Dans vos fonctions, comment envisagez-vous la question de l'arme migratoire et quelle réponse l'Alliance pourrait y apporter en cas de crise ? Enfin, ma dernière question est en rapport avec le concept d'OTAN 3.0 que vous avez évoqué et qui a notamment été présenté lors du sommet d'Ankara. Pensez-vous qu'un général européen, un général français, allemand, polonais, italien ou d'une autre nationalité européenne pourrait un jour vous succéder comme SACEUR, comme commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe ? Je vous remercie, mon général.
Alexus Grynkewich
I'll answer the last question first, maybe with a joke. I, uh, after the Berlin Security Conference, Ambassador Whitaker, the US Ambassador to NATO, had made a comment about he looked forward to a day when there might be a German SACEUR. The next time a German general came to my house, ma'am, they brought a ruler to measure the drapes, uh, with a Bundeswehr logo on it. So, uh, just just very briefly on that. The way I always answer this question is, uh, uh, I was nominated by President Trump to come here and be SACEUR.
I was accepted by the North Atlantic Council. I'm going to do this job, uh, as long as I'm in it, as best as I can. Who succeeds me, who succeeds my successor, is ultimately a political decision for the 32, uh, heads of state and government, and and I'll leave it at that. Um, on on the collective defense, uh, questions and the the need to look at the southern flank. Uh, sir, you're you're exactly right.
The southern flank is incredibly important. Uh, we have a a command in Naples, Italy, our Joint Force Command Naples, and I have tasked them with looking at that southern flank deeply. And and we we monitor activity, uh, throughout Africa and the Middle East through that Joint Force Headquarters. We we call it the GEOBANDS. It's areas of concern where we know threats could propagate toward us.
And, you know, you you mentioned migration, uh, terrorism, uh, of course, is uh is a problem that could propagate here, uh, drugs and narcotics, uh, also a growing problem, uh, from the southern flank. Uh, there's a fair amount of Russian and Chinese activity in in Africa and the in parts of the Middle East as well, and that is not contributing to stability. So what I often say is, you know, we definitely need to pay attention to the southern flank, and we need to pay attention to it before it's too late. So Joint Force Command Naples has a task from me, uh, to develop what our military approach is on the southern flank and how we can synchronize allied activity, both that the Alliance is doing as an Alliance, but maybe more importantly, what individual nations within the Alliance are doing, what the, you know, whether it's the United States or France or, uh, others, the the Spanish who are active down on the continent. How do we make sure that everything that we're doing is coherent and driving toward a particular objective to help mitigate those risks that are headed our way?
And then just on your specific comment on migration being weaponized, we absolutely have seen that. Uh, we have seen, uh, migration be used as a form of hybrid attack, uh, where states will gather, uh, certain disaffected, uh, migrants, they'll lure them into their countries, uh, on, you know, with promises of jobs, uh, or, uh, you know, some some degree of of prosperity.
And rather than giving them that, they bundle them, they push them over to the, the borders of the alliance and then they push them across the border, uh, to cause a migration crisis in particular countries. So it is something that we absolutely need to pay attention, uh, pay attention to. So thanks very much for those questions.
Petras Auštrevičius
Thank you, Chair. General Grinkevich, most welcome to our committee and it is my great pleasure from the Renew Europe group side to ask you some questions and make some comments. I join our meeting from the event organized by European Liberal Forum under the title Stronger Europe for a Stronger NATO. I think this is something you mentioned in your introductory part as well. I strongly believe in this kind of the interaction and interdependence we have to live with.
General, in fact, my question is probably split into two parts. First, how much and to what extent we're learning from the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine, meaning warfare. Drones still flying over Ukraine and from time to time crossing the airspace of EU and NATO member states. Well, they usually taken by or met by fighter jets using expensive rockets. I mean drones are very inexpensive in this regard.
To what extent we are developing our warfare systems, platforms in order to meet those growing air challenges to the extent, I mean, they threaten lives of Europeans for the time being, but who knows, who knows where those drones might fly to tomorrow. My second part of this question, well, in 2014 we've been taken unprepared to meet so-called green polite men with no insignia entering Crimea, then and now Ukraine's territory. Did we develop a kind of ability to distinct green and polite from really green and polite? And thirdly, excuse me, shadow fleet. Is there any role for NATO to assist countries bordering and probably targeting shadow fleet used by Russia and its allies?
Thank you.
Alexus Grynkewich
Sir, thanks, thanks for those questions. A couple of, a couple of comments on each of them. As far as what are we learning from the war in Ukraine, there are tremendous lessons from the conflict that we, that we need to capture. You are absolutely right that autonomous warfare and the drones that we see coming across our border sometimes are a key part of that, is something that we have to understand. And it's, it's long-range drones and it's also shorter-range drones that are in effect being used as flying artillery on the front lines.
Underlying all of that, though, and the real lesson in my view that we have to capture is how the Ukrainians are using data. The amount of data that they're capturing from the sensors on those drones, how they're using that to rapidly target using advanced algorithms, this is, this is essential to build the kind of infrastructure, a warfighting cloud if you will, that we can then layer advanced applications on to speed our warfighting decision-making process just like the Ukrainians and unfortunately the Russians have been learning to do in the war in Ukraine. It's also that autonomy is not limited to the air domain. I know everyone is tracking some of the unmanned vessels that have been used in the Black Sea that have really bottled up the Russian Black Sea fleet. It's pretty impressive what you can do with that unmanned technology.
And then even on the ground now, the increasing use of ground autonomous capability that we have to, have to capture. Now, given all those lessons in Ukraine, the one thing that I say is we need to learn the appropriate lessons from Ukraine and now project out where will technology be in the next war.
Generals often get and admirals, I guess, generals and admirals often get accused of preparing to fight the last war because it's what they just most recently studied. What we're trying to do within the alliance is avoid that and think about how do these technologies apply to the next war. And to anyone who tells me that they want us to fight just like the Ukrainians, my answer is, if I came to you with a plan for long-term, high-attrition, drawn-out warfare as SACEUR, you should all fire me. Right, we do not want to fight that kind of war and we have some asymmetric advantages that we can apply, but we do need to do it in the context of the lessons. So thanks for that.
The good news is we have a number of ways that we're trying to do that. You did mention the specific issue of the cost equivalency of the missiles we're using and the drones we're shooting down. We are in the process of working on a different defensive architecture with the implementation of a new standing defense plan that will integrate low-cost ground-based effectors with that air layer so that now we can apply the aircraft only where they're needed and have a much more of a defense-in-depth, very similar to the mobile fire teams and the low-cost effectors that the Ukrainians are using. That takes some NATO standard setting, which is our responsibility to do. It takes national investment.
And then I know there have been some European Union funds that have been put toward that in the past and I think that's a great place to try to think about robusting up our eastern flank defense. And we were talking, ma'am, beforehand, you know, in a way we're all eastern flank nations now. Those drones can go thousands of miles, thousands of kilometers. And so if one gets through, it's not just a threat on the eastern flank, it's a threat to the entire alliance, including all the way in North America in my view. And then the challenge of little green men from Crimea, it certainly is one that we have tried to further characterize.
Again, this kind of comes to societal resilience and how do we recognize it. If we can get some warning that this is coming and expose that some sort of an unconventional type attack is headed our way, I think we have a much greater chance of thwarting that attack in the beginning. So we definitely need to be attuned to that and be concerned that something like that could happen. And then lastly on the shadow fleet, nations from within the alliance certainly have things that they can do to counter the shadow fleet, but the alliance itself is not structured for that kind of enforcement. So it really becomes an individual nation sovereign decision as to whether they're going to engage in that behavior.
Nations share when they're doing that with us, but there is no formal NATO role in any of that activity.
Reinier Van Lanschot
Thanks a lot, General Grinkevich. Thank you firstly for being here and thank you for all the work that you do in keeping us safe. I have a lot of respect for you and also because some of the convictions that you hold and that we share as a great supporter of Ukraine as you are, but also because you want Europe to become primarily responsible for its own conventional defense in a safe, predictable and ambitious timeline. Also in your opening remarks you mentioned a stronger Europe is a stronger NATO. And I believe a European Defense Union can form a single European pillar that strengthens NATO, kind of like a European equivalent to EUCOM.
And how do you look at the following three concrete ideas to make that happen? The first, if HQ AIRCOM has access to a standing pool of European strategic enablers, would this improve overall predictability and access to assets you need for NATO's core tasks? Secondly, a multinational European rapid reaction force, would that provide an integrated force package that improves the overall readiness and European contribution to the new force model? And thirdly, would additional European staff at SHAPE and additional leadership responsibilities beyond the joint force commands, such as the component commands, contribute to the overall goal of Europe primarily responsible for its own conventional defense? I think with these ideas we could make a stronger Europe and a stronger NATO.
Thank you.
Alexus Grynkewich
Well, thanks for, thanks for those questions and, you know, I certainly appreciate any efforts to enhance European capabilities and to, to contribute more to the alliance. We've been very fortunate that we've seen some of that happen already with increased contributions to the NATO force model that I mentioned, pretty substantial contributions that European nations made, and of course taking some of the leadership roles that you alluded to. So on the, on the EU Defense Union, I've had, I've had talks with a number of European leaders about this and I think my, my main comment would be this: whatever it is that the EU does with its member states and how it structures shouldn't be in competition with NATO, it needs to be complementary to what NATO brings to the fight. To have two separate structures would be extremely costly, it would stretch limited resources that we had. And so that's kind of my, my overarching comment is with NATO you have this tremendous command structure aligned under SHAPE with all of Allied Command Operations, the joint force commands, the component commands, and you mentioned a couple of them, and that and deep expertise in some of these, these areas, including at NATO HQ but also over in Norfolk with the Supreme Allied Command Transformation.
We just don't want to, we don't want to be in competition with that, we want to make that stronger if we can, in my view. For, as far as some of your specific questions, you know, we do, we have a force generation process that does provide us with the ability to access additional forces when we need them for things like AIRCOM. Whether that's presented through nations or as a consortium of nations coming together as SACEUR is, I won't say it's irrelevant to me, but as long as those forces are available, I'm happy that they're available. Now, we do sometimes have shortfalls as nations go through their force generation, so if there's ways that the EU can contribute to synchronizing some of that force generation, I think that would be useful to enhancing readiness. But that, that standing pool does exist through the NATO force model now.
And then as far as a multinational rapid response force, we do have an Allied Reaction Force now that is very responsive and can move on a moment's notice that we test regularly from time to time. And we have a number of different multinational corps and division headquarters. I think making those stronger with increased European contributions to those staffs and providing some of the enablers that are, would be extremely helpful, again, whether that's done nationally or through a consortium is, as long as the capabilities show up, SACEUR's happy, I might say. So, so with that, again, I think, I think greater cooperation, thinking about developing forces together, thinking about those synergies, and having nations invest where their strengths are so that, you know, you're, you're taking the best athletes for each particular part of problem or capability that you have, that kind of work in a cooperative manner under the EU I think is most helpful. Thanks.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So the general has to leave in 15 minutes. We have now the possibility five questions, but only one minute. And we start with Alice.
Alice Teodorescu Måwe
Tack så mycket, herr general. Jag tänker på den dragning som du har gjort som ju verkligen inskärper allvaret i situationen och de överträdelser vi ser av olika NATO-länder i Europa sker ju med en frekvens som talar för att både antalet och magnituden av dem kanske borde rendera något slags svar från NATO. För det vi ser är ju en långsam förskjutning av gränser och jag undrar egentligen helt kort vad som krävs för att vi faktiskt ska besvara Ryssland och tydliggöra att de överträdelser som sker är oacceptabla. Vi säger att vi kommer att agera, men frågan är när kommer vi att agera och hur kommer vi att agera och på vilken slags överträdelse? Tack.
Alexus Grynkewich
No, thanks. A really good question and as you might expect, I wouldn't want to reveal the specifics of how we might be thinking about particular responses. But there is one response that I think is very effective. The goal of the Russian activity right now is primarily to break our will to continue supporting Ukraine. And, you know, the logic of this is if we make the security situation seem dire enough, populations will want nations to withhold from Ukraine for their own protection.
As I mentioned a bit in my opening comments, that isn't working right now and the Danish response is one that I would commend to everyone. If there is a hybrid attack on your country, reinforcing the will to support Ukraine will show the Russians that their strategy isn't working and maybe have them back off that strategy. So that's my, that in addition to attribution are the two things that I think I can talk about in this forum. But of course, other responses as they're considered by nations, as long as those just need to be coordinated so we understand them and can think through what that might look like together. Thanks.
Lucia Annunziata
Yes, thank you. I find very interesting in general that this all of a sudden, I think, this discussion round up around the real problem I think we have when we have to confront public opinion when we go back to our nations. They want to know exactly what is the role of the NATO and what is the role of Europe. And I have seen here few people repeating in a different way this question. It's not secondary because of course the NATO is prepared and for now, you know, the power of Europe is just regulatory and financial.
Now, I warn you about this, if we really continue to have this distinction and we don't go very soon to what many colleague here ask like the fine also a military participation, we will end up having a type of politics and decision deriving from politics related to the issue of Europe can or cannot combat and the NATO is really our only ally.
Do you have a problem with that?
Alexus Grynkewich
So I I first I do think it's very important that we explain to our publics what what the threat situation is, what the challenges are that we're facing and then what the what the most effective way to to meet those challenges is. I do not think that the European Union replicating what the alliance does today would be would be healthy, but I do think that the European Union reinforcing what the alliance does today is important and critical to our collective success. So I I think that's my my overall response. I don't think I don't think the European Union would want to try to do what the alliance has built over 77 years. I mean, it's taken 77 years to to get to the point we are today with the structures that we have and the capabilities we have, the processes we have.
Replicating that in the near term based on the current threat is probably more much more disruptive than it is helpful. But driving that collaboration together, making sure that we're well coordinated and making sure that we're mutually reinforcing these each other is essential and we ought to align our messaging coming out of the European Union and NATO on this, including, you know, the the representatives from each of the countries should have consistency, particularly if it's the same permanent representative from a country having the same view when they're talking in the European Union context as they do when they're talking in the NATO context is very helpful.
Wouter Beke
Yes, thank you. Dear General, since Warsaw Summit 2016, hybrid attacks are also included under Article 5. 2016. No, sorry, 2016. Yes, of course.
Sorry, yeah, 2016. Thank you. Suppose that a member states wishes to invoke Article 5 in the event of hybrid attacks, can we count on the solidarity of the US in that case? Or must we in Europe organize ourselves for this? And if so, there is something like the Berlin Plus agreements that allows us as European countries to conduct operations within the NATO.
Is the NATO organized for this? Can European countries and armies then count on the NATO and the backbone of the NATO? And the last question, you mentioned the Allied Reaction Force within the NATO. I assume this also includes the US troops. The US is reviewing its troops presence now in Europe.
The question is not whether but how extensive the withdrawal will be. Do you have any plans to address this? Thank you.
Alexus Grynkewich
Thank you. So Secretary General Rutte will always talk about the deliberate ambiguity about when Article 5 would be invoked and when it's not, and that's because we don't want our adversary to understand the exact parameters or where the line is. So I won't go into where the trigger mechanism is. As far as, you know, can you depend on all allies to to support Article 5, I just reference you to the Ankara Summit Declaration where every head of state and government signed off on a very strong statement about the ironclad commitment to Article 5. So I just can't be any more clear than that that everyone signed up to that in Ankara.
And, you know, after the summit there were a number of news conferences and people talked about the mood within the room at the Ankara Summit. I was in the room and I can tell you that the feeling of solidarity and collective responsibility for each other's defense and working together to secure the North Atlantic was evident from every single head of state and government that was in that room. On on the things like organizations like Berlin Plus, look, there's a there's a number of different constructs. There's Berlin Plus, there's a Joint Expeditionary Force, there's Nordefco, there's a number of these different ways that allies could respond in a multilateral fashion.
Some of those involve the United States, some don't involve the United States. I think it's good to have some optionality there. Article 5 is a consensus decision by all 32 allies. And you all know working in a political environment that consensus can sometimes take time to achieve. And so having a lot of optionality in how we can react and respond in a number of different conditions, I think is just a strong way to structure ourselves.
But Article 5 is ironclad and I think we've been clear on that. Last two points, you asked about the Allied Reaction Force. There actually are not US contributions to the Allied Reaction Force. The US has of course troops in Europe that are ready to react and participate in other ways, like the forward land forces in Poland, but not part of that Allied Reaction Force. And then on the force posture review, I don't really have anything to announce on that today.
The process is ongoing, there's been no decision made, there's no predetermined outcomes, and I'm sure that the US administration will provide updates when they're available. So thanks.
Michael Gahler
On EU-NATO complementarity, there are agreed NATO standards, but we see that not in every case everybody applies it. Now NATO has no treaty violation mechanism, so how to force it? My question is, and I'm obviously asking the same people the same question, is do you see it as helpful if it were that we would apply exactly existing agreed NATO standards and make it binding EU regulations, technical regulations, which would bind all of our member states, so even more than the NATO members, and thereby indirectly be helpful that all the agreed standards are applied? The other question is on Ukraine in the moment when the war, state of war is over. They need the security guarantees.
Now they will not be members of EU or NATO at this very moment, so it will be a coalition of the willing. Should we not conduct a discussion rather in a way that it will be secured mutual security guarantees, because we need Ukraine to help us defend ourselves against Russia? They know how to do it, we don't. So would that be an idea to discuss it in this way, a mutual security guarantee? Thank you.
Alexus Grynkewich
Hey sir, thanks. Very quick answers on both of those. I don't know the exact mechanism that we would apply for there to be regulations that applied NATO standards to all the EU countries, but I am certain that the EU could do a lot to encourage nations, whether it was mandatory or there were certain incentive structures that you put in place for that. So I think anything that you all can do to encourage nations to adhere to those NATO standards is helpful for our interoperability. So I'll offer that.
And then on the security guarantees, I absolutely think they need to be mutual security guarantees. Ukraine, once this war is over, will have one of the largest battle-hardened militaries in Europe that knows how to fight in this new environment of autonomy and electronic warfare, and we will want them to be a security contributor to European security, Euro-Atlantic security.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you, Chair. Thank you, General, for being here. Thank you for your service. I retired from the Finnish defense intelligence as a chief of the defense intelligence, and we take great pride of knowing what Russians military, Russian military thinks.
And we know currently that they love to humiliate us in different possible ways because they know that I don't, we don't retaliate. One good example is the airspace violations which will be increasing in near future because the Russians know that when they do that, the chain of command is long and in the end of that chain of command is the weakest link of our defense, us the politicians who don't dare to do anything. So if you want to send a strong signal to Russia is that we delegate the authority to use force to military because that sends that now we mean business and some things start to happen. So have you had even discussion about that in NATO? Thank you.
Alexus Grynkewich
Yes, sir. So a really, yes is the short answer. And I guess maybe the way I'll answer it is back in September of last year, we had the airspace incursion that, and this was in Poland where 21 drones, I think, some number like that came across into Polish airspace. And Dutch F-35s were there doing what then was called air policing, but we're transitioning now to air defense. And they were able to engage and use force in that, in that moment to shoot down several of those drones.
So I think that is a good example of that delegation having effectiveness. And that delegation went all the way down to the cockpit, by the way. So no one had to call me in the middle of the night. No one had to call AIRCOM in the middle of the night. Those pilots knew what their task was and they were able to take out those drones at the moment.
Following that, we implemented Eastern Century, which is our enhanced vigilance activity across the entire eastern flank. And we've been able to replicate the authorities that those Dutch F-35 pilots had in Poland across nearly every country and nearly every air defense sector that we have on the eastern flank. So the use of force has been delegated for defensive purposes here. And I think that's, that's been really helpful in terms of allowing us to have a robust response. I would also say while we have had a number of airspace incursions, many of those of recent, recently have been down in Romania in the Danube Delta, a very particular piece of airspace on the Ukrainian side of the border with targets that Russia wants to hit.
And they're taking some risk in flying close to the border. And then the jamming forces some of the drones across the border. With the exception of that area, the Russians have been much more careful to avoid coming across the border with drones in the Baltics or into Poland since we implemented Eastern Century. So I think it did have the deterrent effect that you're describing.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
It's nearly on time, one minute. General, thank you very much on the name of this committee and many guests today. It's a really historical moment. Now it's a historical moment that you have time, the SACEUR coming to European Parliament. And you could see we have to do, we have really continue working.
It's not easy, but it changed a lot. And I think it's very important change more. And you could see the, and you hear the questions. So always welcome again. Thank you for your service.
Thank you for your time. And God bless you and the armies. Thank you. Thank you all. Collective photo at the front.
Yes, maybe, maybe of the members a collective photo with, okay, I see there are many groupies. So please come.
So we just waiting for the colleagues from AFCO and then we can could continue.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Colleagues, please take your seat, we want to continue please. Please, ladies and gentlemen, please take your seat. Thank you very much. So, everybody, it's enough space for everybody, please take your seat. Okay.
Dear colleagues, let me now welcome our AFCO colleagues for our joint meeting. If there are no objections, I declare the agenda adopted. Let immediately start with the, please colleagues, take your seat, there is enough space. Thank you very much. So let's immediately start with the consideration of the draft own-initiative report on the institutional aspects of the common European Defense Union.
The timing could not be more significant. This is an important file for both SEDE and AFCO. The State of the Union made clear that defense is now a core European priority. But political ambition needs the right institutional framework to deliver, and we are still far from having an institutional framework that can reduce fragmentation and strengthen our ability to act together. I would like to thank you both co-rapporteurs, Niklas Herbst for SEDE, Salvatore De Meo for the work done so far and for the good cooperation between our two committees.
Thank you very much. With that in mind, I give the floor to the AFCO Vice-Chair, Charles. The floor is yours.
Charles Goerens
Thank you, Marie-Agnes. Dear colleagues, the AFCO and SEDE committees have consistently emphasized the importance of a common European defense that strengthens European security and the need for institutional reforms to enable its development. Our joint SEDE-AFCO public hearing that took place in February has also provided us with important expert insights in this regard that directly fed into the joint SEDE-AFCO report. The draft report contains a set of concrete proposals on how to further strengthen common European defense capabilities and related institutional framework. I am sure that they will serve as a basis for thoughtful discussion.
I now give the floor to the rapporteurs, Niklas Herbst for SEDE and then Salvatore De Meo for AFCO for five minutes each. Our colleague Herbst has the floor.
Niclas Herbst
Yes, thank you, Chair. Thank you also, Madam Chair. You mentioned that the timing could not be more significant, and that's true. But I may add that it's also perfect to have this Sakur here in preparation of this, because now we need to focus on how to operationalize everything we heard. And I don't need to stress the geopolitical situation and the reason why we need to be quick and decisive in this matter.
So Russia's war of aggression, hybrid attacks, sabotage, cyberattacks, you name it. So the core message of the report is that we do not lack a legal basis. It lacks the institutions and procedures to make it work. And first, we should make full use of the existing treaties, and secondly, then prepare for possible treaty changes in the future. And my AFCO colleague Salvatore will speak more about the second step and also the question of enlargement.
So the key question, and that's why I really listened to the Sakur, we don't need no duplication of NATO structures. And you stressed this as well. So the goal is not to copy Article 5. The goal is to make Article 42.7 credible and also operational. So we need a kind of division of labor, while the EU brings what NATO does not have.
And that is also important to stress the fact that we do that we can bring things to the table that NATO cannot. And that is namely sanctions, trade policy, energy, critical infrastructure, civil protection, defense industry legislation, and civil-military coordination. So and the Sakur also mentioned a couple of times that optionality is important and that we do not have some any kind of competition, but that we need EU to facilitate. And that is important. And we stress this in paragraph 2 as well.
Separable but not separate, of course, remains extremely important for us. So it must we must be able to act when NATO consensus cannot be reached.
Optionality was mentioned. Of course we also have to bear in mind that not all EU members are also NATO members. And for them Article 42.7 is a primary basis for collective defense. And we experienced that in Cyprus a couple of months ago. So the core of the report is of course how to operationalize 42.7.
And the starting point is that the article is legally binding. But there are no activation procedures, no contingency planning, no consultation mechanisms. And we want procedures, not new bureaucracy. Procedures, not new bureaucracy. Important in this regard is a playbook for aviation procedures, for example, forms of assistance, coordination, covering hybrid, cyber, critical infrastructure, space, subsea scenarios.
And that should be designed to be comparable with NATO procedures. And the operational readiness review of course plays a major part. Also here based on existing mechanisms and no new agency. Exercises need to be mentioned. They need to be more frequent Union-wide exercises for multiple scenarios where appropriate NATO allies like Canada, the UK or Norway should take part.
And that builds interoperability. Of course we need to take a closer look at the defense readiness omnibus. I think that's understood. And when it comes to the institutions and decision making, of course the European Security Council is a major issue. And again it's important not to duplicate the European Council.
It is not a new decision-making body but a standing format focused on security providing continuity, also coherence. Today security and defense are dealt with ad hoc and scattered across many formats. Optionality, okay, but we also need some kind of framework here. So the Security Council could bring this together at the highest political level. Then of course we have to stress that this is not an operational military headquarters.
I know that there are different points of view on this. And this needs to be discussed in the next days and maybe also in form of solutions or compromises. And let me just close by saying that also democratic accountability is something that we as a Parliament should focus on. Parliament must be informed whenever Article 42.7 is invoked and receive regular reports. And also need to have an annual plenary debate on the state of the European Defense Union.
A stronger Europe makes NATO stronger. We do not replace. We make the European pillar capable of acting together with our partners. And this on time.
Salvatore De Meo
Thank you, Chair. I will speak in Italian to explain my position and position by side AFCO. Ho lavorato su questo rapporto insieme al collega Herbst. Voglio ringraziare Niklas per la collaborazione e per il lavoro che abbiamo fatto sapendo che si tratta di un report ambizioso in ragione della necessità di dover costruire anche in tempi rapidi una politica di difesa comune. Infatti abbiamo ben presente che le guerre e i cambiamenti geopolitici degli ultimi anni ci hanno dimostrato come l'Unione Europea deve essere pronta ad assumere maggiore responsabilità per la propria sicurezza, proteggere il suo territorio e difendere i suoi valori fondamentali.
Vi segnalo i principali elementi di competenza della commissione AFCO che abbiamo portato in questo lavoro che vede sia la commissione SEDE che AFCO lavorare insieme. Il problema dell'Unione Europea è stato detto da Niklas per quanto riguarda la difesa non è la mancanza di basi giuridiche ma la mancanza di un'architettura istituzionale coerente capace di rendere pienamente operative quelle basi. Ed è per questo che nel report noi indichiamo due obiettivi complementari. Innanzitutto ribadiamo la necessità di utilizzare pienamente le possibilità già offerte dai trattati esistenti.
Ci sono norme di cui chiediamo la concreta applicazione. Secondo, dobbiamo riconoscere la necessità di modifiche mirate dei trattati per dotare l'Unione Europea dell'architettura istituzionale di cui ha bisogno. È vero, il trattato di Lisbona ci ha già dato degli strumenti importanti, come la PESCO, l'Agenzia Europea per la Difesa, l'articolo 42.7, ma il problema è che questi strumenti restano frammentati e sottoutilizzati perché non c'è una cornice di governance sufficientemente coerente. A questo proposito nel report richiamiamo la risoluzione del Parlamento Europeo del 22 novembre 2023 sulle proposte di modifica dei trattati. Sappiamo che è stato un report molto sofferto, ci sono molte resistenze politiche, ma in questa nuova formulazione del report chiediamo al Consiglio Europeo almeno di avviare una riflessione strutturata per definire a livello di trattato la governance, le strutture di comando, i meccanismi di finanziamento e il quadro di responsabilità democratica della CEDU.
Nel frattempo chiediamo anche di considerare il ricorso al voto a maggioranza qualificata nelle aree di sviluppo della capacità, dell'industria della difesa, degli appalti e del finanziamento. Incoraggiamo inoltre un uso più ampio dell'astensione costruttiva ai sensi dell'articolo 31 del trattato per facilitare un processo decisionale più efficace ed evitare che la capacità dell'Unione di agire in modo limitato dall'impossibilità di raggiungere l'unanimità. Sul piano istituzionale non ripeto le cose dette da Niklas e quindi chiediamo l'istituzione di un Consiglio Europeo che sia presieduto dal Presidente del Consiglio Europeo, accanto ad esso un Consiglio della Difesa presieduto dall'Alto Rappresentante, ma chiediamo che vengano chiariti i rispettivi ruoli dell'Alto Rappresentante e il Commissario per la Difesa per evitare sovrapposizione. La dimensione istituzionale deve naturalmente essere accompagnata da capacità operative e su questo chiediamo di chiarire esattamente l'operatività dell'articolo 42.7 come spiegato dal collega Herbst. Infine, riguarda un capitolo importante sull'allargamento.
La CEDU deve essere pensata fin d'ora per un'Unione che vada oltre i 27 Stati. In questo contesto facciamo riferimento alla futura adesione dell'Ucraina come una grande opportunità in ragione delle sue esperienze, capacità militari e della conoscenza diretta della minaccia russa. Il report propone di includere già nei negoziati di adesione un dialogo sulla partecipazione dell'Ucraina alla PESCO, alla PESCO e alle future strutture della CEDU. L'allargamento non riguarda solo il numero degli Stati membri, ma anche la capacità dell'Unione di decidere e agire in modo efficace in un contesto sempre più complesso, perché un'Unione più ampia richiede istituzioni più forti, procedure decisionali più efficienti e una maggiore capacità di trovare risposte comune alle sfide che affrontiamo. Infine, un elemento non negoziabile.
Ogni elemento che riguarda ovviamente le politiche di difesa devono essere preventivamente condivise con il Parlamento Europeo. Questa è una condizione essenziale perché rivendichiamo con forza la sua