Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting Joint meeting Committee on Constitutional Affairs
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SEDE, AFCO European Parliament
Niclas Herbst
And that is important. And we stress this in paragraph 2 as well. Separable but not separate, of course, remains extremely important for us. So it must, we must be able to act when NATO consensus cannot be reached. Optionality was mentioned.
Of course, we also have to bear in mind that not all EU members are also NATO members. And for them, Article 42.7 is a primary basis for collective defense. And we experienced that in Cyprus a couple of months ago. So the core of the report is, of course, how to operationalize 42.7. And the starting point is that the article is legally binding.
But there are no activation procedures, no contingency planning, no consultation mechanisms. And we want procedures, not new bureaucracy. Procedures, not new bureaucracy. Important in this regard is a playbook for aviation procedures, for example, forms of assistance, coordination, covering hybrid, cyber, critical infrastructure, space, subsea scenarios. And that should be designed to be comparable with NATO procedures.
And the operational readiness review, of course, plays a major part, also here based on existing mechanisms and no new agency. Exercises need to be mentioned. They need to be more frequent, EU-wide exercises for multiple scenarios where appropriate NATO allies like Canada, the UK, or Norway should take part. And that builds interoperability. Of course, we need to take a closer look at the defense readiness omnibus.
I think that's understood. And when it comes to the institutions and decision-making, of course, the European Security Council is a major issue. And again, it's important not to duplicate the European Council. It is not a new decision-making body, but a standing format focused on security, providing continuity, also coherence. Today, security and defense are dealt with ad hoc and scattered across many formats.
Optionality, okay, but we also need some kind of framework here. So this Security Council could bring this together at the highest political level. Then, of course, we have to stress that this is not an operational military headquarters. I know that there are different points of view on this, and this needs to be discussed in the next days and maybe also in form of solutions or compromises.
And let me just close by saying that also democratic accountability is something that we as a parliament should focus on. Parliament must be informed whenever Article 42.7 is invoked and receive regular reports and also need to have an annual plenary debate on the state of the European Defense Union. Stronger Europe makes NATO stronger. We do not replace, we make the European pillar capable of acting together with our partners and this on time.
Salvatore De Meo
Thank you, Chair. I will speak in Italian to explain my position and position by side AFCO. Ho lavorato su questo rapporto insieme al collega Herbst. Voglio ringraziare Niklas per la collaborazione, per il lavoro che abbiamo fatto, sapendo che si tratta di un report ambizioso in ragione della necessità di dover costruire anche in tempi rapidi una politica di difesa comune. Infatti abbiamo ben presente che le guerre e i cambiamenti geopolitici degli ultimi anni ci hanno dimostrato come l'Unione Europea deve essere pronta ad assumere maggiore responsabilità per la propria sicurezza, proteggere il suo territorio e difendere i suoi valori fondamentali.
Vi segnalo i principali elementi di competenza della commissione AFCO che abbiamo portato in questo lavoro che vede sia la commissione SEDE che AFCO lavorare insieme. Il problema dell'Unione Europea è stato detto da Niklas per quanto riguarda la difesa non è la mancanza di basi giuridiche ma la mancanza di un'architettura istituzionale coerente capace di rendere pienamente operative quelle basi. Ed è per questo che nel report noi indichiamo due obiettivi complementari. Innanzitutto ribadiamo la necessità di utilizzare pienamente le possibilità già offerte dai trattati esistenti. Ci sono norme di cui chiediamo la concreta applicazione.
Secondo, dobbiamo riconoscere la necessità di modifiche mirate dei trattati per dotare l'Unione Europea dell'architettura istituzionale di cui ha bisogno. È vero, il trattato di Lisbona ci ha già dato degli strumenti importanti come la PESCO, l'Agenzia Europea per la Difesa, l'articolo 42.7, ma il problema è che questi strumenti restano frammentati e sottoutilizzati perché non c'è una cornice di governance sufficientemente coerente. A questo proposito nel report richiamiamo la risoluzione del Parlamento Europeo del 22 novembre 2023 sulle proposte di modifica dei trattati. Sappiamo che è stato un report molto sofferto, ci sono molte resistenze politiche, ma in questa nuova formulazione del report chiediamo al Consiglio Europeo almeno di avviare una riflessione strutturata per definire a livello di trattato la governance, le strutture di comando, i meccanismi di finanziamento e il quadro di responsabilità democratica della CEDU. Nel frattempo chiediamo anche di considerare il ricorso al voto a maggioranza qualificata nelle aree di sviluppo della capacità dell'industria della difesa, degli appalti e del finanziamento.
Incoraggiamo inoltre un uso più ampio dell'astensione costruttiva ai sensi dell'articolo 31 del trattato per facilitare un processo decisionale più efficace ed evitare che la capacità dell'Unione di agire in modo limitato dall'impossibilità di raggiungere l'unanimità. Sul piano istituzionale non ripeto le cose dette da Niklas e quindi chiediamo l'istituzione di un Consiglio Europeo che sia presieduto dal Presidente del Consiglio Europeo, accanto ad esso un Consiglio della Difesa presieduto dall'Alto Rappresentante, ma chiediamo che vengano chiariti i rispettivi ruoli dell'Alto Rappresentante e il Commissario per la Difesa per evitare sovrapposizioni. La dimensione istituzionale deve naturalmente essere accompagnata da capacità operative e su questo chiediamo di chiarire esattamente l'operatività dell'articolo 42.7 come spiegato dal collega Herbst.
Infine riguarda un capitolo importante sull'allargamento. La CEDU deve essere pensata fin d'ora per un'Unione che vada oltre i 27 Stati. In questo contesto facciamo riferimento alla futura adesione dell'Ucraina come una grande opportunità in ragione delle sue esperienze e capacità militari e della conoscenza diretta della minaccia russa. Il report propone di includere già nei negoziati di adesione un dialogo sulla partecipazione dell'Ucraina alla PESC, alla PESCO e alle future strutture della CEDU. L'allargamento non riguarda solo il numero degli Stati membri, ma anche la capacità dell'Unione di decidere e agire in modo efficace in un contesto sempre più complesso, perché un'Unione più ampia richiede istituzioni più forti, procedure decisionali più efficienti e una maggiore capacità di trovare risposte comuni alle sfide che affrontiamo.
Infine, un elemento non negoziabile: ogni elemento che riguarda ovviamente le politiche di difesa devono essere preventivamente condivisi con il Parlamento europeo. Questa è una condizione essenziale perché rivendichiamo con forza la supervisione democratica. Abbiamo elaborato un report ambizioso, ma credo che il momento che stiamo vivendo richieda una riflessione altrettanto ambiziosa sulla capacità della nostra Unione di dotarsi di una vera architettura istituzionale della difesa. Attendiamo con interesse di lavorare con tutti voi su un testo ambizioso e di ricevere i vostri preziosi contributi per migliorare ulteriormente il testo stesso. Grazie.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. So I will now give the floor to the shadow rapporteurs for two minutes each and we start with S&D, Vasile. The floor is yours.
Vasile Dîncu
Thank you. Be speaking in Romanian. Vreau să mulțumesc ambilor raportori pentru raportul foarte bun pe care l-au făcut. Sunt sigur că vom putea să aducem contribuții pentru că o mare parte din ideile noastre se regăsesc în acest raport la ambii raportori. Întrebarea de centrală este să răspundem cum să facem o Uniune Europeană comună de apărare ca să fie credibilă, operațională și responsabilă din punct de vedere democratic.
În primul rând, vrem ca apărarea europeană să reflecte realitățile de securitate cu care se confruntă statele noastre în acest moment. Nu vrem un concept general de apărare sau o strategie cum facem noi foarte multe. Trebuie să fie una în care, de exemplu, flancul estic, regiunea Mării Negre, mobilitatea militară, apărarea aeriană, mai ales apărarea împotriva dronelor, infrastructura rezilientă să reprezinte cerințe operaționale imediate. Sigur că acest lucru trebuie să consolideze, așa cum au spus și raportorii, pilonul european al NATO, nu să dublăm funcțiile, nicio funcțiune. Sigur că amendamentele noastre vin în ideea că articolul 42 alineatul 7, clauza de asistență reciprocă, trebuie să devină operațional, pentru că în momentul acesta nu este operațional.
De asemenea, observațiile noastre, și aici și raportorii au adus o contribuție foarte bună, trebuie ca angajamentele politice să vină cu un mecanism de punere în aplicare. Un ciclu anual european de pregătire pentru apărare ar putea conecta evaluările amenințărilor, obiectivele măsurabile și capabilitățile, finanțarea și punerea lor în aplicare. De asemenea, avem nevoie de o bază industrială europeană comună pentru apărare. În cele din urmă, de asemenea, apărarea europeană trebuie să fie mai puternică și, așa cum cred că suntem de acord cu colegii noștri, vrem un control democratic asupra acestor lucruri. Trebuie să fim preciși din punct de vedere juridic, pentru că dispozițiile existente nu permit utilizarea clauzei pasarelă.
În fine, vom continua dialogul și cu siguranță vom ajunge la un consens.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And for S&D, Afke Thijs, the floor is yours.
Thijs Reuten
Yeah, thank you very much, chairs, and thanks to the rapporteurs for an excellent draft that puts the right question on the table. I think the analysis is spot on. And I think also with the combined efforts of these two committees and the broad majority in this house that wants member states to move instead of trying to hold the brake, I think we can achieve a major result. What I think we need to elaborate on, and of course there was a word limit and so on, but we need to have more precision on the governance, also an AFCO topic obviously. So I want to focus a couple of remarks there, because I think at this topic we have to go beyond politely asking the member states.
We need to prescribe. We need to say clearly what we want. And with the amendments that I hope to table, we start from the clear objective of the Defense Union and set the conditions that bound it. It must be democratically, as also was said by the rapporteur, it must fully respect national sovereignty above all, etc., etc. But it must also be inclusive of our accession countries and closest partners.
It must complement NATO where possible, not duplicate, true. But on the governance, that must translate into a couple of simple principles, because it must be better than what we have now. Decisions must be quick through pre-agreed triggers, delegated authority agreed in peacetime, and where appropriate majority voting with constructive abstention. A small empowered European Security Council could set strategic direction. A permanent Defense Ministerial Council would handle the implementation.
And stronger link between Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council would connect EU and NATO. Around that we can build the rest of the structure with possible optional institutional pathways set out openly with their advantages and drawbacks. One last point. Institutional building is heavy lifting. It must advance, but it never must come at the expense of readiness today.
I very much look forward to working with the rapporteurs and I think we can do this with a big group of like-minded colleagues overarching groups, overarching the differences that that sometimes we have in this house. Thank you.
Reinis Pozņaks
Thank you very much. We continue with the Patriots. For SEDE, Rachel. She isn't there. Okay.
And for AFCO, Alexandre. Okay. Then we continue with ECR. For SEDE, Claudio Richard. Okay, you will, yeah, please, the floor is yours.
So I will just read the message from co-rapporteur. Thank you, chair, and dear colleagues, I would like to thank the two rapporteurs for the proposal. This report will raise fundamental questions about the scope and limits of European integration in defense matters. Under the proposal, part of the decision-making process could be shifted into permanent EU structures as the report envisages greater institutionalization of coordination and decision-making at EU level, with some areas potentially becoming less dependent on unanimity. It will therefore be important to assess how best to safeguard the role, prerogatives, and responsibilities of the member states, which would continue to provide the forces, capabilities, and political leadership.
It remains difficult to determine what such a union would entail in practice, where the limits of EU-level action would lie and how national sovereignty in security and defence would be preserved. At the same time, European defence must remain fully complementary to NATO. We should strengthen the European pillar of the alliance, not duplicate NATO structures or create division between EU and non-EU allies. We must also preserve national sovereignty. Decisions concerning the deployment of troops and military commitments should remain under a sovereign responsibility of each member state.
At the same time, uncertainty over the precise aims of a European Defense Union raises questions about its practical and legal significance as long as its duties, competences, and tasks are not defined with sufficient legal certainty.
I would also underline that European defence cooperation must first and foremost strengthen the security of member states directly exposed to Russian threats. And finally, Europe defence investments must benefit the entire union, including defence industries in the Eastern Europe, while improving military mobility and dual-use infrastructure on the eastern flank. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, and for ECR, Ofko Charlie Weimers. The floor is yours.
Petras Auštrevičius
Thank you, Madam Chair. I would first like to thank the rapporteurs for their work on this important subject. There are several points in this report where we share the underlying assessment. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally changed the security environment in Europe. Conventional military threats are once again a reality.
Europe must therefore take greater responsibility for its own security while preserving the transatlantic partnership and strengthening NATO's European pillar. Stronger coordination between European governments is clearly necessary. Such cooperation can help Europe act effectively while keeping responsibility where it belongs: with the member states. We also share the view that stronger cooperation in defence must go hand in hand with democratic accountability. Citizens must know who is making the decisions and who bears the political responsibility for them.
However, we have significant reservations about the broader direction of this report. There is an important distinction between cooperating more closely in Europe and centralising more power in Brussels. The proposal before us would move away from flexible intergovernmental cooperation towards increasingly permanent EU-level mechanisms and structures. The report wants to open the door for qualified majority voting and openly states a need for more flexible treaty interpretation, thereby further distancing itself from the treaties and the citizens. We do not believe that this is the right direction.
Defence is one of the most fundamental responsibilities of a sovereign state. Greater European effectiveness should therefore come from stronger capabilities, better preparedness and closer cooperation between our nations, not from progressively transferring political authority away from them. This is especially important when it comes to decision-making. The treaties themselves continue to give particular protection to decisions with military or defence implications. So, we want more European cooperation, we want Europe to be prepared, but the cooperation should remain intergovernmental.
And finally, we will be constructive and I look forward seeing the developments in the coming months. Thank you.
Petras Auštrevičius
Thank you, Chair. Well, we appreciate the decision to make this report on institutional aspects of a common European Defence Union. The Europeans expect from the European Union to deliver, since the security issues remain on the top of European expectations.
The Europeans expect from the European Union to deliver, since the security issues remain on the top of European expectations. So, how it should be done? In fact, indeed, we need some new innovative solutions, because today we don't have any European Defence Union as such. So this is a medium-term, long-term project, but we have to start moving towards this target. Well, if to read from the European Union's concept of security, it states that NATO remains a cornerstone of collective defence of its member states in Europe.
It means that we have to find a common solutions. Those structures or institutional architecture we are speaking about must be compatible with the NATO one. So they can't be, you know, in kind of competition or overlapping each other. We expect that this report will lay down certain principles or at least a roadmap towards the European Defence Union, which undeniably is well expected by Europeans. Thank you.
Charles Goerens
Merci, chers collègues. Si la défense européenne était une cathédrale, je dirais qu'elle se situe à Barcelone. C'est la cathédrale inachevée. Avec la cathédrale inachevée, elle a commencé il y a cent quarante ans et l'Union européenne, ou la défense européenne, a commencé, à en juger du premier texte, en 1952. Donc ça fait juste la moitié de ce qu'a pris la cathédrale de Barcelone pour se développer jusqu'à maintenant, et encore celle-ci n'est pas terminée.
Alors, elle doit être mue par un souci de solidarité entre les membres. Alors vis-à-vis des menaces et des aspects qui appellent de la part de l'Union européenne une responsabilité, disons que ce qui est le plus important, c'est d'avoir une lecture de la situation. Et cette lecture doit être commune. Nous avons besoin d'une analyse de la menace et cette analyse de la menace doit être commune. Nous avons besoin d'une action pour répondre aux exigences de sécurité et cette réponse doit être commune et solidaire.
Donc ce n'est pas en multipliant les structures et les institutions que l'on va y arriver. Je crois qu'il faut avoir un dispositif clair, susceptible de dégager des responsabilités derrière lesquelles personne ne peut se cacher. L'on connaît les difficultés qui se posent au niveau de l'Union européenne pour surmonter les difficultés notamment liées à l'absence d'unanimité dès lors qu'il faut prendre une décision. On le sait. On ne va pas pouvoir l'imposer, il faudra changer les traités.
Mais là où les traités nous donnent l'impression d'être plus flexibles, il serait irresponsable de concourir encore ou de recourir encore à l'unanimité dès lors que la décision peut d'ores et déjà être prise à la majorité qualifiée. Les quelques amendements que nous avons soumis en tant que Renew vont dans ce sens.
Je vous remercie de votre attention.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. So now we continue with the Greens, Reinier for SEDE and AFCO of course. You have four minutes. It's not a must, but you have.
Reinier Van Lanschot
I hope to not use them all. I'm very excited about this INI. It doesn't happen often that I'm so excited about INIs, but in this case I'm very excited also because I love constitutional affairs and I love European defense. Exactly. And I'm happy from both angles that we work on this now because this INI is also very timely, not only because of the announcement of the European Security Council in the recent State of the Union, but also Commissioner Kubilius who expressed yesterday again that we need a big bang in institutional defense readiness focused on function rather than form.
So thank you chairs and thank you to the rapporteurs, Mr. Herbst and De Meo. I think paragraph two sets the right goal. The European Defense Union should strengthen NATO's European pillar and separable but not separate act where NATO consensus cannot be reached. And our job is to now make that principle work in practice and focus on that function rather than on the form. So what we are doing, let's try to be as clear as possible in this INI.
When we say a European Defense Union separable but not separate from NATO, what we intend to do is build a European equivalent of United States European Command, EUCOM. You all listened to the Supreme Allied Commander Grinkevičius just now, or at least the ones that were here, and he also expressed that a stronger Europe means a stronger NATO. So I firmly believe these two things can go hand in hand if we work on the following six building blocks: a European Security Council to give a political mandate, operational Article 42.7 so a response is automatic, a European military headquarters for command and control, a European military intelligence center, a strategic enablers unit, and a rapid reaction force to deter and if necessary defeat a Russian attack fast and on our terms. So any European Defense Union also needs to meet three criteria: faster decisions without unanimity, firm parliamentary control, and inclusion of non-EU partners like Ukraine, the UK, Canada, Norway, and others. To make sure it's separable but not separate with NATO, the European Defense Union commander should also serve as deputy SACEUR with an automatic release protocol if Article 5 fails to trigger.
Redundancy in my view is not the same as duplication. So I will table amendments to that effect in close collaboration with many of the other shadows. I see great opportunities there to work on this collectively as the political momentum is building and I look forward to the negotiations. Thank you very much.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And now for the Left, AFCO, Karolina Morace. No, she isn't here. And for ESN, Hans Neuhoff. No, either.
Okay. So any catch the eye comments? Now you have the possibility. Please.
Loránt Vincze
Thank you very much. Maybe from an AFCO perspective, some ideas also from my side. Thanking to the rapporteurs and the shadows for their work. I think we have a very good draft report on the table. There is no doubt that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security and defense.
We need a stronger European capabilities, greater readiness, and credible European pillar within NATO.
At the same time, I think we need to use the possibilities already provided by the treaties. And we have important instruments at our disposal: the mutual assistance clause, the framework for CSDP missions, the European Defense Agency and PESCO. Probably before creating new mechanisms, we should ensure that we make full and effective use of this existing framework. And this also applies to the discussion regarding the treaty change. I would be cautious about making a broader treaty revision a condition for moving forward on European defense, because we can end up in a blockage.
So where we identify concrete institutional obstacles that cannot be addressed within the existing framework, yes, we should rather consider targeted and clearly defined treaty amendments. This would allow us to remain ambitious but also pragmatic. And here the Council and our Parliament should find the right procedure to advance such targeted treaty amendment. This would solve a lot of our problems in different areas of competencies. Thank you very much.
Charles Goerens
Merci chers collègues. Maintenant nous allons donner la parole aux deux rapporteurs pour les remarques finales. Je crois que c'est Monsieur Herbst qui va commencer, enfin arrangez-vous entre vous deux.
Niclas Herbst
Thank you for all your contributions. I think we have a lot of things in common among the political groups. Yes, decision-making and governance is the core of course of this report since it's about the institutional issues of the Common European Defense Union. It's not a report about military contingency planning. And we need to be aware that of course we do have a lot of things in common, but we also need to decide on some things, like the question of a war headquarters.
I know that there are different approaches towards this question here in this committee, but we need to have some kind of decision. The same on other issues as well, especially qualified majority voting. I mean, that's an evergreen for us here to discuss in the European Parliament. And we need to be clear on that. But we also need to, you know, somehow strike the balance between keeping NATO together or giving the right political signals on the one hand and also strengthening the European idea of defense as well.
And of course the elephant in the room is the question that we also need to be prepared to defend Europe without the US. Without anybody in this room wanting this to happen, nevertheless we need some kind of preparation here. And there we need to strike the balance. So I hope to keep up the excitement of René and others in this regard. But we also need some kind of realism here.
And we just listened to Sakur and he said we have to bear in mind as well the limited resources, not only in terms of money but also in terms of qualified personnel, even with the growing use of AI-driven tools. We need to bear this in mind. And all this need to come together for the report. I'm thankful for your contributions. I think we will have good compromises and we will have a good report in the end.
And as long as we have, you know, a common vision for the defense of Europe, I think we will be successful in the end.
Salvatore De Meo
Sì, aggiungo poco altro a quello che è stato già detto da Niklas. Permettetemi di ringraziare tutti i relatori ombra per aver già dato un primo contributo di condivisione su un report molto ambizioso. E come diceva Niklas, sono molti i punti di convergenza e tutti partiamo dalla consapevolezza che dobbiamo mettere in campo azioni straordinarie rispetto ad uno scenario straordinario.
Ritorno a fare una brevissima considerazione sulla necessità di guardare i trattati come la soluzione. Quindi noi oggi abbiamo già le norme che ci permetterebbero di fare passi in avanti. C'è bisogno di una volontà politica. E quando nel report facciamo riferimento alla possibilità di aprire semplicemente una riflessione su modifiche mirate, vogliamo semplicemente che la questione venga sollevata anche a livello di Consiglio europeo. La precedente legislatura abbiamo deliberato una proposta ambiziosa, eccessivamente ambiziosa secondo alcuni.
Io credo che non sia quella la strada da seguire, condivido le riflessioni di Lorant, del coordinatore della AFCO, perché non dobbiamo permettere ad alcune forze politiche magari di mettere questo report in una posizione di stallo. Ma ritengo allo stesso tempo necessario aprire una riflessione se le attuali norme politicamente non trovano la forza di essere applicate, dobbiamo anche arrivare a valutare, a riflettere, a dibattere sulla possibilità di modifiche mirate che non vadano ad incidere sulla complessità dei trattati. Quindi attendiamo anche di vedere gli emendamenti che perverranno da tutti i gruppi politici e son convinto che la consapevolezza da cui partiamo ci porterà a lavorare nella stessa direzione e a fare in modo che ci sia un report che stimoli la Commissione e stimoli un processo di costruzione di una politica di difesa di cui oggi non possiamo più fare a meno. Grazie a tutti per i vostri contributi.
Charles Goerens
Thank you to the rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs and members for the fruitful exchange. Let me remind the timetable for this report. Deadline for tabling amendments is on 2nd October at 12:00. Consideration of the amendments will take place on the 3rd of November during the SEDE meeting. The shadows' meetings will take place in the weeks 46, 47 and 48 if necessary.
The report will be voted in joint committees on the 1st of December. Any other business? The date of the next meeting is not yet fixed.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Not yet fixed. But we will continue in 10 minutes for vote. So we have to wait till everybody is here. We couldn't continue, so just a tiny little break.
So, dear colleagues, please take your seats.
We will continue in two minutes and 30 seconds. So colleagues. So dear colleagues, we are coming now to the vote on the report on from prototypes to capabilities, enabling new defense actors to scale up. This will be an electronic vote, so please have your voting cards ready. Before proceeding to the vote, I would like to briefly give the floor to rapporteur Martins Stakis for one minute.
Martins, the floor is yours.
Mārtiņš Staķis
Thank you, chair. And dear colleagues, before we vote, a big thank to everyone who worked on this report. Chris Felix, well done, thank you so much. And all the group advisors and assistants who helped draft the compromises. That was a real team effort.
So we received 354 amendments and we managed to include a large part of them. And what I'm most glad about, this is the report that stays focused on one problem: how a good prototype becomes the real capability in the hands of our armed forces. And it does not just describe the gaps, it proposes concrete ways to close them. So the report now covers the whole chain. First, contracts and how we buy, testing infrastructure and certification, scaling to serial production, critical components and supply chains, emerging technologies and above all drones, regulatory simplification, faster access to funding, skills, fair market access for SMEs and intellectual property, and cooperation with Ukraine, where all of this already happen in weeks, not in years.
So thanks again for the fruitful cooperation. Thank you and I ask for your support.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Martins. I can see that we have clearly enough members to meet the quorum for a vote. It's rule 224-2. Before we proceed, we need to check if the voting system is working correctly, so please insert your voting cards and we will now have the question: did you enjoy the green week? The vote is open.
The vote is closed. Yes. The majority did it. Sorry for three who don't, did not. Okay.
Anyway, so now we are coming to the vote. So please take your seat everybody, it helps going through. Okay. We are vote for the draft report from prototypes to capabilities enabling new defense actors to scale up. So we have the one compromise and it's a vote by hand.
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstention. Adopted. So we come to the final vote by roll call call and the vote is open.
And the vote is closed and it is with 23 adopted, five against and one abstention. Thank you very much and congratulation Martins for your great work. Yeah, that's it. Thank you. So colleagues we continue in a few minutes with our two guests.
So colleagues. Please take your seat. Thank you very much. The next point on the agenda is the exchange of views on the EU Ocean Eye initiative. It's my pleasure to welcome Dr. Allison Weston, senior coordinator for maritime security and deputy to the director for security and defense policy in the European External Action Service.
And Ms. Iglika Yakova, deputy head of unit at the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in the European Commission. So thank you very much for your time. We would be interested to have an update on priorities in the area of EU maritime security and infrastructure protection including the related aspects of the EU Ocean Eye initiative. And so we start and give the floor to each of you for 10 minutes starting with Dr. Weston. And then afterwards Allison have the possibility.
So the floor is yours.
Alison Weston
Thank you very much. Good afternoon. It's a pleasure to be here again and together with my colleague from the European Commission. I was just we were just joking that this is an example of very good inter-service cooperation. We work very closely together on all of these maritime security initiatives so it's very good that we're able to both be with you together today.
We have our maritime security strategy since 2023 which updated the previous strategy. Of course many things have happened in the world since 2023 but nevertheless the main strategic objectives are still extremely relevant. And later on this autumn the EEAS and Commission will be presenting a joint implementation report on that maritime security strategy that takes into account input from EU institutions, EU agencies but also from our member states to try to provide a comprehensive overview of our activities in the area of maritime security. But today we were asked to talk specifically about some of the aspects within the broader maritime security picture, particularly Ocean Eye and some of our initiatives in the realm of protection of maritime infrastructure. And so I want to locate the comments on those issues within the broader framework of our maritime security strategy which still continues to guide us.
Of course the biggest change in the last three years has been the deterioration in the geopolitical situation and the spillover of a number of conflicts and geopolitical competitions into the maritime space. So in many ways the problems that we have to address in the maritime space are not really going to be resolved alone in the maritime space. They have to be resolved also on land. But from our perspective we are focusing on the consequences for the maritime domain for our member states but also for our partners around the world. And of course the most important message that we we knew before but is increasingly visible is the extent to which our maritime spaces connect us.
So what happens in one area of the world in a maritime area has a huge impact and huge consequences and implications in other parts of the world. And we've seen that of course very clearly this summer with the impact of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and now increasingly with the challenges in the Red Sea and the Bab-el-Mandeb.
So this is the context in which we're looking at our maritime security initiatives. They're not only responsibilities for the navies. Navies still have important roles but also many other national and European agencies and services have to be involved to tackle this increasingly complex web of maritime security challenges. And in this strategic context, this is where the Ocean Eye is particularly relevant. This is fundamentally an initiative that is aimed at strengthening Europe's ability to observe and to understand the ocean because fundamentally it's very difficult to take the right actions to identify the right instruments if you don't actually understand what is happening in your oceans.
And from the EEAS perspective, and Angelica will speak with a lot more authority on the Commission's perspective, but from our perspective, its importance is really in how stronger ocean knowledge can contribute to maritime domain awareness, can underpin our resilience, can help us protect our critical infrastructure and fundamentally more broadly protect European maritime security and our strategic autonomy. So very briefly in the maritime security strategy and our six strategic objectives, we have a number which are extremely relevant from this perspective: stepping up activities at sea, cooperating with partners, enhancing maritime domain awareness, managing risks and threats, strengthening capabilities and investing in education and training. We have already three EU naval operations that are tackling a broad range of maritime security challenges from sanctions enforcement, counter-piracy, protection of critical maritime infrastructure and also increasingly helping to tackle the shadow fleet. And these mandates are evolving to focus much more on maritime domain awareness, information sharing, information analysis, understanding what is in our maritime environment. Another example of this is the EU maritime security exercise which was a key deliverable of the maritime security strategy and the most recent iteration took place in Finland just last week in Helsinki which was an opportunity to test the integrated surveillance mechanism, the Baltic hub if you like, that was foreseen in the cables action plan and brought together services from navies, coast guards, EU agencies as well as a number of partner countries to do a live exercise focused on the protection of critical maritime infrastructure.
And this is exactly the type of ecosystem where stronger ocean observation can provide added value. I mentioned maritime domain awareness. This is a phrase that is coming up more and more in our work across maritime security but of course this is not only about tracking ships. It's not only about identifying where the ships are but it's also combining that information about vessels and their movements with other information about the location of infrastructure, environmental conditions, oceanographic characteristics and patterns of maritime activity. This is the fusion of data and information that coastal states, that authorities, agencies, services need to be able to tap into to be able to respond to the kinds of challenges.
This is particularly important in regions that are difficult to monitor or where our interests extend beyond European waters. So for example we're increasingly starting to see the Arctic as a strategic area that we need to focus on much more directly as the ice melts. We see more traffic in the Arctic. There are more discussions about the possible opening of the northern route but also more interest in the exploitation of the resources that are in existence in this very sensitive marine environment.
So again, a stronger European capacity to observe and to understand the maritime environment has relevance well beyond our waters. And in that context, the protection of critical underwater infrastructure, maritime infrastructure more generally, is one of the key areas where this is important. Again, the underwater data cables are responsible for the vast majority of global communications, but also in Europe we're very dependent on underwater pipelines, energy cables, offshore wind installations, liquid natural gas terminals. This infrastructure is absolutely critical to our energy security, and that makes it also potentially a target of interest for those who would do us harm. So again, we need to understand what is happening around this infrastructure, and the Ocean Eye is part of the EU's instruments, set of tools and instruments to help us better able to do this.
And of course, not every vessel operating near infrastructure is a threat. If we look at where this infrastructure is located, it's very often on busy shipping channels where we have high numbers of commercial traffic, where we have fishing vessels, where we have coastguard, where we have search and rescue, all sorts of perfectly legitimate traffic may be operating around maritime infrastructure sources. But nevertheless, it's very important to develop our picture of what is happening, to improve our ocean observation, to understand the trends of what is happening in this space, so that the authorities who are responsible for responding to these challenges and threats have the information that they need to inform their incident responders, but also to inform their policy making. And I think I want to use my last couple of minutes to talk about the global dimension of what we do in this area, because I'm in the External Action Service, so we're primarily looking outside our own waters. And of course, as I said at the beginning, our maritime interests extend far beyond European waters.
We are interested in and concerned by what happens in the maritime space on a global basis. Our trade routes, our energy supplies, our digital connectivity and our supply chains all depend on maritime spaces around the world. And that means that we need to depend on our partnerships. We are developing our own capabilities in many areas, but we also understand that we have to work together with our partners. And that means working with NATO, working with like-minded partners like Canada, like Norway, like the United Kingdom, working with partners in the Indo-Pacific, again absolutely critical for our trade routes, and working more globally to support freedom of navigation, the integrity of this maritime space, and to work together on challenging those who would weaponize our dependence on the maritime space.
So again, the international dimension of Ocean Eye and of our maritime domain awareness and all of our maritime initiatives is important not only from a scientific perspective, and again IGLO-CA will be able to say more than me, but also from a strategic perspective, because we are and we are committed to be a reliable, stable, predictable partner on maritime security issues. And so it's really important to make sure that we can strengthen our cooperation around global ocean observation and working with our partners to help them develop their awareness, their knowledge of what is happening in the maritime space. So in my last 19 seconds, just to underline that we see this as an enabling capacity, an enabling capability within our broader maritime security architecture, that we work within the strategic framework of the European Maritime Security Strategy, and from our perspective, excuse me, the security dimension needs to be built in from the beginning. It's something we need to be aware of from the very beginning and build into all the work that we do.
And I will stop there. Thank you very much.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Allison. And now I give the floor to Iglika to continue.
Iglika Yakova
Good afternoon everybody. I hope I make it in 10 minutes. I'll pay attention. I would like to start from where you ended, Allison, and go back in time and remind you that last year the Commission adopted the European Ocean Pact and it was endorsed by the Council through Council conclusions. And the Ocean Pact was announced in Paris at the United Nations Conference on the Ocean, no sorry, not in Paris, in Nice.
The ambition of the European Union was to put in place a coherent, unified framework integrating all ocean-related policies. And for the first time we also had maritime security and defense into these areas of ocean policies that have an impact on the maritime domain and that could be looked as a whole. So of course we focused on ocean health, on competitiveness of the ocean economy, of the maritime economy, of the industrial base. We also focused on research and innovation, investment, international partnerships. But together with all this, we included in our analysis and in the Ocean Pact the focus on maritime security and defense.
And then the Ocean Eye is part of this implementation effort of the Commission to put in place the Pact through an Ocean Act. The Ocean Act is currently under preparation and that will be the legislative tool based on the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive that will guide our effort to have an integrated approach to the ocean and to the maritime domain overall. And then in terms of maritime security, we have also put in place an ambitious agenda. Within the Ocean Eye, we have an important aspect that we could share here on how it relates to strategic autonomy, European maritime and naval security and infrastructure resilience. So first of all, let me start with some explanations on the ocean observation and the Ocean Eye in particular.
So ocean observation in Europe and globally overall is fragmented. And it lacks systemic operational commitment and efficiency. It faces extreme funding concerns, constraints, and this has also been exacerbated by the current geopolitical uncertainties. And so that's why the Commission presented three months ago the Ocean Eye initiative. This is an initiative covering various fields such as industry, research, society, security, environmental protection and culture, and it serves as a core delivery mechanism of the Ocean Pact.
It positions the EU as a reliable global partner with its action firmly anchored in science. So our ambition is to coordinate the EU and Member States' efforts to establish an efficient, streamlined and sustained European ocean observing system in full respect of Member States' competencies. As I mentioned, the Ocean Act will integrate the governance of Ocean Eye, and this is a first step, literally the first step where the knowledge and data chain will help to make it strong, as strong and reliable as possible.
So first of all, we will strengthen and integrate Copernicus Marine Service, EMODnet, and the Digital Twin Ocean into a European Digital Ocean System. We will ensure a seamless operational flow of information from observation to knowledge services, benefiting global research and industry. And regarding the industrial dimension, we aim to strengthen a competitive European industrial ecosystem for ocean observation technologies and user-centered services. We also aim to ensure a collective social ownership of the ocean and to develop a strong educational and cultural outreach dimension, which would allow us to bridge science, art, education, and society, and then to work more with the next generation. Now on strategic autonomy, if I could focus on that.
The Ocean-I is about strategic autonomy through knowledge, technology, and operational capability at sea. It strengthens Europeans' ability to observe, understand, and act in the maritime domain, while reducing vulnerabilities that are linked to fragmented systems, to external dependencies, to gaps in data, to technology and infrastructure resilience. And it's no longer a niche scientific function. We wish to expand from this scientific function and to go more into strategic infrastructure, so that it underpins maritime security, defense, offshore and subsea infrastructure protection, safe transport, climate resilience, even food security, and of course that would all mean that it would underpin the competitiveness of the European blue economy. Our ambition is to move from dependency to capability and to connect these observation systems with digital systems, with innovation, with industrial development, so that here in the EU we can generate trusted ocean intelligence and translate it to operational, economic, and even security value.
You cannot protect what you cannot see, what you cannot understand and monitor, and that's why Ocean-I strengthens precisely the knowledge and the situational awareness layer that will help us build our security capacity. So why this matters now? Well, the maritime space has become a space for growing geopolitical competition, for hybrid threats, strategic vulnerabilities, and so also the European critical offshore and subsea infrastructure, shipping lines, energy assets, digital connections, they all depend on stronger maritime situational awareness and sustained ocean knowledge. The Commission makes clear that resilience of these critical maritime infrastructures is now a priority, a strategic priority, and that knowledge is indispensable to safeguard the European interests, the European resilience, and also to ensure the leadership. So Ocean-I responds to this reality.
If Europe cannot observe the ocean reliably, then Europe cannot protect its interests in the sea, in the ocean. Then also strategic autonomy in the maritime domain is not only about equipment, it's not only about platforms and tools, it's also about having capabilities to observe and understand the process and share information about the maritime environment. We also mean that our ambition is not to act alone.
We wish to have the capabilities, infrastructure, industrial base to choose when, how, and with whom we cooperate, when, how, and with whom we are partners. You probably saw last week that the President of the Commission was at UNGA and together with the Canadian Prime Minister there was this important announcement on the International Alliance on the Ocean Eye and the Ocean Observation Governance System. So that's an important also pledging effort on the side of the Commission and also building partnerships with Canada to go hand in hand. I think I will have to accelerate. From the fragmented maritime information towards a more coherent and operational maritime picture, our ambition is to have in situ observations and modeling in digital capabilities and also to have technology sovereignty.
If Europe is dependent on external providers for sensors, for autonomous systems, for data infrastructure, for analytical capabilities that are needed to understand how the maritime space functions, then this creates a strategic vulnerability. So we need to focus on this and that would mean that the resilience is also the resilience of our technological sovereignty. That would mean that maritime resilience should be also just as important as the resilience at land. And so we need tools that will improve our understanding of what happens for onshore but also offshore, for at sea, on the surface and subsea infrastructure. And there comes the industrial innovation and the efforts that the Commission wishes to put to develop deep tech startups, scale-ups, develop breakthrough solutions in sensors, in autonomous systems, in value-added services, in AI, in digital twin.
And so the ambition is to support from research to market the whole line of transition to improve access to finance, help European innovators scale up technologies and deploy operational solutions. And for this we have important funding tools hopefully to be put in place from the competitiveness fund through Horizon Europe. And that will allow us to bring the necessary funding opportunities to put in place the Ocean Eye. I would stop here and will be happy to further develop with the questions.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Perfect, thank you very much. And now I give the floor to members for a first round of questions starting with the coordinators in ping-pong so you can immediately answer. Two minutes for question and we start with Pekka from EPP.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you, Chair. Just to clarify, I'm not the coordinator but still. Yes, the maritime infrastructure, the whole maritime industry is extremely important. I'm coming from Finland, 96% of our trade goes by Western sea lines of communications. So and but overall I think that when you look at the Europe, this is a global question because we have to be able to secure our trade with our partners globally and it happens through ships.
And we see how it's more and more congested, the actions on surface, we see what's happening in the Red Sea, we see what's happening in Hormuz, we are expecting that this may spread. So the security of the maritime traffic is a challenge. But even bigger challenge is under sea as you mentioned, the undersea infrastructure, its protection.
And it's great to hear that we are creating capabilities to have a better situational picture and awareness what's happening to that infrastructure. But the fact is that if we have a perfect situational awareness and picture, but we don't have any means to intervene, stop, repair, and punish those who attack our infrastructure, then it's just real-time view on how we're going to be beaten. So in the discussion, it's not necessarily in the scope of your work, but has there been discussion, you know, what else we should do to secure it better? Because as I said, the securing the infrastructure, the most important thing is to have the situational awareness, but that doesn't help if you don't have the means to protect it, to repair it, and again, punish those who attacked our infrastructure. Thank you.
Alison Weston
Thank you. I was in Helsinki last week for the maritime security exercise, which was focused explicitly on this issue. We had some excellent briefings from the Finnish Border Guard, who are confronted with some very particular challenges right in front of Helsinki in the Gulf of Finland, where you have a very narrow and difficult shipping channel with a very high volume of shipping, very shallow water, and a high density of critical maritime infrastructure. So it's a perfect storm of challenges that is quite distinct. It isn't necessarily exactly the same set of, you know, combination of challenges in other sea basins, but here in the Baltic Sea, there are some real immediate challenges.
And it's very interesting to see the action that Finland has already taken, which has been to invest in the information sharing with Baltic partners, so very close cooperation through what I mentioned, the integrated surveillance mechanism, to understand what's happening, to have the capacity to respond, so to identify what is going on. Also very close contacts with the private companies, because of course most of this infrastructure is privately owned. So to have close relationships with the operators on monitoring cables, responding to damage to cables. Not all of it is sabotage, sometimes there are accidents. And also to facilitate cable repair.
So having a high degree of resilience and redundancy is the first way we can protect ourselves. So if a cable is cut, no data is lost, it's immediately rerouted. We all still have the ability to do our banking, our business, send kittens over the internet, whatever it is. So resilience and redundancy, and I think there's a high degree of this in Europe. There are a lot of measures that are being taken in the framework of the European Cables Action Plan to improve the resilience of cables, the better protection and monitoring of cables.
So there's a lot that we can do there. But I think your question is probably about the more robust end of the enforcement spectrum, and what can we do when we see ships cutting cables in international waters, which are the difficult ones. And there this is an international reflection that has been launched, and there's been quite a lot of exchange with international partners. We are governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which underpins all of our trade, as you said. Freedom of navigation is absolutely essential piece of UNCLOS, so we work within that framework.
But there's been increased support with international partners to see how we can better identify what measures we can take to improve enforcement. So I don't have the silver bullet for you right away, but I can assure you it's something that's very high on the agenda not only of the EU and its member states, but also many of our international partners as well.
Maybe I could say a few words on the maritime industrial strategy that was adopted a couple of months ago, and where you have a very specific agenda on how to...