Committee on International Trade Ordinary meeting
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INTA European Parliament
Ihren Sitzungen folgenJörgen Warborn
And we have to be very careful so when we have a turbulent situation with the US and tariffs with them, now we have calmed that situation, but we also have a problematic situation with China. Let's not create enemies with the rest of the world, with our free trading partners, and that's what they sometimes feel now, that there is a tension and a conflict, and we have to be very careful when we deal with the IAA. Thank you.
Totally agreeing, we have to be clear that the balance between IAA and strengthening European industry and fair partnership with our partners will be guaranteed. Richard.
Rihards Kols
Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair. Since it's webstreamed, it's occasion for those remotely to follow, I think, the WTO steering committee meeting today, because I see the present are those who are members of the steering committee and unfortunately not other colleagues are present. But that is also, I think, the importance for the upcoming forum that we're going to host in Brussels, and I think we need to lead by example as for the parliamentary diplomacy that really drives the reform the WTO so desperately actually needs. And from the forum and meeting with ambassadors, with the facilitators for the reforms discussions, I think it's going to be a heavy load job for them, knowing that each member state is submitting their own ideas and views how everything needs to move forward. So I do not envy them in their task to deliver proposals for the ministerials.
I absolutely agree what was already said, that the frequency of the meetings of ministers have to increase at least once a year. That said, of course, the parliamentary dimension, we meet twice a year, and I think again, this is where we lead by the example. And I think for the public forum, not only to discuss ongoing challenges, but to assess what is the progress with the reforms. And whenever we have the public forum, of course, we adopt the declaration, kind of photo-fixation of that time our assessment where the governments are heading and trying to fine-tune. So I think this is a good instrument that we can impose to track record what is the progress and where we see the probably the challenges might lie.
Overall, I think the the forum itself, Mr. Chair, you mentioned that you went with a slightly skepticism towards there, but imagine what ministers are thinking going more than once in two years. I think they're even more skeptical in those things, but we have to overcome those skepticisms because as the Director General mentioned, still the trust in the WTO framework is way above the the average, 70% is still being conducted through WTO and we we need to keep this momentum intact. So therefore, I look forward for Brussels forum and two days we have to fill with the content and I agree with Mr. Warborn as well that maybe even during the public forum here, we should invite the stakeholders that are not only parliamentarians, but particularly business community itself. So overall, it was good to engage with the fellow parliamentarians, but of course there's way more work to be needed to be done.
Catarina Vieira
Thanks a lot, Katarina.
Thank you very much, Chair. It was a pleasure to participate in the WTO Public Forum and as the colleague mentioned, indeed to be a panelist on the joint workshop on trade in services that we organized with our partners in the IPU, which was very well attended and it was a good opportunity for us to discuss trade in services and how it should work to benefit all types of partners, also those in the global south. And this was also a very positive opportunity to exchange on trade policy with fellow parliamentarians from around the world in the WTO steering group. If I look at the forum as a whole, I I actually was quite impressed by the number of private sector actors that were present there, which compares to the very low number of those from civil society present. And that really concerns me because global civil society groups primarily represent the interests of farmers, fishers, workers, and small producers from developing countries and they seem to be largely sidelined at the World Trade Organization's Public Forum this year with only about 5% of the total sessions allocated to them.
In my view, much more transparency is needed on the criteria to select workshop applications and when it comes to ministerial meetings, this is actually even worse than than at the public forum. So I'm seeing a worrying trend where civil society is not being allowed to properly do their job as they used to in other ministerials. So I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my call on the Commission to ensure that the WTO makes agreements with host countries that ensure enabling environment for civil society organizations to organize actions, share leaflets, and approach participants, of course always in coordination with the WTO's services. So if there was that side of concern, there was also a lot of encouragement, as the Chair also mentions. I was very encouraged to see that there was a lot of openness, including by India, to explore proactive discussions about plurilaterals and focusing, they want to refocus the discussion on what could be the right guardrails to to have such plurilaterals.
And I welcome this as an important step to reach as soon as possible an agreement in the near future. At the same time, I was also a bit worried about the negative perception by some actors on the decision by the EU and its partners to go ahead with the adoption of the e-commerce joint statement initiative. In my view, the EU should or would be doing a greater service to multilateralism to first contribute on updating the WTO rules on plurilaterals and then adopt the e-commerce test text because rushing through it while we're trying to figure out the other side is kind of putting the carriage in front of the horse and it could undermine our reputation as a supporter of the multilateral process. Thank you.
Thierry Mariani
Thanks a lot, Thierry.
Merci, Monsieur le Président.
Je ferai une remarque très brève puisque nous n'étions pas présents notre groupe dans cette réunion et je me permets une fois de plus de vous demander officiellement que notre groupe puisse y participer. Nous sommes le troisième groupe au Parlement. À chaque fois on nous répond que parce que nous n'avons pas candidaté pour la première mission la règle de la constitution de cette délégation à l'OMC a été créée dans le marbre et que désormais nous ne pouvons pas y participer. Ça fait deux ans et demi que je demande la même chose. Voilà.
J'en dirai pas plus. Excusez-moi mais quand vous voulez vous pouvez y arriver. Là il n'y a rien d'extraordinaire quoi. On fait preuve de bonne volonté dans cette commission. Je ne comprends pas pourquoi vous vous obstinez à nous exclure de ces délégations depuis deux ans et demi.
Bernd Lange
So the composition is based on the steering committee and Jörgen and myself we are the co-chairs. But we will come back and discuss this again and we will give you an hint on that how this composition is organized. Okay thanks a lot. This is closing item five. We switch into items six and seven which is the trade agreement digital trade agreement with Korea and the accompanying resolution on that.
Our rapporteur Lina is not present today so I will read out her notes. The negotiation of the digital agreement with Korea were launched in November 2023 and concluded on the 10th of March 2025. So even one year and some months so it's always taking some time. This was not in the notes of Lina that was my remark. So on the 10th of June this year the EU-Korea summit signed the agreement and then the consent procedure started.
And now we are at the final stage. And I guess this agreement is really a possibility to enhance the digital trade between the two partners by establishing binding rules that promote consumer trust ensure legal certainty for business and facilitate trusted data flow. On the European procedure we have had two monitoring groups so far. First exchange with the DG Trade and second with EDPS BEUC and EDRi. So civil society was also on board.
And now Lina wants to present the main points of the accompanying resolution. On data protection the agreement upholds the EU strict standards for personal data and privacy preserving each party's policy space. The agreement will facilitate electronic transactions facilitating e-commerce introducing electronic signatures and authentication source and code protection a ban on forced technology transfer e-invoicing and paperless trading. On cross-border data flows the agreement applies across all sectors with regulatory policy space preserved for data privacy protection and other public policy goals. On source code protection it is slightly more advanced than the previous agreement so with Singapore important for protection SMEs and startups from forced tech transfer and linked to the EU's technology sovereignty objectives.
The agreement, I guess, is really for strategic importance in this current geopolitical context, is a milestone in the EU's ambition to set global digital trade rules with a strong partner as Korea, also given Korea's position in East Asia. The resolution calls the Commission to integrate the recommendation of the European Data Protection Supervisor when implementing the agreement. So, these recommendations are targeting fundamental rights, sensitive data, localization policies, plus effective regulatory oversight. On labor rights, Korea has recently ratified ILO convention on freedom of association and right to organize the collective bargaining. This resolution calls for continued engagement to ratify the outstanding convention on abolition of forced labor.
In conclusion, the recommendation of the rapporteur is to give the consent to the agreement with Korea. And this was the statement by the rapporteur, and now I give the shadow rapporteurs the floor, and Jörgen is the first, please.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Chair, and I'll take the floor on behalf of our EPP colleague Gabriel Mato. And first of all, thanks to Lena for her work both on the recommendation and on the resolution. I believe that this agreement sends an important message at a particular important moment. At a time when we are seeing increasing economic fragmentation and new barriers to trade, the European Union and Korea are choosing the opposite path: greater openness, greater legal certainty, and clearer rules for companies. And this is not only about data flows.
It is about making trade easier in practice. That means electronic contracts and signatures, electronic invoicing and payments, paperless trading, and removing unjustified data localization requirements. And this matters particular for our SMEs, because they are often the ones that suffer most from unnecessary administrative costs and regulatory barriers. There is also an important development since we last discussed our trade relations with Korea. In July, the Commission confirmed that Korea continues to provide an adequate level of personal data protection.
So, together with Korea's recognition of the European framework, we now have a strong basis for trusted data flows in both directions. This shows that facilitating digital trade and maintaining high standards of data protection are not contradictory objectives. As I have said before regarding our broader trade relationship with Korea, the real test will be implementation. So, I would like to ask the Commission one concrete question: once this agreement enters into force, how do you intend to monitor its practical impact on European businesses, in particular SMEs, and will you establish a clear indicator to assess whether it is actually reducing costs and barriers to digital trade? Because ultimately, the success of this agreement should not only be measured by the quality of its rules, but by the concrete business opportunities that the rules create in everyday operations for European businesses.
Thank you.
Thanks a lot. Terry, you want to? No. And then we have ECR, Renew is coming later, Markéta.
Markéta Gregorová
Thank you very much, dear colleagues. I acknowledge that the agreement has some very positive elements and so does the rapporteur's draft report, including recognition of the numerous positive provisions that protect consumers from manipulative practices online, spam messages and financial scams. In my view, some elements in this agreement are not strictly necessary, though. For example, on personal data, I also question, as EDPS, the appropriateness of addressing this issue in a trade agreement, which is a permanent binding instrument, since the EU already has an adequacy decision with South Korea. My main concerns are linked to the following two topics.
Firstly, on non-personal data flows, a main element in this agreement is a ban on data localization, with the exception of measures when one can prove that they were not discriminatory and for which there was no other least trade-restrictive measure possible. We already know that data has become the most valuable resource. Currently, the need for European data sovereignty and cloud systems is a key priority in policy discussions. The ownership of data and security are now clearly interconnected. In this context, I worry about how this and other digital trade agreements will affect our own ability to regulate in the future.
Secondly, AI and access to source code. Companies already have legal means to protect against the theft of source code, namely intellectual property rights and trade secrets. So is it really proportional to force us to comply with binding permanent trade disciplines that will require the EU in the future to justify any measure and prove that the chosen EU regulatory approach is the least trade-restrictive possible? I'm not sure we want our hands tied so closely. I plan to introduce a few amendments, notably on these key issues, on the rapporteur's report and I look forward to working on this file.
Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, Markéta, and now I give the floor to the Renew shadow rapporteur, Dan.
Dan Barna
Thank you. Thank you, Chair. We all agree that our trade policy must deliver real opportunities for our citizens and entrepreneurs and in this context I would like to thank the rapporteur, Ms. Gálvez. This agreement is a significant step ahead for our economic future, following the digital trade agreement with Singapore and an asset for our businesses. In an era where more than half of EU trade in services is already digital, this partnership with a global technological leader is a necessary strategic step.
The digital trade agreement with South Korea provides a concrete opportunity for our innovative entrepreneurs, small businesses and also mid-cap companies across every Member State to expand without absurd bureaucratic hurdles into one of the most dynamic markets in the world. In an increasingly dynamic international context, Europe chooses the right path to remain competitive and open by concluding new bilateral agreements, including on emerging technologies. For us, the Liberals, this is precisely what an open digital economy should look like: fewer artificial barriers, more choice for consumers and a level playing field for companies to innovate and compete. At a time of growing protectionism and geopolitical fragmentations, working with like-minded partners such as Korea allows us to shape the global digital rulebook through openness, high standards and fair competition rather than isolation. The direct benefits of this agreement are removing unjustified non-tariff barriers for businesses, facilitating e-commerce and shaping a rule-based digital future where we safeguard our data, our values and our technological sovereignty.
Thank you.
Thanks a lot. So I have no further requests for the floor, then I give the floor to the Commission. DG Trade is represented by Ivan Braskovic, head of sector unit for services, digital trade. Where are you? Over there.
Ivan Brašković
Thank you very much and good morning to everyone. Thank you very much for the for the good questions. So maybe starting with with the remarks made by on personal data. So on the measures on the protection of personal data, so why do we deal with this in a trade agreement? So just to say that the the agreement fully follows the approach agreed in 2018 among the co-legislators, Parliament included, and is recognized as such by the EDPS, meaning that we include a horizontal exception that allows for any measures on the protection of personal data and privacy, and that such measures should definitely not be considered as as derogations and breach of the agreement.
This comes without any tests on proportionality or necessity, nothing of the sort. We reserve full policy right to implement the GDPR and any other measures on the protection of personal data and privacy. And in that regard, it's fully consistent with the EU approach agreed among the co-legislators. When we talk about non-personal data, and indeed the agreement prohibits data localization, which we think is a very important thing for our businesses, because as you will know, the EU is the global exporter of digital-enabled services, and we all know that forced data localization requirements can be extremely costly and can be an extreme barrier to trade, can really close businesses, especially SMEs, in their operations across the borders. And these rules provide certainty to those businesses.
So we provide unjustified forced data localization requirements. Now, I would like to underline this word unjustified, because there are situations in which such requirements could be justified and legitimate. Data sovereignty is one one such case. And the agreement recognizes that there are legitimate policy objectives in which such measures could be brought. And we believe that we strike the right balance between very strong protections that allow our businesses to operate abroad, which is good for our competitiveness, but then still allows us to fully implement the digital acquis and any actually acquis in the EU that we have in place or we think that legitimately we could we could adopt.
The same goes with source code. The article on source code again strikes this balance between providing sufficient protection for our businesses, because what happens is that sometimes in third countries, as a condition of market condition, they are forced to provide access to source code or even transfer the whole source code together with the intellectual property, which of course has very damaging effect on competitiveness overall. So we have to protect our companies when they export abroad. And at the same time, of course, we recognize we have to preserve legitimate right to regulate, which we do. The article does not prevent the implementation of the AI Act, DMA, DSA or any other piece of legislation.
And we made it in such way that we do not prevent our policy space to regulate in the future. So I would we would disagree saying that first of all that the measures are too restrictive. So yes, we have a strong prohibition, but we also have very broad exceptions that allow for legitimate measures. And second of all, we would also disagree that it's it's not necessary, because the we we understand that a lot of this is related to the intellectual property, but there are no such rules in our intellectual property agreements.
The the WTO TRIPS agreement is not sufficient. It is useful in harmonizing IP rules but it does not regulate market access meaning that it does not prevent countries from requiring access to source code as a condition for entering to the market. So what TRIPS does is provide some protection so treating source code as as literary works which allows then for trade secret protection but what it does not have is strong safeguards against forced code forced code transfers source code transfers apologies. So this is exactly the gap that we try to fill in with this agreement. And then finally in in relation to the question on the implementation we have linked this agreement to the institutional setup of our bilateral free trade agreement and we have created a new work group that will deal with digital trade issues where we will meet regularly and discuss implementation issues exchange the figures and see whether the agreement can be improved with time.
Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot and so there will be some amendments and to mind you that the deadline for amendments is the 8th of October. I guess at 12 12 o'clock high noon yeah yeah exactly. Good. So thanks a lot this concludes the discussion about the digital agreement with Korea and now we switch to the monitoring group activities point 8 and we start with the monitoring group of the Andean countries which took place on the 7th of September and Mr. Soydo Alvarez is the standing rapporteur. Please.
Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Muchas gracias presidente. La última reunión del Monitoring Group de la Comunidad Andina tuvo lugar el pasado 7 de septiembre. Tal y como se acordó en la reunión de coordinadores y a petición de algunos grupos políticos la sesión se centró en la aplicación del artículo 1 del acuerdo comercial. Contamos con la participación de la embajadora de Ecuador y la encargada de negocios de la embajada de Colombia. En el caso de Ecuador hablamos de la grave crisis de seguridad derivada del narcotráfico del debilitamiento del sistema penitenciario y en su impacto sobre nuestras relaciones comerciales especialmente en la actividad portuaria.
La embajadora subrayó las buenas relaciones de su país con la Unión Europea y respecto a la reforma constitucional en materia de seguridad y control penitenciario mencionada por algunos participantes explicó que se trata de un proceso que todavía está en curso y que se está desarrollando con pleno cumplimiento de las obligaciones legales y constitucionales. En el caso de Colombia trasladé en nombre del Parlamento nuestra solidaridad por el terremoto del pasado 10 de agosto y también abordamos el impacto que ha tenido en la inversión el deterioro de la situación de seguridad y de derechos humanos en los últimos cinco años. Un asunto que para la administración entrante requiere una solución urgente según nos comunicaron los representantes del país. También destacar que estaban esperando que de en los próximos días ya tomara posesión el nuevo embajador de Colombia ante la Unión Europea. La encargada de negocio reiteró que el nuevo gobierno sitúa el fortalecimiento de las relaciones con la Unión Europea entre una de sus principales prioridades.
Muchas gracias. Next monitoring group is the monitoring group on Indonesia, which took place also on the 7th of September. And Jürgen is replacing Mr. Winkler.
Jörgen Warborn
Yes, thank you, chair, that is correct. So the monitoring group focused on technical barriers to trade, agri-food, IP rights, and public procurement. The EU chief negotiator explained that the most important non-tariff outcomes of the agreement are the streamlining labeling requirements, the use of international standards as opposed to domestic ones, and the recognition of EU certification in certain areas. As for the automotive sector, the agreement includes a dedicated car annex, which is built on the specificities of the industry. The agreement also sets out the creation of an automotive working group, which would be in charge of monitoring the implementation process on the ground.
This is extremely important as the regulatory framework in third countries can be very complex. On the agriculture side, Indonesia offers a vast opportunity. The agreement assures improved market access for EU farmers and agri-food producers and the protection of the most sensitive products. For the dairy sector, Indonesia represents a huge market, the fourth largest market after UK, China, and the US. 221 European geographical indications will be protected, and the agreement will also remove tariffs on dairy products, poultry and beef, fruit and vegetables, processed agriculture products such as chocolates, confectionery, bakery goods, canned fruits and vegetables, and in addition to this, also olive oil.
Tariffs will remain on sugar, rice, alcoholic-based products, some lines of poultry and manufactured tobacco. There are no concessions for the very sensitive products for the EU, like sugar and ethanol, rice, and sensitive lines of poultry and eggs, bananas or rum. There are also calibrated quotas for other sensitive products. On intellectual property rights, the agreement ensures protection of innovative and creative products and will include concrete measures for IPR enforcement. And in relation to public procurement, the agreement ensures that procedures to award public contracts are transparent, fair, and non-discriminatory, and there is a non-discriminatory rules based on foreign ownership and national treatment for all EU businesses established in Indonesia.
Negotiations on procurement market access will start within five years from entry into force. As for the timetable of this agreement, we understand that the formal referral of the draft decision from the Council will take place later in autumn, and that is the moment when we can officially start our consent procedure. We will, however, anticipate the work on the consent procedure by already drawing up an interim report. The consideration of the draft interim report is taking place later today.
Indeed, thanks a lot. And then I switch to Australia, also on the 8th of September, Jürgen.
Jörgen Warborn
Yes, thank you. And as you know, in March, the Commission President and the Australian Prime Minister announced the conclusion of the negotiations for a free trade agreement between EU and Australia. And once the Council referral asking for the consent of the European Parliament arrives, it will of course be up to us in the INTA Committee to prepare the EP position on this agreement. There is no date yet, but I hope the referral will come as soon as possible. The agreement with Australia is of great strategic importance.
It offers the potential of increasing trade with trusted like-minded partner and offering great complementarities that the EU economy can draw advantages from, notably in critical raw materials. It is my intention to use the monitoring group to scrutinize the text of the FTA over the next month. The first thematical meeting took place on the 8th of September, and it focused on the goods-related provisions of the FTA. And we had a discussion with the EU chief negotiator and several DG experts and the Deputy Director from Business Europe. Our next thematic monitoring group will be in November, and that will focus on agriculture and geographical indications.
That will be all from me, thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. No further question on that. Then we switch to the US. Monitoring group took place on the 9th of September, a little bit discussing this switch in the legal base for the tariffs in the context of the Airbus deal. So remember you are aware about the switch from the 301 tariffs to the 122 tariffs to the 301 tariffs.
And with this change on the 24th of July, there was a little bit, yeah, a little bit, yeah, let's say acceptance that we are a little bit worried about the procedure before. So at the moment my feeling is, and this was also underlined during the meeting, that in the USTR there's a kind of rationality. But of course there are also some processes which are not covered by the USTR but by the Secretary of Commerce, like the Section 232 discussion and investigation about derivatives. And as you know, we had in our whole discussion about the Airbus deal and the legislation always the problem that a lot of products from the machinery were tariffs even higher than this magic 15%. And now US started another discussion investigation about another set of so-called derivatives, round about 20 products.
And they had a public discussion about that quite recently, some days ago. And there's a risk that they will establish additional products above 15%. And then of course we will have a problem. There are also some additional investigations regarding the import of polysilicon and the derivative products. And nobody knows exactly what this will mean for us.
And there is also a new investigation about drones and parts of drones. And we have Section 301 investigation about excess capacity or overcapacity. At the moment everybody is convinced that nothing will happen before the midterm, that's for sure. Midterm, the election will be on the 3rd of November. And then I guess we have to discuss again with the responsible person in the United States.
Okay. Then we have the United Arab Emirates.
Midterm, the election will be on the 3rd of November and then I guess we have to discuss again with the responsible persons in the United States. Okay. Then we have the United Arab Emirates, 28th of September. Linn Boylen is not here. The discussion was in principle about the latest developments on the ongoing negotiations between EU and the United Arab Emirates, a bit similar to the discussion we had here in the committee.
On the 28th of September we had a monitoring group on Israel. And there, the rapporteur is also not here, no. There was an exchange on the latest developments, specifically regarding the illegal settlements and the discussion about possible reactions from external stakeholders. Okay. Then we had another monitoring group, so we are quite active and of course monitoring groups are really belonging to the core of our committee and we have the chance to discuss more intensively items and then of course it's important to bring it here to the full committee.
And the next is on India and Cristina is here and she will report on the monitoring group for India, 28th of September.
Cristina Maestre
Good morning, I will speak in Spanish. Buenos días, esta reunión que celebramos antes de ayer fue la primera reunión técnica destinada a analizar el contenido del Tratado de Libre Comercio entre la Unión Europea e India con vistas al próximo procedimiento de aprobación. Los ámbitos tratados en la reunión fueron el comercio de mercancías, el comercio de servicios, la agricultura y el acero. En cuanto al comercio de mercancías, la Comisión recordó los principales logros en materia de acceso al mercado, con más del 90% del comercio cubierto. Se trata pues de una de la mayor apertura comercial que la India ha concedido jamás.
Se espera que el ahorro en derechos de aduana para las exportaciones de la Unión Europea alcance los 4.000 millones de euros al año, con beneficios clave, por ejemplo, en la industria del automóvil y en el sector de la maquinaria, el sector farmacéutico y el sector aeronáutico. En cuanto al comercio de servicios, el Tratado de Libre Comercio también permitirá ampliar las oportunidades basándose en los compromisos internacionales existentes y proporcionará a los prestadores de servicios de la Unión Europea estabilidad y seguridad jurídica. En relación con la agricultura, aunque las negociaciones excluyeron desde el principio los productos más sensibles, como los lácteos, el pollo o el arroz, el acuerdo sigue ofreciendo beneficios significativos para la Unión Europea en los sectores de los alimentos procesados, el aceite de oliva, el vino y las bebidas espirituosas, por lo que para los que el acuerdo supone un auténtico punto de inflexión. La Comisión explicó que se mantendrán las rigurosas normas de la Unión Europea y que se aplicarán disciplinas estrictas en los requisitos de importación para garantizar que se respeten debidamente las medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias. Esto fue un punto en el que pusimos también los asistentes muchísimo interés y el acento.
Durante el debate posterior se plantearon además de estas numerosas preguntas sobre el acero y los controles que se llevarán a cabo, así como el acceso al mercado en el sector de la cerámica. Se debatió el calendario del procedimiento de aprobación, ya que la Comisión acaba de remitir al Consejo los proyectos de decisión del Consejo sobre la firma y la celebración del acuerdo. Y la próxima reunión de seguimiento sobre la India tendrá lugar en noviembre, donde abordaremos obstáculos técnicos al comercio, las normas de origen, las pymes, los derechos de propiedad intelectual y el comercio digital. Se espera que para estos tres últimos meses del año estemos celebrando este tipo de reuniones más técnicas para profundizar en cuestiones concretas que tienen que ver con la letra pequeña del acuerdo. Muchísimas gracias.
Bernd Lange
Muchas gracias, and of course I'm convinced that we will discuss this India trade agreement quite intensively in the future months. Next monitoring group is the monitoring group on Korea, and Lena couldn't be here today, but it's clear that the main item of this monitoring group was the trade agreement, the European data protection, the European digital trade agreement, and a lot of civil society, as Lena mentioned in the exchange of views here before, were present. Then we have the monitoring group on Canada. Javier Moreno is also not able to be here, and it took place on the 30th of September, and there was mainly the state of play on the agenda and the start of the negotiations of a digital trade agreement with Canada as well. So then it would be the third one after Singapore, Korea, and then Canada.
The Philippines, where we concluded the agreement in the negotiation process, had a monitoring group on, not the Philippines, but we had a monitoring group on the Philippines on the 1st of October, and Jörgen, please.
Jörgen Warborn
Yes, which I think on the 1st of October, we had it this morning. So maybe we had it on the 1st of October as well, but let me give you the latest update from 8 o'clock this morning. So of course we were debriefed on the fact that last week there was an agreement on a substantial agreement announced, extremely positive news. This agreement with one of the fastest growing economies in the Southeast Asia is exactly the kind of diversification we need. At a time when both sides are working to diversify our economic relationships, the agreement will help build trusted partnership, stable and predictable trade rules, and more resilient supply chains.
There will be elimination of tariffs and improved market access. With 113 million people, the Philippines represent a major market for EU exporters. This free trade agreement will liberalize over 94% of the tariff lines and covering more than 97% of the bilateral trade. EU industrial exports to the Philippines are led by machinery and appliances, transport equipment, medicines, and medical devices. Our agri-food exports to the Philippines include meat products such as pork and poultry, as well as dairy products and spirits.
There will be transparent rules on sanitary and phytosanitary measures and on technical barriers to trade which will facilitate the trade and reduce cost for companies while guaranteeing the respect of the highest standards. The agreement opens the Philippines procurement market to foreign bidders for the first time ever. There are also rules facilitating digital trade. There are ambitious sustainability commitments making the respect of human rights and the Paris Agreement essential elements of the agreement. And finally and very importantly, ambitious provisions for cooperation on energy and raw materials.
The substantial agreement at political level reflects the shared ambition of the EU and Philippines to build a modern trade partnership based on fair, clear rules and shared values. Negotiations will be concluded on the basis of this substantial agreement, notably final provisions about implementation and technical details. Thank you.
Thanks a lot, Jörg. You mentioned the digital element in the agreement. Is this similar to the digital trade agreement we have now on the table for Korea and the negotiations with Canada or it's smaller or what is your assessment on that?
Jörgen Warborn
Since I do not know all the details on Canada and Korea and honestly not on the Philippines yet either, I guess I have to come back to you on the questions on how it compares.
Okay, thanks a lot. And I heard only rumors that because of that such an additional digital agreement is not necessary anymore, but we have to look closely on that. Thanks a lot. This leads me to the next item which is the vote. And we have three minutes and we will wait for three minutes so everybody can be relaxed a little bit and at 10 o'clock we will start the vote.
Bernd Lange
Okay, dear colleagues. 10 o'clock, we start our voting session which is quite small this time. It is dealing only with the oral question and the resolution on EU-Africa trade relations. Before starting with the vote on the oral question, we make a test vote and the question is: are you happy to have two sessions in Strasbourg in October? The vote is open.
We are missing two votes. Okay, so then I will close the vote. And the answer is clear. Good. So now we switch to the oral question.
The vote is open. The oral question on Africa. The vote is open. And the vote is closed. And it is adopted.
And so I have to read out the vote because it's not on the screen. So 30 in favor, no abstention and one against. And now we switch to the resolution and we have compromise 4 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. 60 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. Compromise 5 in favor, against, abstention, adopted.
66 in favor, against, abstention, rejected.
Compromise 6 in favor. Against. Abstention. Adopted. 72 in favor.
Against. Abstention. Rejected. Compromise 7 in favor. Against.
Abstention. Adopted. Compromise 8 in favor. Against. Abstention.
Adopted. 82 in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected.
Compromise 10 in favor. Against. Abstention. Adopted. 89 in favor.
Against. Abstention. Rejected. 90 in favor. Against.
Abstention. Check 90. The vote is open. And is rejected with 16 to 16 and one abstention. And 91 in favor.
Against. Abstention. Rejected. And 92 in favor. Against.
Abstention. Rejected. 93 in favor. Against. Abstention.
Rejected. 94 in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected.
95. Check. Okay. The vote is open. 94.
Check for 94. And the vote is closed. And it is adopted. Yeah, the abstention was not so clear. So try to signal everything you have to give the indication.
95 in favor. Against. Abstention. Adopted. 96 in favor.
Against. Abstention. Check. The vote is open. 96.
And the vote is closed. And it is adopted. Compromise 11 in favor. Against. Abstention.
Adopted. 97 I lost. 97 in favor. Against. Abstention.
Check. 97 we check. And it vote is closed and is rejected. Compromise 11 we voted in favor. Then we switch to 106 in favor.
Against. Abstention. Rejected. 107 in favor. Against.
Abstention. Adopted. 108 in favor. Against. Abstention.
I guess adopted but we check it. 108 the vote is open. And the vote is closed. And it is adopted. 20 yes, 13 no, and no abstention.
Compromise 12 in favor. Against. Abstention. Adopted. 117 in favor.
Against. Abstention. Rejected. 118 in favor. Against.
Abstention. Rejected. Compromise 13 in favor. Against.
118 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. Compromise 13 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. Compromise 14 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. Compromise 17 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. 132 in favor, against, abstention.
Once again, 132 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. 134 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. Compromise 15 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. 143 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. Compromise 16 in favor, against, abstention, adopted.
152 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. 156 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 157 and 58 in favor, against, abstention. I think rejected, but we check. Vote is open.
And it is closed. And it is adopted. So 18 in favor, 16 against, and no abstention. 159 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 160 in favor, against, abstention.
Checking, 160, the vote is open. And the vote is closed. 16 in favor, 15 against, and three abstention, adopted. And then we switch to compromise 18 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. Compromise 19 in favor, against, abstention, adopted.
Compromise 20 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. 179 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 180 in favor, against, abstention. Checking, 180, vote is open. And it is rejected, 15 in favor, 19 against, and no abstention.
Amendment 1 in favor, against, abstention, adopted. 2 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 3 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 4 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 5 in favor, against, abstention, adopted.
7 in favor, against, abstention, adopted.
Against. Abstention. Adopted. Twelve in favor. Against.
Abstention. Rejected. Thirteen in favor. Against. Abstention.
Adopted. Fourteen in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected.
Fifteen in favor. Against. Abstention. Check fifteen. The vote is open.
And the vote is closed. And it is rejected. Eight in favor, twenty-six against, and no abstention. And amendment sixteen in favor. Against.
Abstention. Rejected. Seventeen in favor. Against. Abstention.
Rejected. Eighteen in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected.
And nineteen in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected. Twenty in favor.
Against. Abstention. Rejected. Twenty-one in favor. Against.
Abstention. Rejected. Twenty-two in favor. Against. Abstention.
Adopted. Twenty-four in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected.
Twenty-five in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected. Twenty-six in favor.
Against. Abstention. Adopted. Twenty-eight in favor. Against.
Abstention check. Twenty-eight. Vote is open. And the vote is closed. And it is rejected.
Fifteen in favor, eighteen against, no abstention. And then we have twenty-nine in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected.
Thirty in favor. Against. Abstention. Please, once again. Thirty in favor.
Against. Abstention. Adopted. We can check, of course. Thirty, vote is open.
And the vote is closed. And it is adopted. Twenty yes, fourteen no, and no abstention. Compromise two in favor. Against.
Abstention. Adopted. Thirty-seven in favor. Against. Abstention.
Rejected. Thirty-eight in favor. Against. Abstention. Rejected.
Thirty-nine in favor. Against. Abstention. Adopted. And then we have forty-two in favor.
And against. Abstention. Adopted. Compromise three in favor. Against.
Abstention. Adopted. Fifty in favor. Against. Abstention.
Rejected. Fifty-one in favor. Against. Abstention. Adopted.
Fifty-two in favor. Against. Abstention. Once again. Fifty-two in favor.
Against. Abstention.
I think adopted, but we should check it. 52, the vote is open. And the vote is closed. And it is adopted, 18 yes, 16 no, no abstention. And 53, in favor?
Against? Abstention? Adopted. And now we have the final vote electronically. The vote is open.
And the vote is closed. And it is adopted by big majority, 22 yes, 1 no, and 11 abstention. Thanks a lot. This ends the voting session for today. And if anybody wants to leave the room, be quiet, please.
Okay. So, next item is item 10, the EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. And dear colleagues, I guess this is really an important trade agreement, an important success for the European Union to get this agreement... no, I will not use deal anymore. No, this agreement done. It is the fourth most populous nation with more than 280 million, the third largest democracy on Earth, a lot of islands, but it's really an important player in the ASEAN region and the ASEAN community.
And it's really for me a signal that we as European Union are seen as a reliable partner. Specifically, Indonesia was always trying to be independent. In previous times, there was this movement of block-free states, and Indonesia was in the board of this movement. And now they choose us as a privileged trading partner.
privileged trading partner this is a clear signal and the conclusion of the negotiation was done in September last year so one year of translation of linguistic checks and juridical checks and whatever and now we are close for the ratification process and the legal text is now ready and it's now on the desk of the Council to give the green light for this signature. And I guess we are really in in a good mood to have really a possibility for ratification soon because as you know Indonesia is at the moment a beneficiary country from the GSP and this will expire at the end of the year. And I guess we should really avoid that there will be a loophole between the ratification and the expiring of the the GSP beneficiary. And therefore I guess it's wise to start with the discussion about the agreement even we have not get the formal transmission from the Council to the Parliament but the text is ready and we can start. And having said that of course we decided at the coordinators to start with an so-called interim report so that we are on the safe side regarding our rules of procedure and we can really formulate our position and then when the text is formally on our desk we can react quite quick.
And Iuliu Winkler is the rapporteur and he will be replaced by Jörgen Warborn today.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you chair, dear colleagues, dear representatives of the Commission. Around 90% of future global growth will be generated outside Europe, much of it in Asia. If Europe wants to stay competitive we will have to be where the growth is and we need reliable partners to get there. Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous nation and the third largest democracy, exactly such a partner we need. Yet the EU accounts for only 6% of its trade today so the potential is enormous.
Why an interim report? Well there are three reasons. First, time is of essence. Indonesia graduates from the GSP scheme on the 1st of January and realistically we cannot vote on consent before then. The resulting gap between GSP and the CEPA preferences would hurt precisely the operator this agreement is meant to help.
By setting out our positions now we give the Commission and the Council our expectations early rather than facing a fait accompli at the consent stage. Second, this agreement is a benchmark. We have just concluded the negotiations in substance with the Philippines and talk with Thailand and Malaysia are well advanced. In a way the CEPA with Indonesia is their template so EP's priority on rules of origin, sustainability and raw materials should be on the record now. And third, there is precedent.
We have used this mechanism before on files with similar timing constraints. Now to the substance.
The assessment of rapporteur Winkler and by myself as well is strongly positive. After nine years and 19 rounds of negotiations concluded on 23rd of September last year, we have a modern and ambitious agreement. It creates a free trade area of more than 700 million consumers between two complementary economies. On trading goods, the CEPA eliminates tariffs on more than 98% of tariff lines. Indonesia tariffs of up to 50% on certain vehicles and components will be phased out gradually, which I think strikes the right balance.
At the same time, the Commission must monitor the phase-out closely and make full use of the rules of origin. For our agri-food sector, market access improves and 221 European geographical indications will be protected. Geographical indications should be in every EU trade agreement. However, sensitive products need transitional periods, tariff rate quotas, or safeguards to protect our farmers, and Indonesian SPS requirements must be based on science, not used as disguised barriers. Beyond tariffs, non-tariff barriers are often the real obstacles for our exporters, especially the SMEs.
It's good that there are provisions on customs cooperation and mutual recognition of conformity assessment, and the report calls on the CEPA Trade Committee to prioritize removing these barriers. SME also gets dedicated chapters and rules on paperless trade, and we will emphasize that the Commission has to ensure that SMEs can gather all the information they need on one single digital platform. On services, the agreement opens opportunities in engineering, architecture, and financial and professional services. It also covers cross-border data flows with safeguards consistent with EU data protection standards. The right to regulate in the public interest is fully preserved.
On investment, the IPA provides a stable framework with modern transparent dispute settlement system that leaves the old ISDS model behind. On public procurement, it's positive that there are rules on transparency and national treatment. However, it is regrettable that market access provision will only be negotiated within five years of entry into force. Hopefully, we can agree that they shall cover both central and sub-central entities. I think it goes without saying that this agreement carries a massive geostrategic value.
Indonesia is a leading global supplier of nickel and other critical raw materials for our clean energy, battery, and technology industries. The CEPA includes discipline on export restrictions and export duties. This is what de-risking looks like in practice, not closing ourselves off by diversifying with trusted partners. What is more, it offers a durable rules-based way forward on the issues behind the WTO nickel dispute. Of course, there are sensitive aspects and rapporteur Winkler addressed them in his report.
First, fisheries. Our sector is concerned about increased access for Indonesian tuna. A safeguard is only as good as our ability to use it, so the report calls on the Commission to monitor imports, prices, and employment closely, to keep a structural dialogue with the sector, and to enforce the rules on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.
Then labor rights. Indonesia has committed to the core ILO conventions. As the EPP, we are convinced that measurable progress on the ground through the domestic advisory groups and technical cooperation will do more for Indonesian workers than the threat of trade restrictions. More generally, it's preferable with TSD chapters built on dialogue and capacity building with dispute settlement as a last resort. Let's call the alternative what it is, the more radical approach of automatic sanctions or unilateral withdrawal of market access.
Experience shows that punitive mechanism often leads partners to disengage rather than comply. That said, a preference for dialogue is not a preference for inaction and the Commission should report to us concretely and regularly. This leads me to the role as the Parliament. The report calls for a clear measurable implementation benchmark, regular reporting to this committee and proactive use of the review clauses. Strong parliamentary oversight is the democratic counterpart to the swift entry into force of business needs.
The amendment deadline is the 14th of October, followed by compromise negotiations with a committee vote in December if possible or early next year. Dear colleagues, to conclude, this is a good agreement for European companies, workers, farmers and consumers and a strategic one for the Union. With this interim report, we set out the condition under which Parliament expects to give its consent. Our central request to the Commission and the Council is simple: treat the ratification timeline with the urgency it deserves. And finally, Mr. Winkler wants to thank the INTA Secretariat, his staff and our EPP group advisor for their excellent work and support in preparing this report.
He looks forward to working with all of you and with the shadow rapporteurs in a constructive spirit. Thank you very much.
Thanks a lot, Jörgen. Now I give the floor to the shadow rapporteurs and Kathleen Van Brempt is the first for two minutes, please.
Kathleen Van Brempt
Thank you very much, Chair, and let me start by thanking the rapporteur. Jörgen will put that through, not just for the work on the draft resolution, but also in particular for the constructive way of organizing several monitoring groups over the past year to properly inform the Parliament and the shadow rapporteurs about this agreement. And as a shadow rapporteur, I would like to express our group's general support for the CEPA and the draft resolution. Indonesia, it's been mentioned, is Asia's largest economy and a key partner in Indo-Pacific. And also very important, this agreement gives us the chance to show also to the public opinion that diversification and extra FTAs does not have to mean a race to the bottom.
It can build on higher social, environmental and labor standards. But our support is based on clear expectations on implementation. First of all, the commitment on trade and sustainability must translate into measurable results on the ground. We need effective monitoring, clear indicators on labor rights, deforestation, land rights and regular reporting to the Parliament. And we need clarity on how the sanction-based enforcement mechanism will actually work when serious violations do occur.
Proper monitoring of course also only works if the right people are involved. Domestic advisory groups should not become a box-ticking exercise. Second, on critical raw materials, we should avoid creating a new extractive relationship. Indonesia should not simply become a supplier of raw materials for Europe's green transition. A real partnership means sustainable extraction, local value creation and strong labor and environment protection.
Palm oil is also where the ambition of this agreement will really be tested.
The palm oil protocol is a promising framework, but it needs again measurable objectives on deforestation, traceability, biodiversity and labor rights. We also need stronger investment protection as an important first step forward in terms of legal predictability. And finally, we must make sure that the intellectual property rules in the agreement will never undermine the access to affordable medicine and public health. Voilà, to sum up, our relationship with Indonesia should not be purely transactional or centered on raw materials. Sustainability, civil society, effective monitoring and support for value creation in Indonesia is very important.
That's why we of course will put forward some amendments that strengthen these elements in the resolution. Thank you, chair.
Thanks a lot. Next is for the Patriots, Christophe.
Christophe Bay
Merci monsieur le président. Tout d'abord, je tiens comme mes collègues à remercier et féliciter notre rapporteur, monsieur Winkler, qui a effectué un travail tout à fait remarquable de transparence d'information durant ces nombreux mois sur lesquels nous avons travaillé sur ce projet d'accord. Comme vous l'avez souligné monsieur le président, l'Indonésie est un partenaire important, 280 millions d'habitants, 6 % de croissance. Il compte bien entendu dans nos approvisionnements en matières premières critiques. Mais un accord ne peut être jugé uniquement au nombre de lignes tarifaires supprimées.
Certes, l'accord prévoit la suppression de droits sur plus de 90 % des lignes et ouvre des perspectives, il faut le reconnaître, intéressantes, constructives pour nos entreprises européennes, notamment les entreprises françaises. Pour autant, notre groupe exprime trois points de vigilance sur lesquels la Commission devra nous apporter des précisions. Le premier concerne les marchés publics. L'accord impose des règles de transparence mais ne garantit toujours pas un véritable accès des entreprises européennes au marché indonésien. Ce point a d'ailleurs été soulevé par l'un des précédents intervenants.
Deuxième point effectivement, qui est le point peut-être le plus majeur et qui concerne la question des obstacles non tarifaires. Ça me semble effectivement la question la plus irritante face effectivement à la position de nos partenaires indonésiens où il faut le reconnaître, peu de points positifs ont été apportés dans les nombreuses questions que nous avons posées sur ce sujet. Et enfin, troisième point, c'est bien sûr l'accès aux matières premières. Certes, l'Indonésie ne doit pas être un fournisseur de matières premières brutes, tel n'est pas le cas puisque je rappelle que le partenariat entre l'entreprise Eramet et les Chinois conduit à une modification du produit sur place. Pour autant, la question se pose de la réalité du libre-échange puisque les Indonésiens ont souhaité maintenir des licences d'exportation.
Donc voilà les trois points, monsieur le président, sur lesquels je souhaiterais que dans les semaines et mois qui viennent, avant le mois de décembre, la Commission puisse nous éclairer de nouveau. Je vous remercie.
Bart Groothuis
Thanks chair, and my great thanks through Jörgen to rapporteur Winkler.
He did an excellent job. And I just want to say that recently I used the 400 budget, which you all know, to order some caps: "Make Trade Free Again". As a, you know why. This is a great example. This is not just about free trade, which we as liberals of course love.
It's about geopolitics and geoeconomics and geostrategy. It's about critical raw materials, but it's also about showing the rest of Asia how we deal. And this is something I really like to say, this we're doing a good job in what we're saying. We are diversifying and we are looking for new partners. And so this, what Jörgen said and what also Bernd said, I agree with.
This is also for other partners. So I will bring some amendments to the great report by Mr. Winkler to also help implement this trade deal. And not just for the Indonesian farmers and others who are maybe struggling with it, but also to show others in the region that we are serious about free trade, serious about diversifying. This is really important. And for that matter, there's a window which is opening.
The window isn't open that long, but as you said, on January 1st, that window is closing because of practical reasons. But there are other windows on nickel and cobalt. We see that in practice, by doing, the Indonesian government is also, and the Chinese are openly and publicly complaining about it, opening their window for us. So we should accept it. And I commend you to support it.
It gives a strong basis for us to support this deal. And I will put forward some amendments like I said. But all in all, we're very happy, especially also with the openness with which Mr. Winkler worked. Thanks.
Catarina Vieira
Thank you, Chair. I can't resist and say, let's make trade fair, maybe not again, but for the first time. But in any case, as the Greens/EFA group, I welcome the improvements in the and this developments in the free trade agreement with Indonesia. And one thing we're certainly happy to see is an enforceable TSD chapter with commitments to the most important international conventions on sustainability, labor rights, and human rights, and with a court where the parties and civil society can file complaints whether either of the blocks have lived up to their commitments, for instance, on climate and labor rights. A good TSD chapter is absolutely fundamental in ensuring that the increased bilateral trade does not lead to also increased environmental damage and human rights violations.
So I think this is an achievement that deserves to be celebrated. And I would like to thank DG Trade and Indonesia for agreeing on this principle. I also would like to welcome that the Commission listened to the concerns in Indonesia and agreed to a state-to-state investment protection agreement. We can no longer support these behind-closed-door agreements where companies can sue governments for their legitimate policy choices, such as on climate and energy policy. So I really hope that in the future we also see that the agreement on state-to-state remains as it is and does not expand to investor-to-state disputes in the future.
While there's a lot of positives, there's also a lot of concerns. I have to be clear on that because the first one I'd like to highlight would be the possible negative impacts from extraction and also processing of raw materials. While Europe does need more critical minerals and materials, the sector in Indonesia remains very concerning when it comes to pollution, for example, when it comes to the use of fossil fuels, when it comes to the impact on the environment, but not only all of these things, also to the impact on workers and indigenous and local communities affected by mining projects. So while I do acknowledge that the TSD chapter and the raw materials chapter do address some of these concerns, I would have liked to have seen even more specific and stronger safeguards to mitigate the negative impact of the mining sector.
And I think we also cannot ignore the elephant in the room, which is palm oil production and imports, which are of course huge and with liberalization might become even bigger. And really we need a very strong EUDR in place by then, I hope, well implemented, but even so it's never a silver bullet. And we do know that palm oil driven deforestation remains an issue in Indonesia, unfortunately even towards other markets. So I'm very worried about the impacts of additional demand on this commodity. Outside the FTA specifically, the situation in West Papua remains really severe.
More than 100,000 indigenous Papuans have been displaced and severely repressed, including killings perpetrated by the military. The military presence in West Papua has been increasing significantly over the past years and there are severe concerns of excessive use of force, intimidation and human rights abuses against local communities who oppose projects there and journalists or media who report on these matters. So there are provisions of course also inside the FTA for things like domestic advisory groups, which are also channels and avenues of conversation, but this will be very difficult to carry out on issues on this region specifically. And on that I would have liked to have seen a specific risk assessment embedded for any goods sourced from West Papua where we know there's a heightened risk. So in this house we will evaluate the FTA, as my group will certainly do as well, and see if how we can reflect all of these important elements on the interim report.
And when it comes to our final vote, we will take into account not only everything I said, but also the political context in Indonesia, the overall rule of law situation, human rights situation and what's going on in West Papua. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And I have also two questions to the Commission. First, of course I tried really that we will present a Christmas gift with the ratification of the agreement, but realistically it might be that the ratification will come a little bit later. So how the Commission will act? GSP is expiring and ratification is not there.
So what will the Commission will do? And secondly, when we visited Indonesia and also a coffee plantation, it was always the question how to integrate procedures from the EUDR into government to government procedure or procedure we created now with the trade agreement. Is there a reflection how we can simplify also the procedures, the different obligation requirements of different EU legislation into the governmental structure of the trade agreement? And I have no further requests for the floor. Then I give well-known Fabian G.
Please.
Jean-Marc Germain
Thank you, Chair. Maybe two, three questions to the rapporteurs of the INI and also to the Commission. First is how do we think this new agreement within the perspective of the Industrial Accelerator Act, because we spoke in the, you spoke in the report of for example public procurement agreements, so how do we anticipate this future legislation?
Second, if I'm correct, there is a huge wage gap between European industry and Indonesian industry, it's like one to ten or maybe more. So how do we handle that? I know that it's not within the trade agreement that to enforce equal social situation, but it's maybe an issue. And third would be that with those low wage and if I'm also correct, a strong and performance economy with a lot of Chinese investment, how do we prevent from fierce competition with Europe coming from industry with those backing of China? Thank you very much.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. Now I give the floor to the Commission and the well-known Fabian Gehl who will answer the question and give some comments.
Fabien Gehl
Thank you very much, Chair, and good morning. Thank you very much for having us this morning for this discussion. I would like also to start by thanking the entire committee and the rapporteur, Mr. Winkler, for the organization over the last few months of the different monitoring groups. We found this was a very useful engagement, very constructive, and also the opportunity not only to talk between the Commission and the Parliament, but also with stakeholders that will benefit from the agreement. As a starting point, we would welcome the interim report presented today.
We take note of the recommendation with respect to the implementation. This seems to be a very strong point throughout the report and the discussion this morning in relation to specific provisions. We do welcome to have this discussion already today. I think it reflects the joint will to advance towards a swift ratification. And while to answer the question you've asked, Chair, there is no specific date that is known yet.
As you know, over the last few months, we've tried to accelerate every step of the process to the maximum. We are very well aware for a long time, actually, including on the Indonesian side, of the GSP deadline of the 1st of January. There is no legal tool that would allow to extend that, and that's why we are focusing on accelerating the process. And we've encouraged also operators to anticipate a possible gap should that happen. I think the report that was presented is very clear about the potential of the FTA in the under-exploited relationship there.
There is a gap to cover and the fact that both economies are rather complementary when it comes to trade. We very much welcome the idea that this agreement can be a reference point in the region, and we welcome that the report stressed that this could be a landmark contribution to the region. Now, we've heard a lot about the benefits of the trade agreement this morning. It's indeed a combination of high level of liberalization, a regulatory framework to address non-tariff barriers, and a very robust sustainability chapter. And with that combination, I would concur with what we have heard this morning about how this agreement could contribute to the key objective of EU trade policy in terms of diversification, resilience, access to markets of growth, sustainability, and digital trade.
Trying to address some of the questions raised this morning, I would stress that there is a massive amount of provision that would tackle beyond-the-borders restrictions. Non-tariff barriers have been a concern throughout the negotiation. We will see improvement in terms of the import licensing regime on the Indonesian side. There are very clear provision on TBT that will promote the use of international standard, and here as well trying to prevent national standards to be used as a trade barrier. And that's very true especially for the automotive sector, where we have devoted special provision to this end.
And at the same time, we've been very careful to protect sensitive products from rice to sugar, but also in the fisheries sectors where we have been very careful, especially with respect to canned tuna, which is a long and historic sensitive for the EU. And this morning we also discussed geographical indication as a point that was very important. I would stress as well in terms of objective with respect to digital trade, this is going to be the first time Indonesia commit to the non-application of custom duties on electronics transmission. It's a first for them, something we have harvested in the agreement. And I think this aspect of the agreement becomes even more important in a context where that multilateral commitment has disappeared.
On the agricultural side as well, as it has been said, European farmers are meant to benefit from the agreement, especially for beef, dairy, processed food.
Now moving to energy and raw material, where we have indeed a combination of rules, of cooperation, trying to address this very fine balance between local value creation, downstreaming policy and supporting Indonesia in its industrialization, and at the same time having sufficient transparency, non-discrimination rules for our own business. We believe that we have crafted this necessary balance, notably when it comes, and this was a question raised this morning, on export duties, where indeed Indonesia will retain the right to levy a series of export duties, but this will be framed, this will be transparent, this will be focused on unprocessed goods, so up to first level of processing. After that, there will be guarantees for the EU to benefit from beneficial preferential treatment as we move forward. On public procurement, let me stress that indeed the market access negotiation for cross-border provision of goods and services for public procurement will take place in the next five years. However, already today, as soon as the agreement is in force, EU companies that are established in Indonesia will benefit from non-discrimination, so they will be able to take part in public procurement process on the basis of the rules in terms of transparency that we have established.
There was a few points this morning on sustainability, and as you know, we have delivered on the TSD review across the board on all this element with a very strong engagement platform component that will complement the usual provision we have in FTA. When it comes to the question on how do we bring in the notion of simplification of regulation and regulatory requirement which pertains to sustainability but also to other aspect, of course this is something that needs to take place within the EU through our own domestic legislation. Where the agreement can enter into play is through the different frameworks we've created for cooperation. There will be a mechanism where both sides can raise question and engage with the other side when regulation is crafted in order to understand better what to expect and anticipate sometimes the impact of each other's regulation. I will finish by saying that when it comes to the future implementation of the agreement, we actually welcome the recommendations we have seen so far.
We're going to pay particular attention to the areas where the Commission is asked to monitor and to demonstrate caution when it comes to, for example, the proper use of rules of origin, SPS requirement, of course the cooperation on sustainability, provision on SMEs, the specific case of the tuna sector, as well as indeed the inbuilt agenda in different places for future negotiations. Across the board, I think this agreement will provide us a rules-based platform and relationship with Indonesia. And coming from the multilateral world, we believe this is a very important contribution to ensure that our trade will remain rules-based. Thank you very much, Chair.
Thanks a lot, Fabien.
Jörgen, you want to come back?
Jörgen Warborn
Yes, very shortly. I got, or the rapporteur Winkler got some questions from Jean-Marc, and I'm not responding for Winkler, he has to do it himself. But only the way I perceive it when it comes to the first question on IAA is of course that Indonesia has to be included in the equivalence paragraph or however you put it. On the wage gap issues, yeah, of course there is a wage gap difference. I don't want the Indonesians to set the wages for European workers, and that also means that of course Europeans cannot set the wages for the Indonesian workers.
However, there are of course commitments to the core ILO conventions and they have committed to them from the Indonesian side, so that is of course usually how we do it in the free trade agreements. When it comes to the third question, if I understood it correctly, that's the competition from China and how that plays in. I think this is an opportunity when it comes to this, of course, because since there is a possibility to pick up the trade with this huge country and facilitate the trade, of course there will be, this is a diversification strategy that is excellent to bring on the competition on China. At the same time, it will not solve every issue we have with China with this free trade agreement with Indonesia. We need to continue the diversification and continue with the other free trade agreements we have in the pipeline and of course ratify, you know, like the Mercosur agreement and the other ones.
That will of course help with the situation with China as well, apart from the other toolbox we have when it comes to safeguarding with China. I think that is the way forward for that. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. Regarding the circumvention issue, of course we have the rules of origin and we have to really have a proper surveillance on that. And I remember when we negotiated Vietnam, of course we had also the suspect that this will happen. And so the rules of origin and also the obligation to have added value to products and not just having a different label on, but we will have a look exactly on that regarding Indonesia as well. So, amendments.
I guess there will be some amendments and the deadline for amendment is the 14th of October, 12 o'clock, high noon. High noon. Okay, good. Next point is point 11, the agreement on electronic commerce. An agreement negotiated for years in the context of WTO.
Unfortunately, it was not incorporated into the WTO rulebook. Nevertheless, 67 WTO members covering roundabout 70% of global trade agreeing during the MC14 in Cameroon to adopt this agreement. And now it's in the ratification process and one country has already agreed on this agreement, this plurilateral agreement, it was Singapore. And of course we could make a big difference because we are 27 member states. So, with this and mentioning also that Brando will be our rapporteur for this file as the, not only for the consent report but also for the interim report, I give now the floor to Ivan Brešković from DG TRADE to explain a bit the agreement for eight minutes.
Ivan Brašković
Thank you very much, Chair, and honorable members. Thank you very much for the opportunity to address you today on the e-commerce agreement.
So indeed this is the outcome of very lengthy five-year negotiations in the WTO and we consider it a major achievement for the multilateral trading system. And once implemented this agreement will represent the first set of global rules on digital trade agreed among a very large number of WTO members, which means more predictability, more legal certainty and more trust for businesses and consumers engaging in digital trade across borders. The agreement brings very concrete benefits for consumers and businesses but particularly for SMEs. First it contains disciplines on trade facilitation which will make digital trade smoother across the borders. These include for example provisions on paperless trading, electronic contracts, electronic authentication and electronic signatures and all these can reduce costs, simplify transactions and make it easier especially for SMEs to operate internationally.
Second, the agreement strengthens trust in the digital environment. It includes provisions on online consumer protection, on spam messages, on cybersecurity and on open internet access. And these disciplines are essential if citizens and businesses are to have confidence in the digital marketplace. Third, the agreement promotes a more reliable international environment for digital trade. It includes rules on electronic payments and telecommunication services which helps to ensure continued access to internet-based and electronic services.
Fourth, and this is very important, it prohibits customs duties on electronic transmissions among the members of the agreement, which is an important commitment in supporting open digital trade, particularly in the era when we cannot rely on the multilateral e-commerce moratorium anymore. Fifth, the agreement also has a strong development component which is designed to support the participation of developing countries in digital trade and help ensure the benefits of digitalization are shared more broadly. Now, I would like to underline one point in particular is that the agreement also contains a horizontal exception for measures to protect personal data and privacy, which we discussed earlier today also in the context of the Korea DTA, which is a feature in all our agreements on digital trade and which for the EU is an important safeguard. More importantly, the agreement provides a solid regulatory foundation on which participating economies can further develop their digital economies and strengthen both domestic and cross-border digital trade. And it has become a de facto template for digital trade negotiations across the world already.
Now turning to the current state of play in the WTO. So the usual procedure for a plurilateral agreement such as the e-commerce agreement would be incorporation into the WTO legal framework. However, as you know we have not been able to reach consensus on incorporation in the WTO, which in our view is not primarily this blockage not primarily about the content of this agreement but rather reflects the broader institutional difficulty of securing consensus in the WTO including on plurilateral outcomes.
So, faced with this situation, participants had a choice to either leave a fully negotiated ambitious agreement on hold indefinitely, or find a legally sound way forward among those who are ready to implement it, while in parallel we continue to pursue incorporation into the WTO framework. And this is why on 28th of March in 2026 at MC14, 67 WTO members, including the EU, issued a joint declaration confirming the intention to implement the agreement as soon as possible, subject to the completion of internal procedures. To make this legally possible, an interim arrangement annex was added to the agreement, together with an appendix on appeal arbitration procedures, which now allows the agreement to be applied on an interim basis pending the incorporation into Annex 4. And to be clear, incorporation into the WTO legal framework still remains the ultimate objective. The interim route has nevertheless raised questions and sensitivities among some WTO members.
At the General Council meeting in July, some members expressed concerns about the legal and institutional implications of this approach, including the role of the WTO Director-General as depository and the support of the Secretariat in implementing this agreement. The co-sponsors of the agreement, including the EU, responded clearly and firmly. We underlined that these interim arrangements are fully consistent with the WTO law and practice. The WTO Director-General has maintained the same line and continues to support the interim arrangements. We expect a second round of discussions at the upcoming General Council.
Our objective is to mitigate criticism as much as possible so this support is maintained. Now, quickly on the next steps. Under Article 29 of of the agreement, acceptance takes place through the deposit of an instruments of acceptance with the Director-General of the WTO. And the agreement will enter into force for those WTO members that have accepted it on the 30th day following the deposit of the 45th instrument of acceptance. As you mentioned, Chair, so far Singapore has deposited its instrument of acceptance as the first and so far only member, but many co-sponsors are expected to complete their procedures in the first half of 2027.
For the European Union, the Commission proposal for Council decision was adopted and transmitted to the Council and to the European Parliament on 13th of July. Our objective is to conclude the agreement as soon as possible. The EU's acceptance, as you, Chair, mentioned, counts as 27, so it will be a very significant step towards entry into force and will send a very strong political signal. So in this context, we would like to encourage you to conclude the consent procedure swiftly, because your approval will allow the EU to remain at the forefront of shaping global digital trade rules and help bring this important agreement into effect without delay. Thank you very much.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And Brando is our rapporteur, I give him the floor for four minutes.
Brando Benifei
Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the Commission for the presentation. As INTA standing rapporteur for digital trade and e-commerce, I have followed these negotiations and the broader debate on the governance of digital trade closely. Although there is understandable pressure to move quickly on the consent procedure, I considered it important that Parliament also prepare an interim report so that this committee can examine the political and regulatory questions raised by an agreement that will increasingly affect how digital markets are governed and ultimately the daily lives of our citizens.
At the Abu Dhabi ministerial in March, members could not even agree on a work program to reform the organization and they let the multilateral moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions lapse. In that vacuum, moving ahead with interim implementation of the e-commerce agreement is a decision I welcome, provided it remains a bridge towards incorporation into Annex 4. In a stalled system where consensus is weaponized by a handful of members, a plurilateral approach used as a stepping stone is the only workable way to set baseline rules for a digital economy that AI is transforming faster than any negotiation. However, India, Brazil, South Africa and others have raised legitimate concerns about plurilaterals fragmenting the system and sidelining development priorities. What is the Commission doing to keep this process open, transparent and development-sensitive while pushing relentlessly for formal incorporation into the WTO framework?
How will the Commission defend the role of the Director-General as depository and the Secretariat's support, which are important anchors for the agreement within the WTO system? The e-commerce agreement text itself has traveled far since Buenos Aires in 2017, when the risk was a narrow corporate instrument focused on market access. The final agreement combines instead practical rules on electronic contracts, signatures, invoicing, payments and paperless trade with commitments on consumer protection, cybersecurity and development, and it supports digital trade without locking in a deregulatory model. Since the text cannot be reopened, implementation becomes the decisive test. The cooperation provisions are broad, which gives the EU an opening to promote its model, so I would call on the Commission to make data protection, competition in digital markets and online consumer protection all listed as areas of cooperation a priority in operationalizing it.
The development provisions deserve the same priority because the way commitments on bridging the digital divide, technical assistance and capacity building are delivered in the Global South, including through EU programs, will be the strongest answer to the claim that this agreement serves advanced economies only and the best case for WTO incorporation. How will the EU deliver concretely on these commitments in the Global South? There are also areas where we will need close monitoring. Scope needs clarity, notably the distinction between digital goods and digitally delivered services, where ambiguity creates legal uncertainty and enforcement gaps, and the Commission should commit to report regularly to this committee on how these provisions are interpreted and on any emerging dispute. China is a party and the telecommunications provision will interact with the presence of non-EU suppliers, including Chinese ones, in our critical infrastructure.
So how will the Commission ensure that these commitments never translate into pressure to lower our security standards or to accept vendors posing systemic risks, and can it confirm that the security exception covers our decisions here? These are precisely the questions that I believe Parliament should examine through the interim report. Consent should therefore be accompanied by a serious political scrutiny of how this agreement is implemented and how the EU uses this plurilateral step to rebuild a broader WTO consensus. I look forward to working with colleagues across this committee to give the Parliament's contribution to this next phase. Thank you.
Thanks a lot, Brando. I now the shadow rapporteurs for two minutes and Jörgen is the first.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Bernd, and thank you to the Commission, and thank you, Brando, also for your intervention and work with this throughout the monitoring group and so on. Let me just say that I fully support this. I think we should support it from the European Union's side and make sure that we do it as soon as possible. It is very good now that we have agreement on paperless trade, on electronic contracts, on signatures, and on building trust basically for consumers as well. And I think this will facilitate digital trade, and of course, since this is a trade that is growing fast, this is a big potential for Europe as such.
It is so there are 67 members now that have signed up to this, and it is good. It is though regrettable that we couldn't get a multilateral agreement, and that of course is the situation we know in WTO, that it's very hard to get multilateral agreements. The plurilaterals, I'm sure, is the way forward, and I think we should give its full support to this interim arrangement because this is the way to keep the bike going. If a bike doesn't move forward, it falls, and we need to have a movement forward. It goes to show that WTO decision-working doesn't work, and that's why the plurilaterals are so important.
Just to underline also the importance of the prohibition of customs duties. Very good, since the last ministerial does not have the two years, pushing the dates two years forward that we have used to have, this is very important. I do regret though that not least the US is not part of this, and they were part of the negotiation up until, if I could remember, like two years ago or so. We even dropped a few things from the European Union that we thought were important to keep them on board, but they decided to leave the negotiations. So as I would like to proceed, my questions to the Commission would be: couldn't we move forward with this, but then also continue to negotiate those questions that we dropped at an earlier stage?
I think it was source code among other things, data flows, some important issues that I think we should continue to push with the partners we still have. Thank you.
Rihards Kols
Yes, thank you very much. Well, ECR Group clearly welcomes this proposal by Commission, and I hope that we as a Parliament can move swiftly with the consent procedure. And it's already widely recognized that it has been a while since the joint statement initiative on e-commerce was launched at the WTO. It might have taken 10 years and failure to agree on e-commerce moratorium due to an objection by just one country, but finally we will have the first global rules on digital trade supported by 67 WTO members, including our partners such as UK, Canada, Japan, and also I have to mention also our candidate countries, Ukraine and Moldova. And the objective of this agreement and the need for the EU move swiftly is self-evident.
We need to make digital trade much more efficient with the e-signatures, e-invoicing, and less papers, I would say. And it means real savings, especially for our SMEs, and SMEs is our, I would say, heart and bloodline for the economy altogether. And WTO e-commerce moratorium lapsed in March, as we already heard that, but this agreement locks a permanent ban on among its signatures, which is the certainty business needs.
Yet it should not be the new normal how to reach agreements on international trade. We need to make sure that this agreement is incorporated into Annex 4 of the Marrakesh agreement. So here to conclude I have two questions for the Commission. First is when will the EU deposit its signature and when do we expect to reach the 45 signatures threshold? And last but not least do you have any thoughts on how to bring countries such as US and India on board at least that they do not block inclusion of e-commerce agreement in the Annex 4 of WTO.
Thank you.
Thanks a lot. And now I give the floor to and I'm happy to to give the floor to Majdouline. Good to have you back and all the best for you.
Majdouline Sbai
Merci beaucoup. Je vais parler en français. Chers collègues. Cet accord comporte de nombreux éléments positifs comme l'interdiction des pratiques commerciales frauduleuses, trompeuses et mensongères qui portent préjudice aux consommateurs dans le cadre du commerce électronique. L'accès à des voies de recours et à des mesures de réparation en cas de problème après un achat en ligne, la mise en place d'une coopération entre les autorités chargées de la protection des consommateurs, ce qui est essentiel pour répondre aux abus des plateformes de commerce électronique telles que Temu, Shein ou alors encore AliExpress.
Pour rappel, d'après une étude récente du service de recherche du Parlement européen, une part croissante des importations de vêtements dans l'Union européenne est désormais acheminée par le biais de canaux de commerce électronique vendant directement aux consommateurs sous la forme de petits colis. La Commission européenne estime qu'environ 4,6 milliards de ces colis arrivent en Europe, sont arrivés pardon en Europe en 2024, soit environ 12 millions par jour. Plus de 90 % d'entre eux provenaient de la Chine et dont une part importante concernait des articles de mode et des accessoires. Ce qui souligne l'ampleur des importations directes vers le consommateur qui contourne ainsi les circuits traditionnels de vente au détail et les procédures douanières existantes en Union européenne. Jusqu'à récemment, les envois d'une valeur inférieure à 150 euros pouvaient entrer sans droits de douane en vertu du seuil de minimis de l'Union européenne.
Nous sommes préoccupés par certains éléments du texte. Nous sommes partisans, nous estimons que les pays devraient disposer de marges de manœuvre politiques nécessaires pour y recourir à l'avenir, notamment les pays en développement. Nous saluons également le fait que le texte ne contienne pas de dispositions relatives au transfert transfrontalier de données et n'impose pas d'obligations comme le préconisaient initialement les géants de la tech et le gouvernement américain visant à empêcher les autorités d'accéder au code source. Nous déplorons que le processus ayant abouti à ce texte a manqué de transparence. Le texte n'a été rendu public qu'en 2024 et aucune consultation formelle n'a été menée auprès de la société civile.
Pour terminer, je voudrais juste ajouter un point. Malheureusement, ces démarches amende, droits de douane sont arrivées beaucoup trop tard. En France ou ailleurs, beaucoup ont fermé et les magasins se raréfient dans les centres-villes. Donc nous encourageons vraiment la Commission et le Parlement à accélérer ces démarches. Merci.
Bernd Lange
Merci. And I give the floor back to the Commission, Ivan, five minutes.
Ivan Brašković
Thank you very much. So maybe starting with with the membership and indeed oh actually let me just start by saying that indeed we have to see this agreement in a bit of a broader context and indeed it has to be seen in the context of the overall reform of the WTO and the fact that the consensus system does not work anymore unfortunately and that we definitely need to reform the multilateral trading system.
We also agree that plurilateral agreements are the way forward, which is exactly why this agreement is so important because it provides a credible way forward for the plurilateral agreements in situations where it's one or two or a handful of WTO members that block agreements that actually do not impact them at all. They do not, the e-commerce agreement does not impose any rights or obligations on those parties. And this is exactly why this interim arrangement was such a positive outcome of the MC14, especially when other areas in relation to digital trade, you mentioned the lack of the multilateral e-commerce moratorium, the lack of agreements to extend the work program e-commerce. So when these fail at least we had a positive agenda in the area of e-commerce agreement. It is true that this agreement is perhaps not as ambitious as we wanted it to be five years ago when we started negotiating.
We had indeed discussed the possibility of including rules on data flows, on protection of source code, even going as far as negotiating market access, but through time we realized that we would not be able to achieve a meaningful outcome in a foreseeable future, especially after the US withdrew from negotiations on these issues. And it was decided by the parties jointly that we will go in two stages. We will first negotiate this agreement that we have today on the table and then once it is implemented we will move to phase two negotiations. And this is something that is explicitly recognized in the agreement as well. In our view, and this is the view of many members in the WTO, we first have to find a way to bring this agreement to implementation.
Then once this is out of the table then we can start discussing on whether we can actually bring more issues on board. At the moment we are also focusing quite a lot on extending the membership of this agreement. We are performing quite a strong outreach to the remaining members, including of course the US who we would very much like to see as part of this agreement. But in terms of how do we actually bring US or India to join these agreements, this is really not about the content of this agreement as such, this is really a much broader effort in aspects of the WTO reform that will need to be sorted out first. Now there was a question on how do we deal, are we lowering our security standards with this agreement potentially vis-à-vis China?
Do we, how, what kind of security exception we have to implement here? And these are I think very valid questions in the broader context of the WTO, but looking at the content of this agreement there is very little that could be considered as relevant for security standards. We talk about facilitation of issues such as e-signatures and e-invoicing, providing online consumer protection, protection against spam messages. So we believe that nothing here is raising security questions vis-à-vis any third country and that we do not need to depart from the WTO standard when it comes to security exception. So we rely really on what we have in the WTO, not really entering into debate does the security exception need to change for some other areas, this we really leave for the reform discussion.
In terms of reporting back to the Parliament we're very happy always to come to report, including on the cooperation under this agreement. It is true that there are certain areas listed in the agreement that the members explicitly wanted to discuss that perhaps do not include competition, but this is a non-exhaustive list and we're happy to discuss any topics that members bring on board.
But first we need to implement the agreement. We have to have the committee on e-commerce and then we'll be able to bring those topics. We are still far away from that. And that was actually a question, how far away are we from that? So we hope, depending of course on how fast the Parliament moves, we are hopeful to be able to deposit our instrument of acceptance early next year, so hopefully in January or February.
And we hope that by the summer there will be a big bulk of members who will already be able to accept the agreement, and perhaps towards the end of next year we will hopefully be able to reach number 45. I would also just like to touch one thing on the e-commerce and the low-value parcels and the tariffs. I just want to say that this is really not a topic of this agreement. We really talk about facilitation of digital trade. Unfortunately it's called e-commerce, which then causes confusion with e-commerce parcels and e-commerce platforms such as Temu and Alibaba, but this is really a very separate issue from what we deal with in this agreement.
And then finally, the remark that the process of the negotiations was opaque. I'm, this is unfortunate to hear. It was, we have tried to involve all stakeholders, civil society, businesses. We have been coming to the Parliament very regularly and shared the text of the agreement, and we have done this both here from the EU side but also in the WTO. So we believe that the process was actually quite transparent, so but we're happy of course to discuss how to improve these processes in the future.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, and thanks a lot for the insurance that you are always happy to go to the Parliament and discuss with the Parliament. So I'm sure that is valid for the whole Commission. Thanks a lot for that. Bernd, you want to come in?
It's okay.
Okay. So we give Bernd some homework, so that for the next meeting on 4th and 5th of November he will present a report and then we can discuss the concrete text and then we will have also a deadline for amendments. Thanks a lot, and now we switch to our last item for today, it's item 12. And I hope that Denis is there, and he is there. So, happy to have Denis Redonnet again with us.
And dear colleagues, today it is the presentation of the 42nd annual report on EU trade defense activities. And this question of trade defense activity is getting hotter and hotter, I would say, and specifically regarding the discussions or the reports I read in Politico and the new name of our active is rapporteur I guess, on new instrument on the trade defense side, on overcapacity, on unfair practices and whatever diversification instrument. I will not ask you this today. But of course we are really keen to hear a little bit about the situation in the last years and perhaps some consequences for the futures. We have now 40 minutes and therefore I give you now the floor for eight minutes.
Thank you very much, Chair. Indeed the purpose of this agenda item is for us to regularly come and report on activity on the basis of the annual report, but maybe I take the opportunity today to share also some comments on the policy developments underpinning our activities in the field of trade defense. As you as you rightly say, there is more pressure now, more request for recourse to the instruments.
Denis Redonnet
Of course, I will focus here on trade defense instruments proper, knowing that they are of course only one part of a much broader toolbox that goes into indeed the questions of, for example, the need to reduce a number of dependencies. And there is a read-across between the way the instruments work, and we are very focused on this. But on the trade defense side proper, anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, safeguards, and the way we use these instruments, in 2025 you've seen that we've actually opened a fair number of new investigations, 32 new investigations. So we are in terms of volume of activity, you know, matching the record level of the previous years. So that that is because we need to address the continuing pressures from distorted imports on a range of industry sectors.
That pressure is especially pronounced in the chemical sector, which accounts for more than a third of the new of the new cases. We imposed trade defense measures, and so the number of measures that are currently in force has increased from almost 200 at the beginning of 2025 to 2032 by December of last years. And that includes several several things which are perhaps worth highlighting. First of all, to say that we make an estimate of what this means in real-life terms and in terms of the actual number of manufacturing jobs that are potentially preserved by the presence of these corrective measures. And we estimate that those this number is around 640,000 manufacturing jobs that are protected by the measures.
To note that in 2025 we have adopted measures in one area on ferroalloys, or we have adopted a safeguard measure. We have also adopted measures that were applied retroactively in three of the cases of implementation to counter phenomena that we can that that may happen, such as stockpiling, so making the measures more more efficient as well where necessary. Measures we have also adopted new measures that tackle this very important form of distortion in our view, which is the the issue of cross-border subsidies, so subsidies that are flowing from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction and from there affecting exports to the EU in a case concerning tires from Morocco. We have also increasingly, and this is a trend, we have tackled circumvention of trade defense measures when when companies, operators try to evade the duties through transshipment or through minimal assembly practices in third countries. Then we close those loophole circumvention those loopholes, and circumvention measures now account for about a fifth of the totality of the measures that are in place.
So there's a strong, if you want, there's a strong enforcement angle to our policy stance in this area as well, because it's necessary. We have also continued to defend European exporter interests that are affected by the trade defense measures by third countries, and in some cases have provided relief for those export interests. And that is in our view also necessary because we are a disciplined user of trade defense instruments, and we believe as a matter of level playing field that other jurisdictions need to be as disciplined and rules-based as we are in the implementation of these measures. And finally, we launched in April 2005 an import surveillance tool to monitor possible trade diversions to the EU, and I will come back to this if if time allows it in a little more detail.
Many of the cases of course, new cases and the stock of cases concern imports from China. President von der Leyen said recently in this house that the second China shock is not looming but is already there and through trade defense instruments we are dealing with some of these import pressures very often linked to global overcapacities. Now, the second thing and this I move to the policy side is that in the course of last year we have given a lot of attention inside the Commission to the question of how can we strengthen the efficiency, the impact of the instruments and how can we do better what we do within the existing framework of the basic anti-dumping anti-subsidy regulation which govern our activities that are the subject of this report. And so let me just perhaps say a few words about this. As I mentioned already almost four years ago now, we became the first jurisdiction to countervail in the case of anti-subsidy tools what we call these cross-border subsidies.
So subsidies that are flowing to other third country markets and that are distorting the imports that we are importing from those third country markets. And this is a phenomenon which we believe is structurally important, which is happening at scale in many countries where we do have important trade relationships and we are committed to continue to tackling these practices and as a matter of fact the Court of Justice has also endorsed our approach in this area which is an important validation of this policy orientation. We are also seeking to address another manifestation of the impact of overcapacities in third countries, the so-called push-out effects. So through a concept in the existing legislation which is known as the particular market situation provision which we have in the regulation, this would allow normal values that we calculate in the case of anti-dumping investigations to better reflect the real market conditions in third countries and reveal the true magnitude of dumping when imports or production in these countries is being pushed out of their domestic countries and therefore redirected towards the EU market. We are seeing this and we are, we have cases ongoing which is going to be based and have recourse to our ability to deal with this kind of distortion.
We are also exploring the possibilities under the existing anti-circumvention rules. I mentioned the fact that this concerns a lot of cases to also address new attempts, new forms of circumvention. In particular we want to tackle situations where the measures imposed on one country are circumvented not just through let's say traditional transshipment but also through the setting up of production in third countries that uses inputs from the country subject to the measures and therefore with the finished product then being exported on the basis of distorted prices to the EU. Now, this relates to the structural trade defense protection.
When it comes to contingent trade protection in the form of tools to deal with injurious import surges, as I mentioned, we have been using the safeguard instrument now, which is not something that we had recourse to a lot in the last few years, except in the case of of the safeguard on steel. Now, in September, the Commission imposed provisional safeguard measures on grain-oriented electrical steel products in order to deal with the difficulties faced by the industries due to the high import pressures and the global overcapacities in this sector, grain-oriented flat-rolled products of silicon electrical steel not being covered by the 207 measure on on steel. And finally, a further issue that is being considered, or we are considering in trade defense, is to really try to look at how we deploy the instrument under the existing rules, but to reflect the fact that we need to take a value chain approach. That if we provide protection in one segment of a value chain, it doesn't create adverse effects on other parts of the value chain, which themselves may be becoming subject to pressures from distorted imports very rapidly as the distortions move up and down the value chains. And finally, I said we have upgraded the import surveillance tool that we introduced already in April of 2025.
We believe it was important to upgrade and develop the import surveillance tool, and we have done so at the beginning of this year, because whilst initially we had set up this mechanism to see whether changes in the tariff policies in the US would actually lead to very rapid short-term trade diversion onto the EU market, we have now updated the methodology and established an import barometer, which is designed to track longer-term and sustained increases in imports, particularly where they're accompanied by falling prices. So looking at a sort of broader and more structural market pressures on the EU market. We published the first results of this revised methodology before the summer and again basically last Friday, that is on the DG Trade website. And that reinforces the conclusions that we believe need to be drawn there, that there are sectors now, important sectors of our economy, facing sustained and abnormal import increases. And that concerns very broad sectors such as machinery, textiles, basic metals, and chemicals.
And it is of serious concern that the import surveillance or barometer results that I'm referring to show potentially worrying trends for almost a quarter of all imports into the EU at the moment. And China and Chinese origin is the main driver of these import increases. So I apologize I've gone over time. I hope this gives you some some useful elements in addition to the report itself.
Perfect, Denis. I give now the political groups the floor, and for the EPP, it's Mr. Soido Álvarez, please. I forgot to say two minutes.
Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Muchas gracias, presidente. En primer lugar, agradecerle al representante de la Comisión la información que nos ha suministrado en el día de hoy y le deseo mucha suerte a la hora de desarrollar todas las medidas de defensa comercial con las que tenemos que salvaguardar las empresas y la industria europea.
En el pasado año se abrieron casi el triple de investigaciones que la media histórica y este año el ritmo no ha bajado. China sigue siendo como ha dicho ahora mismo el origen de la mayor parte de estos casos fruto de una sobrecapacidad que impacta con mayor intensidad nuestro mercado. Pero la presión no llega solo desde Pekín. De las 181 medidas que pesan sobre nuestras exportaciones 45 son estadounidenses muy por delante de Turquía y de la propia China. La Comisión ha respondido con más agilidad en estos casos gracias sin duda al registro automático de las importaciones los derechos retroactivos y el nuevo sistema de seguimiento de envíos que permiten llegar antes de que el daño sea ya irreversible.
Pero aún nos queda camino por recorrer. Por eso quisiera preguntarle a la Comisión. En primer lugar sobre el sector químico es el que más investigaciones concentra. ¿Qué cambia en la práctica para un producto de estas características el que se declare crítico por la alianza de productos críticos desde el punto de vista de defensa comercial? En segundo lugar el informe también describe la evasión como uno de los principales retos y la ley de aceleración industrial incluye propuestas que pretenden atajarla pero ¿qué otras medidas contempla la Comisión más allá de las ahí incluidas?
Por último la sección 301 contra Alemania por los precios de los medicamentos cuya audiencia se celebró la semana pasada en Washington. Hoy es solo una investigación pero si acaba en medidas concretas deja de ser un asunto bilateral y se convierte en un asunto de competencia europea. ¿Qué medidas de respuesta nos puede adelantar la Comisión en el caso de que esto ocurriera? Muchas gracias.
Brando Benifei
Thank you chair let me first salute Mr Redonnet thank you for your intervention and explanation in this traditional appointment in our committee. I want to welcome the Commission's continued commitment to fighting unfair trade practices but looking at the persistent pressure on key European sectors I think we also need to be very clear. We have to double down. The scale and speed of global overcapacity trade diversion and unfair competition require us to make full use of every instrument we have and to develop new ones. This brings me to a very recent interesting development we are aware that the Commission is working on a new trade instrument which some have already described as a kind of European section 301 and we heard something about this.
If this is indeed where the Commission is heading I would very much welcome some more elements. When can we realistically expect a formal Commission proposal and what would be the precise scope and trigger of such an instrument? In particular would it allow the EU to respond to systemic unfair trade practices and structural market distortions that cannot easily be addressed through our existing trade defense instruments? And most importantly how this could differ from the anti-coercion instrument?
My second brief point regards steel. The new steel overcapacity regulation is now in force and Parliament secured a review mechanism for expanding its product scope. We need to know where we stand. The Commission is currently consulting on four additional categories: the cast iron tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, non-alloy and other alloy wire, stainless wire, and finally the non-alloy and other alloy forged bars. So how is this process progressing and are we on track to have the assessment and the expansion of the measure moving forward as foreseen?
This is an important test of whether our new steel instrument can actually keep pace with the reality on the ground. Both issues are particularly relevant for us ahead of our INTA mission to China at the end of October. We need to go there knowing exactly where the Commission stands on these very important topics. Thank you very much.
Majdouline Sbai
Thank you, Madelaine.
Merci au représentant de la Commission, Monsieur Redonnet, pour sa présentation. Le rapport indique que l'année 2025 a été marquée par l'institution d'une mesure de sauvegarde rarement appliquée concernant les ferro-alliages. Nous avions sollicité la Commission sur ce point et nous nous réjouissons de la mesure. Néanmoins, l'exclusion du silicium de cette mesure a des conséquences très sévères sur le terrain. Sept mois pour accepter le premier dossier anti-dumping déposé par le groupe Ferroglobe.
Douze mois pour mener l'enquête, encore une fois, c'est long, bien trop long. Je rappelle que Ferroglobe est le dernier producteur européen de silicium, matériau stratégique à la fois pour ses applications civiles et militaires. Depuis 2025, l'industrie européenne du silicium est entrée dans un bras de fer avec la Chine, avec au centre du jeu des produits asiatiques à bas coût qui ont inondé l'Europe depuis la mise en place des droits de douane prohibitifs par les États-Unis. Fin 2026, La Tribune rapportait que Ferroglobe ne produisait du silicium métal que sur trois des huit fours potentiellement utilisables. Son usine espagnole, comme celle de Montricher en Savoie en France, était totalement à l'arrêt.
Ferroglobe pointait que le marché du silicium métal s'était encore largement détérioré depuis le refus de la Commission européenne de mettre des mesures de sauvegarde sur ce produit. Évidemment, il y a des travailleurs derrière les entreprises, il y a des savoir-faire industriels et il y a notre autonomie stratégique dans des secteurs clés. Avec les collègues de différents groupes et de l'Assemblée nationale, nous essayons en vain d'obtenir un échange avec le commissaire qui travaille sur ce sujet. J'espère que le temps pourra être trouvé rapidement et je compte sur vous pour cela. Dernier point, nous défendons, nous soutenons le changement de notre manière de nous défendre.
Se défendre commercialement, c'est développer des actions secteur par secteur. Vous avez parlé de chaîne de valeur et on s'en réjouit, plutôt que produit par produit, ce qui nous permettra d'être à même de sauver notre industrie. Merci.
Christophe Bay
Merci, Christophe.
Je remercie Monsieur le Président. Il est toujours passionnant d'entendre Monsieur Redonnet, mais hélas ses propos sont extrêmement préoccupants. Une fois encore, ce rapport annuel met en avant une réalité : nos entreprises sont confrontées à une concurrence déloyale. J'ai hélas, Monsieur Redonnet, entendu dans vos propos des termes comme nous observons, nous examinons. J'aurais aimé que le terme nous agissons puisse être employé plus souvent.
Certes, sur le papier, 232 mesures de défense commerciale sont en vigueur. Pour autant, et vous l'avez souligné, des pratiques désormais de dumping, de subventions s'ajoutent des contournements de plus en plus complexes : transbordement vers des pays tiers, assemblage à faible valeur ajoutée, dissimulation de l'origine des produits. Certes, les États-Unis et la Turquie ne sont pas en reste, mais il faut reconnaître que notre principal adversaire dans ce domaine, c'est la Chine. L'Europe connaît désormais une pression plus structurelle liée aux surcapacités mondiales chinoises. Il y a quelques mois de cela, un collège d'experts est venu nous présenter, je crois que c'était au mois de mai, représentant à la fois des chefs d'entreprise et des salariés, un tableau assez apocalyptique des pratiques chinoises.
Face à cette situation, ils préconisaient un certain nombre de mesures face effectivement à des procédures complexes, lentes, bref inefficaces. Alors ma question, cher Monsieur Redonnet, est la suivante : depuis le mois de mai, la Commission a-t-elle pris des mesures correctrices à la suite des propositions et observations faites par ce collège d'experts ? Je vous remercie.
Merci. Now, further members, and Jörgen is the first for one minute.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you very much, and thank you Mr. Redonnet for your presentation and for this report that of course builds on 2023 numbers, but I'd like to take the opportunity to ask you about the future. And first of all, when it comes to timing, because what I hear from business is that it takes too long with investigations, and it takes too long to convince the Commission to kick in the investigations, and during that time, the European businesses are hurt. So how can the Commission make sure that we shorten that time and that we use our instrument more swiftly ? That's the first question. The question linked to this is the resources.
Do you have enough resources in the Commission in order to make these investigations faster and to make more of the investigations ? I do note that it is 32, almost a high score so to speak, but given the turbulences in the world trade, we might need to double or triple the number of investigations. I don't know, but maybe you could comment on that. And finally, on the import barometer, it is of course very interesting that you can see this now in real time. Does that also mean that you will take the decisions on going to investigations your own and not only waiting for the businesses to come to you with their problems ?
Thank you.
Thanks a lot, Bogdan.
Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski
Mam dwa pytania, a właściwie jeden apel i jedno pytanie, ale kolega Warborn mnie wyprzedził. Od razu powiem, że chodzi o czas reakcji. Czas reakcji i skrócenie czasu postępowań tak, abyśmy byli, krótko mówiąc, skuteczni. Natomiast druga kwestia, to będzie kontynuacja tego, o czym mówiła koleżanka wcześniej. Otóż słusznie objęto ochroną kwestię żelazostopów.
Bardzo dobrze, że to zrobiono. Zrobiono to bardzo późno, ale to była kluczowa decyzja. Natomiast popełniono przy tej okazji bardzo konkretny błąd, wyłączając krzem metaliczny z zakresu środka ochronnego. I efekt jest taki, że udział europejskich producentów w rynku chronionym żelazostopów spadł poniżej 10%.
Mamy też sytuację taką, że zarówno we Francji, w Hiszpanii i w Niemczech zamyka się zakłady ze względu na import z Chin, o czym wspomniano, ale także z Angoli. W związku z tym moje pytanie jest takie, czy Komisja jeszcze w tym roku zamierza wypełnić tą lukę określoną reakcją i doprowadzić jednak do skuteczniejszej ochrony żelazostopów poprzez włączenie krzemu metalicznego do środków ochronnych. Dziękuję bardzo. Thank you very much.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot and from my side originally all to three questions but both you mentioned the timing and I guess we need also a revision of the legislation so that we can act much quicker. Secondly, what's about small and medium-sized enterprise? We made some years ago a study that small and medium-sized enterprise are not having the same influence in getting be involved in the process than big companies. And what is your feeling? Is there an improvement?
There will be in this new helpdesk we form coming soon. So are they really now more in the focus of the Commission than perhaps before? And thirdly, the question of this, yeah, going down the supply chain. You mentioned it in the sector of chemicals and that's true. What are the criteria and how far we can go for products?
And this is also linked to this GOES steel, this grain-oriented electrical steel, which you mentioned now or you made some proposals that this is now covered with some tariffs as well. And now some smaller users of this steel making a huge noise. So how we can really bring the interests of the producers, original producers and the user together so that at the end of the day it's a common understanding that we need this trade defense instrument.
Branislav Ondruš
Borislav.
Thanks a lot. Please take your headphones. I will intervene in Slovak language today. Kolegyne a kolegovia, pán Redonnet, ochrana našich podnikov a pracovných miest zďaleka nefunguje efektívne. Komisia podľa môjho názoru predstavuje dosť masívny aparát, aby predsedníčka mohla presunúť pracovníkov na zrýchlenie rozhodovania o podnetoch proti neférovej konkurencii.
Ale dokonca ani prijaté opatrenia nefungujú a Komisia nekoná. Poviem vám príklad. Ochranné opatrenia na ferozliatiny platia už takmer rok, ale stále sa dovážajú za ceny o 30 až 40 % nižšie, než sú minimálne dovozné ceny. Dokonca pri ferosilíciu je ten rozdiel až 42 %. Pri kremíku Komisia 1. septembra začala priebežné preskúmavanie antidumpingových ciel na dovoz z Číny, ale žiadosti odvetvia o registráciu dovozov od začiatku konania nevyhovela.
Preto mám tri otázky. Po prvé, prečo Komisia pri preskúmavaní ciel na kremík z Číny nenariadila registráciu dovozov a kedy zváži dočasné opatrenia? Po druhé, ako chce Komisia upraviť opatrenia na ferozliatiny, keď dovozy prichádzajú hlboko pod minimálnymi dovoznými cenami? A po tretie, ako chce Komisia konečne posilniť kapacity DG Trade, aby sa čakanie na jej rozhodnutia skrátilo?
Ďakujem za pozornosť.
Denis Redonnet
Yeah. Thanks very much. Just to say several things. For to Mr. Zoido Álvarez who raised several points. One is that the question of the registration of imports is indeed a policy change that we have introduced and that we will continue to generalize.
It does have an impact because it sends a signal of determination and of course increases the risk that there could be retroactive application of the duties. So it does have a stabilizing impact and it's an important policy change that we have that we have introduced. Several of you raised the questions that are that are separate from the from the trade defense zone, in particular whether there would be particular distortive measures taken by other jurisdictions, Section 301 etc. I think that's perhaps not the subject of the discussion today. You were yourself refraining, Chair, from asking me to reply to to this.
So I will abide by your instruction as I always do. On the on the questions relating to specific sectors, in particular Mr. Benefei raised the issue of steel and the steel measure and the question of the the the further evolution of this measure, including the product scope review. So there I think we we are we of course are going to implement the first review which as you've described is limited and has clearly identified a number of products now. The broader review that is built in the measure with respect to the potential expansion to downstream products will be done in a subsequent stage and will be done in the con in the course of of next year. And obviously that'll be very important because there we we will need to see how we address the the impact of the measure as it as it becomes clearer and clearer in terms of of implementation.
You have seen that we have we are looking at different aspects of this, both the need to perhaps enhance protection on the other hand a good evidence-based assessment of the downstream impacts. And both have got to be to be done. Les questions ont été posées sur le cas du silicium, silicon metal en anglais. Donc sur ce dossier qui est effectivement très important, sachant que le produit lui-même est une partie très importante de la chaîne, notamment dans l'acier, et sa criticalité est bien reconnue, je veux dire par nous. Plusieurs choses.
D'abord le fait que nous ne l'avons pas inclus dans la mesure de sauvegarde sur les ferroalliages n'était pas une erreur. C'était le reflet simplement de l'impossibilité d'avoir une mesure qui puisse aussi couvrir ce produit. Mais nous avons travaillé de manière très intense avec l'industrie concernée, vous avez mentionné l'entreprise Ferroglobe, et ce qui nous a permis d'ouvrir l'enquête antidumping le 1er septembre dernier. Et nous travaillons maintenant à la question de l'enregistrement des importations. Nous travaillons pour un enregistrement rapide des importations, je peux vous le vous le confirmer.
Donc la protection dans ce domaine et dans sur ce produit et sur ce secteur est quelque chose qui fait partie des priorités du moment. Je dirais que c'est aussi lié à une question qui a été soulevée également sur la nécessité de prendre en compte les problématiques de résilience et d'existence de dépendance.
On a de plus en plus de situations dans lesquelles les demandes de protection viennent de secteurs dans lesquels il reste un producteur européen. Et donc se pose une question d'importance qui est : est-il important de maintenir une capacité de production industrielle sur ce segment d'une chaîne de valeur sur le territoire européen ? Et cela nous conduit à prendre des mesures qui ont cet effet de renforcement de notre résilience dans certains secteurs clés. Je pense par exemple à la lysine, qui est un produit très important dans la chaîne agricole, pour lequel nous avons pris des mesures de protection à travers une mesure anti-dumping. Je pense aussi au cas de l'alumine fondue en fonte, où là aussi nous avons appliqué l'instrument anti-dumping pour prendre en compte le fait qu'il y avait dans cette affaire une question de résilience et de sécurité économique sous-jacente.
Donc ces considérations-là, elles rentrent dans le champ d'activité de l'utilisation des instruments de défense commerciale sans avoir d'ailleurs à changer la base sur laquelle nous prenons des mesures. Simplement, ces considérations rentrent en compte. Et nous agissons et nous continuons à agir. Et peut-être en réponse à l'intervention de Christophe B, je peux aussi vous indiquer que pour ce qui est de cette année, nous avons déjà lancé 27 nouveaux cas cette année. Donc vous voyez que la tendance, nous faisons de plus en plus, et c'est normal puisque les distorsions auxquelles les entreprises européennes font face sont en augmentation et pas en diminution.
Then I turn to the question of timing, which both Mr. Warborn and yourself have raised. And you were quite rightfully mentioning that there are different aspects of this. There's the question of the time that it takes within the investigative process, and then the question of how much time does it take before we are able to actually initiate investigations. I think these are two slightly different issues. I think the fact that the instrument is investigation-based means that there is a certain incompressible period of time that you need between initiation and the imposition of provisional measures.
We try to bring protection as quickly as possible, and we try systematically to impose provisional duties. And as I indicated, we also now increasingly systematically register imports very soon after initiation. So that is what we can do and what we are trying to do actively to make sure that the investigation period does not delay unnecessarily the timing for industries concerned to receive a legitimate level of protection. And then there's the question of the time that it takes between the moment that the industry sectors feeling the import pressures are starting to come to us, approach the Commission, indicate that they believe there is a case of dumping and an injury, and the moment that we are able to initiate an investigation, which then basically is time-bound. There, it is in part indeed linked to resources.
And I think last year I had come here to the committee and I had been very explicit in indicating that there was at that point a number of weeks of delay that we believed was unwarranted between the moments that we have contacts with industry and the moments we're able to initiate. Since then, there has been internal reallocation of staff and we are working hard to reduce that period of time.
That depends also on the ability of the industries to work closely and intelligently with us to build good cases, to bring solid evidence in the right way, at the right time, in order to reduce what we call the, it's not a great name, but what we call the deficiency process, which is where the moment where we need to ask further questions and ask further data in order to reach the bar that is necessary, the evidentiary bar for initiating the investigation. So we cannot do, we are not going to take shortcuts, but we're going to help the industry sectors that need the legitimate protection to be able to do this as quickly as possible. On the question, your question on the import barometer, and you're asking whether this is changing the way in which we can take action and whether, and I think there was implicitly your question, whether we would on the basis of those observations of market trends, whether we would act on an ex officio basis as opposed to a complaints basis. Just to say that in this, what this identified are import surges which typically would lead us to consider that we might be in rather than an anti-dumping, anti-subsidy terrain, that we would be in safeguard territory. Now, on safeguards, the rules are clear is that member states have to come forward normally to request the commission to initiate a safeguard investigation.
Of course, the commission can also act on an ex officio basis, but in any case, we need in order to be able to take the route of safeguards to have not just the necessary level of information about the surge in imports, which is precisely what the import barometer tool gives us, but also to have a sense of the nature of the injury to industry. And that itself requires, of course, to receive from the market information that does not come directly from the trade data. But it is precisely in order to facilitate this interaction that we're putting the trade surveillance data out there directly to accessible to the industries concerned so that they can actually come and indicate what is the market impact that they are seeing in terms of injury and therefore would enable, depending on the case, the possibility for us to deploy potential trade defense instruments. And we need these different sides, if you want, of the equation to actually be working together in order for us to be efficient and do benefit from having the import surveillance mechanism in place. And of course, in certain cases, there might be cases where we might envisage an ex officio trigger of a safeguard investigation.
I cannot exclude it, nor am I announcing it either. On the question of SMEs, you're right, this is something you have raised, actually, Mr. Warborn, you had raised with me several times in this committee. Again, there are a lot of pressure and demand for protection. So we have to be specifically careful that those that have more difficulty to aggregate, to build cases are not disadvantaged compared to the industry sectors that perhaps have more fluidity or knowledge of how to operate the instrument, how to work with the commission. So that's why we have a monthly, almost a monthly engagement on these issues, and we have tried to leverage also some of our outreach tools, notably Access2Markets and the market access days that we do in member states where we now systematically bring the trade defense instrument into that picture to raise awareness and to facilitate contacts with the, in particular with the complaints office for the SME sectors, or rather, yes, SME potential SME complainants, or rather the aggregation of sectors which tend to be SME dominated.
And as the scope of our industrial base which is coming under pressure expands, it's very clear that we have more and more sectors which tend to be populated by SMEs that are going to come under scrutiny, or rather will come under focus for the instrument. And on the, and finally, chair, perhaps I hope I have replied to everything, on the value chain approach, I said a few words indeed on this. We observe that several things, I mean, doing this is a bit more constrained when it comes to the anti-dumping instrument than under the safeguard instrument. It is easier under a safeguard to have a broader scope and therefore take into account some of the supply chain linkages and interactions which can have an unwanted effect in terms of the effect of the protection at one end of the supply chain. So that's something we have to take into account.
In some cases, because of the necessity to stay close to the like product, in the anti-dumping cases, it means that we end up having many individual investigations. In the chemical sector, this is the case, for example, for amino acids, where you have to take them one by one, which means that there's a relatively limited cases, but there are legal constraints with respect to the way the instrument operates, which we can't wish away. But we're trying to adapt ourselves, notably by working with industries concerned, notably the chemical industry, notably under the Chemicals Alliance, to, without cartelization, to ask them to think about how different segments of the chemical sector will need protection at different points in time, and that they also prepare trade defense cases with that in mind and on that basis. Again, the coordination of the timing of the protection becomes important and we can work on that. And in some cases, and you mentioned the GOES case, we have sought to also construct the measure in a way that the downstream becomes protected because of the protection of the upstream good being incorporated in the imports downstream.
So there are ways in which we can try to look more creatively and more intelligently at this question of value chains, and we are committed to testing them in current cases as much as possible and doing this, you know, in good understanding with the industry sectors concerned.
Thanks a lot, Denis. We stay in contact on this investigation about the situation as it is, and I'm sure also for new future instruments after the deadline we had with China so far. Thanks a lot. Dear colleagues, any other business? Karin is not here.