Committee on Security and Defence Extraordinary Meeting: Exchange of views with Commissioner Kubilius
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SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsAndrius Kubilius
And that is very important. And thanks a lot again for your report on the institutional aspects of European Defense Union, for your initiatives in formal cross-party group to support European Defense Union, including European Security Council. So that is how this Big Bang, in my view, was born and how it will become a reality, which really I hope and I'm sure that it will be very much needed. In my personal view, the establishment of an European Security Council and an European Defense Union are very closely interlinked. To make our defense institutions fit for the new security reality, as Commission President was speaking, and fit for NATO 3.0, we urgently need a new European defense architecture to resolve two major issues.
The first issue: an expanding geographical basis for this new architecture. European Defense Union on equal footing should include not only EU member states, but also partners like the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Norway, and Canada, and especially Ukraine. Second: the capability to effectively take decisions. That is why we need, in my personal opinion, an E5-type European Security Council. I was elaborating that, you know, earlier.
And such kind of council could serve as leadership body for the European Defense Union, which could work together with a broader general assembly of all the members of European Defense Union. More clarity, of course, will come with the European Security Strategy, probably by end of October.
We have to wait until then to see exact shape of the new institutional defense architecture which will nevertheless be for the member states to take up. And discussions among member states also are going on and quite intensively. The Commission President also spoke about another important defense institutional topic, the emergency security protocol to deal with hybrid attacks. Attacks that remain under the threshold of armed aggression. As you know armed aggression is covered by Article 42.7 of Treaty of the European Union.
And member states also make decisive progress in the operationalization of this mutual assistance clause. And the forthcoming European Security Strategy from that point of view again will be very key for our in general for our institutional defense readiness. Now on European Union support to Ukraine. Definitely this is our strategic priority. Russia is escalating and we need to make our support stronger, more effective and predictable.
Now first of all few words about Ukraine support loan. As you know all the weapons schedules for the 2026 of that loan has been approved for 28.3 billion euros.
That includes also PAC-3 anti-ballistic missiles from the United States. Last week we disbursed another package of 3.3 billion euros for Ukraine, bringing the total amount to almost 12 billion euros. And I am confident that we will be able to disburse the full 28.3 billion for 2026 by the end of the year. But that will not be enough. More bilateral support is here essential.
This year, according to Ukrainian data, what Ukrainian ministers are telling us, Ukrainian defense is facing a deficit of 23 billion euros. As a cause, unfulfilled promises made by individual countries during the Ankara NATO summit to provide more than 40 billion euros on this individual basis. And also what we need to remember, according to the available statistics, three-fourths of individual support to Ukraine from all our member states, three-fourths of that amount comes just from five European countries. Where are the others?
And finally, you know, in addition, what we are looking for when we are talking about our support to Ukraine. As you know, we finished the first round of SAFE loans, you know, implementation, and now we have around of 20 billion euros of unused SAFE loans money because some countries asked more, then they looked into their fiscal situation and they diminished, you know, their appetite. And we're planning to use them, that amount of money, to open a second call, as Commission President announced in her address. And the goal of this second call, to do more with Ukraine, both in Ukraine and the EU, both for Ukraine and for ourselves, giving Ukraine's lead in defense innovation and really to finance some very important joint projects like, for example, anti-ballistic flare or another anti-ballistic, so-called Blixem, or as some experts are calling, Anti-Oreshnik, for specific ballistic missiles. Now, so that's on Ukraine.
Now, few words on material defense readiness on our side. Again, material defense readiness on our side is our clear priority. As I'm always saying, we need a big bang for production, procurement, finances. So we did quite a lot, but what I want to, you know, first of all, to stress. On Monday in the Defense Council, we discussed so-called Defense Readiness Report prepared by European Defense Agency together with Commission and EEAS.
Really a valuable report, objective and frank, showing our progress and non-progress in defense readiness. The report is still not public. I don't know what you will do, how the Parliament will discuss that. It would be very important. But I can quote what Reuters wrote about that.
Always media is helping us to, you know, to share some, you know, information. So quotation from recent Reuters article. I quote: "The European Union is not rearming quickly or effectively enough to meet its goal of being ready to defend against Russia by 2030, according to the executive summary of an EU report prepared for the bloc's leaders and seen by Reuters." End of quote. So this is really a warning signal.
Big changes are needed to implement the defense readiness roadmap. And really we need to make the member states capability coalitions, which are led by different member states, much more effective. It would be a big mistake to continue in the same way. And that is where, since I came from physics, I would allow myself to remind you the words which are attributed to Albert Einstein. I quote: "The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results."
So, I hope that we are not insane. And so that is why Commission is implementing a lot of new initiatives and instruments to help industries and member states ramp up their defense readiness. Few words on EDPCIs. Your excellent report on flagship European defense projects of common interest, EDPCIs, is starting to bear fruit. EDIP now provides a legal framework for EDPCIs, and this is our chance for a breakthrough with pan-European projects where member states and EU institutions can work together to match common European defense needs with pan-European industrial capacity.
End of quote.
I am sure the EDPCIs will create a strong synergy between member states, EU institutions, and European defense industry. They will allow us to overcome the slow speed of the purely national bottom-up approach which until now prevailed in the development of European defense capabilities. On Monday, the Council approved the first five EDPCIs: first, drone and counter-drone defense; second, space-based capabilities; third, integrated maritime and sea-bed defense; fourth, EU federated air and missile defense; and the fifth, Eastern Flank Watch. Some of those EDPCIs, which also include Ukraine, also cover so-called strategic enablers.
An additional EDPCIs will be approved a little bit later on. Now, next point on security of supply. A big challenge for our defense readiness and defense ramp-up is security of supply. We cannot produce enough of ammunition and explosives, or, for example, drones, if we fail to resolve the lack of nitrocellulose for explosives or magnet materials for drones. That is why we allocated 163 million euros from EDIRPA for industrial support instruments for companies ready to produce critical components for ammunition.
Other initiatives of the same type will follow. Next point on ramp-up of defense industrial production. Russia is still outproducing us, and Russia is able to increase their production numbers. Our defense industry is increasing production also, sometimes substantially, but still too slowly. What we need to do, in my opinion, first, we must move more of our attention from what is called haute couture production to good-enough production.
That is the reason, that is the lesson of Ukraine: good enough to hit the targets, less technically advanced, cheaper, and easier to scale production. That is what still we have a deficit of that.
That is also the goal of our ASAP agenda, and so I thank you for reaching an agreement on ASAP in record time. And I hope that next week there will be positive vote. Second, what we need, so-called framework contracts for ever-warm facilities. We need industry that keep production lines ready to surge defense production in times of crisis. These industries will have EU-funded contracts to de-risk investments and running costs.
And the last point on this, let's say, material defense readiness when we're talking about production is on integrated defense market. Again, there is no need for me to tell you that everything is fragmented in defense: procurement, production, certification, intra-EU transfers, testing, etc. And this fragmentation prevents industries to ramp up production. The last European Council of the heads of states expressed very strong support to an integrated defense market, and it's also strongly supported by the European Parliament. That is why we will soon present a defense market package, including revision of the defense procurement directive.
And on military mobility, just few words. I am always repeating what the famous American general from the times of First World War, John Pershing, used to say. I quote: "Battles are won by infantry, wars by logistics."
It shows for me very clearly the importance of military mobility and military logistics for defense readiness. An important trialogue is coming up. Let's keep our military mobility package ambitious. And on space for defense. Definitely modern defense readiness is impossible without space.
And we have an ambitious agenda. First, IRIS² for secure satellite communication, our Starlink, will start operations in 2029 with 350 satellites. Till 2029, we have what we call GOVSATCOM services in that area. Second, there is a good progress in the development of the Earth observation governmental service, or what we call eyes in the skies for our defense and security services. Third, LEO PNT, Low Earth Orbit Positioning Navigation and Timing.
According to our plans, from 2027, it will no longer be so easily possible to jam and spoof our navigation signals. And the last point here in this agenda: launching. The most important strategic priority on the space agenda, because we are very much behind what we need to have. And in our calculations, we see that very soon, just for launching of European institutional satellites, we shall face a problem.
I will not go into the numbers, but the problems are very, very clear. So that is why I announced that I will go on launching tour. In the spring, I went on missile tour, now I will go for launching tour, visiting our launching ports and also industries which are producing launching vehicles, in order really to find out how we can ramp up our, what I call, space readiness. So, Madam Chair, this is, you know, what I was trying to tell you in quite a telegraphic way. I don't know if I fit into limits of time, but a lot of things really are happening in defense.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. We have lots of time for you. It's very important for us. So now I will give the floor to the members for a first round of questions, starting with the coordinators in a ping-pong format, so you can answer immediately. Two minutes for question, please, and we start with Nicolas Pascual de la Parte.
Nicolás Pascual de la Parte
Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you very much, Commissioner, for your insight readout of the situation. The situation is actually critical because we have said many times that time is of the essence, but we don't apply it.
I mean, now Russia has approved the budget, has improved 20% the budget on defense vis-à-vis last year, and that means that there are bad signs from Russia. Russia doesn't want at all to sit down in a negotiating table. We saw just the other day in New York the meeting of the German Foreign Minister Baerbock with Lavrov. Lavrov said that the meeting was useless for him and next time call him by telephone not to lose his time. It's clear that there is no will from the Russian side to end the Ukrainian war.
This is clear. And at the same time, we have in this year elections in many European countries, in France, in Italy, in Spain, and the fatigue and the exhaustion of the public opinion is increasing. And we saw just in the last elections in Germany as well, in the Länder elections, that those who are against continuing the fight against Russia are winning the day. This is the situation. I mean, we can end up within in some months with political parties in some European countries who are against continuing the war effort and to ask for a ceasefire at any cost.
That's why the time is more of the essence than ever before. And Putin knows that. Putin thinks that he has to wait only some months in order to see the political result in some European countries to break up our unity and to sow disconcert and fear among the people. That's why, Commissioner, I think that we have to prioritize.
I mean, we have many things, a lot of meat on the grill, but now we have only some months to deliver some credible deterrence against Russia's aggression. And that means to prioritize our effort in some flagship projects, which for sure are anti-missile, anti-drone, long-range artillery, and communications and intelligence. Let's forget about the other things. I mean, we have 31 projects of common interest and 1,000 objectives and priorities, but let's prioritize those things that will allow us to stop the Russians winning the war in Ukraine in the next months and to help our Ukrainian friends with all our support, financial and political, and change the mindset of this fragmented approach of every member state. Prioritization, quick delivery, and political unity.
Thank you very much.
Andrius Kubilius
Yeah, thanks a lot, dear Nicolas. Well, I can subscribe everything what you have said.
The question really about, you know, the problems what we are facing, both, both, you know, political. I was always saying that, you know, again, from structural point of view, that when we are talking about our defense readiness, we need those three pillars. Material defense readiness, weapons production and so on. Institutional, how we are organizing ourselves, how we are making decisions. And the last one, political defense readiness.
Where really how to keep our political will to defend ourselves when Russians really are targeting that political will with all their quite smart, you know, hybrid instruments and so on and so on. So, and absolutely clear that in all those, you know, three pillars, we need to move ahead, including, you know, defense against hybrid threats. But when, you know, if you're asking my, my view on priorities, I would say, you know, yeah, strategic priority is to support Ukraine and first of all to find additional possibility on financial side. Because if we shall not find, you know, how to support Ukraine when Russians are increasing their budget by 20% for next year, and still on Ukrainian, you know, our support to Ukraine, despite the fact that we are really doing a lot and we are the only ones who are really supporting, but as I said, there is a deficit and there is a next year with all the challenges. If we shall not find that financial solution, then really we shall face a lot of problems.
And now those finances definitely can bring a lot of changes which are very much needed in order to achieve peace.
In my view, again, we need to come down to very clear understanding. Peace in this war can come only through the formula strength through peace, peace through strength, and that strength should be on Ukrainian side. And that strength can be only achieved with our support. So now if we should find possibilities really to increase our support and to finance some of game-changing projects, what I said, you know, like FrankenSAM, like BLIXEM anti-ballistic projects, or Ukrainians are going to produce their own ballistic missiles, you know, that can bring a change. Because Putin needs to feel, to understand finally that he is not able to achieve anything in this war and that the war is coming closer and closer into Russian territory itself.
So that's my answer to your question.
Sven Mikser
Thank you very much, Sven.
Thank you. Thanks, Commissioner. Always good to see you here at the Parliament. Two brief points. First, regarding the State of the Union address, I think it was somewhat disappointing and somewhat surprising as well that defense and security did not shine through as a real priority.
It was not very prominent in that speech. And this is a sentiment that is shared by many colleagues across the political spectrum here in Parliament. Secondly, regarding Ukraine. I obviously share your hopes that that we will be successful in dispersing the 28 billion by the end of the the year. But we know that money is a big part of the problem, but it's not the the whole of the problem.
And and as we have seen Russia being unable to make any significant gains on the battlefield, we've also seen them so of shifting their focus on on striking civilian targets and and causing civilian deaths in Ukrainian population centers. And we know that that there is a critical shortage of air defense assets. And this is a the bad humanitarian situation is bound to be aggravated further by the by the winter season that is coming very, very soon. So time is of essence here.
So can you share with us as to what we have done and what we can do in the short term to actually translate this monetary support into real air defense capabilities that are going to be able to protect civilian targets against Russian drone and especially missile attacks during the winter season.
Andrius Kubilius
Well, thanks a lot, Sven. Well, I don't know, you know, it's State of the Union address, it's, you know, of course, maybe we could expect that the first chapter should be about defense. It was not, but it was very well, you know, defined and bringing some kind of really very, very big and new approaches, what I said, you know, on this institutional defense readiness. Because in my view, really, we are living through fundamental transformations on European continent. Maybe we are still not able to grasp how it's, you know, what does it mean.
But we need to understand that with recent American administration strategic, or you see, I'm not talking about some, you know, well, we are what we are becoming accustomed sometimes to unexpected statements, you know, whatever from President.
No, I'm talking about strategic, you know, American position, which you can see from, for example, National Defense Strategy of United States. Definitely they really are looking how to shift their attention much more to Indo-Pacific, which means to diminish, you know, their presence on European continent and asking Europeans to take this primary responsibility. Which from my point of view, it's not enough just to look into how much weapons we need to have, but we need to look also how we institutionally are organizing ourselves inside of NATO, but, you know, taking care about European developments. So that's why all that what I said before about President's speech and attention to those institutional issues, I think is very important. Now on Ukraine.
My view, yeah, it's, you know, I was talking more about financial side, because that is a basis for what we can have and how we can help materially Ukraine.
And especially before winter season, because if we are looking into a little bit, you know, longer period, so all those projects which Ukrainians now are developing with European companies, and I visited some of those like, like Freya or, or Blixem, can resolve this, you know, the biggest issue of anti-ballistic defense, where both Ukrainians and we Europeans are very heavily dependent on almost one weapon system, Patriot. And I can repeat you the same numbers which I was telling perhaps earlier in spring. For example, last year Ukrainians faced 1,000 ballistic missiles per year. If I'm correct, I need to check, but according to last data, Russians are able to produce more this year, and next year it can be even, even, even more. And now the, the numbers are around of 2,000 or something like that.
Till now, American production of PAC-3 missiles produced in United States, more or less was around 750 per year. And now, you know, to destroy one Russian ballistic missile, in a good, you know, circumstances, you need to use more or less two PAC-3 missiles. So if you are getting, you know, 1,000 or 2,000 Russian ballistic missiles into your territory, which means that you need to have capacity to use, you know, quite a big number of those PAC-3 missiles, which are not available.
Now, I hope that, you know, situation can improve. Some member states, especially Germany, as I see, really are doing a lot in trying to work with other member states, which maybe have in their stockpiles, you know, still some numbers of PAC-3 missiles, and to do very simple, how to say, operation. Ukrainians for next year, for 2027, have quite a big number of contracts for PAC-3 missiles, but for the next year. And now the question is, you know, can we convince some member states to exchange what they have in their stockpiles now, to give to Ukraine, and then to take what Ukrainians will get, you know, what contracts they have for 2027. And I have had, I don't know if you had good meeting, as I understand, with SECURE, with Alex Grynkevych.
I have had that Grynkevych personally announced that, you know, such kind of exchange will not endanger any member state, you know, will not create a dangerous situation for any of European Union member states if they will do such a, such a job. So maybe that will, will really bring the outcome.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
Pierre Romain, from the Patriots.
Merci, Madame la Présidente.
Monsieur le Commissaire, je poserai ma, ma question en français. Merci, Monsieur le Commissaire. La préférence européenne est une idée plutôt récente dans les discours des institutions européennes. Elle est aussi devenue une réalité, certes modeste, dans certains programmes et instruments communautaires. Mais la préférence européenne reste extrêmement précaire et elle a de sérieux adversaires contre elle qui voudraient bien la faire disparaître avant qu'elle ne s'installe définitivement.
Son adversaire le plus puissant, les États-Unis, a décidé de lancer une offensive d'intimidation. Lundi, nous recevions le général américain Grynkewich, commandant suprême des forces alliées de l'OTAN en Europe. Il a clairement affiché son opposition à la préférence européenne en matière d'armement en utilisant l'argument de l'efficacité. L'origine ne compterait pas, il faudrait seulement regarder la performance des équipements. Or nous savons bien que la technologie n'est jamais neutre, surtout lorsque le fournisseur a les moyens d'interférer dans l'utilisation, l'entretien ou l'exportation du matériel livré.
Sinon rien ne devrait nous empêcher d'acheter du matériel chinois par exemple. Hier à Bruxelles, c'est l'ambassadeur américain auprès de l'UE qui a répété exactement les mêmes arguments au sommet Défense et Espace. Il a qualifié la préférence européenne de simple considération économique régionale. Le contexte de ces déclarations n'est pas anodin, les États européens sont en pleine discussion à propos du prochain budget de l'UE 2028-2034. Monsieur le Commissaire, que pensez-vous de ces déclarations officielles américaines ?
Partagez-vous l'idée que l'origine d'une arme n'a aucune importance et que seule sa performance compte ? Comment comptez-vous protéger et renforcer la préférence européenne dans le cadre du futur budget de l'Union européenne ? Merci.
Andrius Kubilius
Well, really important discussion and we shall come very soon with procurement directive that perhaps will also concentrate on some of those very important issues.
But first of all, I would make some difference how we need to look into preferences when we are using European Union money and when national money are used. And we need to remember that in development of European defense, national money plays much more important role than European Union money. Just I was always repeating that if we shall approve MFF with 130 billion euros, I hope that with Parliament assistance we shall convince member states on maximum. So we shall have for seven years till 2035 around of 130 billion for defense and space. If you are calculating for the same period how much member states can spend till 2035 if they will fulfill their pledges to NATO to increase their basic defense spending up to 3.5%, it will be around of 6 trillion euros.
So 6 trillion and 100 billion, so that's the difference. Now on European Union money, yes, we have this practice that usually we put some kind of eligibility criteria. I hope that we shall perhaps continue with the same.
But when we are talking about national defense spending, of course, it's much more responsibility of national governments how they will do. And in addition, I would say we also need to see two different goals which at the same time we need to achieve. And it creates some kind of, how to say, the challenge how to match those two goals. One goal is really to develop our defense capabilities according to NATO capability targets and our plans till 2030 to have those capabilities. And in order to have those capabilities, you need to procure weapons now, not in five years' time, not in ten years' time.
And very, very, very easy to see that in some cases we are not producing in Europe some of those weapons which we need to have. And that is why, unavoidably, we are going to look where to procure them. Of course, not in China, not in Russia, or not in North Korea. But we have partners with whom we were working for quite a long time and perhaps it can be unavoidable. Second, at the same time, definitely we need to develop our defense industry.
I've always repeated that defense industry, in my view, is one of the four key resources which you need to have for your defense readiness.
One is weapons, you know, and weapon systems which you need to have in advance in your stockpiles. Second is military personnel, soldiers which are trained and, you know, you can mobilize them. Third one is military mobility, which we know how important it is with all the military logistics around. And the third one is industry. Industry here on European continent, not far away from possible conflict zones, in order to maintain, to repair, to produce, and so on and so on.
But it will take time for us, you know, to develop such kind of industry where we would be, you know, really satisfied that it can produce everything what we need to have. In order for our industries to produce everything what we need to have, a lot of things we need to change. In my view, one of the biggest problems is that we lack this integrated defense market. I can talk and talk about that, we shall have maybe separate discussions which we shall come with with procurement.
But this is a problem. I mean, it's not so easy. Everything is so heavily de- you know, what Draghi is saying. It's so much fragmented in in our, you know, industry and market that we are facing big big problems. And here again, in order to overcome that fragmentation, in my view, we need to have much better and much more effective institutional arrangement how we are organizing ourselves in Europe.
Now we are trying, you know, with EDIRPA, thanks a lot again, you know, for the Parliament with this new initiative. We are trying to overcome this, you know, permanent problem of European defense that till now we were not able to build any kind of more significant pan-European defense project. Because why? Because we are too much fragmented. So, you know, that's where we are.
So capabilities and defense industry are, you know, two goals which we need to achieve. And we need to here be prudent, you know, not to do in such a way that, you know, we are jumping in development of European, you know, European industry as it is, as, you know, as most important goal, and we are forgetting about our defense capabilities which we need to develop now. And when we are not producing some things, very important things, which, you know, we need for our capabilities.
Assita Kanko
So for ECR, Assita, the floor is yours.
Thank you, Chair. Welcome, Commissioner. I I appreciate your honesty about- I appreciate your honesty about the state of the Union and the point on defense. That's very refreshing.
And as a Flemish, we say that the best friendship is protected by sustained honesty. So I'm going to continue also in that context by saying that this morning I expected to have a strong opening about your proposal for procurement. So I wanted to have more of that, and I hope that will be soon. So maybe you can tell us when we will concretely have something on the table we can work with. And if it's linked to the lack of ambition that we have noticed during the state of the Union, what kind of help do you need from the Parliament?
Because we are ready to advance on that point. And second, you are right to quote the idea that it's the inventory that wins the battle, but it is the logistics that win the war. I would like to add to that that it's also money, and even better, even stronger, money well invested. The problem is, where is our money going, being lost in translation, actually, in what is happening in Europe? So how can we increase this flexibility?
And I welcome the fact that you stressed that we need to move forward with the military mobility. But when we add the European preference that will come with a lot of bureaucracy to that, where are we headed?
So how are you going to to navigate both both orientations? On the European preference, I I hear from the Belgian defense network that we have here in Europe is that people are worried. Do we think still about quality when we think about European preference? It's like when you hire somebody, do you hire someone who can do the job? Do we hire a weapon that can do the job or do we choose for a weapon because it's a neighbor who produced it?
And to be honest, I love the French, but is it going to be European preference or préférence française? So let's also be honest about that and stimulate competition, look at quality first and continue building the interdependencies that we can have with American businesses as well. Thank you.
Andrius Kubilius
Thanks a lot for for very good questions. First of all on procurement and a little bit broader package on integrated market and also revision of intra-EU transfers. As I said, what the Council asked us, we are we are planning to come either at the end of November or beginning of December with our proposals. Now really, no, crucial question is about procurement.
We shall see how much we shall be able to do in agreement with member states also, but first of all, we need to see situation of today. I was talking that earlier before summer, I can repeat what I see a problem when we are talking about procurement. We need to see really how things are looking now. So, at least what we can get an information, some countries which have quite a strong defense industry, they are procuring about of 80% or even maybe more what their big primes are producing. Primes are producing, governments are buying.
Now, out from that, what is a very logical question? If I would be CEO of prime and I know that government will buy whatever I am producing, 80%, why should I look into how to innovate?
Why should I look into, you know, any kind of Ukrainian lessons if I know in advance that the government will buy? Second point, again, big numbers, again about, you know, 80% in some countries, procurement goes without, you know, without directive or whatever, without public procurement, it goes through so-called direct award, using exemption of Article 346 from Treaty on Functioning of European Union, which allows to use that direct award in the case of security issues. But, you know, I remember myself being Prime Minister, if you have some kind of this possibility, so then everything can be, you know, going through exemptions and so on. So what is the consequence? Primes are surviving such kind of, you know, arrangement.
But for small and medium-sized enterprises, for start-upers, it does not leave any kind of space for them to start to develop themselves. And that again reflects very much on, you know, what kind of warfare doctrines, defense doctrines we are implementing. Are we really able, do we have the environment which allows, you know, really to develop, you know, and to innovate very much also on doctrinal side? Because if you in the government are buying, you know, everything what your primes are producing for the last 20 years, your doctrines will be very much dependent on, on that what you are procuring.
So I am not saying that we shall resolve all those issues, I am just trying to show you what, you know, what a landscape is in that field. And how important really is this, you know, how to make procurement defragmented, procurement really European, which would allow really not only primes, but also I am very much in favor of primes, I am not criticizing them. But, you know, which would allow also to create an environment for smaller and innovative industries to start to produce and to flourish in Europe. And yeah, on sorry, maybe too long, but good question was. Yeah, on military mobility.
Again, why I am talking about that we need to keep ambition, you know, and we who are in the trilogue, we know that Council a little bit looks how to, how to say, relax some of the requirements on on emergency mechanism, on so-called readiness pool. In my view, what we need to, and I am always, you know, trying to use this opportunity and because I I was feeling that myself I went through some kind of transformation in my understanding what we need to talk about when we are talking about military mobility.
Because till now, in my, you know, understanding, military mobility was about what we, you know, what we call military Schengen. I mean, how to make rules, you know, that the transport should go through the borders very easily. So we did that in military mobility package. And second question always was, you know, what's about infrastructure? Roads, bridges, tunnels and so on, which again, you know, we now propose to increase the budget up to 17 billion.
We have 500 so-called hotspots on, on that infrastructure. We have military corridors. Everything that was in our understanding, yes, this is important. But what we were forgetting, you can have very good rules on the borders. You can have, you know, brilliant infrastructure.
But the question will be, do you have means to transport? Do you have, you know, rail, you know, flatbeds for railways enough and trucks and so on and so on? And that is where big numbers are coming. I can tell you one number which I learned.
Just, you know, in order to transport one brigade, which is around of 5,000 troops, for example, from Belgium to Lithuania, it will take a convoy of trucks 12 kilometers long, trucks standing to each other, you know, absolutely without, without the distance. So 5,000 takes 12 kilometers. Let's ask ourselves the question. The first-tier NATO, you know, preparedness requires 100,000 troops to be moved during the first 10 days of the war. So 5,000 is 12 kilometers, 100,000, at least I will say, is 20 times more.
So you can calculate what does it mean. I am not saying that, you know, 240 kilometers we shall have, you know, convoy, but I, I'm just trying to show you what does it mean size here and what kind of logistical, you know, challenges we shall face. And, and what an ambitious, you know, package we need to have, because it's not about one train or, you know, small convoy passing, you know, through Europe. It's the question of big numbers. So that's my point.
Petras Auštrevičius
That's reality. So we continue, Pedras.
Commissioner, most welcome to the, to the committee and indeed congratulations with your first annual report. But you know, I mean, I challenge the one-year kind of reporting. Because in one year we might see very wrong tendencies, delays, wrong decisions. Should we switch to some quarterly intermediate reporting and results in order to see and probably correct or push, you know, assist and something? That's on organizational side.
Thank you, Chair.
Commissioner, you mentioned that only 20 billion from 150 of SAFE money is reserved and not used. But about those 130 billion, what is your take? I mean, was it really strategically and very wisely invested? What is the experience of cooperation between neighbors, countries of more than one? Is it really more kind of pan-European project direction or more national?
So what can be, what kind of lessons might be drawn in order to, you know, to have something of different quality? And about drones wall.
Doesn't matter direction or geography where this wall will be kind of installed and we will have a capacity, eastern, southern. Are we getting closer to this kind of concept and capabilities? Because I don't see any European drone or Shahed. There is no European Shahed. So we are miles, miles away from, from this.
When we are going to have European Shahed which might protect and indeed give a sense of security for Europeans?
Andrius Kubilius
Thanks a lot, Petras. Very quickly on report, annual or not annual. Yeah, I mean, I would be very happy if we would also look because that is part of institutional, you know, institutional, how to say, arrangement. How we are planning and how then we are, you know, controlling ourselves. Because that report is not, you know, for whatever, you know, to say to the public we are doing everything very good.
In my view, some kind of those reports are very important as what I call self-mobilizing instruments. That we need to see what kind of problems we, we have and, and how we are moving.
Now, I was on planning first of all. I was talking with NATO, I don't know if they will look into that, but I said, you know, with all our experience of last several years, when we were trying, you know, to build pan-European projects and to develop cooperation among member states, more of joint procurement, joint development, I see one problem, which comes from our, of course, from our treaties and from the language that member states are responsible for their, you know, defense, this is their sovereign prerogative. But that makes, you know, a lot of fragmentation in everything what we are, you know, what we need to do. I asked NATO, can you at least, you know, try in your so-called, you know, capability targets, which they are planning together with member states, to put some capability targets for broader areas, not for one single country. Because once those capability targets are oriented to one country, and that country now gets, you know, and spends more on defense, the outcome everywhere is very simple, psychological, you know, member states and defense ministers have temptation to go alone.
Yeah, we say loans, we achieved some kind of outcome, yeah, much more of those projects were financed as collective projects, but still that is not coming into, how to say, into genuine behavior of member states because again I can say, safe loans, 150 billion euros was great success, but member states are spending much more of their national money. And to convince them, you know, with big amount of money in the pocket to go for joint development, it's quite a, quite a task. That is why I said on EDPCIs, I think that EDPCIs can be really some kind of breakthrough in bringing this much more collective approach, working together, member states, institutions, you know, finding synergies and having some kind of this balanced, what I call bottom-up but also top-down approach. Member states will decide what they want to develop, but also we can use our instruments, we can use our programs to facilitate member states in some way really to move ahead. Now, that is my answer also on safe loans.
Yeah, they are successful, but definitely they were covering just part of what we need to achieve.
Et bien sûr, notre orientation vers les marchés publics conjoints, oui, c'est bien, cela a donné quelques résultats, mais cela ne devient pas encore une pratique quotidienne lorsque les États membres dépensent leur argent. Maintenant, sur le mur de drones. Oui, nous avons maintenant deux, au moins deux EDPCI liés aux drones. L'un est l'initiative de défense par drones, l'autre est le flanc oriental. Bien sûr, il y a des questions qui avancent, les États membres développent maintenant leurs capacités de détection, leurs radars, etc.
Mais aussi ce que je répète toujours après, vous savez, comme vous le faites aussi, après toute l'expérience de l'Ukraine et en parlant avec les Ukrainiens, je dis toujours aux Européens : comprenons un point très simple. Dans la défense par drones, la production de drones n'est qu'une petite partie de la tâche. Apprendre des Ukrainiens tout cet écosystème, comment le créer, comment être très dynamique, comment obtenir toute l'expérience de la ligne de front et réagir immédiatement si les Russes commencent à brouiller, c'est ce qui est crucial dans tous nos futurs plans de défense par drones.
And that is why I see really quite a possibility of really added value from initiative which we created and it started to be working, so-called European Union and Ukraine Drone Alliance, where really the leading companies from Ukraine and from Europe are sitting around the table and they are discussing really very important stuff, including how in Europe we can learn a lot. And including, you asked about production of Shaheds or whatever European ones. Well, at least what I hear from some European companies, they are really producing drones which are very much needed for Ukraine, I don't know Shahed, not Shahed, and also anti-drone capabilities. But well, again, what is an issue on European side with drones and drone defense and our industrial development. We need to remember that Russia this year is going to use 10 million drones against Ukraine.
10 million. Ukrainians will have the same 10 million. I just want you to again to remember simple arithmetic.
If you take 10 million drones and 365 days per year, it means that per day Russians are able to use 30,000 drones. More or less 30,000 drones. That is the number. Now the question is, you know, on European continent now we are producing 1.5 million drones. Immediately the question is, so there is a problem.
We need to produce 10 million drones, you know, immediately. The answer even from Ukrainians is very simple. It would be mistake. Because drones, especially, you know, you know very well, FPV, kamikaze drones, in two months' time, if you will keep them in stockpile, like prepared for Russian invasion, they will become obsolete. Because Russians of course are finding, you know, what to, you know, how to jam and so on and so on.
So then the question how to organize ourselves and again learning from Ukraine, you know, on one side to keep production of 1.5 million as we are now producing, from another side to be ready to produce 10 million if Putin will decide to do, you know, nonsense and to attack any kind of European country.
And that is where comes those, you know, what I was saying few words about ever-warm facilities. Contracts with the companies which during peacetime can produce, you know, 1.5 million drones, but who are ready the next day after, you know, aggression to scale up, to surge their production. So what does it mean ready? It means that they have, you know, production lines, they have components in the stockpiles and they have labor force ready immediately. So and that is what is what is crucial.
Martins.
Mārtiņš Staķis
Thank you, Chair. And thank you, Commissioner Kubilius, for being here. Two years ago, when on a hearing I asked you one question, will you involve the members of the Parliament on developing the new strategies and new programs? You promised to do so and I'm pleased that you kept your promise. And also on behalf of the whole European Defense Union group of MEPs, I also want to thank you for mentioning our work in your blog after the State of Union.
So it really matters to us that the Commission sees the Parliament as a partner in this. But my question is about the NATO. This week we had a meeting with Secure General Grinkevich from the SHAPE. And his main point of the European Defense Union was was clear and simple: everything the EU does in defense must be complementary to NATO. And this is also the main criticism we receive from the other member states and from allies.
So how do you see this work in practice? So what is your plan to make sure that the proposals now on the table add to the NATO's work and do not duplicate it? Thank you.
Andrius Kubilius
Well, thanks a lot for a very good question. And definitely I can praise European Parliament and informal groups and formal groups and committees very much because I really feel that partnership very strong. And definitely you as a forum of, leading forum of Europeans, you are doing great job because you are able to look into this European level. What is a problem with Member States that usually they are still keeping this national approach. I was told by some experts even very interesting observation, and German experts, that what is an issue when we are talking about development of defence in Europe and how to become more effective, more united and so on.
And their message was very simple: look into the structure of existing defense ministries in Europe on national level, and inside of the structures you will see very clearly the feature. They have very strong department on relations with NATO and very limited number of people who are working with EU and who understands EU. So, and some countries, not all, they agreed with such kind of, you know, situation, they started to develop very much their EU, you know, how to say, expertise inside of defense ministries, which in my view really is, is, is very important. Now, definitely we are, you know, on, on European continent, definitely we are working together with NATO and we shall continue to work with NATO. But, you know, the question is that NATO itself is changing quite dramatically with all the NATO 3.0 concept, with, you know, with very clear demands that we Europeans should take, you know, primary leadership on European conventional defense.
The question then is very political: how we are going to, you know, to meet this goal and target, how we're organizing ourselves, how we're creating, you know, political will, what we need to do, how we're developing some kind of pan-European, you know, projects and pan-European capabilities.
And in my view, that is a question of institutions, like Commission President said. Our institutions, which we created during peacetime on European continent, are not fit anymore for purpose. And I am really believer in, in importance of institutional arrangement. I remember myself being Prime Minister and I saw very clear difference. If I have, you know, strategic goal, for example, we, we started in my government back in 2008, you know, to fight for, for Lithuanian energy independence from Gazprom and so on and so on.
And my first step was to create specially Energy Ministry in order to have, you know, some institutional instrument to be powerful in that area. And that worked. So the same here, if we have big tasks, big questions about how we shall develop ourselves, we need to have an institutional arrangement. It's not against NATO. It's, you know, it's exactly opposite.
It's how to make Europe stronger, which will make NATO stronger. If we shall become stronger, in my view, we shall have even better relations with our transatlantic partners, equal relations.
Marc Botenga
Merci beaucoup. Moi aussi je parlerai français. Monsieur le Commissaire, comme on est ici non pas pour vous applaudir mais pour vous tenir responsable, je vais revenir avec une question que je vous ai déjà posée deux fois, c'est que nous dépensons beaucoup plus que la Russie, même quand on ajuste pour pouvoir d'achat en matière militaire. Et malgré cela, vous continuez à nous dire que la Russie produit plus d'armes que nous. Alors la question c'est : où va cet argent ?
La dernière fois, les deux dernières fois, vous m'avez dit : ne vous inquiétez pas, on faisait des audits pour être sûr qu'il ne s'agit... que cet argent ne va pas dans les dividendes, les rachats d'actions et les profits des multinationales plutôt que dans ce pour quoi on voudrait que cet argent du contribuable serve. Est-ce que vous avez des résultats de ces audits que vous pouvez présenter ? Parce que c'est l'argent du contribuable, c'est nos pensions, c'est nos services publics. Est-ce que vous avez des chiffres à nous présenter à cet égard ou des résultats d'audit ? Deuxièmement, il y a quelque part entre vous et le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN quand même une divergence, parce que le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN continue de répéter que nous avons de quoi... tout ce qu'il faut pour nous défendre de la Russie et que la Russie ne pourrait jamais gagner une guerre contre nous, etc., tandis que vous, vous dites : non, on n'est pas prêt.
Alors est-ce qu'il y a un de vous deux qui raconte des carabistouilles, pour utiliser un mot poli ? Et donc je voudrais un peu avoir... c'est qui qui a raison ? C'est vous, c'est le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN ?
Et si on n'est pas capable de se défendre avec tout notre budget, où est la responsabilité ? C'est qui qui est responsable ? Est-ce que vous allez renvoyer la balle aux États membres ou aux multinationales qui ne font pas ce que vous voulez qu'elles fassent ? Et puis un dernier un dernier élément, on regarde beaucoup vers l'est. Il y a eu un accord important pour la sécurité de l'Europe sur le Groenland avec les États-Unis qui permet aux États-Unis de faire plus ou moins tout ce qu'ils veulent sur leurs troupes sur place.
Est-ce que vous considérez qu'il s'agit d'un bon accord qu'on pourrait copier pour l'Ukraine par exemple ? Ou est-ce qu'en revanche vous considérez que c'est une menace à la sécurité de l'Europe d'avoir cette puissance impérialiste occuper davantage d'espace sur le territoire de l'Union européenne ? Merci.
Andrius Kubilius
Well, thanks a lot for as always for your very interesting questions.
Well, on audits, we have the Court of Auditors which are doing the job and perhaps we shall see very soon, you know, their audits on how we are spending the money. We are spending the money both on European level and on national level, and national level spending, of course, is very much supervised by national parliaments and national political parties and audit institutions. So, I would also make a small remark. We should not be so easy when we are talking about how much Russia is spending and how much we are spending. If to look into the nominal numbers, yes, we are spending, you know, much more than Russia.
If to compare purchasing power parity, it will appear that Russia is spending the same amount as all of us we are spending, more or less. So that's what we need to keep in mind. And we can see really that Russia is still, well, we are, you know, we are doing sanctions and we are, you know, really hitting Russia very heavily and, you know, we are looking into their financial situation, deficits are growing up, but they're still able to increase their production. And that is what, you know, we are facing. Now, I said, you know, the problems with our material defense readiness, what we need to do in order to achieve better results with our money.
The first report came out, again, very, very, we can call it, you know, our own audit. It showed where we have the problems with development of our defense capabilities, and that is a strong signal what, what we need to change and I was speaking about that.
Now, do we have everything, and NATO is saying we have everything and we're ready? Yes, we're ready, we shall fight very heavily. But I would remind that NATO back in 2024 put new capability targets, which we're planning to achieve in 2030. And as I said from our report, somewhere we are behind. So we need to develop our capabilities, including, for example, air defense, where Mark Rutte himself publicly always is repeating that in air defense, we need to increase our air defense capabilities by 400%.
400%. So really at the moment, we did not achieve that, you know, 400% increase. And Greenland, yeah, good good agreement in between of United States, Denmark, and Greenland, that is what Denmark was proposing from the very beginning. So I don't see any any kind of what additionally I can complain. The question is about if you you said, let's let's do something similar in Ukraine.
I did not understood what you have in mind. You want what? American basis in Ukraine? I would agree. If you want Russian basis in Ukraine, I would not agree.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
We have more questions, but unfortunately the Commissioner has to go. So I hope you could come back again very quickly. Each week. It's a... so please, colleagues, for the next appointment, please take your electronic devices very fast, quickly out of the room. And then we will continue in a few minutes with a Polish general.
Thank you very much, Commissioner.
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