Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee Ordinary meeting
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DELEGATIONS European Parliament
Jonas Althoff
Thank you so much. And thank you so much also for your opening statement, Mr. Toveri. Thank you so much for the invitation. It is a great honor for all of us to be here and to have the opportunity to present our research.
So I will just maybe briefly introduce my two colleagues here to the left and to the right. To the left, we have Maria, who is a researcher on enlargement and migration at the Egmont Institute. And to my right, we have Marina, who is the director of the European integration program at Ukrainian Prism. And then myself, my name is Jonas Althoff. I'm a policy advisor for enlargement and the Eastern Neighborhood at the European office of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Brussels.
Some of our Ukrainian colleagues might know our office in Kyiv or might know KAS Kyiv as well, so of course a very special welcome to all of you as well. Together with my colleagues, we have published this summer a publication that is called "The Future of EU Enlargement Policy: Four Scenarios for Enlargement in Wartime Europe." And what we will just briefly do now, I will of course introduce the background of the publication and the publication in general. I will be very brief on the methodology of the publication and then I'll hand over to Maria, who will then present the four scenarios for enlargement in wartime Europe, also in light of course of the pre-enlargement policy reviews. We'll then also shed a quick light on the four scenarios in light of the October EUCO conclusions before also of course zooming in on Ukraine, and my colleague Marina will in particular work on that part.
So next slide please. And next slide as well, thank you. So how our paper called about? Basically what we had in mind is of course as all of you know, enlargement has been back on the agenda of the European Union. It has been back on the agenda in particular ever since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia.
But what we've seen in the past month is actually that the progress on enlargement is highly depending on each country and that it's uneven so far. And at the same time we have seen these numerous proposals, these new ideas of new models of enlargement. And with all of this in mind, we basically asked us one strategic question and that is how could EU enlargement evolve until 2029, which is of course the end of the current institutional cycle, and which accession model could it follow?
And in order to do that, we first organized an enlargement workshop where we tried to bring together different experts from, in particular, Brussels, but also elsewhere on enlargement. And after this scenario workshop, we then conducted expert interviews, in particular with experts from Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. And building up both on this enlargement workshop and on the expert interviews, we then published our publication this summer. Maybe just one quick remark about the scenarios. So these scenarios that we'll soon present, they're not necessarily predictions because we do not assign probabilities to the different scenarios.
You can, I think, rather see them as generalized frameworks, and their realities and their different elements can coexist as well, and this is what we'll see actually in a second. Next slide, please. So maybe very briefly on the methodology we used. The method we used is called intuitive logics scenario planning. This is actually the most widely used method of scenario planning, and it goes back to Herman Kahn and to Pierre Wack, who worked at the Royal Dutch Shell in the 1970s.
The core aim of this method is to comprehensively capture uncertainty rather than build a single most precise scenario. So we actually, what we tried is to explore several plausible futures of EU enlargement. And in order to do that, we basically completed three different steps. The first one is we asked ourselves: what are the key drivers of enlargement?
So we identified these key drivers, of course. Then we ranked these drivers in a second step by importance and certainty. And then in a last step, we framed the two key drivers as an axis of a three times three starting matrix, which you will see in a second. Next slide, please. So as I mentioned, the first question that we had was, what are the two main important drivers that can have an influence on EU enlargement?
And the two main drivers that we identified were first, the EU member states' positions, because enlargement is of course ultimately a political decision that requires unanimity. And the second variable, or the second driver that we identified, is the logic of accession. Is it a merit-based process, or is this standard merit-based progress, for example, complemented by elements of gradual integration or even of post-accession conditionality? Those are the two logics of that we mentioned. And then building up on these two drivers, next slide please, we finished up with a so-called starting matrix that really was the basis of our research.
And in our workshop, we then tried to test this starting matrix. We revised it, we tried to add further drivers, and building up on this starting matrix, we then came up with four scenarios of enlargement in Wartime Europe that Maria will now present to you.
Maria Gargano
Thank you, thank you very much Jonas for this presentation. And yes, I will again state the parts on which all these scenarios have elements which can actually coexist and they have to be seen mostly as lens of interpretation for our realities and for possible pathways rather than prediction or rigid forecast on what will happen to enlargement policy. So on the next slide please. So we have this next slide please. I'll start with the first scenario ready.
So you'll see it's it's the scenario where we see a we see a geopolitical we see a geopolitical push from member states due to and we call it dynamic enlargement because this becomes possible if Ukraine wins against Russia or the war is halted through a ceasefire or it remains in a stalemate. So the there is the feeling of urgency and the geopolitical and geostrategic imperative for pursuing a dynamic enlargement is a consensus among member states. We see that Montenegro's accession treaty is ratified is considered a success. The member states agreed on the safeguards and it does represent a blueprint for follow for following enlargement rounds and we put Albania here as one of the two frontrunners we had identified during our study this summer. But we we did not include Albania as entering the EU because obviously we're we were into this time horizon of the end of the institutional of the current institutional cycle.
For other candidates, which and then we see that in the pre and the pre-enlargement policy reviews, this has as as given elements for it. We see especially through the roadmaps that Ukraine and Moldova remain are identified as as frontrunner through the the gradual integration and will follow with in fact the roadmap we the roadmaps we will see with the publication of the enlargement package at the beginning of next month. So what's the other parts of this the the good parts is obviously a boost for enlargement policy in a moment of of stall, but as well the reception for other countries in the Western Balkan region is might be in terms of might be mixed feelings, especially on the waiting times and the vulnerability these these candidates in the gradual integration path, especially with let's say longer times for adapting the the their association and for the difference between the association agreement and the DCFTA with Moldova and Ukraine, then this this will see a bit of vulnerability and threats towards the stability of those other candidate countries.
I'll go for the second scenario, next slide please, which we called cautious integration and this responds more to a more cautious approach by member states where there is a common denominator in terms of the enlargement as a process needs to continue, but there is no agreement on how and whether there are alternatives or other ways to or because this was as we was said before developed during the summer where other models were discussed and very much in the in the press like association membership as well as reverse enlargement, but we see in this scenario that member states don't manage to agree on any of those procedures. So we see that Montenegro still access the EU, but in this case is not it's not a is not a blueprint for future enlargements.
And so what's done is a maximization of the gradual integration extended obviously to all the candidates and to more and more areas. Becomes instead of a let's say a parallel path, it becomes more and more institutionalized. And this we can see how this is for example now in the pre-enlargement policy review, it could be seen, certain elements could be seen in it. For example, this gradual integration annual dialogues as well as including candidate countries in designing measures to protect the single market. However, this also creates a non-linear process which is due, as I said before, to diverging legal bases.
And this also creates, could create some issues in terms of incentives to continue through this path for candidate countries. And this could manifest in, as we've seen, protests and so on, but also in a certain frustration and rising Euroscepticism in the candidate countries' public opinions. I'll go on the third scenario, next slide please.
So this this needs a little bit more of framing as a scenario because as we said this was developed during as I said before this was developed during the time in which a lot of other models of membership were discussed and our idea here was to create to create a membership that was that would be beyond the being a member not being a member so create three concentrical circles that would attach candidate countries to various policy area. And this obviously was pushed by a moment of geopolitical push in which member states would agree not on the end result but on the need to anchor candidate countries to these concentric circles. We have the one on security and defense gradual so the second more on the single market so through gradual integration and the third one on the association of programs Horizon Erasmus Plus and so on which would be used as socialization and way of as I said anchoring these candidate countries into the EU institution setting.
This we can see in the staff working documents that some of the initiatives could be linked to this, to these three circles. We can maybe go in deep later on the different parts for the different circles. But what's interesting also to keep in mind is that here remains more of a technical feasibility rather than a political prerogative for membership, which is what remains and emerges also from the staff working documents. Next slide. Is a staff working document which, the staff working document which was part of the pre-enlargement policy reviews next to the communication.
So where you have more details on the different policies. I'll, this is the last one, the enlargement frozen, which is a scenario where we've developed, we've seen various, the various drivers on economic downturn as and skepticism among the public opinion of member states, as well as some, some elections, national elections whose leadership have specifically, would specifically campaign on this and obviously create a much more difficult process to go on.
And this is the, of the three, is the only scenario in which Montenegro does not manage to access the EU before the end of this institutional cycle. And one of the main factors is that member states are concerned, insist on the reforms and on reforms prior to enlargement and also they did not manage to agree on stronger safeguards in accession treaties. So there is a deep dissatisfaction. This is in both candidate countries but also in some member states who would have pursued these processes. But also this because they know that the EU's leverage in these countries will go down as well as pro-EU, pro-European parties whose destiny in candidate countries was tied to their country's accession, they lose grip on their countries and lose elections and this slow down also the reforms.
And just to conclude on this, we see that there are many elements in the Commission proposal on the pre-enlargement policy reviews that address the stronger safeguards, budget concerns in certain areas.
I'm sure Marina will address some parts of this. But the there is a but it does address the fact that there is a technical feasibility of for a lot of this reviews, but there is but it does not necessarily overcome the lack of political agreement over this process.
Jonas Althoff
Thank you Maria for presenting these four scenarios. Maybe next slide please. And yet the next one, thanks. I will just very briefly try to tie the four scenarios that Maria has presented to the council to the conclusions of the European Council from last week, because I think that it is interesting to bring both together. So in our publication, we actually already wrote that the October European Council would of course be a litmus test for enlargement.
And if you look at the council conclusions, first of all, I think it's interesting to see what made it in the conclusions. So in the conclusions, of course, the 27 heads of state and government mentioned that enlargement is a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity.
They of course talk about the fact that the enlargement process must remain merit-based and that both the candidates and the EU itself must be ready. They of course also note the Commission's pre-enlargement policy reviews and welcome also the opening of clusters 2 and 3 for Ukraine and Moldova last week. However, honestly, also from a think tank's perspective, I think it is more revealing what is not in the text than what actually is in the text. Because when you for example look at the passage on Montenegro, you can actually see that there was a reference in the initial draft to concluding talks with Montenegro by the end of 2026, and there also was a mention of trying to finalize the accession treaty of Montenegro quite soon. This mention has however been dropped in the final Council conclusions.
Similarly, also in the final Council conclusions, you do not find a real mention of gradual institutional integration of candidates. I mean, we've briefly discussed a lot of these initiatives that we've seen, for example, the Mertz proposal on associated membership. The Commission has done a lot of proposals in the pre-enlargement policy reviews. There is however no mention of all of these gradual ideas in the Council conclusions. And last but not least, of course, there's also no mention of a possible reform, for example, of the EU's setup for external action, in particular when it comes, for example, to fewer unanimity decisions.
Next slide, please. And when you now tie this to the four scenarios that Maria has presented, I think the best fit actually would be the second scenario, which we called cautious integration. And I think that there are three main reasons for this. The first one is that in this scenario of cautious integration, as Maria explained, there are, of course, divergent views that in the end reduce the enlargement policy to one shared message, and that is enlargement should continue, but only on the terms that preserve member states' prerogatives. And this is exactly what we've seen at this October European Council.
I mean, yes, of course, the heads of government and state agreed that enlargement has become a geostrategic investment, but this they've been saying for a while, if I may say so. Yet, however, in particular, the bilateral issues dominated and the national prerogatives as well, as we've seen, for example, with the bilateral issues that we are now seeing between Croatia and Montenegro. The second reason why we think that the scenario two would actually be fitting is that alternative pathways of enlargement seem to have stalled as well.
In the scenario two, the member states struggle to advance new models of integration, such as, for example, associate membership. And this is also something we've seen at the European Council, since there's no mention of a real gradual integration or of the ideas that are mirrored in the pre-enlargement policy reviews. And then in the end, third reason, I think you can even talk about that there only is an urgency in enlargement in rhetoric. Commissioner Hahn, for example, has mentioned that this European Council in October could be a Helsinki moment for the European Union, but it seems that this Helsinki moment has indeed been dominated in the end by the MFF discussions and definitely not by enlargement. So those are the three reasons why we believe that the second scenario, cautious integration, could actually fit best when it comes to the recent European Council conclusions we've seen.
However, there are also elements and signs of the other scenario. I mean, for example, scenario one, dynamic enlargement, there's some positive in it. For example, when you look at the European Council conclusions, this is actually the second time that the EU has managed to publish these Council conclusions unanimously.
I mean, on Ukraine, for example, this is the second time in a row that we didn't have a different document on Ukraine, right? So this is, for example, a positive sign that could hint rather at scenario one, but there are also other signs that could, for example, hint rather at the fourth scenario, enlargement frozen. Maybe briefly to conclude, last slide, we have mentioned that our paper outlines four alternative futures that of course range from dynamic enlargement, cautious integration, differentiated membership to what we called enlargement frozen. Out of all these four scenarios, we didn't make any predictions. And as we've seen with the example of the European Council conclusions, their elements can coexist as well.
But maybe as Maria has said, the pre-enlargement policy reviews actually contain elements of all four scenarios, but in particular the recent EUCO conclusions rather point towards a more cautious integration. And with that, of course, we've arrived to the big question, what's to come? And I think for the coming month, what would be particularly interesting is to of course follow the Commission's enlargement package, but also the December European Council, where of course the question of Ukraine and its financing needs will have to be addressed again.
And with that, I would just very briefly like to hand over to Marina as well, who will also mention some Ukraine-specific points on enlargement and the four scenarios.
Speaker 4
Thank you very much, colleagues, for laying out our common research. Thank you very much to members of the European Parliament, hosts of this event, and especially this is very pleasant to be talking here in the presence of Ukrainian members of the Parliament and to think along with you of where we are headed. So as we all understand, Ukraine is a very case sui generis, very specific, and it's the first time that EU is thinking how to enlarge in war times. So many things are not there yet and they are to be developed. And actually, so quite recently, with a communication of the European Commission of 6th October, which is called Preparing for a Wider Union, and the Council conclusions that were just referenced of last week, they open, let's say, a new chapter.
And I would want to actually tie our research to the current reality and then, as I said, as I mentioned, take you along in a thinking process of where we're headed next.
So first of all, what comes up very prominently from this Commission communication is the reference to gradual integration. Indeed, other terms like for instance reverse integration that was also a proposal of the Commission of earlier this year, February 2026, were completely dropped. The same way as was packed, this was as you know political association first initiative presented by ECFR. There is no mention of any alternative ways or formats, but only gradual. So this means Commission thinking is taking us kind of back to basics.
The country can move as fast as it can and the sooner the better, but the reward and the recognition of each and every step would be opening of new opportunities and access to new sectors.
So this is what comes very prominently. Also, in terms of timing, it's coming in the towards the end of the sixth year of Ursula von der Leyen's Commission, so already second term. So we can say it's good it's already there because still we have time until 2029, but it's already a bit delayed. And as in the Politico article, it said that in 2027, the European Union is going into a perfect storm with elections in major in at least four biggest EU member states that would of course very much thwart the entire process. So yet again, it can be very much redefined in the process.
The European Commission communication is very straight, it's not ambiguous. It recognizes that aspiring candidates need to be assessed on merit-based approach.
So that leads us to the conclusion that geopolitical sympathy will not replace technical compliance. And this is very important in Ukraine's case because of course there is a very understandable wish and desire to emphasize that for Ukraine to be fighting a two-fronts is an extremely difficult task. So to be reforming and to be fighting the war. But what we can read in the European Commission's document is that it will not be taken as an excuse and that still Ukraine has to meet all the conditionality to be able to become a fully-fledged member. Now, I also mentioned that there is a reference to gradual quite some times.
Yet we know that Ukraine accepts nothing less but being a fully-fledged member. Here in the Commission document we see that there is actually no contradiction and there is no attempt to create a two-tier Europe, but rather gradual should be perceived as, well, staged integration leading to full membership, which is an enabling factor in and of itself and is a positive one. Also we do not, what is remarkable that European Commission hints very strongly at an ability to actually proceed with enlargement without necessity to undergo treaty changes. We know that there is no buy-in from EU member states to go through this lengthy and cumbersome and difficult process. And what European Commission lets us understand is there is also no necessity.
When it comes to the foreign policy, clusters could be opened and intermediary decisions could be taken by qualified majority vote. And it's only closing of chapters and negotiations that need to be improved by unanimity, which is of course still can be a hurdle, but at least there would not be unnecessary obstacles on the way. I think this is in a nutshell everything I wanted to, well, to give as an overview, but of course I would be very happy to engage into discussion regarding how to reinvigorate this process and how to, yeah, make it happen. Thanks a lot for your attention.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you, thank you for all of our three experts for good briefings and food for thought. You know, it seems that the great idea of United Europe always faces the same problem, which is the member states. And this is not the only sector where we have the same problem. But now it's a good time for possible questions and short comments from the members, both from our parliament and Verkhovna Rada. So please, anybody, any questions or comments?
Yes, please, Mrs. Fedyna.
Sofia Fedyna
Good afternoon for everyone, Sofia Fedyna, Ukrainian Parliament. Actually, after listening to this report and to this information, I'm have a bit mixed feelings about my speech because I wanted to comment exactly on four scenarios. But at the same time, being today here in European Parliament and day before yesterday, I felt how many people actually do not understand the reality that's going on in Ukraine, not only with Ukraine's future and Ukraine's reality, but also with that threat that we have to European unity and democracy in the European Union. Actually, these four scenarios I perceive not only as political discussion procedures and so on, but actually it's a question of which Europe we wish to build.
After the Second World War, European Union was an idea of a peaceful coexistence that will eliminate any possibility of war. But this war is approaching, and furthermore this war in a hybrid state is already affecting the European unity and European actually survival. We see how Moscow Federation effectively uses any conflict, any misunderstanding and every situation in European country to undermine the Europeans' possibility to act as one and to protect the main values. And unfortunately we see from some countries members of the European Union just the wish to block or to trade Ukraine's European future for some pros in their own internal policy. What I see today with all this, that first and foremost European Union enlargement today must be regarded as an integral part of the European security policy.
And this must be the starting point to every discussion about enlargement, about procedures, and especially this unanimity non-unanimity procedures that can block or unblock the future enlargement and on the contrary to create opportunities for Moscow coercion, for aggression and attempts to redraw internationally recognized borders.
Recently, it appeared a map which Europe is admired by Moscow Federation. The Europe that is divided to many, many, many small regions and that cannot understand each other. Ukraine today is making extraordinary contribution to Europe's security. And it's not only the wish of Ukraine to become the part of Europe and to provide security to Europe. We are doing our job already today.
And Ukraine is really seeking the stronger Europe. And we are doing our work today. The security perspective must influence how we see all this different approaches to enlargement. And dynamic enlargement, I see that two-track approach must not grant some candidates a clear path to full membership while leaving Ukraine in indefinite stage of sectoral integration. If we talk about cautious integration, it may really preserve the consensus, but caution must not become a paralysis.
Sometimes it becomes like this. And when Ukraine fulfills agreed criteria, there must be corresponding decisions of the European Union. If differentiated membership, it will start a very complicated discussion, serious and complicated discussion, and differentiation must be a bridge towards the equal membership, but not a permanent system of unequal rights. And frozen enlargement, it would create the possibility for Moscow Federation to obstruct the sovereign European choice of its neighbors. And what I see, Ukrainian people, they made several times their European choice.
And for us, it's very important to be in European family, not even the European Union as institution, but to be a part of big European family. I know that internally in our country, we have to do a lot of homework. And we are working on that.
Sometimes it's too complicated even internally. It brings too many discussions, but I would like to emphasize that we are keen to implement different requirements for the European to to adapt European legislation. But it's, I think, unfair to demand for Ukrainian people to have these requirements implemented now, immediately, while we even do not know when exactly we are going to become a members of the European Union. It's hard to survive today, not even make reforms, though we do not stop reforming, however regardless of how hard it is. I understand that these scenarios are not destinies, but they are the choices, and every choice carries consequences for the European security.
A strong Ukraine with a strong European Union, it's not a concession to Ukraine. It's a strategic investment to the in the security and future of the entire continent. And the last but not least, Moscow Federation is not going to stop. It will work next year very effectively to ruin any possibility for Europe to survive, and not because of European integration. It will work on undermine European support to Ukraine.
And when Ukraine does not make it in withstanding Moscow aggression, every European country who supported Ukraine will be next.
And unfortunately, these security issues should be the framework for our future discussions. Thank you.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you very much, very good remarks. And I at least personally totally agree. And the last point is very important to understand, which most of the member states don't seem to understand, that this is a question about European idea and survival of the European idea. And if we give up this, Moscow won't stop. And as a Finn, we know as well as Ukrainians that you really, really, really don't want to be a neighboring country to Russia.
And if we give Ukraine to Russia, then it will be Hungary and many other countries who are new neighbors to Russia. So let's stop it here. But there are a number of requests for questions and talks, so we'll start with Mr. Gahler. We take it in order.
Michael Gahler
Yes, thank you very much and thanks for your description, which I can more or less share. I mean, one of the dilemmas or tragedies is that we are discussing on issues of enlargement very concretely only because of the war.
So just think in theory Yanukovych had signed in Vilnius in 2013 the treaty there, then the people would have continued to hope that it would change something internally. We would not have discussed candidate status or even starting negotiations, and you would have dragged along more or less in the old way. And at some point there would have been again a, be it an Orange or another Maidan revolution because the corrupt structures simply would have continued. Now as I said, the tragedy is, well, first there was the small-scale war, Crimea and the Donbas. There was our reaction in favor of the people, we have visa freedom.
Yeah, that was something feelable, sensible for the people. Then we had other measures that also had this effect. And now when it comes to the, after the full-scale war and we are where we are and we are negotiating and all that, I think all scenarios that now profit immediately and to be felt for the normal people that can be done in this process should be done.
So because if we do it the the the only way, it will remain in a technocratic and bureaucratic setup and the people will lose all their hopes. So, I mean, the one thing is that we of course accepted you as fellow Europeans with all your refugees in our countries, with all the status that you have, that nobody else has and doesn't need to have, but that is an enormous sign of solidarity and then the other steps that we have already taken. So I would definitely say, take what is possible and whatever you call it, gradual or selective or what you name it, everything that has its concrete positive effect also on the ground we should focus on. So that the people really believe that we mean it. Yeah, and in so far I would definitely say, yes, let's open these different negotiation clusters, but in parallel, let's have as we have the roaming area for that it doesn't cost extra to to communicate.
Let's now finalize this SEPA thing so that these things can can happen. Let's do on the humanitarian side everything we can to to reduce the hardship. And of course, and that is we can discuss as many things nice to have, if we lose sight of the security and defense issue, then it's everything for nothing.
And that is definitely the sense of urgency that we need to propagate in our EU countries, that it is not only about Ukraine, but it is also about us. And and that we see that for the French elections they are dearly really preparing to to add to the strength of the extremes on the right and on the left. They will try it in Poland, they will try it wherever there is an election, whenever it is, everything that hurts us will be done. And this awareness must rise. We must do the utmost and all the individual things on the shadow fleet and you name it and the long-range missiles that we need to deliver.
It is good that you are here. I mean you you're here preaching to the converted, yeah, these are the the closest friends. We need to follow suit on on the national level in our respective national audiences. And when we see that there is a fatigue saying, oh, our social security systems are getting down, pensions, health, unemployment, and then we give so much money to Ukraine. It is an effort.
It requires political leadership from the top in our member states to say, if we don't support Ukraine and even more than now, all the other nice to have things and necessary things for our social state and our future, it will be in vain if we are unable to defend ourselves.
And currently we defend ourselves through Ukraine and the aspect of security guarantees I said it in the previous meeting yesterday it must be discussed in a way that it is a mutual security guarantee because you are the only ones who can hold up the Russians we cannot and that is why we need to have this debate at the same time of course only after the war is over because we cannot take you in in any way that would automatically trigger Article 42.7 that is definitely not what will is going to happen but we will definitely have to to have these apart from the accession issues the security issue is the key issue for make it or what is this in English make or break yeah that's I think the word. Thank you.
Helmut Brandstätter
Yeah thank you chair. I'm afraid to tell you that it's even more difficult and more complicated.
We have a European Union according to the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 when it was accepted by everyone, and that means common foreign policy, foreign and security policy. If you listen to certain people in this house in the last days, and it's mostly from the right-wing group, they say they want sovereign states, they want no geopolitical activities at all, they want a Europe with states who don't do anything. So, if we follow that, we have to say, okay, they are not on the basis on our constitution, which is a very clear sentence. But when I think about the next French elections, there will be probably a president who also does not want this European Union and wants to go reverse. So I think this is a really complicated situation now, and that I follow Michael Gahler, of course, we have to say that openly.
Do we want to continue as European Union? Do we want to give security to the people in Europe or not? And I quoted today already Mr. Solovyov. Everybody in Ukraine knows him. It's a Russian, Putin's friend, in Russian TV.
He said Putin's message to Trump is very simple. It is: let us divide Europe like brothers. That's our situation. And we are not good enough, I have to say that, to explain that to a huge majority of the Europeans. Do you want to be divided by Trump and Putin, or do you want to live together in a European Union that gives our people also security?
And it's a crucial moment, and it depends on us to explain that much better. We are not good enough to explain it, and of course here we need also the cooperation with you. That brings me to the next point, and also what Mr. Gahler said. Of course, when we go to our voters, they say: why do you give so much money to Ukraine? First of all, I say: okay, I would like to give them the frozen assets, and of course the right-wings are against it because they want to cooperate with Russia.
And then there's one more thing, and we had very heavy discussions also with colleagues on video and also who have been here, and it is corruption. I know, and to all the Ukrainian colleagues I talk to, they say: yes, we have corruption, but we are fighting. We had a very interesting conversation per video with the two heads of these two organizations. They explained what they are doing. Please give us more information.
We also have to go to our voters and say: yes, there is corruption, and you know it and I know it, but that's what they did in the last month and they do something against corruption. Sorry to say, if Orbán had done a similar thing, he probably would still be Prime Minister. He didn't do it, but that's his problem. We have to say it: it's not going to a corrupt country, it's going to a country that is fighting corruption.
And please, we need your information, give us everything about it. And then I only have a short question to the friends of the Adenauer-Stiftung. Just in case Montenegro will not manage for different reasons. One of the reasons might be that I hear more and more from the Croatian government that they want to do everything in order to hinder Croatia, to hinder Montenegro. If that really, I don't know if you have any studies about that, but if there is no Montenegro until 29, 30, or if there are really more obstacles, what would that mean for the rest of the enlargement process?
Speaker 10
Thank you. So who of our three brave experts will give answer to this simple question? Okay, if you can wait for it for Mr. Sánchez first.
Nacho Sánchez Amor
Yes, sorry, sorry for that. I have to attend another meeting, but I was absolutely interested in participating in this. I think we have to examine the study and the words of our Ukrainian colleagues from a broader perspective. This is the big dilemma.
The big dilemma is enlargement is a geopolitical operation or is another way to reinforce this club of democracies. And this is the tension that we observe in the scenarios that could be rewritten in this part, meaning the third scenario is let's do the things because it's a geopolitical need to do so, and the others are more on conditionality and to create or to maintain some unanimity or some way of life that we want to preserve as a club of democracies. And this is the dilemma. For sure, there are geopolitical situations that trigger the appetite for enlargement. But enlargement is as it is.
We have to be sure that we have on board mature democracies, because Hungary has been a vaccine. Never use the example of Hungary. The Hungary created the reaction, please guys, don't repeat past mistakes, we have to have on board complete mature democracies. It's difficult to talk about irreversible democracies when we see the United States, but this is our goal. Then, our Ukrainian colleague, the European Union, it was created to maintain, to avoid war.
It's true. The enlargement is an strategic interest in our security. But you are always forgetting the other side of the coin. We need to be sure that we admit mature democracies. And it's not only about the urgency.
We are defending Ukraine without having you on board. You are not a member and we are spending a lot of money and we as politicians have to explain to our constituencies that this money is perfectly well fitted for the occasion. And we didn't expect to have you on board to defend Hungary and to defend and to try to defend us on the Russian aggression. And for that reason, I would like to insist in the same way that Gahler and Verhofstadt... This is an appetite and this is a window of opportunity.
Do your homework. Do your homework. There is no other way. There is no other way. You have to complete the fundamentals.
Let's retire alibis to the people who want to freeze the process. And it is easy to freeze the process if you don't do your homework. I know how difficult it is, especially for your country, to deal with a war and the reforms. But you said, how can we have the reforms when we don't know when the reforms are being useful for the membership? The decision of what model of society do you want is yours.
It's completely yours.
If you want our way of life, you want a mature democracy, you don't have to create this idea we are only making reforms because that could be useful for the membership. I imagine you want to be a democracy for yourselves. This is the model of society you choose. Then don't create this conditionality, we are only speeding up reforms when we see the door open. You have to decide what model of society.
I know it's very difficult in the case of Ukraine, but this is a message for every candidate country. You have to decide, is democracy your system, your model of society? Excellent, because this is a very important step to be ready for the membership. But this other idea, we are only conducting reforms if we see the perspective of a close membership of the European Union.
It's not easy to talk to you all in this way, but I think it's good that you as the stakeholders, you come back home with this enormous amount of information and feeling that we in our side, we have our doubts, we have our problems. The COST paper is not to encourage the candidate. It's a kind of to reassure the member state that we have some safeguards because we have to overcome reluctances inside the European Union, and it's good that you are openly seen our doubts, our difficulties, and in which way we can convince the member state to have you on board in one of other scenarios. I'm sorry I have to leave.
Jonas Althoff
Thank you very much, Mr. Toveri and Mr. Brandstetter for your questions. I'll maybe start and you can complement if you would like to. So maybe first of all on Montenegro. Actually out of the four scenarios, there's only one single scenario that actually predicts that Montenegro could not join the European Union. And that is as you mentioned the fourth scenario, the scenario on enlargement frozen.
And I mean in our paper, we actually clearly state also the consequences that this could have. I mean there are multiples that you'll also find in the paper, but for example, of course this would lead to anti-European sentiments not only in Montenegro, but also in the other candidate countries. Montenegro really is a blueprint, right? It is we need this positive success story now.
And if we don't have this positive success story, of course, it will lead to anti-European sentiments not only in Montenegro, but also in the neighboring countries. It of course also leads to the creation of gray zones that are of course something that the EU should avoid in its immediate neighborhood, because Russia and Moscow are of course interested in using these gray zones in their own interest, right? And then what we mention in this paper is that the ring of friends that the EU tries to create could actually in this fourth scenario become kind of a ring of fire because of, for example, the persistence of gray zones, but also because of the persistence of anti-European sentiments and the whole disillusionment with the enlargement process in general. And then when it comes to the bilateral disputes between Montenegro and Croatia, I mean, this is something that we've of course seen also now with the Council conclusions. It is not really a secret that Croatia was the one that actually pushed for dropping these mentions to Montenegro's accession path, to finishing the accession treaty by the end of the year, to closing all chapters by the end of the year.
So this is of course not an open secret. The bilateralization of this whole enlargement process and the use of bilateral issues in the enlargement process is of course not something new.
We see it with other candidates as well, Bulgaria, North Macedonia and so on. And I mean, it has always been, I can't speak for the Commission here of course, but only in my personal capacity, but I think that the Commission has always said that bilateral issues should not necessarily be addressed in the enlargement process. This is something that two countries can of course address in different fora, also bilaterally, but only because there are two different or two or three issues between countries, this should not stop other countries from joining the European Union. But then again, this is particularly what we've seen now with Montenegro and Croatia, and there are other examples of course, also historical ones.
Maria Gargano
Yeah, maybe just to complement on this last issue.
I'm looking in the looking a bit in the scenario perspective, as we say, this would look like the fourth scenario, so freezing the enlargement or at least not having Montenegro in until this institutional until the end of this institutional cycle. But this would also not encourage other bilateral issue to be solved outside of the enlargement process. And so, for example, if we look in the specific at North Macedonia and their constitutional requirements they have to adopt, that's not going to happen if if the first example is that that it didn't work out in the case of Montenegro. So this is this is for sure not an encourage would not for sure be an encouraging step ahead for other issues to be solved outside the enlargement process.
Viktória Ferenc
Thank you very much for the for the words. And thank you very much for the panelists for this for the presentations, the valuable presentations. Before becoming an MEP, a member of the Parliament, I was working as a researcher, so my my former life is very similar like like your analysis. So I appreciated this analysis very much from the analytical point of view. But from the political point of view, when when discussing Ukraine's accession scenarios, we must keep one fundamental principle in mind, and this is the merit-based process.
The EU accession always must remain a merit-based process firmly grounded in the Copenhagen criteria, including respect for and protection of national minorities. And I mention this topic because this is for me deeply personal, because I am a Hungarian member of the European Parliament from Transcarpathia, from Ukraine. And my community, the Hungarians in Transcarpathia, for almost five years has been suffering alongside the Ukrainian people because of Russia's war against Ukraine. More than 120 members of our community have lost their lives defending Ukraine. Countless families continue to suffer from separation, loss, and uncertainty.
So I really know what you are in. And in this emotionally fragile situation, the legislation adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament in September on the national minority law and on the 12th of October concerning minority education rights represent much more than legal amendments. It sends an important message to national minorities: our voices are heard and our rights matter. Speaking and learning in our mother tongue is not a threat to the state, but a right that deserves protection. And this is an important step forward, one we have been waiting for since 2017.
And I would therefore like to express my sincere gratitude to the Ukrainian parliamentarians who supported this legislation, including those present here today. And I am particularly pleased that the Ukrainian parliament has now recognized that our previous concerns were not artificial obstacles to EU accession, but genuine issues requiring legislative solutions. Dear colleagues, this is an important milestone, but certainly not the final step. Six out of the 11-point commitment package have been addressed, but five other points remain outstanding. These include issues like minority language rights in public administration and parliamentary representation of minorities.
I hope to see further progress by 2027. Addressing our Ukrainian colleagues, I sincerely hope that the new legislation will be fully implemented in practice and that this positive momentum will continue towards the full restoration of minority rights. And ultimately, I would add that the question is not how quickly Ukraine can join the European Union, but what kind of country Ukraine will become through this process. European integration must remain a genuinely merit-based process, where progress, including the opening of negotiation clusters, is based on the actual fulfillment of the commitments and the Copenhagen criteria.
In other words, commitments must be fulfilled before further steps are taken. This is how we can ensure that European integration brings lasting improvements. Thank you very much.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you, thank you, Mr. Ferenc, and as your example showed, with determination and perseverance, you can get things happening, and we have to handle Ukrainian integration to the EU the same way. We don't give up. So, and then we have Mr. Sjöstedt.
Villy Søvndal
Yeah, thank you very much. You started your point from the Ukrainian side with the point that it's important to understand the gravity of the situation, which worsened quite a bit the last weeks in the way that US very clearly now are not supporting Ukraine, neither with sanctions nor with any kind of help, but also that they see Putin as a nice guy who, as he said, I quote, treated Ukraine nice.
I think it's hard for you to recognize, but that's where he stands. So everyone who doubted if we can trust Trump must now be very much sure, no, we cannot. We are on our own, but we're not fully on our own. We are also together with countries like Canada, with a lot of the Asian countries, and we have to build this alliance very strong. For those of you who think it's difficult to convince your countries about the point, I think the leading argument is you can look into two future scenarios for Europe.
You can look into a scenario where Russia has the control of the most well-trained, innovative 860,000-man army of Ukraine. And you can then think about what that means in costs for the future in security for the next generations. I know Finland is very much aware of that. I know the Baltic countries are very much aware of that. I know countries like Poland, etc., are very much aware of that.
Or you can look into a situation where that most well-trained, experienced with fighting army is a part of European defense and broader than Europe, also with Canada. And then I think the next generation would be able to look into a security assessment which looks a lot more positive. That's one important thing I want to say. And second thing, I think we have to say very clearly that we have a double interest in a Ukraine membership. We have, of course, the interest of giving the security for the population of Ukraine after these dreadful years.
But we have also a geopolitical interest. And I think we should say that louder. I mean, it's a strange game if we do not say it loud and clear that we have an extreme interest for the reasons I mentioned just before for Ukraine being part of a European security setup. And broader than security, also democracy shield from the ones who do not want that in the world.
And then of course everyone should do their homework. We should do ours and I think the Parliament has always had the role to push for membership and we'll continue to do that. And in this Parliament there is a solid majority for doing that from the ECR to the EPP to the Socialists to the Liberals to the Greens and part of the Left as well, the Nordic Lefts. So we have that very big solid majority and it's untouched until now. Our problem is more the member countries.
And just one word on corruption. We had a meeting some of us yesterday where you said that a lot was done both from the state's organs fighting corruption but also from the NGO organs. I think you just have to remember that when you look for something you find it. If you do not look for anything you will not find it. I mean the Russians do not find very much corruption, not because it's not there but because they do not look for it.
And I think we should go out and tell loud and clear that a lot of progress is made in Ukraine on the field of fighting corruption, but there's still a bit to go. But I mean, you have a couple of other things to do as well. But do not hesitate on the fighting of corruption. Do not hesitate on the necessary reforms that are part of the game. And our part of the game is to speak up what's going on in real life in Ukraine.
And then just as a final point, we had a discussion last time we were in Ukraine in June about gradual integration. And I think some of you were a bit wondering if that was a good idea, was it not a way of putting Ukraine in a waiting room? And the answer is no, because I think we should start this discussion with saying we want Ukraine with a full membership. When we said that, we say, but instead of waiting, as Gala and others also have said, some of the advantages by a membership you could take at the early stage. Because when one chapter is finished, for example, the single market, you would get a big advantage not to wait until the end, but to take this now.
And I think it's very important also for you to be very clear on that, if you agree that that is the way we could move quicker forward, so that your people could feel very quickly the progress of the membership, also before a full membership. And about the unanimity, that's a weak point we have back from several years. Maybe we can change it in a way that we put it into another format. We are discussing that, I'm not going into details, but we are very much aware of the problem we have, and we also have to do our homework. Thank you.
Maria Noichl
Thank you so much, thank you for being here, and I'm not an expert of enlargement. No, I'm in the Agriculture Committee, and for your information, in the Agriculture Committee, the majority is against the enlargement. It's crazy. There is always the feeling, oh, there is so many agriculture and it's against us and it's the competition and so on. And I think this is a shame.
I am a member of the Agriculture Committee and I'm not alone, but I'm in the minority to say it would be great for us to have Ukraine with us. If I think in the future, for example, 100 years later, then I would say for my grandchildren, great-great-grandchildren, it would be great to have the Ukraine in the EU for food security. And I think this word I miss on the table from the Commission. I think food security, the possibility to have water in the future, to have a good situation for planting, I think this is so important. If I would say what is in the future important, then I would say you have every day something to eat.
And we see in Spain and in Italy, it's not so easy, less water, less possibility. And I think this is for me one important point. But my colleagues in the Agriculture Committee always say, no, no, no, this is our market, it's the market without the Ukraine. I think this is one point. Sorry for this to say, but I think this is the situation.
I would say the same as you, what is the homework for our side to do? For me, I would say, is it possible to have an enlargement without amendments for the treaties? And I would say no.
I don't know the English wording for Einstimmigkeit, what is the English word? Sorry, I missed this word. For me, I would say it's not possible to make Europe larger if there is the possibility to make blackmailing every day. And we had the situation with Hungary with blackmailing. They say, "No, I vote against."
Maria Noichl
Okay, and then I think this is our homework. We have to do it fast in the next time, not 20 years later. And the next point is, and I think this is the second thing I would like to say, in the Lisbon treaties it was clear there should be more power to the Parliament. And we see nothing now. And these are, sorry, I'm no expert, I said it before, I'm no expert in enlargement, but I see on the one side we have not done our homework and I see on the agriculture side a big, a big crash.
And we have to fight with information, with clear rules for agriculture. Yes, thank you so much. Thank you for your work and thank you so much for really, I think, I think so many people in the Parliament are proud on the, on the fighting situation in Ukraine. It's so terrible, I'm five times grandmother, it's for me, if this would be in my family, would be in this situation, I think thank you, thank you so much.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you, I'm also on agriculture committee and sometimes it's hard to bite your tongue because the fact is that 1.2% of EU's economy is agriculture and we would be idiots not to take the security that Ukraine gives us because of that 1.2% and some other things, but that's a different discussion. We have also here from EEAS the head of the unit Ukraine division, Ms. Baiba Davere, so if you could shortly give some statements.
Baiba Davere
Yes, thank you so much for chairman and honorable members and also Ukrainian friends for allowing me to participate here and listen to this exchange.
It's a very, very useful. I'm working in European External Action Service and we are together with the Commission of course trying to support Ukraine's reform process and accession. And I am very happy to see here this debate which is so open and useful. And let me underline just three points. First, I want to underline that current momentum on enlargement, it's a window of opportunity.
2026 has seen opening of already four clusters and we hope that by the end of the year we'll open the remaining ones. It's, I know it has been delayed, it's a long waiting and it's difficult, but it is remarkable that we are moving ahead after so much blockages. And also Ukraine is moving ahead with reforms. And it is absolutely understandable that Verkhovna Rada is operating in terrible conditions that especially now since August that Russia started bombing also during daytime. During your plenaries you have to go to shelters, you can't even take decisions and vote the laws in an uninterrupted manner.
So it is absolutely understandable, we fully understand, but let me underline that this momentum, current momentum is very, very important and it's not only about Copenhagen criteria and ticking the box or adopting a law that will unlock this amount of money or that amount of money from the Ukraine Facility, Ukraine Reform Plan, whatever. I think it is very important for us in the EU on the EU side, but also on your side, especially in Rada among different political forces to understand that this is, you know, these reforms are basis also on which our Union is based. So we cannot, politically of course it's important for our own security and prosperity to have Ukraine with us and we hope Ukraine will join us as soon as possible, but it's impossible and no member state would accept a country, be it Ukraine or some some other country, that is not ready, that reforms that are not only adopted by the parliament but also they work in real life, that we don't have conditions ensuring that it's a democratic country with independent judiciary, freedom of speech, etc, etc, because the fact that such a country will join will impact the situation and citizens in member states.
And that's why Member States are so sometimes cautious, sometimes reluctant, and EU citizens also need to be convinced. And I hope you understand that, because sometimes we have impression that understanding under current war conditions, understanding in Ukraine, including among politicians, including among Ukrainian population, of what it really means in terms of reforms and accession, what it really means to be a Member State, this understanding is not very good, because it's only very often we want a date and let's go, and if we have a date, we will do everything. And I think this is not the right approach. It's very important to underline, yes, we want to be a different country, a country like EU Member States, and we are ready for it now because we are committed. And I think this is the message that will work more among EU citizens and in Brussels, rather than the message that our, which is also legitimate message, we hear it often, that our people are dying on the frontline, are dying in their homes when they're sleeping.
We made this choice in 2014 already, there was a Revolution of Dignity. At that time, people went to Maidan to show their choice for European Union. More than 100 people were killed. It was our choice. We did many reforms since.
And now you owe us. You owe us enlargement on that date or that date.
I think psychologically and emotionally we can understand that, but it somehow doesn't work. I think if you would underline more this "we are ready for reforms and we are going to get there and we want you to be ready too because it's better for you that we are part of Europe", I think that message would work better. And also another aspect I will just underline is that these reforms are not only for us, it's also for Ukraine because people who are dying now on the frontline, so many Ukrainians are suffering because they want the future for a different Ukraine. Ukraine to be a different country, not a country governed by oligarchs, not a country where corruption is widespread, a different country like we have countries in Europe. So I'm very happy that it was your choice.
I'm very happy that you're aware where you're going. And just to underline that these reforms and conditionalities is not against getting Ukraine in the EU faster. On the contrary, the more you invest efforts now, the faster it will happen. So I think it's not mutually exclusive because sometimes we hear this argument that "oh, we are like really working on these horrible conditions, there is a war, but you are putting these conditionalities, why are you doing this because it's just slowing us down?"
And I think it's on the contrary, these conditionalities are kind of like benchmarks and indications for, for Ukraine to actually focus on, okay, so this is where we need to go faster in order to get faster in. So I think it's kind of a mutually enriching process that we need to follow. And last point I will mention is about importance of gradual integration and also decisive role of cooperation between European Parliament and you and also the support that European Parliament can give to this process because I think we have seen very much how this roam like at home is helping virtually every Ukrainian citizen to have a better connectivity to their family members who live in Europe, those who are refugees in Europe. And how much it costs when you go for even for us, when we go to a third country where roaming costs a lot. It's a real cost.
The same about SEPA. So now the next step, let's get Ukraine into SEPA so that every, every family member who needs to send money or pay for something in Ukraine, those of Ukrainians who are in Europe, they feel it that it's a kind of very concrete advantage for them. And I think these are just two examples how through this gradual integration we can actually, Ukrainian citizens can already feel these benefits. And it will be even more convincing for them that yes, sometimes these reforms can be painful, it takes time, but we need to do it because it leads to some tangible progress.
Thank you so much.
Pekka Toveri
Okay, thank you. And we are running out of time and we have six requests for speech. So now we start integration of Verkhovna Rada to EU Parliament. Everybody has one minute as we normally have. One minute.
Learn to speak fast, but that's how it is in EU Parliament. We start with Mr. Gahler.
Michael Gahler
Very quickly, only on agriculture. The Ukrainians know what I'm going to say. We had the same discussion on agriculture prior to the big enlargement, so the ten countries who came. And we settled it and we dealt with it. Now they were unreformed when they came and had to be reformed and that was the big fear.
Now the Ukrainian agriculture is very efficient. That is the other way of the threat. And that is why I think we will first, we will find a way. And second, as your goods are needed on the global market, I think there will be a way for this sector for you once the war is over that you can deliver that at a perhaps even better price than in the EU.
So I think that will be dealt with and on a timescale we will settle it.
Bilozir
Dear Chair, Mr. Tori, dear colleagues, it is a great pleasure to address you not only as a member of the program of political leaders program, but also as a member of our Ukraine Parliamentary EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee. I would like to emphasize that we are actively working together with you, exchanging experience and advancing Ukraine's European integration. And I'm looking forward to our sitting in two weeks in Brussels. I want to ensure you that Verkhovna Rada continues to adopt legislation necessary for Ukrainian for European integration despite constant Russian attacks and permanent air sirens, enormous economic destroyment that we have recent two months. And that we do understand that the EU membership requires serious reform, strong democratic institution, the rule of law.
And we are committed in Verkhovna Rada to delivering this reform. And today when we discuss this scenarios, I would like to emphasize three priorities. First, we need a clear and predictable and merit-based accession process. Ukraine not asking for exceptions, but we asking for fair treatment. And we could see that Hungary blocking our opening the clusters.
Now they deblocked two and three, thanks to them, but then now they are blocking another one, screening results of the four and five clusters. So this is the problem. And the second, the European Union's internal preparation for enlargement should move forward in parallel with Ukrainian accession negotiations. And sometimes institutional reforms within the EU, they are important, but they should not become another reason to postpone our integration. And the third, we need deeper parliamentary cooperation.
We had recently the meeting with President Metsola and our delegation on it was delegation of women empowerment program, and we asked for the possibility to establish a permanent representation of Verkhovna Rada at the European Parliament and to have this observer status and take part in the committees and so on and so forth. And the last thing what I wanted to say about the agriculture. I was rapporteur in the Parliament Assembly of Council of Europe on the topic ensuring food security in the time of crisis. Russia weaponizing agricultural goods. They are overtaking Africa, blocking our port.
95% of our exports goes through port and no solidarity lanes that we are thankful to you will, you know, make the situation better. And together with the EU we can form this soft power providing this global security, food security for Africa. So you should not be afraid of us. We together can make this power exporting it to Africa. It's a great market that Russia is overtaking.
Instead Latvia is getting through its the goods from minerals and fertilizers and grain. It's freely goes to the to Europe when Ukraine is blocked. So I think there is a wide range of issues that we can solve together. And the last thing I want to say, thank you for your continued support and for our strong parliamentary partnership. Thank you.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you. It was all good and good points, but it was three and a half minutes, so we have to work better on this. Mr. Krulko will show how to do.
Ivan Krulko
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My name is Ivan Krulko. I'm first deputy in budget committee. And even now we are in European Parliament, but all the day from 10 in the morning we have committee meeting about budget for next year for Ukraine.
So even even now we are working and I vote all the day for amendments to to prepare new budget for next year to stay alive and stay strong under Russian aggression. And I would like to say that Ukraine's accession to the European Union is not only about enlargement. It is about Europe's security, credibility and strategic future. Even under constant Russian attacks, Ukraine continues to implement reforms and align its legislation with European standards. Let me give one concrete example.
Ukraine completed the screening of its legislation in September 2025, an important achievement under wartime conditions. We have shown that Ukraine can deliver results and fulfill its commitments. It is important that this progress is reflected in the next steps of accession negotiations. We believe the review of EU enlargement methodology should create new opportunities, not additional obstacles. We fully support a merit-based process.
Where the European Commission confirms sufficient technical progress, we should explore ways to advance preparatory work without unnecessary delays. More flexible mechanism for intermediate steps could be considered, while fully respecting the rights and interests of all Member States. I don't see our Hungarian friend, and I would also like to address a very, a very clear message. I was born in Zakarpattia, in Khust, 10 kilometers from Hungarian border. And I sincerely believe that the time has come to turn the page of our disagreements between our countries.
Ukraine and Hungary are neighbors, and we have much more that unites us than divides us. For ethnic Hungarians living in Ukraine, our country is not simply a place where they should feel at home. Ukraine is their home. They are part of our society, our history, and our shared future, and we respect their identity, language, and cultural heritage, and remain ready for constructive dialogue on sensitive issues. Let us look for solutions together, rather than allow Russia to exploit our disagreements.
We already have examples of gradual integration. Since January 2026, Ukrainians have benefited from the EU's roam-like-at-home system. This is a practical result for the citizens can feel today. We should pursue similar opportunities in energy, transport, and future access to the single market. Some decisions associated with European integration are practically sensitive for Ukrainian society.
Take proposal to introduce VAT on low-value international parcels. According to estimates that should be verified against official fiscal projections, the additional annual revenue could be less than 200 million euro. This is just one day of war for Ukraine. Yet such a measure may impose cost on citizens and businesses. We therefore need careful impact assessments, reasonable transitional periods where EU rules permit them, and a balance between fiscal benefits and social consequences.
European integration must retain public trust.
And Parliament of Ukraine has a special responsibility. We adopt European integration legislation while working under martial law. We welcome stronger cooperation between the European Parliament and Ukrainian Parliament, including practical expertise and support for implementing to EU acquis. Thank you very much.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you. That was four minutes forty-five seconds, so you have to understand that you are eating other people's time if you don't take it a little bit shorter, please. So we'll take Mr. Sanchenko.
Sanchenko
Yeah, I'll be short. I have few concrete ideas, proposition to colleagues who do this good job. We in Ukrainian Parliament have inter-factional unity strategic foresight. So I'm really recommend you to communicate with them. This inter-factional union gathered the MPs and sociologists and futurologists who already do with support of UNDP joint work with UK Parliament about some foresights.
And I think it will give more perspective about what's happening in Ukraine.
Second point, I think it will be really interesting if you will do some kind of work focused not on the trends that you see, but it's also interesting to see about the weak signals that you could... I don't see here this part of work. And I believe the like the black swans and weak signals, it's interesting part because as far as you see, they are very effect and it will be helpful for our future work. The third one, I believe that the understanding that maybe sometimes miss out, that our European integration as a country, as a people, is existential for us. So if, so this unites for all polls more than 90 percent of Ukrainians.
That's why all the question in the Parliament for us as a MPs who represent people and for people, it's like, it's obvious. So we see ourselves only here in Europe. That's why the last I want to highlight, it's really interesting to see the scenarios of future of Europe if Ukraine will not enter the European Union. What will happen?
What is the scenario A, B, C? So we will be, I don't know, again came back to Russia and we'll do some USSR 2.0? And what will be with European Union? Or scenario two, scenario three? And in my perception, this work could be much more efficient for our Ukrainian integration than the scenario of accession.
Because of course the threat, you see the far-rights use it, but in this purpose, I think this is the reality. If we will not, and I will end with this, if we as a country will not enter European Union, join European Union, for majority of people of Ukrainians it will be frustration. So right now this is the thing that unites us also, our victory and our European integration. So this is really, I'm sure, important to have also discussion what will happen if not. Scenario A, scenario B, scenario C.
And I'm sure all of them are not very good for future of Europe. Thank you.
Kostenko
Thank you, Chair, and thank you for organizing this event today. Kudos to the analysts and researchers for the work you did with the Russen and Adenauer Stiftung. We really believe that the work you do on exploring the possible ways on enlargement could help this process, and it's important that you continue your distinguished work.
So thank you very much for that. I would really much suggest that you explore different ways of graduated membership and how it could be involved in the upcoming years, because, for example, the free roaming we are already implemented and it already works for the Ukrainians. SEPA, I think, will be very close soon in the upcoming weeks or months. And that means that there are still a lot of ways that we can do that and how we can gradually integrate into the Union even before the political will exists in the process. So thank you for that.
And just a couple of remarks on what we have discussed here on the enlargement processes. Absolutely 100% agree that the blackmailing of one country against another should stop. This includes North Macedonia-Bulgaria situation, Croatia-Montenegro situation, and Hungary-Ukraine situation, because every country could exploit this process just to use this as an incentive to imply measures on any neighbor. And this will definitely make worse for the Union itself and not only for the candidate countries. This enlargement has been mostly incentivized and started in 2022 because of the full-scale invasion.
And it will end after the full-scale invasion will start.
Nobody, believe me, nobody in Ukraine believes that we will become EU member state before the war ends. Everybody understands that the war is the number one priority, and that means that we have to be ready to use this window of opportunity right now. And the upcoming years will be decisive both for Kyiv and Brussels on how we see the upcoming future for our continent. There should be no more buffer zones in Europe. Buffer zones are the great possibilities for Russia, as fellow MEPs told here today.
And after 1945, the buffer zone ended in Berlin. Do we want it to continue anymore from this day? Because what Russia is trying to do is they're trying to reverse this narrative, they're trying to do everything in their way to make sure they are back in Berlin, and Ukraine is only first step in this process. That's why the enlargement process and including as many as possible member states of European continent into the Union is extremely vital for the future of the Union itself. The Union wants two things: money and security.
Believe me, Ukraine can provide both. We are not as a rich country as of this moment, but we do have a lot of resources that are, have a huge potential to be developed in that process, like all the candidate countries that entered before 2004 did.
And entering into the Union would help both the Union and the member states to become more rich, more powerful, and build a stronger Europe. And about security, I wouldn't be even more precise on how to do that, but basically Ukraine is the frontrunner in providing security for the continent. And this is the major step forward to become and to make Europe a number one player on the world map. Thank you.
Iryna Prodan
Thank you very much, distinguished co-chairs, Mr. Topolánek, and dear colleagues. Thank you very much. I will try to be very brief. My name is Iryna Prodan and I'm honored to be here as a participant of Young Political Leaders. I also represent political party UDAR, led by Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko.
We are grateful, I'm gonna try to be as fast as possible, we are grateful for your role in helping Ukraine to obtain its candidate status and for continued expert, technical, and financial support, including through Ukraine Facility. We are talking, we have been talking today about all the reforms needed for the enlargement and accession of Ukraine.
And as we mentioned many times, Ukraine does do Ukraine's homework in this regard, but at the same time, as you know, some legislation has not been passed, some legislation required under the Ukraine Facility has not been passed for now, delaying the corresponding funding and slowing down some reforms. While government was the one to prepare step-by-step plan, all the responsibility now is being put on Ukrainian Parliament, on Verkhovna Rada, for so-called failure of those legislation. I want to say that the failure to adopt the temporarily one of the bills does not necessarily mean refusal to deliver reforms. Lawmakers and Verkhovna Rada often have quite legitimate concerns about the submission of the bills to the Parliament, the quality of legislation, different contradictory norms those bills include, and whether the bills reflect the agreed commitments or not. And in this regard, I do invite you, and I also want to pay your attention to consider how from your side you could help strengthen Verkhovna Rada's involvement from the onset.
Sorry, this is a literal translation.
I did a typo mistake in my saying, so it sounded funny in Ukrainian. Yes, Rada is the council, and zrada is betrayal, so it was just the typo I said. So please do look from your side how to involve the parliament in these decisions, so it's not the government to plan and agree, but then Verkhovna Rada to be blamed for those things. And also finally, what I want to also pay your attention and want to address the catastrophic situation now in the city, in the town of Oleshky, occupied town in Kherson oblast. Particularly, we would like to extend our deep gratitude to Vice-President of European Parliament Pina Picierno for announcing a hunger strike to draw attention of the world to this matter.
I've been working since the war began, I've been working with the United Nations responded in Ukrainian frontline in the east and south, doing the humanitarian response. And then later, subsequently, I was deployed to Gaza humanitarian response. So I have seen, I witnessed hunger and desperation of people. This is why this situation is particularly very painful to me. People are trapped there.
Those who cannot leave, they experience hunger, looking for food.
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