Delegation for relations with the United States Ordinary meeting D-US ordinary meeting
Legend
Transcript markers
- text Sentence being played
- text Search result
- text Intervention cited by the link you opened
Click a sentence to play the video from that moment. Select text to quote it with the speaker, timestamp and link.
More options
Offset
Transcript offset
Export
Replay
Versions of this video
Transcripts may differ slightly from one version to another.
DELEGATIONS European Parliament
Thibaut L'Ortye
It doesn't mean the agreement is perfect. And we know there's been many conversations in the European Parliament about the deal and what it meant which led to some of the tariff reductions we've seen earlier this year. As an business organization we don't support broad-based tariffs. I think we've made that very clear and we've made that very clear in the United States as well. But as we look at that relationship we really should not forget I mean the risk of escalation which is the reason in the first place that deal was was struck because the consequences would have been huge for companies on both sides of the Atlantic and citizens ultimately.
And so obviously we look to both sides to honor their commitments under the deal. And we do think there is a positive agenda that's possible when you look at the EU-US joint statement. Not that it's an easy conversation but you think about areas like non-market economies, like critical minerals and more broadly AI supply chains. You think about mutual recognition on cybersecurity. There's a lot that we can do actually and hopefully we can bring that agenda back to the front recognizing of course that the political relationship is is difficult.
The second point I want to make to connect the figures to the conversation in the European Parliament is about how do we build a stronger industrial base in Europe and how do we reduce strategic dependencies. I mean that comes up a lot. And that objective makes a lot of sense obviously in an era of global competition. Dan through the numbers will give you a sense of the interconnection of the European and the American economy. And this interconnection can actually be a strength as we look at how we can tackle some of those challenges.
And so when we look at the conversation around made in Europe, made with Europe and more broadly industrial policy obviously the challenge remains the same. It's how do you achieve those objectives and at the same time ensure that Europe remains an attractive place for global investment. So ultimately in that conversation on industrial policy how do you recognize the added value that those companies bring to Europe and then we'll talk about some of that. Because ultimately if the EU wants to attract a larger share of global investment and it should given the objectives and the ambitions it has it must further strengthen some of the conditions. That's about some of the conditions and the attractiveness of it as as an investment destination.
Some of that is related obviously to industrial policy, but a lot of it also has to do with the single market fragmentation, a lot of the other issues we're not going to get into today. So with that, just to say, I've worked on this report with Dan for over 10 years. Something that continues to strike me every year again and again is the ties that bind our continents that have been built ultimately by people, by companies, the density of those ties that are mutually beneficial. We'll get to that in the numbers. And so we as AmCham EU strongly think there's ways for us to build on that, to build on those ties, and hopefully we find areas where interests really align on both sides.
And so with that, I'll hand back to you and maybe we can hear from Dan.
Eva Maydell
Thank you, this was very concrete. Dan, if I may, are you connected? Can we hear from you now?
Speaker 6
There we go. Okay, thank you so much. It's good to see you again and I'm glad to be with you. As Thibaut says, we have some new data. So this is the most up-to-date data that we have.
It hasn't been publicly released. I think that's going to be tomorrow, but happy to brief you on it now. And it'll follow just basically the outline of our annual report. So with your forbearance, I'll do a couple slides here just to help us get through this quickly. So, you know, we're facing still this year, next slide please, some stormy seas.
And I have to have the colleague, there you go. And all the pressure points that we're going, I think are well known to everyone. Next slide please. Hello? Yeah.
I don't need to go through these. These are issues you're all familiar with, we're all dealing with today. But it means, you know, companies are trying to navigate those stormy seas. And as Thibaut said, it's difficult then to predict your business if you're dealing with all these types of disruptive issues. But the backdrop is, if you just take last year, the last year of real full data, next slide please.
We see that we broke any number of records last year. These are historic records, never before seen in 2025, despite all these uncertainties. Trade across the Atlantic hit a new high in goods and services, both with Europe as a whole and with the EU in particular. The same was true if you break it down, the goods trade was very high, historic records across the board, trade in services also. So companies have been able to navigate these difficulties.
But as we say, there are some issues going forward. Next slide. One of the themes I highlight often is that it's not just about trade. Trade is not the real driver of our relationship, it's investment flows. And so affiliate performance, that affiliates are, you know, an Italian company in the United States with its different operations, or a US company in Europe.
Those are affiliates. And their performance in terms of their income last year and their sales also hit new records. European company sales in the United States hit a new high and our sales, US sales in Europe the same. And companies are still earning well. The other linking issue here that wasn't even around some years ago now is quite critical is of course our energy partnership.
And you see how that has gone from essentially zero to a huge important link in our relationship. So but let's turn now to how things have happened this year. This is the newest data. Next slide please.
And we call it the transatlantic pulse. What's interesting is that the US is on track this year to either balance or to record a surplus in its goods and services trade with the EU and with Europe as a whole. I think the last time this happened was in 1991. So this is a major change and affects the whole political dynamic across the board. The backstory though, it's not happening because maybe of the reasons you think.
The US usually runs a large trade deficit in goods and a smaller surplus in services with the EU. And what happened in the first half of the year is the goods trade deficit went down dramatically while the services trade continued strong. The primary reason for this was that last year, because of this uncertainty, US companies just bought a lot of European goods. That's why we had that record of European trade with the United States. They stockpiled lots of things because they anticipated perhaps a trade war or just continued uncertainty.
And what they're doing this year with all those stockpiles is they're winding them back down. So the goods trade across the Atlantic, especially European goods sales to the United States, has declined a lot. I don't think it's because of declining demand in the United States. It's simply this one-off issue of the tremendous uncertainty from last year causing companies to stockpile last year, now they're simply winding down those flows. So we're going to see a maybe a balance in the trade, but it's mainly because of this issue.
And it's a little bit down year on year from last year, which was as I said a record year, so it's a little off the record, but it's still very high. That's on trade flows. The next slide, please, as I mentioned, is these details here. You see on the left-hand side, US goods exports to the EU went up in the first half of the year, but EU goods exports to the United States declined over 16%. So that's a significant drop.
But the US deficit with the EU in goods went down 62%. That's a major decline in the deficit. Whereas on the right-hand side, you see services trade, which is just remains quite positive for both sides of the Atlantic. Next slide. The other update here is about investment flows and the earnings of the companies.
So as I said, investment really drives the relationship. Companies would prefer to be on the other side of the Atlantic close to their customer, selling goods and services next to their customer, rather than sending stuff across the ocean. That's the primary motivation. And that's why investment flows actually facilitate trade flows. Trade comes from investment across the Atlantic, not the other way around.
So the FDI, foreign direct investment numbers, are quite important to see how this has gone. And here again, European investment in the United States has jumped a lot. I think again, partly because European companies were being encouraged, shall we say, by the Trump administration to do that, but also because of the strong positive dynamics of the US economy. So it jumped up 70% in the first half of this year, European investment in the United States. Whereas US investment in Europe again dropped significantly, not as much as trade, but still 20% drop, almost 21%.
But again, there's an explanation for this, that lots of this was outflows from Ireland, which is a significant investment destination for US companies. And again, it's the uncertainty driving this of the dynamic. Companies, especially pharmaceutical companies based in Ireland, have been whipsawed by all these dynamics. And so this is part of the explanation.
But if you look at earnings, also because the dollar is quite strong right now, earnings of both European and American companies have been quite good. And again, just to put this in a global perspective, over 56% of American companies, what they earn around the world, they earn it in Europe. So more than half of all US earnings in the world are in Europe. That's why Europe is so central to US companies. So that's the update and just to again give it the context of what the things I was saying.
Next slide, please. Just go going through this quickly, drawn from our annual study. Next slide. We this is the most mutually beneficial relationship on earth. 9.8 trillion dollar economy.
16 million workers are employed. That's only directly employed by companies because of investment. If you added trade, indirect effects, it'd be substantially higher. This is a low conservative esper estimate of how many jobs are created by our economy. And as you say, you as I said, the investment dynamic here is really what drives it.
I think what Thibaut also mentioned earlier, which is quite significant for our conversations, is that the transatlantic economy is important to our companies not just because of the US and Europe, but because this deeply integrated economy allows them to be globally competitive. They use the transatlantic base as a sort of geoeconomic base to be competitive in China, in India, in in every other part of the world. They eclipse many other companies from other countries because they have such a huge base. The base they have is not the EU or the US, it's the transatlantic base. And that's unbeatable.
No other country or group of countries has that capability that we have. Next slide. So again, to just drive home the dynamic, the bar on the far left you see are the foreign affiliate sales. Those are US companies in Europe selling things to European consumers and European companies in the United States selling to Americans. You see how that's such an overwhelming dynamic.
And if you add the trade flows and you update this chart, which we will do next spring, you'll come to at least a 9.8 trillion dollar economy, if not more. And it dwarfs any other relationship either the EU or the United States has with any other countries or group of countries. Next slide. Again, driving home this point about the investment flows. Where do American companies invest in the world?
They invest mainly in Europe. It, you know, US investment in Europe 3.5 times more than all of US investment in the entire Asia-Pacific region. And that's a region with, you know, population that's hugely more significant than in Europe. And yet that's where American companies go. And the trend has not changed over decades.
You see that it's a steady, steady pace there. Next slide. The same is true the other way around. European investment in the United States continues to be robust and steady. It's double the investment that Asian companies make in the United States.
So the single largest source of investment is from Europe. And that's going to continue in the and you see that chart is a very dynamic one going up significantly. And that and I didn't add the first half of this year, which again went up 70%, just to remind you that one number. Next slide.
So because of this the sa- oops, we just went way past. The sales there's one before this slide, please. There we go. So US company sales in Eur- oh, I'm sorry. Next the next slide.
Hello, next slide. There. US company sales in Europe four times exports. That's why the sales of the companies in Europe companies, you know, in Brussels and in in Bulgaria and everywhere else are doing much bigger business than when we send things across the ocean. So focusing too much on trade misses the big picture and misses what's really driving this economy.
Next slide. The same is true the other way around: European company sales in the United States 3.4 times more than European exports to the United States. This is how companies really operate rather than sending goods across the ocean. Next next slide. And I'm not going into it, but we can in the discussion if you want, we are the we are each other's most important innovation economies, you know, R&D investment across the Atlantic is significant.
We the digital economy is centered globally across the Atlantic and trade in what's called digitally deliverable services, trade that you, you know, you can send something with the click of a button on your laptop that's worth millions of dollars in terms of a contract or something. That's what trade in digitally deliverable services. Think of like an architectural design. That's a digitally deliverable service. You hit it, goes across the Atlantic, it's it's worth millions of dollars perhaps.
And that is becoming the economy and and it's important that we understand those digital links. And I mentioned the energy partnership as well which continues. But it's important to note that it's not one way the energy relationship. The largest investors in the US energy economy are from Europe by far, led by Germany. And it's both greenfield investments more than mergers and so on.
It's also fossil free and also fossil fuel investments. So it's the full spectrum of the energy economy in the United States is being driven by foreign investment from Europe. So it's a two-way street, it's not just a one-way street. Next slide. So, you know, this is the underlying conversation.
I won't go into this in great detail, you could read that later but and it's in our report. Europe still needs the United States for all sorts of things that we have specified in our report on the left-hand side. But maybe, you know, what's less discussed is do Americans need Europeans? Does the United States need Europe? And the right-hand column there provides all sorts of reasons why the United States also needs Europe.
So it's not a one-way street. And if we think about the debates we're having today about whether we need each other, whether one part of the economy should go one part of the transatlantic economy should go its own way, become so-called autonomous, we are so deeply intertwined, you know, you cannot be autonomous. But you can become indispensable. So it makes sense to build down excessive dependencies you might have on any source in the world. But if you can build up your indispensability to others, you have a lot of leverage and of course you maintain that stability that companies are looking for.
So indispensability rather than autonomy in my view would be a much better policy choice for either side of the Atlantic and to work on finding those areas of indispensability. Next slide. Last last slide. Again, just the point we're we are each other's most important partners.
We keep showing companies keep showing how resilient they are in the face of all these changes. But one last point on the right hand side of this chart. Resilience has a cost. It's very hard to conduct business if you keep having to shift your supply chains. And this chart drives home that point because it shows what's called related party trade.
So most trade across the Atlantic say European trade with the United States is trade within the same company. So Siemens for instance of Germany sends goods and parts and component to Siemens in the United States. That's trade but it's trade because it's Siemens trading with itself. Or BMW sends engines and front bumper assemblies from its plant in Munich to its plant in Spartanburg South Carolina to create a car produced in the United States made in the USA which makes BMW the largest US car exporter by value of any. But it's this inner interlinking of the inner company trade flows that drives that.
That's why investment flows end up driving trade flows. So anything we can do to facilitate that investment and not block it and also allow those trade flows not to be disrupted within the company would be the best things one can do to maintain you know some sense of stability and predictability for the relationship. So thank you so much. I'm happy to have a discussion on any of these topics and look forward to it. Thank you.
Brando Benifei
Thank you very much Mr. Hamilton. Hello. Thanks for being with us again for this important meeting. I want to thank first of all our vice chair Eva Maydell who coordinated the meeting chaired the meeting until now. I was blocked because of an unexpected prolongation of the voting on our bureau of our political group.
All the colleagues here know that this is the moment for that but we didn't know the timing when we fixed this this meeting and unfortunately it lasted a bit more than foreseen. But thank you for your presentation. I've seen part of it not all of it but other colleagues were here for the rest of the time. So before I go to also do in the last part of the meeting the debriefing on the TLD in San Francisco that we have postponed I will now thanking you again and thanking Eva again for chairing I will open the floor for any colleague that wants to raise any issue on questions or comments on the data that show again how important is our trade and direct economic relation between the two sides of the Atlantic. I had the the honor to present one of the reports also in Congress in Capitol Hill some months ago and I think they are the best example of why using data we can easily show why we need to be working together.
I like the concept however I don't see that very much in contraposition to autonomy. It can be complementary but the indispensability that you you mentioned. I think this is something we need to to work on.
But I open the floor for colleagues. Mr. Donasibento Cabral, please.
Paulo do Nascimento Cabral
Thank you, Chair. First word to thank the presentation of this study. I have two or three ideas because we need to take into account, and the report says in the beginning, that we are facing stormy seas. And it's a good analogy when we speak about the transatlantic relation between Europe and the US. But the numbers, as you just mentioned, Mr. Hamilton, and also our Chair, are quite astonished.
9.8 trillion dollars and 16 million jobs. So do you believe that we are condemned to be linked between each other? Second, how do you expect the tariffs will impact these numbers or not? To be honest, I think it was not fair, the imposed tariffs that we have right now on the Turnberry agreement, but at the same time it brought some stability and predictability to our business, and I think it's important to have it. Thirdly, this means that our companies and the money are more rational now than the politicians or not?
And one final thing, because I participated in the beginning of the week on a 75th anniversary of the American Chamber in Portugal, giving a speech. And one of the things that it was referred there, well, two things, I have to say. One is the importance of Portugal and Azores, right in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, to be, I would say, some kind of a platform for business between Europe and United States. But at the same time is the money that will flow where we have some stability and where we have some peace or adequate environment to prosper. Do you see that there is some risk for this or not?
Thank you.
Lina Gálvez
Yes, thank you, Brando. Sorry, I've missed also the first part of your speech because I was with the Chair in that other meeting. But I, one of the things I hear very clearly you saying that US needs Europe. And my question is, does US need European Union or European countries? Let me explain myself.
Because after the Second World War, obviously the US were big supporters, I would say even builders, of what was at that moment the common European market. But the both geopolitical landscape was very different than now. We have the Soviet Union close to us, it was the Cold War. But also economics, the way we were producing things were very different. It was still kind of standard, so to have a unique market was very useful for American companies.
But now this has changed also completely. Sectors that are leading are changed completely. So I do again my question. Does US right now need the European Union or the European markets irrespectively if we are united or not? Thank you.
Eva Maydell
Thank you, chair. I mean, every year the numbers are striking, right? But before I ask you a question, it's more of a comment. Unfortunately, even though many of us know those numbers quite well, it feels that the political narrative currently doesn't really resemble that, particularly from the other side of the Atlantic. And I think the presentation of this report is even more important to be done so in DC and other capitals across the US.
But my question is, looking at the numbers on the overall worth of the economy, on the billions in goods and services that cross every day, the amount of percentage the EU attracts from the overall foreign direct investment of the US, which is quite stable and growing and above 50%, it's, you know, it's so solid, I would say. But of course, we had the tariffs kicking in, which increased fivefold over a year. So I'm just wondering whether some of those headline numbers are maybe giving us a backward-looking picture, whether now the tariffs and the political uncertainty are not already changing where companies are going to put their next factory or their next R&D center, let's put it, a major investment. Of course, if I hear what Thibo said, that actually there's more certainty among the companies compared to the beginning of the year, these are, you know, I like the optimism. But still, I was just wondering whether we could potentially expect a relocation of capital and where to and in which areas to become visible and whether there's any hints in that direction.
Speaker 13
And then colleague Vaidere, and then we will go back to Mr. Hamilton, please.
Speaker 12
Yes, thank you very much. So, I'm interested in such aspect of trade. So, as you know, European Union has a wish to intensify relations, economical and political relations with Canada. So, and I'm interested how this our initiative could reflect in EU-US relations in practical terms. What could we gain from that?
What could we lose from that from American side and Canadian side and European side? What is your opinion on this? Thank you.
Speaker 6
Thank you so much. Well, let me go through some of these, I'll try to be quick as I can. What effect did has had the tariffs, have the tariffs had, was one question. Well, as I mentioned, many companies last year in anticipation of tariffs or even a trade war bought a lot of goods from each other, especially American companies bought a lot of European goods and stockpiled them because they didn't know what was going to happen. So that's one reason why the trade last year hit an historic high.
This year they're winding down those stockpiles. And so it's been a decline in US purchases this year from Europe, and that's because they already have bought everything.
So, I anticipate once they wind those down, and I think we see some trends already in July and August, that the demand for European goods is picking up again because they wound down those stockpiles. So that's, that's been one effect is simply affected the trade flows. The other, as we mentioned, is it affected investment flows with major European investment in the United States over the first half of this year, because again, it seems that they want to get in underneath the tariffs, or to show that they are contributing to the US economy, which is one of the critiques that President Trump has made, or because the US economy is actually really very dynamic right now, and Europe is totally linked into that, and so for very positive reasons, there's been a jump in the investment in a very dynamic American economy. So I think those are the primary issues, I think. The other, though, is that companies have had to adjust.
Either they pass on, you know, the cost to the consumers, so consumers are paying more. A tariff on European goods means American consumers pay 15% more. That's, that's a tax. I mean, the tariff is a tax on Americans, just to be clear what it is. And that's, you know, going to have some ripple effects across the US economy.
And it adds this unpredictability that Thibaut mentioned that is not, that's sort of the bane of how companies operate, they don't want that. So it's had lots of disruptive effects. And even with the Turnberry deal, you know, there's still a lot of tension about that, and so companies are still, you know, watching very carefully. There's no one strategy companies have adopted. As I said, some have stockpiled, some have diversified, some have passed costs onto consumers, and they're just constantly having to adjust to what this is.
There was one question about Portugal. I'm happy, I just came back from Lisbon myself. And, you know, I was at a conference called Atlantic Convergence. A thousand, a thousand companies from across the entire Atlantic going to Lisbon to talk about the digital economy, because the, not just Portugal, but the Iberian Peninsula is becoming a digital hub for the full Atlantic, the pan-Atlantic, not just the North Atlantic. And, you know, if you talk to companies these days that are, you know, they're saying the North is saturated in terms of the digital economy, but there are million, hundreds of millions of people in Africa and South America, Latin America, that do not have access either to reliable energy or to digital links.
And so the new frontier for them is the South. And they're positioning themselves to be jump-off points to build out that connectivity to the South. And the southern edge of Europe, of the European Union, especially Iberia, is becoming that hub for the pan-Atlantic. So I would watch this space. If you look at the build-out going on in Spain and Portugal these days, it's stunning.
And I think Portugal has a very bright future by building on that Atlantic vocation it has, not just to the United States, but to many other countries, and happy to talk about that in a different conversation. But I think it's a very positive message. Which, you know, brings to the question about, you know, are, is the United States interested in Europe or the EU, you know, what's the difference? I mean, you know, a little historical perspective, of course, we've been, we are constituent parts of the same Atlantic civilization and economy for, that we have been for 500 years. So we're not going away, you know, we're not leaving each other anytime soon.
In the past 80 years, I think generations of American leaders understood that a fractured Europe was not in American interest. That's what got us into world wars and depressions. And that only the US, continued US presence in Europe would be able to ameliorate some of those tensions.
It's not in US interest to have European countries look over their shoulder at each other when they think about their security or their prosperity. It is in US interest if they combine forces together with the United States to create a zone of prosperity and security, and that's been our lesson for 80 years. And we're faced with that same challenge to our security right now in Europe as we face the greatest war on the continent since World War II. But, you know, I think if you look closely at how American leaders and US governments, Republican or Democrat, have thought about the European Union over the years, in general the rhetoric is positive, but whenever a new initiative comes out of the EU, US leaders look to their interests. And so you have this sort of cycle, it's a very predictable cycle.
First Americans say, oh well, this new initiative, it's, you know, they're not serious about it, they're not going to do it, we can ignore it. Then they say, oh well, maybe it is getting serious, it's a threat, and we better, you know, watch out for this. Then they see what happens is that finally the Europeans come together on something that's not such a threat and maybe there's some benefit for Americans, and so then they sort of deal with it. And so, you know, we have this cycle, and you could trace that from the single market to the euro to any of these big initiatives, that's been the cycle of US response because in general the US will support a Europe that comes together, but it's not going to support a European that comes together at American expense. It's just a basic logical thing.
Americans, I think across the board, would want a European Union that is America's counterpart, not trying to be America's counterweight. And given the fractious state of European unity, if American leaders think that the EU is trying to become that counterweight, it will play Europeans off against each other because it's so easy to do, in all bluntness. We don't want, I think that's not an American interest, that's not an European interest. So how we manage that relationship, the words we choose, the kind of European initiatives that come forward, if they're explained well to American counterparts, we can manage this. We have done it for decades, and I think we can do it again.
But we have to be careful of this cycle. And some of the rhetoric one hears sometimes, especially this word autonomy, I'll come back to it, no one understands it. I think many people in Europe don't actually understand it, if we're going to be honest. But if we can talk about being indispensable, I think that's a new, a different basis for a political conversation about what we mean to each other across the Atlantic. And just to, just a last point on that, if you go to our study from earlier this year, there's a whole chapter on why the United States needs Europe and needs the European Union.
And I mentioned in the slides a few very specific examples of where that's true, and that's not going to go away anytime soon. So I would, I would be confident in the relationship, but be careful about how we discuss these things with each other so one does not get the wrong impression. The point about, you know, the what's in the media or what's the political conversation versus the numbers that we show is, is absolutely why we do this.
The study came out the first year during the middle of the Iraq war because the the media was full of headlines about, you know, protesters throwing chairs through McDonald's windows in Paris or Americans, you know, spilling French champagne down the down the street, down the gutter, and calling things freedom fries rather than French fries, things like that. We were at a crisis, if you read the headlines from that time, the relationship was at an end, it was the end of the transatlantic relationship. Well, we seem to have managed that. And that's because in that year, French companies never made more money in the United States than they did in history, and American companies had a record-breaking profitable year in Europe and France during the middle of the Iraq war. So sometimes the headlines and the political rhetoric are at complete odds with the reality of our relationship, and that's why we write this study to give us some orientation.
So if you say what's missing these days, most media coverage when they look at goods, I mean when they look at trade deficits, if you look closely, they're only talking about goods. Look at the chart in a newspaper when you read it, you're seeing they're not talking about services, almost never. And yet services are where most jobs are in Europe, most jobs are in the United States. It is a healthy relationship that we have in the services economy and we need to include that, and that balances immediately some perceptions. The other, as I keep saying, is look at the investment flows, follow the money, because that's where companies invest, that means they're putting a stake down in the other economy.
And that drives the trade, so look at where the investment is and where the services go, and that gives you a fuller picture of this dynamic than often what you either hear about or or read about. Last point was about Canada, question about Canada. Again, here's where words I think will matter. If there is a deep integrated relationship between the EU and Canada, which there already is, frankly, you have a trade agreement that you don't even have with the United States, so it's already a deep relationship, but many EU member states haven't ratified that agreement. So again, it creates uncertainty.
But the more you can deepen that, the more you can do a number of things, I think will ripple back into the US economy in a positive way because we are so deeply integrated with Canada. I remember during the TTIP discussions and the CETA discussions some years ago, some companies were thinking, well, maybe we move some operations to Canada to profit from the CETA arrangements with the EU if we're not going to have a TTIP. So these are kinds of considerations companies, you know, they move their assets around because they are based in Canada, they're based in the EU and they're based in the United States. So they can leverage their presence through these investment ties to try to take advantage of it. So that's the positive sign.
If this is seen as an anti-US effort, if it is seen as somehow building again a counterweight rather than a counterpart, then you're going to get some understandable blowback politically from American leaders, and not not the one right now in power, but a general sense that what is this all really about? So I think one has to be very careful about the phrasing, but this can be a positive because, you know, some years ago we were both engaged in that effort. The whole TTIP dynamic, the CETA dynamic, it was about building on these deep ties. That didn't work at the time, the TTIP negotiations, but that doesn't mean that some of the elements that were part of those negotiations shouldn't be revived. And I think we could do a whole lot with a new sort of positive agenda for our relationship that gets beyond some of this acrimony.
Brando Benifei
Thank you. And now, and I want to thank him for being here and for the work that we have done together with the AmCham EU for this this time, I want to give the floor to Thibaut.
Thibaut L'Ortye
Thanks so much. Now, I'll be extremely quick, but I think three maybe things from a business perspective on on your questions, or four.
Are we condemned? I don't think we are. I think there is an agenda that is possible and I think it requires champions. It doesn't mean that, you know, either side needs to be naive about where we are. But I think there are very concrete examples I gave where we can, you know, bring a momentum where interests align.
And I do think there's a role for people in this room. You know, I think you're going to talk briefly about the TLD. I think those connections and putting those issues on the agenda is important. I think there is a sense of agency that is possible there. On the question, yeah.
Condemned to be together.
Sorry?
Condemned to be together.
Thibaut L'Ortye
Yes, exactly. Yeah, yeah. No, exactly. No, of course, of course. I think on the question of the EU, I mean, the reason why our organization was created, so over 60 years ago, is the single market.
I mean, there is no doubt about the commitment of American companies to the single market. If anything, in every conversation I have with a member company in some way, shape, or form, it's about how do we build a stronger internal market. And if anything, the single market needs more champions here to be saying, I mean, this is the greatest assets that we have, it's the main driver of foreign investment into Europe. And so from the perspective of American companies, European integration is one of the greatest things that happened here and certainly we don't take for granted how we benefit from it. So I also want to just make that clear from our standpoint.
On your question of relocation of capital, a lot of the other studies that we're seeing that also look at projects show a downward trend. And I think my takeaway from this is again, I think there is some agency that is possible. The takeaway is this conversation here in Brussels around competitiveness actually matters because there's a question of the perception of Europe. And of course there is the volatility, but there's also how people in headquarters think about Europe, look at the opportunities. Do we go back to, you know, the single market, the access to the periphery?
And so I think that work that's happening here is extremely important for that reason because I don't think that those numbers are fait accompli, that there is no change possible. Actually there is, and I think that's the trajectory of, I think, the conversation politically at the moment without being naive obviously about the fact that it's a challenge. And then finally on Canada, to me it connects to the single market. The reason why companies invest here is also because of the network. The single market is a springboard that you can use to access the periphery.
And so obviously every attempt that the EU has to strengthen that network, it's with Canada, but we've seen it with many other parts of the world, is actually strengthening the investment proposition of Europe as a place that is open for businesses globally. And so obviously that connects to a lot of other debates I mentioned that in my opening remarks around how do we make sure that the attractiveness of Europe is connected still to its openness. Thanks.
Brando Benifei
Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Professor Hamilton, and also thanks to AmCham. I will just briefly inform now the members of the outcome of the TLD in San Francisco. We were all together 16 MEPs representing seven political groups, and including the chairs of AFET and INTA. The bipartisan congressional delegation led by the TLD US co-chair Representative Nathaniel Moran and comprised of four members of the US House of Representatives.
Key discussion topics included AI and tech industry, transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, defense and transatlantic security, as well as agriculture and trade. Members of both delegations engaged in exchanges with guest speakers from various stakeholders. The EU Ambassador to the US, Her Excellency Jovita Neliupšienė, briefed the members of the European Parliament on the overall situation of the United States, focusing on the upcoming US midterm elections. The mission started with a welcome reception at the Fairmont San Francisco Hotel, where Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi made a greatly appreciated guest appearance, briefly addressing the TLD participants. And US representatives reminded participants of the pivotal role that Hotel Fairmont, where we were, played in the drafting process of the UN Charter 80 years ago.
In the margins of the TLD, MEPs also had the opportunity to visit Innovit, the Italian Innovation and Culture Hub, and join a panel debate hosted by the Consulate General of Italy and facilitated by European Union Office in San Francisco. All in all, it was a very interesting and well-organized event. Following closely on the 91st TLD in Nicosia in June, it was easy to continue discussions in the light of the latest fast-paced events. So to conclude on this point, I would like to mention that the 93rd TLD is scheduled to take place next year in Vilnius, Lithuania, which will hold the EU rotating presidency until June 2027. The precise dates and agenda are not yet confirmed as after the midterm elections, I need to discuss them with the new TLD co-chair and ranking member.
Finally, to conclude, as information for you, the next meeting is scheduled to take place on the 9th of November at 5:30 in Brussels and will focus on the outcome of the midterm elections and its impact on transatlantic relations. Are there any comments on these two points? Any other business, as we say? No. So thank you very much.
Thank you again to our guests and thank you to Eva Maydell for chairing for half of this meeting and see you all on the 9th. Thank you very much.