House of Lords

4 September 2026

House of Lords

Follow its sittings
03:48 - 12:47
Speaker 1
And this whole operation was brilliantly orchestrated by our committee clerk, Matthew Manning, to whom I'd also like to pay tribute.  We learned a lot from many excellent witnesses.  And while to pick on one is unfair, I will take the liberty of breaching this rule by paying tribute to Charles Goodhart, the former Bank of England economist, whose brother William was a distinguished member of this House, whose contribution at the age of 89 lost nothing in its clarity and pungency.  He's a great exemplar of why we should not be pessimistic about the possibilities of an ageing society.  I also pay tribute to other members of the committee, including those who were rotated off before this debate. 

The UK is a rapidly ageing society.  The numbers are striking.  The Office for Budget Responsibility projections say the old-age dependency ratio, that is, the number of people above the state pension age relative to the number of working people, will rise from approximately 31% around now to 38% in 2050 and 47% in 2074.  And indeed, in the years of the last governments, conservative governments, 2010-2024, the population over 65 rose from something like 16.5% to 19%.  The decline in fertility rates is even more striking. 

In 1964, a peak fertility rate of 2.93 children per woman was achieved.  This has fallen precipitously.  In 2023, it had reached a new low of 1.44 in England and Wales and 1.25 in Scotland.  Now, the long-term replacement rate is 2.08, so you can see the basis of that demographic crisis.  We heard from our witnesses that the prospects for raising the fertility rate are dim, and policy attempts elsewhere to do this have failed. 

This was a great disappointment to me because when I worked for the President of the European Commission two decades ago, we had a confidence that the adoption of Nordic-style family-friendly policies, subsidized childcare, gender equality, more equally shared responsibility for bringing up children between men and women, that those would help sustain an adequate fertility rate.  Sadly, this has not proved to be the case.  Immigration is likewise not the panacea that in some quarters is made out.  It might help if immigration was circular, that is, immigrants returning home as their countries become more prosperous, which to some extent has happened with East European immigration. 

The problem with the immigration further afield that Britain has experienced since 2019 is that families are more likely to settle here permanently, adding in the short term to the public spending costs, but not adding to demographic sustainability in the longer term as second generation birth rates tend to adjust to UK norms.  Among our witnesses, people were optimistic that the change in profile of the population is manageable.  However, the rate it is occurring could pose substantial challenges, though it's worth highlighting that some of this is a result of a great success story.  Rising life expectancy is something to be celebrated.  For girls born today, life expectancy is 90. 

For boys, it's 86.7.  But there is a worrying gap occurring between life expectancy and healthy life expectancy.  Healthy life expectancy has actually fallen in the last couple of years, and there's already a north-south gap, a huge gap emerging.  It's seven years, for instance, in healthy life expectancy between London and the North East.  And these are very worrying trends. 

The fiscal picture is also stark.  In its 2025 Fiscal Risks and Sustainability Report, the Office for Budget Responsibility, for which I have great regard, unlike some other people, say that on current policy settings, borrowing will be pushed up by the early 2070s, clearly unsustainable, 20% a year, and debt will rise to over 270%, again, clearly unsustainable.  We aren't alone in facing this challenge, but that's no source of comfort.  The fact that others will be grappling with the same issues could actually increase competition between nations over a dwindling workforce at the same time as our economy will be struggling.  This is also more than just about the current elderly. 

The current young population will become the older generation of the future.  Indeed, thanks to the increases in life expectancy, they will be older for longer.  Yet, demography is not destiny.  One key conclusion we reached is that the government needs to focus on the older economically inactive who are below state pension age.  And I think these are facts that are not particularly well known. 

Discussion of raising the state pension age to deal with this problem is, in our view, misplaced.  Those who are still working at the point of the state pension age are entitled to claim the state pension and they're in fact highly likely to continue working beyond it.  The focus, the focus has to be on those who exit the workforce before reaching the state pension age.  Now, at the age of 50, this is the scale of the problem, at the age of 50, 80% of the age group are still in work. 

At the age of 65, the participation rate has fallen to 25 to 30%.  And it's that catastrophic fall in the participation rate which we feel is the public policy challenge that needs to be addressed.  Simply to raise the state pension age would actually plunge a significant number of people in that late 60s bracket into poverty, as happened when the pension age was raised to 65 from 65.  Now, the government is beginning to think very hard about how to promote workforce participation at the other end of the age spectrum among young people.  Absolute brilliant Milburn review, which I believe is greatly to be welcomed as an outstanding contribution to public policy.