Public Accounts Committee

6 July 2026

Public Accounts Committee House of Commons

Follow its sittings
00:06 - 01:43
Speaker 2
Order, order.  Welcome to the Public Accounts Committee on Monday the 6th of July.  Today we are examining the work of the Covid Counter-Fraud Commissioner in identifying and recouping taxpayers' money lost to fraud during the pandemic.  During Covid-19, the government acted at pace to deliver life-saving equipment, protect jobs and sustain the economy.  However, that urgency came with significant risks and it's now estimated that 10.9 billion pounds may have been lost to fraud across a range of support schemes, of which a staggering 9 billion has not been recovered. 

The establishment of the Commissioner's role reflects the scale of that challenge in recouping these losses and strengthening the government's counter-fraud capability.  So today in the second panel, the committee will examine whether government has recovered all they reasonably can, whether departments have the tools and resources needed to pursue fraud at scale, and what lessons are being learned to ensure the UK is better protected against fraud in future crises.  In this first panel, we will hear from the Counter-Fraud Commissioner, who I will extend a warm welcome in a minute, the Public Sector Fraud Authority and from officials at the Treasury.  So without any further ado, it would be really good and in welcoming all of you here today, if we could start with you, Commissioner, if you could introduce yourself, say what your role was, would be really helpful. 
01:43 - 02:21
Speaker 5
Well, good afternoon everyone.  I'm Tom Hayhoe, I spent a year working out of HM Treasury as the Covid Counter-Fraud Commissioner.  With a brief, and I would stress it's about counter-fraud not corruption, which I think there's sometimes a bit of confusion as to what the role was.  With a brief both to do what we could to achieve further recoveries of money lost through fraud in the course of the Covid pandemic, but also to make recommendations as to how we could prevent recurrence of fraud on that sort of scale.  That in essence was the brief that I was working to. 
02:21 - 02:36
Speaker 2
Don't normally do this, but may I commend you on what I think is a very diligent and comprehensive report.  I think we all owe you a debt of gratitude.  Thank you.  Could we then please go to Mark, you've many times before this committee, please introduce yourselves. 
02:36 - 02:39
Speaker 19
I'm Mark Cheeseman, I'm the Chief Executive of the Public Sector Fraud Authority. 
02:39 - 02:41
Speaker 4
Thank you.  Beth. 
02:41 - 02:44
Speaker 16
Hi everybody, I'm Beth Russell, I'm the Second Permanent Secretary in the Treasury. 
02:44 - 02:46
Speaker 20
Thank you.  And finally Marcus. 
02:46 - 02:50
Speaker 1
Hi all, Marcus Mason, Director Public Spending at the Treasury. 
02:50 - 03:16
Speaker 2
Thank you very much.  I will in a minute call the first question, but just before we do, could I...  Well, let me, while I sort out who's going to ask the next question.  I'm first.  Sorry? 

03:16 - 04:16

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

I'm first. You're first, thank you Catherine. On your point, Commissioner, we've had evidence from Transparency International and they make exactly the point that you made.

The role, of course, first announced by the Chancellor when she was in opposition, that it was a counter-corruption commissioner, became a counter-fraud commissioner when or before you were appointed. This mean it excludes, this is what Transparency International say to us in their evidence, it excluded cronyism, conflicts of interest, abuse of power, and despite political messaging implying others. They say, and I'm sorry, I'm not being critical of you, but I would like to put this to you to get an answer from you, the commissioner failed to address systemic corruption risks, leaving limited learning for future crises and continued reputational damage to the UK government. And I'm not being unkind by putting those questions, as I say, I'd just like to get your take on that comment.

04:16 - 06:03

Speaker 6

I think the first thing to point out is that at the same time as establishing my role as the counter-fraud commissioner, the government established a post which Baroness Hodge took on, it's the, and I can't remember precisely the title was, to be charged with taking the lead in terms of anti-corruption across government. So I think that would be the first point. The second one is that corruption doesn't necessarily result in fraud. Fraud frequently is related to corruption, but the two are not the same. And so, for example, one of the issues that was raised by, I think it was Transparency International who did it, pointed out the initial poor performance of contracts under the what public was called the VIP lane, popularized as the high-priority lane on PPE procurement, which actually at the end of the day didn't result in greater financial losses, albeit that there were some shortcomings in some cases of some contracts, but actually the money was recovered in those cases.

So there's no doubt to my mind, as someone who's quite sympathetic to the concerns about cronyism, that there did appear to be some cronyism, but it didn't necessarily translate into fraud. And there's no shortage of fraud which was completely unrelated to cronyism. So I think it's helpful to make that distinction. And I think if I'd been trying to cover both briefs, it wouldn't have been a reasonably addressable thing in the scope of a year and probably would have been less focused on the recoveries that we did make and the recoveries that there are still to make.

06:03 - 06:08

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you for that helpful explanation, that really is helpful. Catherine, please.

06:08 - 06:51

Speaker 14

Thank you, Chair. I think my first questions are probably to you, Tom and Mark. The Treasury has noted in its response to the COVID Commissioner's report that the Public Sector Fraud Authority has assessed that the COVID-19 spending that could be attributed to fraud and error could potentially be even greater than the 10.9 billion pounds that has been quoted. Probably a question for you, Mark, what are the reasons that are given for that assessment?

06:51 - 08:17

Mark Cheeseman

Absolutely. If I start off, I think the first thing is to give a bit of context. So the 10.9 is the best estimate that we have available, and actually if we look at benchmarks internationally, we are only one of three countries that I know of that have estimated COVID and pandemic level spending, the others being US and Canada, the others don't have them. So the other important bit of context to give is that actually fraud measurement is quite a new thing. HMRC have done it for a while, DWP have done it for a while, but broader in government, and this committee has challenged us on it before, it is quite a new thing.

And as such, practice in it is growing. The reason that the PSFA and the predecessor, which was that there was an independent panel that reviewed the estimates done in PPE and in grants and in the COVID loans, the reason that they came to that as an underestimate was because the measurement exercises that were done didn't meet the standard that had been set.

And the prime thing for that was that there were some areas of risk that hadn't been measured. However, I think it's also important to note that the 10.9 billion is a total best estimate that we have, and some of that we have had impact on. And some of that's covered in Tom's report. And there's other aspects as well, so for instance in bounce back loans, you could fraudulently take a loan and then pay it back, and that would come out of the 10.9 billion.

08:17 - 08:45

Speaker 14

So how confident are you, and I guess this is for both of you, that we do have a full extent of the potential loss here? Are you confident in those assessments? Are you confident that each department has maximized its ability to detect where that fraud might have occurred? What's the range for that figure, that 10.9 figure that you're working with?

08:45 - 10:34

Tom Hayhoe

I'm not sure I could give you the range, but I can illustrate some of the problems and why there is a degree of uncertainty. As I documented in the report, and it's actually documented directly by DHSC and they provided for a 10 million, 10 billion pound write-off, there was massive, massive over-procurement of PPE. Quite a lot of that ended up finding its way into landfill. What we don't necessarily know with some of that is whether some of that stuff would have turned out to be faulty, potentially contestable, and query whether there was fraud involved in it. So there are bits of uncertainty in there.

And in relation to the bounce back loan issue, which Mark has alluded to already, there are loans that may have been fraudulently taken out, where the degree to which cages have been rattled and to which DBT through their dissolution objection program, which means if you've got an outstanding loan, bounce back loan, you can't wind your company up, that within that, there will have been, there may be some cases which will turn out to be fraudulent. There will be others where the, and we've already saw 70,000 such companies withdrawing their application to dissolve, the money will end up being repaid, so the loan, the fraud won't necessarily crystallize. So it's around those sorts of things that I think we can put a lower limit as to what the level of fraud is, but I would struggle to say what the upper limit is.

10:34 - 10:52

Speaker 14

Could I just probe you a little bit on that example you gave of the PPE, because it's fraud and error? And it would, so to what extent does the error cover the ordering of PPE that is not required?

10:52 - 11:01

Tom Hayhoe

Well, there's no doubt that there was a major error in terms of the, or errors in the way that the PPE procurement program was undertaken.

11:01 - 11:08

Speaker 14

So then why is that not included in the 10.9 billion figure? Is that just for fraud rather than fraud and error?

11:08 - 11:44

Speaker 10

Well, the error was in attempting, in procuring a lot more than was ever going to be needed. And the extent of that, and I believe that the PAC has looked in detail at PPE procurement previously, was that, and this is the figures in the DHSC accounts for 2023, that at that point, this extraordinary chart just chopped off at 104 months, at that point there were 100, at least 104 months of forward stock of clinical gowns.

11:44 - 11:46

Speaker 3

But is that included within the 10.9 billion figure?

11:45 - 11:46

No, that's not.

11:46 - 11:47

And why not?

11:47 - 12:09

Mark Cheeseman

So the reason for that would be that government intended to buy that PPE, so that was the process, that was what was intended at the time. What the fraud and error estimate looks at is from government intention, what was then either a fraud attack or was done by error, went out against, not aligned to the criteria that government had set.

12:09 - 12:15

Tom Hayhoe

So a mistake in procurement as opposed to a difference in use of the word error.

12:15 - 13:24

Speaker 12

In hindsight you could maybe have broadened the scope to be fraud, error and waste might have been a useful exercise. I think PAC's already addressed some of that stuff in relation to PPE. But I guess what I'm trying to get to the bottom of, given there are, you know, not everything is known, which is clear, but to what extent are you confident in the government's assessment? So to what extent are you confident that they are targeting the right extent here? I mean, they are significantly undershooting in terms of recovering, but is it even worse than is apparent and there's actually an even greater amount of money if you were going to look at a range?

And I have to say in my experience, you would normally have a range in these circumstances rather than a specific figure if you're not clear about what that figure is. So I'm just trying to get a sense of how confident are you that it is as it has been stated and to what extent is there actually significant uncertainty around these figures?

13:24 - 14:26

Mark Cheeseman

So I think the first thing I'd say is that this was the first time we'd done this in a pandemic and we're actually the first country to do it. So coming to the 10.9 billion pound figure was an attempt to do that. To what extent do we know the full extent? Well, what we did during the pandemic is we had a global fraud risk assessment, which we have continued now because we saw it was good practice, and from that we looked at what the highest risk schemes were and those were the ones where the measurements happened. So in terms of are the highest risk areas covered by the measurements, I am reasonably confident that that is the case and I think the work that the Commissioner has done has looked at that as well.

To what extent do we know the full extent? Well, we've talked before about general estimates of fraud and error in the public sector, that is a difficult question. I would say we certainly know enough to act. And we know enough to act in two ways. One is to take action where fraud and error has occurred and as the Commissioner has reviewed.

The other is to re-engineer the system off the basis of what has happened to make it stronger so the levels will be lower in the future.

14:26 - 14:50

Speaker 15

Which brings me to probably a question for you, Beth, which is, you know, what is the process by which the Treasury is deciding whether it's feasible, whether it's value for money to pursue the recovery of fraud and error, and what guidance is the Treasury providing to departments to determine that?

14:50 - 16:22

Beth Russell

So we've obviously, the government's published a response to the Commissioner's report which accepts the vast majority of the recommendations and some of those obviously refer to specific recommendations related to specific recoveries in departments, particularly around the bounce back loans. As you're probably aware that in the budget last year, the Treasury has already put 17.5 million pounds into a series of pilots to look at in that area specifically, coming directly out of Tom's work and the discussions with the Department for Business and Trade. And then we will be looking at the evidence out of those pilots. They're deliberately designed in a test and learn way precisely because I think some of this we do need to test where it is most effective, what actions are most effective to recover more of this.

So we will be getting real-time information out of those pilots and be able to make quite rapid decisions about whether to scale those up or decide actually in some areas that isn't working. I think in terms of your broader, I guess, question about looking at investment to recover fraud and error. I mean, if you look beyond actually that specific investment, particularly in DWP and HMRC, the Treasury has invested, I think it's around five billion pounds in the last two fiscal events in this area. Obviously, we're always encouraging departments to come to us with spend to save proposals in this area.

16:22 - 16:29

Speaker 14

Five billion pounds being invested in the recovery currently.

16:29 - 16:37

Beth Russell

Yes, I believe so. That's in the last two fiscal events we've put that's a cumulative number over the scorecard period.

16:37 - 17:06

Speaker 15

Okay. And I guess given we're still only at a tiny proportion, well, sort of around ten percent of the estimated losses and there's still nine billion pounds of losses unrecovered. What would be your assessment, Tom, of how effectively the government is assessing the value for money and the priorities when it comes to pursuing these recoveries?

17:06 - 19:49

Tom Hayhoe

I think one of the things one has to recognize is that an awful lot of that will not be recovered now. One of the things which was quite frustrating having kind of come into this role with an initial brief, first Tom go and focus on PPE, was that I had to write off certain, well basically approve recommendations to ministers to write off seven hundred million in disputed contracts where there was no prospect of making the recovery. And the circumstances there were things where there were, because of the haste and the pressures at the beginning, defective contracts, contracts that went out with completely digitally corrupted schedules attached to them. There were counterparties in China where there was no prospect of making a recovery. And certainly having worked and discussed this with some top city firms who have been doing work for DHSC on this, their advice was it is not worth spending more to try and recover this because the prospects for success are sufficiently low.

Added to which there was the problem, and any of those who are lawyers around the table will be familiar with this, that in order to secure damages you have to demonstrate your loss. If you had nine years' worth of gowns at a sort of finite life and in the packaging which would mean they could remain sterile, etc., the defense would have been that actually you were never going to use those anyway, so where's your loss? So there are some issues there. Now the question then about should there be more investment in fraud both fraud prevention and recovery. My view, but I'm not a sort of fraud professional, I sort of came to this having had years as a retailer and in NHS governance, that but nonetheless is the I think there is a compelling business case to invest more in fraud.

In relation to HMRC, one of the things that I was initially critical of, but I can see exactly where they were coming from, was that the HMRC stood down its COVID counter-fraud team because they reckoned they had better returns to be made on their counter-fraud work elsewhere.

Now, given that there were still very substantial returns on investment that they were making on the COVID stuff, that suggests to me that actually there is a compelling case for HMRC investing, the returns they're making on their work. Now, HMRC have been at this for, they've been chasing fraud going back probably to the smugglers in the 18th century, and it's embedded in there. I think in other government departments it's less embedded and there is more to do.

19:49 - 20:03

Speaker 11

Okay, well looking forward, which departments would you say have the greatest potential to bring in further substantial recoveries? You've mentioned HMRC, are there other departments that should be focusing?

20:03 - 21:27

Tom Hayhoe

I think in the case of HMRC, they're better placed than I am to make the assessment as to what the level is, but I think there is a compelling case there. The area that, the two areas that gave me concern, which I highlighted in the report, one of them was in terms of work to be done around bounce back loans and the opportunity there. And one of the themes that comes through in the report, I hope, is actually that we tend to focus too much attention on criminal recoveries, which are very expensive and often unsuccessful, and in terms of actually recovering money, singularly unsuccessful. Whereas actually there is a lot of scope around using the civil routes, and so the rattling the cage around director's disqualification, and that can be for up to 15 years, which is actually quite a severe sanction. It only requires proof to the civil standard, the investigation is very different in lots of ways.

And in terms of both provoking people to withdraw their plans to dissolve their company and not repay the loan, actually the record of the dissolution objection process and potentially 70,000 companies withdrawing, that's probably the order of 0.9 of a billion that was saved, never actually crystallized as fraud, but it would have done if the actions hadn't been taken.

21:27 - 21:43

Speaker 15

Okay, I mean I wanted to ask about sort of incentives, but I'm sure we'll... Well, I was going to say in terms of back to the Treasury, how are you incentivizing departments to prioritize this, because it is a matter of prioritization?

21:43 - 22:43

Beth Russell

Yeah, and totally recognize the importance of incentives and improving incentives. I mean, just to say a bit about what we've already done so far in that area. I mean, Treasury already allow departments to keep income up to a certain level, which includes income generated through fraud recoveries. In Managing Public Money in 2023, we made explicit that Treasury would look favorably on requests to retain recoveries from fraud. And then in the Spring Statement last year, partly as a result of this work, we went further with a COVID recovery retention scheme, saying that we would pre-approve keeping the proceeds if departments came to us.

You may have seen that the Commissioner has recommended going further on that. What we want to do there is review the effectiveness of those things we've already got in place, because actually the requests from departments have perhaps not been as many as we thought there might be. So I think we need to understand what is behind that, but there is more we want to do on incentives.

22:43 - 22:50

Speaker 9

Commissioner, do you think it's working? And is that 5 billion pounds all being spent?

22:50 - 22:55

Beth Russell

I think the majority of that is DWP and HMRC, and that is being spent by them, yes.

22:55 - 23:00

Speaker 22

And is it working? The incentives?

23:00 - 23:13

Tom Hayhoe

It assists, certainly. I think that would be the... and in terms of the internal logic of it, if they don't have the opportunity to retain it, they're not going to focus their attention in that.

23:13 - 23:30

Speaker 8

Just to add that I think financial incentives are not the only incentives for us to think about. And I know Mark in PSFA are doing a lot with departments more generally on how to make sure they are really, really focused on this and it is at the most senior levels.

23:30 - 24:58

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you, Catherine. I'm just before we, I'm going to ask Sarah Olney in a minute to come in and the next question, but before we do, to put the whole thing into context, 10.9 billion lost, 1.8 billion recovered, of which 1.3 billion was from HMRC. So the whole of the rest of government has only recovered 0.5 billion, 500 million pounds. One of the questions in there is actually how on, if we look at the 0.9 of a billion that didn't crystallize as a result of the dissolution objections scheme and then beginning to sort of rattle the cages of people who were trying to wind their companies up and the fact there may be a whole lot more, but that's stuff which doesn't come into that total, but otherwise would have done if it had crystallized. And so it's a question as to how you, the unrealized fraud that is prevented is kind of outside those, those totals.

I get that, and I get that the whole business of barring companies from going into liquidation while they've got outstanding BBLs, but nevertheless, you've got to put all that into context, that 500 million that's only been recovered by the whole of the rest of government and you're putting 5 billion in from government to try and recover more money. I'm just wondering really whether we're beginning to spend good money after bad in trying to recover more sums.

24:58 - 25:05

Speaker 23

I think I should clarify on the 5 billion, that is not just all related to COVID fraud, it's fraud more generally.

25:05 - 25:10

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

I see, it's total fraud. Okay. Some clarification, Beth, thank you. Sarah Olney, please.

25:10 - 25:47

Sarah Olney

Thank you, Chair. I had a slightly unusual experience reading your report, someone had something nice to say about HMRC, this is not a common experience on this committee or as constituent MPs, but you, you, you laid out all the steps that they took to be very much more effective at dealing with fraud than other government departments. Can you just perhaps explain for the record what it was that they did and indeed other government departments that have been more successful at countering fraud, what, what it was that they did that made them more effective than the rest?

25:47 - 29:12

Tom Hayhoe

One of the key things about HMRC is that they have the data, they also apply a lot of effort to analyzing it. So data analytics is actually one of the really important keys in all of this. And you know, if I look at the investment that, of course these days I'm chair the NHS Counter Fraud Authority, the investment that we, I've only been there a couple months, but you know, are making in, in investing in data analytics in order to interrogate NHS data to identify and spot fraud that isn't there, that sorry isn't there, hasn't otherwise been recognized. That I think is one of the key things. One of the advantages that HMRC has is it does have a very comprehensive view of both company and individuals' financial affairs, what's been submitted and are in the business of interrogating that.

I think the real question is the degree to which for organizations who don't have that data themselves, how they can be provided with better access to data to be able to do that. And I think that gets on to, you know, a vexed issue that I have, which is the lack of transparency if we're looking at corporate data, and in particular the small companies regime. You know, I made quite a strong statement in the course of the report in terms of the both the deterrent effect of knowing that your at least turnover and profit will be in the public domain.

I regret that one area where I am disappointed at the lack of progress is that while is the full implementation of the ECCTA 2023 is not going ahead to the extent now that the data about a company's P&L will not be revealed unless they opt out or opt to allow it to be in there. Now, to my mind, if you're going to take advantage of the protections that are there for limited liability, and let's face it, it has been one of the kind of engines of economic growth for 150 years, 170 years, but if you're going to take advantage of it, you should not be objecting to members of the public, to your employees, your creditors, the people you do business with, knowing what your basic economics of your business is. And I think there is something about having access to data. HMRC has the an advantage over other other government departments in terms of the comprehensive access it has to data. The other thing which is actually really quite significant within this is that fraud was most appears to have been most prevalent where departments were dealing with parties who they didn't normally do business with.

So levels of fraud in DCMS were a lot less because they were typically working through Arts Council England, Sports Council, who in turn knew the organisations they were dealing with. And some of the a number of departments made particular effort at undertaking some basic due diligence before dishing money out. And I think that was one of the where we have seen the biggest areas of fraud is where people were dealing with unknown counterparties.

29:12 - 29:47

Sarah Olney

Thank you, that's really interesting. I'm going to come back a little bit later to your recommendations, particularly the ones that have only been partially accepted, which includes the point you're making about the small companies regime. What are the so for those departments, I mean, you've talked about the NHS and the difficulty of data and those and the counterparty and the unknown counterparties, probably the best way to put it. What more should those government departments be doing to prevent or to do more to prevent fraud in the future?

29:47 - 31:47

Tom Hayhoe

Well, the sorts of things that are sort of lessons learned I think from something like the Bounce Back Loan Scheme was that the the measures which would normally be undertaken if someone's going to borrow money basically went out of the window. Now, part of that was the fact the government decided it would go for a 100% guarantee on Bounce Back Loans. What I found very strange actually was that I spoke to a couple of people who had been at the most senior levels in big clearing banks who said, frankly, we were really surprised at that. We did not think that that made sound sense. Ironically, the view expressed further down the ranks in terms of DBT and British Business Bank is that the banks wouldn't wouldn't have done anything with this if we had left them with some degree of skin in the game.

I'm reminded of Mandy Rice-Davies here, you know, they would say that, wouldn't they? And I think that the sheer haste which went into the Bounce Back Loan Scheme meant that I think we all need to remember quite what it was like at the time, that things which wouldn't have happened in the cold light of day did happen. And I think to some extent there was appetite to go at a greater pace than was prudent. You know, it would have been sensible, for example, with the Bounce Back Loan Scheme to have stuck at the original £25,000 level that it was set at. And then if there was a need to go back and provide more support, do that in the light of experience.

Some of the more successful schemes at containing fraud, it may be a kind of opposite end, the the zoos scheme, tiny sums of money, but it was done in phases. It meant that you could do a bit of learning. And again, I suspect there they were also dealing with limited number of parties who they knew anyway. As far as I know, there's there are only a small number of zoos who were supported under that scheme and and therefore would have known all of them.

31:46 - 31:58

Sarah Olney

Thank you. And... and Mr. Cheeseman, what specific actions can departments be taking to increase the amount that they're recovering?

31:58 - 32:45

Mark Cheeseman

So to increase their recovery, all departments under the Fraud Functional Standard are required to have access to trained investigators. And under the Debt Management Functional Standard are required to have access to debt collection facilities as well and to seek to continually improve those. So under those functional standards and the work the departments do, we'd expect them to continue to do that collectively as a system. And in terms of other things they can do, it's in line with what the Commissioner has suggested in his report, which is to continue doing the work they're doing on those areas that have been identified where they could do more. And you've touched on HMRC already, review that in the light of what is the return on investment and value for money, which in fraud is a... it's both what is the pure money you get back, but it's also what's the deterrence effect you take by taking action.

32:45 - 32:49

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you. Thank you very much, Sarah. Clive Betts, please.

32:49 - 33:28

Clive Betts

I want to go to a couple of government departments which in effect outsourced their giving of loans and grants to third parties. First is the Department for Business and Trade and the Bounce Back Loans using the British Business Bank and commercial lenders to give the loans out. What lessons have we learned there about providing the ability for third parties who in the end have got no financial incentive to recover the money? They give it out and that's their job done. Is that a concern that we should be looking at for the future?

33:28 - 33:29

Is that directed at...?

33:29 - 33:32

Speaker 27

Yeah, whoever wants to pick it up.

33:32 - 34:24

Tom Hayhoe

I think the... one of the basic lessons should be that you need to provide some degree of incentive and economic... so leaving some degree of exposure to the banks. The... I think there could have been some much tighter policing and stricter application of the requirement that was there sort of in theory but never really I think properly resolved, that you could actually only extend a loan to an existing customer. One of the complaints that the big clearing banks made was actually that some of the challenger banks were seeing this as a great opportunity to build market share. And that in terms of where the bigger exposures were, the smaller the bank, the bigger the financial loss and the big default rates have been.

34:24 - 34:28

Speaker 24

In other words, it was just something they could give out as largesse and...?

34:28 - 34:48

Tom Hayhoe

Well, worse than that, it was actually a great marketing strategy. And without naming names, but there was one particular bank which was notorious for the way in which it appeared to be using this as a way to build its... its franchise with small business customers.

34:48 - 34:51

Speaker 25

And that wasn't illegal?

34:51 - 36:05

Tom Hayhoe

I think the question was that it was... it might have been outside the spirit of the rule, but the framework was written sufficiently liberally that it could have applied. That being said, there were some... the DBT and British Business Bank did actually with some of the most egregious cases, with... or the Treasury guarantee was actually technically withdrawn for the most egregious cases. But it doesn't apply to the challenger bank who I mentioned there, who I think saw it as being just a good commercial opportunity.

I think one of the big problems which I feature in the in the report in terms of one of the lessons learned is that actually you need to remember that just because you're in a crisis doesn't mean that people will behave well. For all the talk of Dunkirk spirit and Blitz spirit, we need to remember that Private Walker from Dad's Army with his black market activity, that people will exploit opportunities and you know I think there was a degree of almost naivety in terms of how we collectively as a nation responded.

36:05 - 36:15

Clive Betts

In the aspect there's no clarity about who is responsible in the end for ensuring the loans were properly paid to organisations who needed it.

36:15 - 36:47

Tom Hayhoe

The big difficulty is when you're saying you want to do something at scale where you adopt a policy that there will be a 100% guarantee. It's very interesting looking at the US example where they their equivalent was actually it was called a loan but actually it was essentially a grants programme but they used the loan device as a means for clawback of grants that were made where it turned out that someone had abused the terms of the scheme that they were using to prop up the economy in a crisis.

36:47 - 36:49

Speaker 26

Were they more successful in getting money back?

36:49 - 37:56

Tom Hayhoe

In terms of those of those cases because their model was was effectively it was a grant dressed up as a loan and they have used the loan successfully where the schemes have been abused. One of the other things that the Americans did which we didn't do here was that they were completely open about everyone who received a grant or a benefit. That tends not to apply in this country. The one organisation who I think was exemplary in terms of being extremely open and open in real time about who was making who they were giving money to was the research and technology arm which I think I can't remember which particular scheme was but if you had got a smart idea for trying to address COVID and put a bid in for 20 grand for support, that was all published and available in real time whereas actually nobody knows who actually got a bounce back loan unless you forensically look at balance sheets at Companies House.

37:56 - 38:24

Clive Betts

I'll ask Mark Cheeseman about local authorities. That's the other area where the department effectively outsourced the distribution of funds to other bodies. And it seems then that the Department of Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government have said, actually, it's not our responsibility anymore. It's local authorities' job to recover the money because they made the loans and we haven't. That's not sustainable is it, that approach?

38:24 - 39:45

Mark Cheeseman

So if it's okay I'll just return to the previous question then then answer that one because I think in the previous question your your question was around how what is government doing with loans and grants and where's it learning and I think actually there's been a lot of activity there to learn. So if I break it down into two, the first thing is understanding the risks. And since the pandemic, managing public money requires government departments to do initial fraud impact assessments and fraud risk assessments. We've trained hundreds of people in fraud risk assessment and put them across the system and we assure them that deep understanding of risk is there. But the second point as well is actually it's been, you know, we're pretty clear that it requires capable oversight and government's invested in that capable oversight because we have a qualification for those who lead fraud within departments.

They take that qualification and as someone who delivers part of that qualification, part of that qualification is on lessons learned around the COVID-19 pandemic and the different experiences. So just to touch on that first bit, I think there has been a journey there which is worth recognising.

Your second point is on local authorities. I mean, the dynamic there is the interplay between the accounting officer's statement and the local government accountability framework and the extent to which the accounting officer keeps oversight of the spending compared to local authorities who are accountable to their local electorate for the money they spend.

39:45 - 39:58

Clive Betts

And there should be accountability. Well, there is accountability at the end, isn't there, the accounting officer? But MHCLG is saying, well, not our fault, not our responsibility. This is all down to local authorities if things went wrong.

39:58 - 41:32

Tom Hayhoe

I think the issue is that at one level they're not accountable for what is driven by local democracy. And I can't dispute that as being the way things should be. That being said, there is a role for someone at the center to be sort of enabling, facilitating, calling out problems. We've ended up, I think, with a COVID fall in the gap between the old Audit Commission, which was actually, having been in the NHS on the kind of receiving end of some of the way that they would operate, and the new local government audit function, that there was no one who was there sort of actually championing this sort of work and making sure that consistently across local government that there was attention not only to basic financial reporting, but actually to good practice management and control of public money. And my frustration, which I sort of channeled towards MHCLG in the report, is that we at the moment have not got that addressed.

Looking at the government response, I think there's an intention that the local government audit office will be more robust in terms of its role in that respect than it was even when I or the plans, even when I was talking to people about this nascent body back in the autumn. But I think it's really important that at least this is there.

41:32 - 41:47

Clive Betts

Part of the problem of the weakening of local government audit oversight by the center, going back to the Audit Commission and a failure then to properly put in measures and bodies to perform those essential functions.

41:47 - 41:58

Tom Hayhoe

But one has to acknowledge the tension there is between local democracy and a sort of devolution of responsibility. But this was central government money that was being dished out.

41:58 - 42:03

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you very much, Clive. Sarah Green, please.

42:03 - 42:41

Sarah Green

Thank you, Chair. I'd like to ask Mark Cheeseman his perspective on the Department for Business and Trade, or BEIS as it was at the time, their decision to pursue recoveries on the bounce back loan scheme through NATIS, through the National Investigation Service. It's a contract that's cost the taxpayer over 38 million. It's recovered 7 million and resulted in only 14 convictions so far. I'm keen to get your take on what lessons can be learned from that choice that the department made.

42:41 - 45:09

Mark Cheeseman

Yes, and that was outsourcing the investigations to the National Investigation Service. Yes, sorry, thank you. So yes, I mean, absolutely, I think I'd break down the lessons from that into three areas. I think the first is that when the investigations were outsourced originally, the focus was on complex criminal matters from a management of fraud point of view. That is the most expensive long-term thing to take action on.

It is expensive and takes time. I've just said the same thing twice, sorry. I think the second thing I would say is that there wasn't enough oversight from the department on those investigations and key oversight, so experienced expert oversight over that, what was going on in the investigations, how they were working, what the performance level was and independent assurance of that. I'd say the third thing was that the funding to in that space was less proactive than it was in HMRC. We talked about HMRC earlier where 100 million pounds, sorry, for 1,200 people.

It more evolved over time as the threat was understood. So I think all three of those were lessons that contributed towards it being more difficult for the National Investigation Service to do a return on investment. There's also issues which have been talked about in terms of the governance there and the overall oversight of that within the organisation, but I've touched on the oversight from the department. I think lessons have been learned on that. So if I point to one thing I've already pointed to, and that's the leaders across government.

So we've done the leadership qualification. Again, we talk about this as part of that qualification. Part of the standard talks about your management and commissioning of fraud services and how you oversee those services, and we use examples to do that to try and build the capability off the lessons learned. I'd say the second thing is what we're doing with the legislation that came through the House recently and now we're building the Public Sector Fraud Investigation and Enforcement Service. So fundamentally in that, we are focusing on a mix, as Tom covers in his report, the different things you can take.

So civil, a lot of those powers were civil powers. They are lower cost to deal with, they are more agile than those complex criminal investigations. And also the government has and is appointing independent oversight, expert oversight of that body, the enforcement service, again building off those lessons learned in the pandemic.

45:09 - 45:12

Speaker 32

That's really helpful. Thank you, Chair.

45:12 - 45:17

Speaker 38

Thank you very much. Anna Dixon, please.

45:17 - 46:06

Anna Dixon

Thank you very much, Chair. And I think we're doing a bit of a double act going back to PPE. Obviously this committee has considered DHSC accounts now over several years in which those large numbers, I think you were mentioning before, of 10 billion have been written down. And indeed it led to qualifications obviously on those accounts by the Auditor General. So you talked earlier about the difference between fraud and corruption.

You've also already talked about the over-ordering sort of error. Just wondered if there was a type of fraud which might have been excess profiteering given the price that was paid for these goods.

46:06 - 48:13

Tom Hayhoe

It's a very difficult one to look at actually, the question as to what excess profiteering is. There was a business, I unfortunately can't remember its name, who are in the business of making gloves, who enjoyed a period when they were able to run their factories on, or their factory, on sort of three shifts, absolutely full time, and made twice the level of profit that they were making, and actually twice the level of gross margin as well as net margin as well as cash profit. Now, I could hardly see what they were doing as being profiteering. This is a company which bounces along in regular times and were able to step up to the plate. Now, I think the, and I would want to contrast that, which is actually the economic system working as it should do, with people who were seeing an opportunity to make a mint and then a customer who was willing to pay it.

Fundamentally, I would see the fault as being the very lax way, in which an uncritical way, in which procurement was taking place, partly driven by a belief that we were going to need to buy twice the amount that we were ever going to need, which then facilitated an approach to purchasing whatever they could do.

Tales of people arriving at a factory in China and discovering actually the Americans had got there first, which created a sort of psychology. Now, the question is, is that fault with the company who is making the supply, or is that fault with the customer?

48:13 - 48:46

Anna Dixon

The customer in this case obviously was the NHS, DHSC. We know that politicians were involved in putting companies onto the so-called VIP lane. So the overordering and the overpaying, at what point does the overordering and the overpaying by a customer where there were relationships between politicians and some of the suppliers that triggers things that you or indeed you should be referring or have referred to for further investigation, should we say?

48:46 - 51:51

Tom Hayhoe

I think the big problem was whether or not they actually were able to deliver. There were customers, there were businesses who failed because they were let down by third parties, intermediaries between them and a purported supplier. There were people who, and the most, one of the most notorious of the cronyism ones was a supplier who happened to be, or effectively they were no more than an agent in Matt Hancock's constituency, who ends up not being able to deliver, but actually returned all the money. If we even look at the case of PPE Medpro, they did actually deliver one contract entirely satisfactorily. It was the second contract, which was the one that didn't appear, which was then the subject of the 122 million pound settlement.

Had the UK operated, not got into quite the sort of panic mode that it did, where the scale of our purchasing, which was completely massively disproportionate to what our requirements turned out to be, partly because a decision was taken that we should purchase 12 months forward stock at the top of the market before we knew what the actual demand would be. In the report that appears in the appendix to, which was my preliminary report to the Chancellor, there's an exhibit of something produced at the end of April, which projected a monthly demand which was no more than, which was only 50% of the level that was ever called off by the NHS. Now, had the NHS or DHSC written off a couple of billion at the end of this crisis and we'd maintained good supply, I think one would describe that as being a right-side failure. However, writing off 10 billion on a 13.8 billion pound procurement meant that we were pushing global prices up because of the scale of our purchasing. It's a very difficult one, which is kind of way above my pay grade and one I think to leave to economists to establish as actually what the appropriate pricing would be in those sort of circumstances.

But ultimately, we should have been a much smarter customer and not operated the approach which we did. Essentially, the sort of rule of thumb which created an upwards movement in prices, which was that I think the figures were, it had to be the price which was being quoted had to be within 10% of what the previous order had been, which did create a sort of formula for ratcheting up. But if I go back to the case of the glove manufacturer from Bedford, who, the fact that they maintained the capacity that meant they were of the capacity, I think they frankly they earned it.

51:51 - 51:55

Speaker 33

But you would suggest that there were some conflicts of interest that you uncovered.

51:55 - 52:39

Tom Hayhoe

Well, there was undoubtedly some conflict of interest cases, and I think the most, the very high-profile case of PPE Medpro is one where, and you know, and anecdotally there was more conflict of interest applied in that case than others in terms of how the case was pursued. So there were many people who were referring cases, and there were, you know, NHS colleagues and DHSC colleagues who received an approach and put them into the high-priority lane, as well as it being a device, I think, to protect, probably protect, you know, not being anyone around this table, but politicians who are being chivvied by someone sort of saying, "I can provide you with stuff, what can I do?"

52:39 - 52:55

Anna Dixon

So you mentioned about the modeling being way out, sort of double plus a 20% contingency from any amounts that were ever used. It just mentions external consultant. Who did the modeling? Did you see, is that report in the public domain?

52:55 - 53:06

Tom Hayhoe

The report is not in the public domain, and I'm not at liberty to say who the company is.

53:06 - 53:42

Anna Dixon

Okay, so the final point from me and then I'm sure the chair will follow up is really about the stuff that was never used. So we've talked there about, you know, some contracts weren't fulfilled. Obviously some contracts were fulfilled, but the stuff was never used. It was put into, you know, storage containers, and it was therefore very difficult to judge whether the stock supplied was substandard or not. And obviously, you know, part of this fraud that we're trying to establish is were we sort of missold the products.

So what did you get to the bottom of that?

53:42 - 54:58

Tom Hayhoe

Well, I think the problem, one of the problems comes back to this question about errors and actually scoping out what the numbers were, is we don't know. And all things that I learned in a kind of commercial career in retailing about things like a goods received note and checking sampling stuff before you opened it, just the sheer volume meant that the whole procurement, I think, essentially was out of control. And it was partially driven by this belief that we needed to build 12 months' forward stock now, order it now. And on top of that, there was another contingency, and there may have been a second contingency, but I could never get quite to the bottom of it. And it was based on a forecast which was, you know, some basic modeling, albeit it was modeling that initially I'm told had come from estimates being bottom-up estimates from within the NHS.

But I think the real problem is when you're doing something at scale and at pace, you need to think twice before you make bigger commitments than you need to. We would not have had the same problem if we'd bought three months' forward stock and kept a bit in the background before we made the next commitment. So there is something about not doing everything at once.

54:58 - 55:12

Anna Dixon

The final question, give a short answer. So the 324 million pound fraud estimate that DHSC put forward PPE, do you think that truly reflects the taxpayers' full loss from fraud? You can just say yes or no.

55:12 - 55:19

Tom Hayhoe

To some extent, there is an element to which we don't know, so it may be bigger. It won't be smaller, put it that way.

55:19 - 55:20

Speaker 36

Okay, maybe bigger.

55:20 - 55:21

Thank you.

55:21 - 55:43

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you. Just to pursue Anna's last point. Could you, Tom, tell us why that estimate of 324 million of PPE fraud, but you approved write-offs apparently of 762 million, so the two figures in your paragraphs in your report 2.4 and 2.10, why did you approve that bigger write-off?

55:43 - 55:59

Tom Hayhoe

The reason for it is that having looked at each of those contracts and discussed it with the lawyers and looked at the particular circumstances around it, the prospect for recovery was next to nil.

55:59 - 56:38

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

But I mean our report says by the 31st of July 2020 it had awarded eight, this is the Department for Health, over 8,000 contracts for goods and services such as PPE and professional services in response to the pandemic with a value of 18 billion. Now when somebody signed those contracts, they must have had an idea of what the volume was. They, we've heard many times in this committee, that they were putting pallets and containers on land in farmyards or even on farmland. They had no idea where they were going to put it. They didn't have enough staff to go round and see what was in those pallets and containers.

This was a monumental failure of government, wasn't it?

56:38 - 57:32

Tom Hayhoe

Yes. Not to put it, you know, it was, this was something where a view that was taken that we should be building overnight this sort of stock which might be prudent to have to protect us in the long term. And it is something, it's something that personally left me as someone who'd spent 13 years chairing NHS trusts, cracking the whip over people who in turn would crack the whip to, you know, to make a cost improvement program for a small frontline team of five grand or something. And, you know, 10 billion was was written off, which was fundamentally arose because, and this is not, most of that wasn't, most of that 10 billion wasn't fraud. You know, that was the separate issue.

57:32 - 57:34

Speaker 40

It was Catherine's point, it was error.

57:34 - 57:52

Tom Hayhoe

It was, it wasn't even, it's not just fraud and error. It was a, it's the distinction that Mark was making, that these were conscious decisions that were taken that should not have been, it was a, you know, a very big mistake and it was one which was, I think, a lack of recognition of the uncertainty.

57:52 - 58:13

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

And the tragedy of it was that there were points where social care settings were desperately short of this PPE. And because they didn't know when the sell-by date came and went, they weren't even able to donate it to poorer countries around the world. So it literally went to waste, it went to landfill. The whole thing was terrible.

58:13 - 58:34

Tom Hayhoe

I think we'd all agree that, and there's, and hence some of the lessons were about, you know, recognizing the risk of big programs and being, you know, exercising a degree of discretion and judgment about how do we mitigate those risks. And I think that's where they, where we had the failure.

58:34 - 59:03

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

This might be a question for you, it might be a question for Mark, but our November '22 report says, in April '22, Supply Chain Coordination Limited, SCCL, took over responsibility for the program, this is the PPE contracts program. However, it is un, and this was in to do with stocktaking, however, it is unclear how exact responsibilities and roles split between itself and the department. Can you throw any light on that, Mark?

59:03 - 59:05

Speaker 39

That's not something I have information on at this point.

59:05 - 59:14

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Could you write to us and tell us what that's all about? Because it seems to me they were employed to do a job and didn't do it, or didn't do it properly.

59:14 - 59:17

Speaker 41

That may be one for the Department of Health accounting officer.

59:17 - 59:27

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

I will ask them in the next session. That's very kind. Well, I think we've done quite a lot on PPE just simply to say that it was, it was pretty awful. Sarah Olney, please.

59:27 - 59:43

Sarah Olney

Thank you chair. Tom I'm as I said earlier I'm going to come back to your your recommendations at the at the end of the report. What do you think is the most important recommendation that you've made that you really want the different government departments to really take on board?

59:43 - 01:01:29

Tom Hayhoe

I think possibly the most important recommendation is the one about preparedness and learning lessons. The I think one of the big risks that we face and this is not a something which is unique to government which is you don't learn the sort of generic lessons from the last crisis. You may learn the very specific ones which and the which won't be reproducible. But now I've cited the example that David Owen talks about about the taxis and and the fuel crisis. There are certain sorts of things which one of the problems at a certain stage in life when actually I remember the you know doing my A-levels by candlelight during the first mining miners crisis but actually no one in a professional world will have a memory that that sort of long.

And for me something that's 40 years ago is in my memory but not necessarily the memory of the kind of frontline decision makers now. The question is how you refresh some of those things what things you put in place to and this is where talking about things like I think there's one of the good examples of work that's happened since then Operation Pegasus which was a bit of sort of road testing. Now I don't know from her healthcare days I don't know whether you're even aware of the rubber windmills which was the kind of the NHS approach to simulating exercises but doing those sorts of things lead to preparedness and constant reminding of it and within that making sure that awareness of fraud and the potential abuse of whatever schemes you put in place are if not top of mind major considerations. That I think is the key thing that I would be.

01:01:29 - 01:01:57

Sarah Olney

Coming back to the point you made earlier about the the small company reporting regime. The government only partially accepted your recommendation on the basis that Companies House accounts reforms will improve transparency and data reliability. Do you want to just expand a little bit more on what you were saying earlier about why you think that's important?

01:01:57 - 01:03:46

Tom Hayhoe

I think the in direct relation to the bounce back loan scheme it would have been much easier for people at the to undertake a very basic bit of due diligence which is let's just look at your accounts Companies House we can see that you didn't have the turnover that you were claiming you had. Secondly I think there's a bigger issue of principle which is one of essentially being if you're going to be protected by limited liability that your creditors the people you do business with the people who work for you it may be also the local government office who is extending certain trading rights you they can look back and see actually this is who you are and the big question there really in terms of the people who argue against is kind of what have you got to hide? Now I think my name appears as a as a director of something like 27 or 28 companies at Companies House. I've spent most of my career working with and in some cases as the principal in small companies. I cannot see a good reason for not as the quid pro quo for limited liability providing that transparency that gives provides basic data on your underlying performance.

It shouldn't be a matter of having to go and as you do at the moment but actually you can identify if you apply either a bit of elbow grease or an AI tool from looking at accounts over a couple of years whether someone has been the beneficiary of a bounce back loan that they've then not repaid.

Transparency in this I think is a basic trade-off for the protection you receive from limited liability.

01:03:46 - 01:04:04

Sarah Olney

Can I quickly ask you as well about recommendation 3C that the government also only partially accepted, that the Treasury should amend managing public money to require accounting officers who seek a ministerial direction on fraud risk to provide updates to ministers. Do you want to say a little bit more about that?

01:04:04 - 01:04:52

Tom Hayhoe

I think that the I think there's an essential issue in relation to ministerial direction, which I think is extends way beyond fraud. Fraud was the only extent to which I had a was my remit. That if you are doing something which means for probably very good reason in a time of crisis that you do something that means that you relax or remove the guardrails that managing public money puts in place, that there should be some process for ensuring there's essentially a sort of sunset clause on it. And quite a lot of ministerial direction may be transactional in which case it's not required. But it just strikes me.

01:04:52 - 01:04:59

Sarah Olney

Are you sort of suggesting that there shouldn't be like open-ended ministerial direction? A ministerial direction issued in a time of crisis, there should be a defined end to it.

01:04:59 - 01:05:24

Tom Hayhoe

It should automatically expire and always be subject to review. You can ask why did I suggest four months? I think three months is too short and six months is probably too long. But some process. And if it's not exactly as I've proposed it, some alternative which provides that degree of protection of essentially the integrity of managing public money, which I think has been a very powerful tool for.

01:05:24 - 01:05:32

Sarah Olney

And can I just quickly ask what what led to that recommendation? Are you finding that there are officials in government departments who are continuing to operate under a ministerial direction?

01:05:32 - 01:06:22

Tom Hayhoe

No, but I think there were there were some issues where the crisis, because it extended for some time, perceived to extend for some time, we went through several rounds of lockdown. The and I think it just you need to have a situation because in some cases there are some ministerial directions, and I wouldn't call out any one in particular, where in retrospect one might have sort of said, well, actually we can live with we don't require the ministerial direction, we can do it within public money, but the decision was taken to go that bit further. Managing public money is a very powerful tool for basic protection apart from anything else for the ministers and senior civil servants themselves. From time to time ministerial directions may be appropriate, but you need to make sure they're not open-ended.

01:06:22 - 01:07:18

Beth Russell

Do you want me could I just come in and add a couple of things to that? So we totally agree with the intent here, which is a direction shouldn't be a sort of one-off thing and then oh that's all right then because I've got a direction. It's it's absolutely got to be a kind of closely and transparently managed. And we've already made updates since COVID to managing public money in 2023 and 2025 to to make that point much more explicit and to say that accounting officers should seek to accounting officers should seek to bring policy into line with what what was the position before the direction as soon as as soon as possible and should be having regular conversations with ministers and about about regularizing the position. And we do plan to do more on that in light of Tom's recommendation.

So we're going to review the ministerial direction process and look at the the best way to pick up that recommendation but in a way that doesn't add more complexity to the ministerial direction process.

01:07:18 - 01:07:42

Tom Hayhoe

Yeah, I agree we don't want complexity, but I think the as soon as possible thing, there are occasions when putting something a line in the sand may actually be helpful. But I wouldn't while I've been a director of 27 or 28 companies, what I've lost track, I'm not necessarily an expert on the precise ways in which some bits of Whitehall work.

01:07:41 - 01:08:01

Sarah Olney

Thank you. And Beth, you were leading me sort of to my next question, which was basically to ask whether you think that as a result of the recommendations, that the government are now better prepared and in a better position to manage or to minimize fraud losses in future crises.

01:08:01 - 01:09:27

Beth Russell

Yes, I mean, I want to obviously say thank you to Tom for his report, like others have said, I think it's a really comprehensive piece of work. Obviously, a lot of it is focused on recoveries from the last crisis, but I think the lessons learned and the preparation for the next crisis is a really, really important part of this. Obviously, a lot of things have changed since COVID, not least Mark's role, the Public Sector Fraud Authority, the recent act, we've got much stronger powers now. We absolutely see, you know, this report as the start of an ongoing process, or halfway through an ongoing process rather than the end of it. I would say that I think one of the things that we haven't talked about, but I think comes out a lot in all of this, is the importance of the start of the conversations about the schemes you're introducing or the things that you're doing and setting them up right.

And a lot of what we've been trying to do through the guidance and engagement the Treasury has with departments, and we published recently Spending in a Crisis, which sets out the things that departments should be thinking about when in that kind of situation and making sure it's not that no risk can be taken, some risk, you know, will always need to be taken, but doing that, understanding the risk, being transparent about them, making sure that if you do think that there is risk of fraud, that you're baking in and taking account of the cost of cleaning that up in advance. So I think there's quite a lot we're trying to do there as well as the contingency planning exercises where we're going to be looking at making sure that fraud is being properly taken into account in that.

01:09:27 - 01:09:33

Sarah Olney

Thank you. And Mark, I was just going to ask, would you agree with that assessment, or do you think there's more that the government still need to be doing?

01:09:33 - 01:11:24

Mark Cheeseman

I'm sure this committee will come with some suggestions of things we should be looking at, as Tom has, I'm sure the COVID inquiry will come with some suggestions, and of course we'll look at them, we'll look at how we can get better and better, because we're not standing still, but neither is our capable and committed adversary, so we need to be continually looking at how we get better. I've already talked about what's happened on risk, and we talked in another committee about what we're doing on data, which was driven from learnings during the pandemic as well. But there are a couple more things I'd just point to. We talked in the last committee about targets, the targets that departments have. Earlier the question was around what was the difference with HMRC.

Well, one of the differences was they're very used to talking about, I invest this to get this outcome from fraud with all these different levers. Other departments were less mature on that. This committee said, you know, we recognized that only 7% of public bodies had those targets. So putting in that performance focus from the Public Sector Fraud Authority and getting those targets across the system is a way of the system learning that lesson to be better prepared, and I think it will be better prepared. The second thing that we've touched on is the Public Authority's Fraud Investigation and Enforcement Service.

That will take action in line with what the commissioner's suggested, but it'll also be there for the next crisis, with better powers, better ability to recover the debt, better ability to look at things. So I think that's there as well. The third thing I'd point to, which I've touched on a bit, is systematically building capability across the system. I've talked about the training for the leaders, talked about training for fraud risk assessors, but there's training on measurement, training on fraud prevention, which the Government Counter Fraud Profession is pushing across the system, systematically getting those learnings there and making sure they're there. We've also touched on how managing public money, the Amber Book, Green Book, a lot of the documentation that supports how we do this have been updated.

So I think yes, we will be better prepared, but we should always challenge ourselves how we're going to go further.

01:11:24 - 01:11:34

Tom Hayhoe

And I probably should say as chair of the NHS Counter Fraud Authority that we, or my new colleagues, do have targets and they're very proud of the fact that they've exceeded them and they will be pushed to have bigger targets in future.

01:11:34 - 01:11:36

Speaker 42

That's very good to hear. Thank you. Thank you, Chair.

01:11:36 - 01:11:44

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you, Sarah. Marcus, I'm very conscious that we haven't asked you any questions. Is there anything you want to add before we close? I'm going to close the session in a minute.

01:11:44 - 01:12:02

Marcus Mason

The only thing I would add, just on the last question, is as part of the response to your report, Tom, we're setting up a scrutiny panel, which will kind of oversee delivery against the actions off the back of your recommendations.

01:12:02 - 01:12:04

Speaker 74

And you want me to sit on it, don't you?

01:12:04 - 01:12:14

Marcus Mason

Absolutely, we'd love for you to be involved. And that is another mechanism, right, to kind of keep us to account over the coming months.

01:12:14 - 01:12:22

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

So the scrutiny panel specifically involved going through all the Commissioner's recommendations and just seeing how you're performing against the recommendations.

01:12:22 - 01:12:23

That's right.

01:12:23 - 01:12:38

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

That's really good. And finally, Tom, just to give you a chance, is there anything we haven't discussed today that you think we should have discussed, particularly in relation to learning lessons for future pandemics?

01:12:38 - 01:13:20

Tom Hayhoe

I think the, I don't think there is anything that we should have, but I would just highlight is that I do recognize that quite a lot of work has taken place even since December, when I produced the report, and some things were already, some elements already in hand. I think the challenge is one to maintain pace, and you know, there are things which, there are bits of me that sort of think, why haven't we done that yet? But you know, I'm confident actually there is work going on, and because I now have this role in relation to counter fraud in DHSC and the NHS, I can see the work that's going on and the progress that's being made.

01:13:20 - 01:22:58

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Can I thank you particularly? We have benefited hugely from your work and your report, for which we're all very grateful. Can I thank all of our witnesses today? It's been an interesting session. We will reflect carefully via the transcript what you've said.

An uncorrected version of that transcript will be available in the next few days, following which we will write a report with recommendations, which I hope you will all scrutinize carefully. But again, many thanks for coming today. We will take a short break now. It's quarter to two. If we could be back here by about five to, or just shortly thereafter, with the next panel, that would be really great.

Order, order.

Can I extend a warm welcome to our witnesses today? Order, order. Welcome to the Public Accounts Committee on Monday the 6th of July. Today we're examining the work of the Counter Fraud Commissioner in identifying and recouping taxpayer's money lost to fraud during the pandemic. During COVID-19, government acted at pace to deliver life-saving equipment, protect jobs and sustain the economy.

However, that urgency came with significant risks, and it's now estimated that 10.9 billion may have been lost to fraud across a range of support schemes, of which a staggering 9 billion has not been recovered. The establishment of the Commissioner's role reflects the scale of that challenge in recouping these losses and strengthening the government's counter-fraud capability. So today, the Committee will examine whether the government has recovered all they reasonably can, whether departments have the tools and resources needed to pursue fraud at scale, and what lessons are being learned to ensure the UK is better protected against fraud in future crises. So today, we are very fortunate to have the Permanent Secretary on one of her many return visits. Sam, would you like to introduce yourself, please?

01:22:58 - 01:23:02

Samantha Jones

Good afternoon. I'm Sam Jones, Permanent Secretary at DHSC.

01:23:02 - 01:23:06

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you very warm welcome to you. Elizabeth, would you like to introduce yourself?

01:23:06 - 01:23:11

Elizabeth O'Mahony

Yes, please. Elizabeth O'Mahony, Director General Finance, Department of Health and Social Care.

01:23:11 - 01:23:13

Speaker 65

Thank you very much. And Steve?

01:23:13 - 01:23:17

Steven Greenwood

Good afternoon, Steven Greenwood, Director of Grants Delivery at the Department for Business and Trade.

01:23:18 - 01:23:22

Janet Alexander

Hi, Janet Alexander, Director of Compliance Operations at HMRC.

01:23:22 - 01:23:27

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Very good to see you. And finally Chris, you've stepped in at very short notice, so thank you for that. Would you like to introduce yourself?

01:23:27 - 01:23:34

Chris Jones

No problem at all. Yes, Chris Jones, I'm Director of Local Government Oversight and Accountability at Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.

01:23:34 - 01:23:38

Speaker 44

Very good. Well, to start us off, please could we start with Catherine?

01:23:38 - 01:24:17

Speaker 12

Thank you, Chair. Hello all. With a minimum of nine billion pounds of unrecovered COVID fraud that or fraud and error that has been identified by the Commissioner, can you, and I appreciate there are a number of departments here, so I guess I would plea for brevity, but you know, what is it that you're doing, well A, do you accept there is much more to do to recover the fraud, and B, what are you going to do about it? Who'd like to start?

01:24:17 - 01:24:18

Shall I start?

01:24:19 - 01:24:27

Speaker 12

And we will go into more depth on DHSC, so yeah, you go last. So we'll start with DWP.

01:24:27 - 01:24:28

I'll start, DBT.

01:24:29 - 01:26:08

Steven Greenwood

That's okay. So I think I'm just going to start with on the particularly I guess we've got the COVID loans and the COVID grants that we're responsible for in DBT. What I would just say on the COVID loans, and I appreciate the point about brevity, is that the majority of those, so about 68% are either repaid or repaying on schedule. So actually the majority, we do expect to recover the majority of the money through the loan schemes. That being said, I think I recognize the sort of substantial amount that's currently suspected fraud.

The Commissioner sets that out in his report, it's about 1.7 billion that's been flagged by lenders as suspected fraud. What are we doing? I'd sort of talk about it probably in three ways. So we've got enforcement activity, that is our activity aimed largely at the most serious fraud cases, so that's both criminal cases and things like director disqualifications as well. The Insolvency Service have already disqualified just about 3,000 directors.

So they are important deterrents and sort of justice outcomes that we're progressing through the system. We then effectively have I guess two areas of work that we're scaling up now, that is compulsory liquidations. The pilot that we ran with lenders I think showed a net positive return, a modest net return, so we're now scaling that up over the next two years. And then working with the Public Sector Fraud Authority, we've been piloting a letter writing campaign. That will encourage people to start repaying and actually is a good route into their civil penalties regime.

I think I don't know if Mark was able to talk about that in the last session, but we see that actually as a really good route to try to recover more money and expect to ramp that up over the autumn.

01:26:08 - 01:26:28

Speaker 12

Can I just clarify something that you said there? Because there is quite a significant gap still between the bounce back loans that have been detected as fraudulent and the amounts recovered. There's a significant gap there. When you say 68%, do you mean in financial value or do you mean in the number of loans?

01:26:28 - 01:26:29

In the number of loans.

01:26:29 - 01:26:44

Speaker 12

Ah, so where are you on the financial value that you're recovering? The 1 billion 620 million not yet recovered.

01:26:44 - 01:26:59

Steven Greenwood

Well, it's a significant amount. It is a significant amount, I agree on that. And I think a lot of the money that hasn't been recovered, I think is genuinely due to business failure, right, of small businesses. So we are focused on that fraud element. And I do agree...

01:26:59 - 01:27:02

Speaker 61

So what does it, so what, just put the 68% in context.

01:27:02 - 01:27:10

Speaker 47

So 68% of all the loans, so there's approximately 1.6 million loans that were made out across the three schemes, the three COVID loan schemes.

01:27:10 - 01:27:12

Speaker 59

And do you have a value for that 68%?

01:27:12 - 01:27:29

Steven Greenwood

That's about 70, of that 68%, it's about 62 billion is either been repaid or is on schedule.

Give me million. Billion. Is either... so that is not the fraud population, that is the whole population. Okay. Billion.

01:27:29 - 01:27:32

Speaker 60

Okay. I don't really understand that.

01:27:32 - 01:27:38

Steven Greenwood

I'm very... I can after this, I'm very happy to... Follow that? I don't know. ...to write and and break it down in a table if that's if that's helpful.

01:27:38 - 01:27:47

Speaker 14

So, sorry, so because we've got 1.7 billion pounds detected... Suspected fraud. Yeah, that's correct. Yep. ...suspected fraud.

And what was that figure you just gave me there?

01:27:47 - 01:27:50

Speaker 47

So I was talking about the whole loan book, so not the suspected fraud.

01:27:50 - 01:27:52

Speaker 53

Oh, we're just talking about the fraud.

01:27:52 - 01:27:56

Speaker 64

Oh, sorry. So 1.7 billion... So what's 68% then, sorry? That is of the whole loan book.

01:27:56 - 01:27:58

Speaker 46

Oh God, right. Well, we're just talking about the fraud now.

01:27:58 - 01:28:21

Steven Greenwood

So of the fraud, okay, 1.7 billion as you say has been flagged by lenders, detected. And we've recovered 80 million of that. Yeah. Yes, which is as per the Commissioner's report. Yes.

So what's the plan to recover the rest? So... So the plan is as I say, it is that enforcement activity... So the 68 billion... sorry, I thought the 68% was you saying that's the amount... No, no, sorry, I was trying to set the wider context of the programme.

01:28:21 - 01:28:23

Speaker 77

Ah, okay. Well, that's quite confusing, but thank you.

01:28:23 - 01:30:19

Janet Alexander

It's actually set out quite well in the table. Yeah. Yeah. So the... which is why I was curious about the 68%. It didn't sort of make sense in the context of this.

Apologies. Thank you. Which department would like to go next? Should I go next? So, HMRC administered kind of three of the grant schemes, so the popularly known furlough scheme and the self-employment scheme and Eat Out to Help Out.

The total cost was 98 billion pounds. We estimated at the start of the scheme because they were developed at such pace that we thought the fraud and error rate, and we don't tend to separate the two in HMRC, was around 5 to 10%. We put in quite a lot of upstream controls, so we've managed to mitigate that risk to 5%, so that was the exposure before we paid out. It's probably just worth being really clear that the 5% is an estimate based on statistical modelling, not a list of cases where we know somebody's claimed the wrong amount, because that's I think different from how other departments have approached this challenge. Okay.

So so far we've recovered 1.3 billion pounds compared to kind of the total of 1.8 across government, but again that's a mixture of error and fraud. We still have more than 50 open criminal investigations. If we are successful in prosecuting and securing a prosecution, there will be substantial monies to recover from those too. I'm not in a position to quantify that today and naturally that will take time to go through the criminal justice system. We still have a relative few amount of cases, circa about a million pounds, working in more routine cases because we kind of were able to stand up our activity very, very quickly because we had a legislative framework that we could kind of act on.

So we recovered quite a lot just in kind of 2021.

01:30:19 - 01:31:13

Speaker 12

That's really helpful. Thank you. And and obviously HMRC has had the lion's share of recovery. You've now got another six years to... or around... there's a... there's a period... well... Should I... should I talk about the legislative framework?

Is that helpful? Well, no, in terms of how long you have yet. So I guess the concern is there don't seem to be specific targets here or any sort of clarity on exactly what it... other than we have that figure of uncollected identified fraud. Sure. And obviously a significant amount of that is attributed to HMRC.

I'm not clear from the answers we've had so far in this committee what the... what the target is that HMRC but also DBT are working towards.

01:31:13 - 01:31:55

Janet Alexander

Okay. So we kind of stood up the Taxpayer Protection Taskforce in the second year, so 2021-22 and 22-23. The target was I think between 525 and 625 million. The taskforce recovered 693 billion pounds. When I kind of last came to this committee back in 2022, we were on track for 1.1 billion.

We've exceeded that, so we're at 1.3 billion. In that embarrassing way, Sir Jim Harra challenged me in the room to get more than 1.1 billion. I'm glad to say that we managed that. And as I say, we're still kind of kind of really pushing those fraud cases through the criminal justice system.

01:31:55 - 01:31:58

Speaker 54

Okay, so there isn't a target... There isn't a target at all, no.

01:31:58 - 01:32:08

Speaker 12

And when will a target be determined? 'Cause presumably it's helpful to have a target to work towards. Or it certainly seemed to have proved helpful in the past.

01:32:08 - 01:32:42

Janet Alexander

I don't know, it's not my decision, but I don't think we are having a target for recovery. And it's probably worth saying in the context of the estimate number, more than 56% is attributed to error, not fraud. Lots of people, as you can imagine at a time of national crisis, made relatively small mistakes. And it's it's not cost-effective to go over every single one of these. And in fact, we said publicly that we would not go after people who've basically made simple mistakes, 'cause we wanted to encourage people to make a claim, not be scared about making a claim.

01:32:42 - 01:32:49

Speaker 14

When you're assessing whether something is a simple mistake, do you assess that based on the size of the error or the nature of the error?

01:32:49 - 01:32:51

Speaker 63

So, what we did in HMRC...

01:32:51 - 01:32:58

Speaker 12

Sorry, I mean the value of the error. 'Cause if much of that is error, it amounts to quite a significant amount of money.

01:32:58 - 01:33:58

Janet Alexander

So, HMRC reviewed every single claim that came into the department and we ascribed every claim a risk score. And the risk score basically is saying, of all the data that we have available to us, is this claim in line with that data or an outlier in the data? And at that point, we don't know whether it's error or fraud. Unless we have, you know, information through the intelligence hotlines where somebody is reporting somebody and then you put the two together and go, "Ah, this looks like this is going to be fraud." And then we kind of took through that kind of prioritized list basically to say, "I'm going to start with the biggest ones either because we've got indication of kind of abuse or fraud, or the quantum is really high."

But until you start engaging with the claimant, you don't know. So it might be a relatively large amount, but it's error, they've just they've just got themselves in a mess. We would still recover that, obviously. But what we haven't done is seek out very small amounts across a large population.

01:33:58 - 01:34:02

Speaker 82

So it is a quantitative rather than a qualitative assessment.

01:34:02 - 01:35:00

Janet Alexander

It's a quantitative informed by data, but also informed by insight. So we had, I think, 40,000 plus references to our kind of fraud reporting helpline. We kind of clashed that information with the data-led approach and said, "Okay, what does that tell us about the nature of the claim?" And as we kind of went through the processes, we saw the quantum go down quite dramatically as we kind of went down the risk score. But after we'd done the risk score, if we had new sources of information, so, and I think the Commissioner's report refers to this, we were able to clash different data sources.

So when we got information from Eat Out to Help Out, we clashed that information with CJRS because it is impossible for somebody to basically say, "I've made all these sales of meals in my restaurant, but by the way, I'm not employing anybody or on furlough." So we so we did the initial kind of risk assessment and then we went back around that population when we had more data that we could clash with.

01:35:00 - 01:35:27

Speaker 14

Okay, that's really helpful, thank you. And obviously that is the lion's share, but the second largest is DBT. So have you undergone a similar process? And are you pursuing sort of quantitative approach to identifying where the largest and highest risk factors are and largest in terms of quantity or the amount of fraud and the value of it, or is it more of a qualitative approach?

01:35:27 - 01:36:06

Steven Greenwood

So I think it's a bit of both, but largely a quantitative approach.

So we've been doing a lot of work. Obviously the schemes are delivered by lenders, so they sort of are the first line of defense effectively. They have a series of markers that they will flag cases as suspected fraud. What we've been doing is working with the PSFA and actually HMRC. We've agreed some data sharing arrangements with HMRC and we're able to bring that data together now to try and triangulate on exactly where are those most serious cases and actually where are the sort of, you know, cases where it's a smaller, someone's inflated their turnover.

So we're trying to effectively disaggregate the cohorts at the moment.

01:36:06 - 01:36:08

Speaker 14

And do you, are you working towards a target?

01:36:08 - 01:36:35

Steven Greenwood

So at the moment we haven't got a target. We've set out in our response to the Commissioner's recommendation that we were going to develop an end state for the program. We're going to do this over the summer and talk to ministers about it. I think one of the things that we'll want to talk to ministers about is whether they want to set sort of a set of parameters around the different interventions to be able to judge, you know, how much they want to pursue the different avenues. But at the moment there is no sort of overall target.

01:36:35 - 01:36:47

Speaker 14

Okay. And then MHCLG is in a slightly different situation as currently deemed unverifiable in terms of the review. Do you want to just explain what your department's doing?

01:36:47 - 01:37:54

Chris Jones

Of course. So yeah, as the committee know, responsibility for financial management is devolved to councils and that's backed up by the statutory roles that we have in place for overseeing council finances as well as a whole raft of kind of assurance mechanisms around internal and external audit and so on. We've agreed with the conclusion that the Counter Fraud Commissioner has made that practice across councils is highly variable and in fact is backed up by kind of other reports such as the National Anti-Fraud Network report from last year and our own experience. So very much looking forward to taking kind of collective action across the sector, working with our partners such as the Local Government Association, CIPFA, the PSFA and so on to get a much better handle than we have had previously on current practice within councils to map the fraud risks that we can see and to undertake further action on them, including the possibility of collecting much better data than we have up to now.

01:37:54 - 01:37:59

Speaker 14

Possibility of collecting better data, is that not a requirement?

01:37:59 - 01:38:20

Chris Jones

So we go through a process of assessing whether new data collections are proportionate, cost-effective, value for money, and we haven't yet kind of completed that process because it's one that we go through as I say with our partners in the sector because it's important to get their views on this as well. So we haven't kind of had...

01:38:20 - 01:38:23

Speaker 66

When you say partners in the sector, do you mean local authorities?

01:38:23 - 01:38:36

Speaker 57

I mean local authorities, Local Government Association, but also, you know, experts in counter fraud that we work with as well as the Public Sector Fraud Authority. So we'll take all that info, all those views, all that information. You know, we do have some...

01:38:36 - 01:38:39

Speaker 50

Why is that not done, not been done before now?

01:38:39 - 01:39:13

Chris Jones

So I mean the assessment that has been made up to now is that we don't have kind of significant evidence of fraud in local authority spending and in fact the assurance mechanisms that we have put in place are an effective bulwark against fraud through local authority spending. So we haven't collected that data up to now. As I said, we're happy to kind of review that decision and that position and we'll be reporting back to the ministerial group that's overseeing this work as we do so.

01:39:13 - 01:39:20

Speaker 14

Okay, that's really helpful, thank you. And in the interests of time, did you want to contribute from DHSC?

01:39:20 - 01:39:26

Speaker 56

From a department perspective, obviously probably primarily you'd want to ask me about PPE. Yeah.

01:39:26 - 01:39:32

Speaker 49

So I think, I think we're coming to that. So in the interests of time, thank you very much. I'm going to hand it over.

01:39:32 - 01:39:59

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you.

You will have an opportunity. Two important questions following on, Chris, from Catherine's questions. I mean, the present system is clearly unsustainable where you're relying on each local authority to assess whether it's, whether it's really detected all the fraud in their area that it should, and all the mechanisms that you've described are additions to that. Is it, are all those mechanisms codified somewhere for future pandemics?

01:39:59 - 01:40:36

Chris Jones

So we have a wealth of information that we have about local authority finances, and we do look at that in a, in a holistic way. So we're, you know, very able to, to catch local authorities when, when kind of significant errors are made that result in significant financial failure, and there are increasing numbers of local authorities that we're supporting in, in that way. Looking forward, as you heard in your previous session and as you're kind of fully versed in, we are establishing the Local Audit Office, which will really strengthen our oversight function of the sector's financial resilience.

01:40:36 - 01:40:38

Speaker 71

That'll take time, isn't it?

01:40:38 - 01:40:53

Chris Jones

That will, that will take a bit of time, but the legislation establishing that office now has Royal Assent. We've appointed a chair who's just been through the Select Committee confirmation process, and we are kind of rapidly staffing up that organisation. So it will, it will happen.

01:40:53 - 01:41:25

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

This all worries me. I use our session on roads as a typical example of this. The Department for Transport gives however many billion to local authorities, but has no idea how effective that money's being, being spent. So we need to have a mechanism codified so that the relevant department, the relevant accounting officer, can really be accountable for whether local authorities, particularly with the emerging mayoral authorities, are spending that money for value for money.

01:41:25 - 01:41:49

Chris Jones

So I think we do have, as I say, significant assurance about the achievement of value for money in local authorities through the series of statutory roles that we have set up. We have given that responsibility to local authorities. Parliament has decided that's how it wants to oversee this system through the Section 151 officer, through the monitoring officer and the head of paid service roles. They are established in order to have oversight of value for money.

01:41:49 - 01:42:26

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Well, I have to say, as chairman of this committee, we will be holding a hearing into this subject, but at the moment I remain dissatisfied that there are strong enough mechanisms of scrutiny of local government, particularly the larger mayoral authorities, to make sure we are getting value for money. But as I say, we will be having a hearing in future on that. Janet, we are often critical in this committee, but you as the chief compliance officer, you've recovered 1.3, you were challenged by your then accounting officer to achieve a billion. Congratulations. We're often critical, but where people are successful, I think it is only right that we should congratulate the individual.

01:42:26 - 01:42:27

Thank you so much.

01:42:27 - 01:42:46

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

So I have a question on the back of it. Given that you were so successful and given that you've got a lot of mechanisms, how is that being promulgated across government departments to make sure that what you put into practice and were so successful at, they can start to do as well?

01:42:46 - 01:43:53

Janet Alexander

Cool. I mean, we work hugely in partnership with the PSFA. I know Mark Cheeseman was here at the previous panel. And we use that as a mechanism to kind of share our experience across government, both in terms of assessment of the risks, but also how we share data to support other government, other departments' sort of activity. And you mentioned that we kind of worked in partnership to make sure we're sharing information.

And I was looking at the NAO's report about data analytics in supporting error and fraud from last July. I think you can see after the 28 pilots, 23 were using HMRC data. So that's really how we kind of work and support each other. And we have, and we didn't do so much in time of COVID, mainly because we were all kind of nose to the grindstone in sorting out our own schemes, but we have in the past lent colleagues to other government departments when they're thinking about, okay, how do I address this kind of error and fraud risk? But really, I think the Public Sector Fraud Authority is the real focus for how we kind of work together.

01:43:53 - 01:43:55

Speaker 55

Very good. Thank you. Sarah Olney, please.

01:43:55 - 01:43:59

Speaker 70

That was my question.

01:43:59 - 01:44:02

Speaker 67

I'm sorry. Would you like to ask a different one?

01:44:02 - 01:44:07

Speaker 69

Only if you'd like me to, but... I don't want to re-ask the same question given we're pushed for time.

01:44:07 - 01:44:11

Speaker 78

Well, let's move on. I'm sorry about that. Or would you like to ask Clive's question?

01:44:11 - 01:44:12

I can ask Clive's question.

01:44:12 - 01:44:35

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Why don't you ask Clive's question? I must apologize to our witnesses. My very able deputy has had to go because we think the statement on civil service pensions, which this committee has done an awful lot on and it's a very difficult and tragic subject, has had to go to the floor of the chamber, so that's why he's left. Nothing to do with the witnesses, I can assure you. Right, Sarah Olney, please, on question four.

01:44:35 - 01:44:48

Sarah Olney

Thank you. Chris, to what extent do you think delivering schemes through local authorities and lenders limited the ability of local government to prevent fraud and to recover it?

01:44:48 - 01:44:52

Speaker 68

Is there a specific scheme, sorry, that you're asking about?

01:44:52 - 01:45:16

Sarah Olney

I haven't prepared for this question, so... So, it's basically around sort of capability, capacity in local government and the existing mechanisms that there were to tackle fraud and to implement counter-fraud measures, given the scale of what was required during COVID. Do you think that local government may have struggled to cope with that?

01:45:16 - 01:46:52

Chris Jones

As I say, our assessment shared with the Commissioner is that capacity and capability are both variable, as you'd expect, over 300 local authorities across the country. Of the schemes that we administered, they all used, or the vast majority used, established mechanisms that councils are used to using. So, for example, they provided money through council tax scheme to those in certain council tax bands who required additional support for the cost of living and so on. That's an established mechanism, those are households they know, and we saw no reason for an additional fraud risk because of that. Where there was potential additional fraud risk, where we're asking for new schemes to be set up, such as the scheme where we repaid councils for significant losses that they might have occurred through income and sales and fees, for example, when leisure centers were closed and car parks were shut and that kind of thing, then we did design a new scheme and we worked with the sector to build in counter-fraud and more assurance mechanisms into that.

We reconciled estimates that were given to us through the pandemic at pace after the fact and balanced the books as a result. So, yes, a mixture of schemes that we administered, some which relied on existing mechanisms and which we're confident in, and some which we did apply additional controls to.

01:46:52 - 01:47:08

Sarah Olney

So the Counter-Fraud Commissioner said in his report that MHCLG couldn't provide him with the assurance on levels of fraud and error in its COVID-19 spending. Is this something that the department's been able to address in the time since?

01:47:08 - 01:47:58

Chris Jones

So, as discussed, we didn't record that data for reasons, as I say, of proportionality, previous approaches to this issue. We have taken steps forward in the interim. So, for example, in 2022, when support was being provided through councils for higher energy costs, we gave much more guidance to councils about counter-fraud, we set clear expectations around identifying recipients and making proper checks. Again, that was because it was a new scheme delivered to many, many more households than councils knew about previously, and there was a higher risk of fraud, so recognized that that existed and took the appropriate action.

01:47:58 - 01:48:17

Sarah Olney

Thank you. And Steven, obviously a lot of the bounce back loans and other loans available to businesses was driven through lenders, banks and so on. Do you think the counter-fraud measures required by the department were sufficient for the loans being delivered in that way?

01:48:17 - 01:50:08

Steven Greenwood

So I think, you know, the department at the time, and I know the committee's looked at this before, but made decisions around taking away some of the controls that were put in place. I think, you know, one of our reflections on how we might prepare for a future sort of emergency situation is that actually you might want to introduce some of those controls back in. That being said, I think if we're thinking about lenders, a few points I'd make. One probably is that the guarantee agreement between lenders and the government has actually some quite strong prescriptions in around the activity that they need to do, so the sort of the post-act, sort of the assurance activity they need to do and the recovery action, and that's guided by industry standards. So there is some, there is control in that system and they are incentivized in that way to do it.

The British Business Bank then has a good assurance program and has continued to strengthen that program of audit and assurance looking at what lenders are doing and whether they're meeting those obligations. And I think in the bounce back loan scheme, for example, that assurance activity has resulted in I think it's about half a billion pounds of guarantee being taken away from lenders. So there is a, there is a sort of control and assurance in the system. But you know, I think I take your point of actually if you're going to design the scheme again, actually, you know, there probably are certain controls that, and ultimately a decision for ministers, right? I think this was made clear at the time and there were various directions etcetera, but it's something that, you know, in our sort of playbooks and frameworks for how we might approach a future emergency scenario, these sort of just a few more of the checks like credit checks for example are something that you might introduce a bit earlier.

Similarly to the CIFAS data sharing, which is a way to detect the multiple loans, that came in later in the program. Yeah, we would definitely look to institute that sort of almost straight away as well.

01:50:08 - 01:50:12

Speaker 79

Thank you very much, Sarah Olney. We now come to Sarah Green, please.

01:50:12 - 01:50:14

Speaker 80

Thank you, Chair. All the Sarahs.

01:50:14 - 01:50:16

Speaker 81

All the Sarahs. Full complement.

01:50:16 - 01:50:32

Sarah Green

I'd like to address Mr. Greenwood if I may, and it's around the Department for Business and Trade or BEIS to use the National Investigation Service or NATIS to pursue recoveries. Why did your department do that? What was the driver behind, behind that decision?

01:50:32 - 01:50:57

Steven Greenwood

So I just, I wasn't there at the time, but, you know, I think ultimately the department didn't have the capability to pursue what ultimately was some of the most serious cases, right? The cases that went through NATIS are some of the most serious and complex fraud cases. So therefore the department took the decision to use this sort of third party external body to take that forward.

01:50:57 - 01:52:08

Sarah Green

In the interests of time, I'd like to focus in on the governance of that service. So the COVID Counter-Fraud Commissioner's report shows that only 17 convictions have taken place so far. But I want to, to just quote from the independent investigation into governance concerns surrounding the operations of NATIS. And I'm just going to quote from it.

It says that it appears likely that the vast majority of staff did not have proper secondment documentation in place at the time, alongside a lack of a formal contract between the department and NATIS. And despite this, it's likely that many have continued to exercise Proceeds of Crime Act powers on the department's behalf. If officers have been exercising powers with expired secondments, their actions could be legally challenged. So my question, and I appreciate you weren't there at the time, but my question is what assurance you can give the committee that any prosecution using evidence collected by NATIS will in fact be robust?

01:52:08 - 01:52:33

Steven Greenwood

So I think I can say, you know, absolutely right to acknowledge these issues first of all, and particularly the sort of historic secondment issue. From a DBT perspective though, I think once that report was made available to the department, we acted pretty quickly to make sure the appropriate, you know, governance was put in place. We strengthened our enforcement capability to oversee that contract and have the right specialists on it.

01:52:33 - 01:52:35

Speaker 88

That contract still in place?

01:52:35 - 01:53:11

Steven Greenwood

So the contract has now ended. So the contract ended at the end of April and we've transferred the work now to the Insolvency Service. On your specific point around the sort of cases, I mean I wouldn't want to comment on any specific case, but I think what I can say to the committee is, you know, we have reviewed this in quite a lot of detail. You know, I think we feel quite confident ultimately that, you know, the cases are not at risk on the basis of what was done at the time. That actually the underlying work and the ongoing powers issue is not going to jeopardize any of those cases.

01:53:11 - 01:53:13

Speaker 92

You're confident, you're confident to put that on the record clearly.

01:53:13 - 01:53:18

Steven Greenwood

I mean we've done a lot of work on it. And as I say, I don't want to talk about individual cases because there may be specific issues.

01:53:18 - 01:53:27

Sarah Green

But maybe if you would be willing to write to the committee with some of that additional detail, because I think the committee would welcome that I think.

01:53:27 - 01:53:29

Speaker 83

Okay, yeah, no, of course, very happy to.

01:53:29 - 01:53:32

Speaker 84

Thank you very much, Sarah. Anna, please.

01:53:32 - 01:54:12

Anna Dixon

Yes, thank you. So I'm going to come on to PPE. I don't know if Samantha and Elizabeth, hello, you were able to hear our pre-panel. One of the questions that we put to the COVID Commissioner himself was around the 11 billion PPE items that were bought and never used by NHS and DHSC, and this estimated 324 million pound fraud estimate. He said it could be bigger, I think he said it was unlikely to be less.

Do you agree, and or do you have a revised estimate, how confident are you in that estimate?

01:54:12 - 01:54:42

Elizabeth O'Mahony

I think we have, yeah. So looking at the, again, not around at the time, but going back through the methodology that was used, we believe that this is a robust estimate, the 324 million. It's 2.4% of the total value of the COVID PPE contract. And I could go on and describe a bit more about what we've recovered, but it feels, having looked at the methodology that we used, it is an estimate of suspected fraud.

01:54:42 - 01:54:50

Speaker 90

Well, given that my colleague Catherine didn't ask you that question about how much you've already and plan to recover, yes please, do you want to answer that now?

01:54:50 - 01:55:19

Elizabeth O'Mahony

So of the 324, so 70 million has been recovered. 163 million we prevented through enhanced due diligence and actually making sure that payments were not made where they were suspected, identified, and made sure we didn't make, made. And then there was a material contract that was suspected, which has subsequently obviously gone through a legal process and been found in favor of the department.

01:55:19 - 01:55:38

Anna Dixon

And in terms of scope for further recovery from PPE contracts, obviously the PPE Medpro we know settled 122 million, but there seems to be sort of different views on the either likelihood of you pursuing some further claims or whether indeed the legal costs of pursuing those further claims are worthwhile. Can you comment on that?

01:55:38 - 01:56:27

Elizabeth O'Mahony

Yeah, sorry, and the two we've got two issues with PPE. We had the suspected fraud and then we had the contract issues. So from a contract issue perspective, we had 394 COVID contracts for PPE. 176 of those we identified as high risk, which totaled 2.6 billion that's in the report, and those were subject to investigation. Those were whittled down to 55 contracts in December 24, which is 1.258 million pounds.

And then subsequently in the report we reference it at 3258 contracts and I'm pleased to say today that's further reduced to five contracts across three suppliers, 114 million. So we will continue to review and we will go through that process.

01:56:27 - 01:56:34

Speaker 85

Sorry, 114 million, that's what's left that you're still... Yeah, 14. 114, five contracts, three suppliers.

01:56:34 - 01:57:00

Elizabeth O'Mahony

Those have actually been and the work that we did was continuously supported and reviewed through the COVID Counter-Fraud Commission, obviously appointed by the Chancellor. And it was agreed as well that as we were going through the claims there were some claims that were abandoned simply because of contractual shortcomings, missing schedules, corrupted information because of the pace in which the contracts were actually put in place.

01:57:00 - 01:57:10

Anna Dixon

So there was literally nothing on paper that you could use to substantiate... For some of it, yeah. For some of it, yeah. Right, okay. So you're saying that's on the contracting side.

Sorry, just on the fraud side?

01:57:10 - 01:57:35

Elizabeth O'Mahony

On the fraud side that was the so in total fraud across the whole group plus UKSHA plus Test and Trace was 535 million, of which 324 related to the department's group on PPE, of which we've recovered 70, mitigated 163 and then the big contract that we just talked about which was Medpro as being found in our favor.

01:57:35 - 01:58:26

Anna Dixon

Okay. So just going back to sort of how this all happened I guess and preventing it and maybe this is sort of easier as I know you weren't around at that time, but obviously now. I mean obviously it seems to be a combination of over-ordering with wildly sort of inaccurate modeling about the actual demand, this decision to order sort of a 12-month stockpile at the height of it, some concerns about substandard product and also whether you were paying a fair price and hence profiteering. So I mean there's a number of things went wrong, but what steps are have you now taken to reduce the likelihood of both profiteering and fraud in the event that you would have to sort of have some sort of emergency procurement in the future? And I don't know whether you want to start Samantha or Elizabeth?

01:58:26 - 02:00:43

Samantha Jones

Yeah, I'll I'll start and Elizabeth will tell me when I've got it wrong. But the so first of all I just want to recognize, I'm not disputing what happened, I just want to recognize the pressure that the individuals were under at the time, the speed that they were making the decisions and I think we all we all recognize that. What we have done is totally accept the work of the of the Commissioner. It's been incredibly helpful and going through the process that Elizabeth has outlined with HMRC as well. And we've taken forward a number of the learning and the recommendations both in terms of how we approach fraud in the department and through contracts, and also as part of our pandemic preparedness exercise, Pegasus, as you will as you will know, and in our in our strategy that was published earlier on this year outlining our approach to what we would do in that situation again and how we and how we have learned from it across all of the areas, including making sure that both the items that Elizabeth identified in terms of why the decisions were made not to not to follow up on on some of the contracts, so contract documentation, what it looks like, the detail behind it, is included as as part of going through it.

Any modeling exercise as well, making sure that it is takes a reasonable case scenario rather than perhaps what was done at the beginning.

And then making sure that fundamentally this was a cross-government exercise, which so rather than it just being DHSC and the NHS, making sure it was it was across government. And we will further update towards the back end of the year, both in terms of the contracts in terms of stock for PPE, the amount of money that's been invested in it, the money that's been invested in as part of the preparedness strategy, and also where we are across from a UKHSA perspective as well. Long answer, apologies, which is taking forward the recommendations into the exercise that we did recently, making sure that the investment that has been given has got the right PPE stock ready to go should we need that again, and the approach to modelling.

02:00:43 - 02:01:17

Anna Dixon

And given the failure to account for and deliver any PPE at the outset to social care, leaving care workers and the older and disabled people they were caring for very exposed to COVID, indeed with many tragic deaths of both care workers and people in their care, does your preparedness, your modelling, and your sort of robustness of your distribution mechanisms now include care homes and care workers who are going into people's homes within it?

02:01:17 - 02:01:32

Speaker 91

Every apologies, I should have been clear about that, heavily involved in terms of the exercise that we went through and indeed the lessons and the recommendations from previous NAO reports, so parity from a social care perspective with the broader NHS.

02:01:32 - 02:01:52

Anna Dixon

Because obviously the over-ordering and then sitting in containers when, you know, so many didn't get the PPE, just I mean I think at a fundamental level we obviously look here mainly at waste, fraud, and the waste of public money, but obviously there was a human cost to some of these decisions as well that I want to just recognise.

02:01:52 - 02:02:32

Elizabeth O'Mahony

The only thing I would add is about the data sharing that we've got now, so to support the early decision, I don't think going into this we had the supply and the delay supply and demand information which we subsequently have and we've got that available transparently which we can share across organisations and with the public. So that is a definitely a lesson that we've learned. And as Sam has described, Exercise Pegasus, we tested we've tested this robustly and I always think there's room for continuous improvement. So we continue to learn about how we will ensure we've got the right appropriate stockpiles or as we've got a stockpile going in the event that we end up in another situation that requires it.

02:02:32 - 02:03:14

Anna Dixon

So you'd be confident that if there were a similar emergency procurement needed, I mean it may not be of PPE next time, it may be of some, you know, drugs, vaccines, could be other things, that you're confident that you could have transparent procurement, that there would be no need for a VIP lane, that conflicts of interest would be handled correctly. I mean all of the things that we saw that went wrong in the procurement, you'd be confident that you have systems now to have open procurement and to get confidence and due diligence applied. Many I think a lot of due diligence was not applied to the early suppliers.

02:03:14 - 02:03:46

Samantha Jones

I'm absolutely confident that we've learned the lessons and the recommendations from what was described both in terms of and of course any learning lessons from the inquiry itself and also from the Counter Fraud Commissioner's work. If I may, Anna, just to say and I do I do understand the point about the VIP lane, but all all PPE orders went through the same process. So they went through the same approach in terms of irrespective of which way they they came into the department, they all went through the same process.

02:03:47 - 02:03:53

Anna Dixon

But that process didn't include much due diligence at the beginning, is that not correct?

02:03:53 - 02:04:29

Samantha Jones

So what I mean, I'm very happy if it's helpful to share this because it's the process that we went through in terms of the products that were received, the samples that were taken, making sure the technical documentation met the specification that was required, etc. So there's a very clear approach that was taken, which is, if you loop it round to the work of the Commissioner, is where we have some confidence, more confidence in the contacts that we were pursuing that we were able to do so.

02:04:29 - 02:04:35

Speaker 87

Okay, I mean, Chair, you may want to pick this up about the dodgy stuff in the containers.

02:04:35 - 02:04:59

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

I do. I do. Thank you, Anna. Anna's given you the soft questions, I'm going to give you the hard questions. So, Elizabeth, I, forgive me, you quoted a lot of figures quite quickly.

Can you confirm again what is your best estimate of the total amount that your department recovered from PPE?

02:04:59 - 02:05:03

Elizabeth O'Mahony

From suspected fraud from PPE, 70 million.

02:05:03 - 02:05:13

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

70 million. That's what I thought I heard you say. So, Samantha, you became Permanent Secretary in February 2022, correct?

02:05:13 - 02:05:18

Samantha Jones

No, no, a year ago. A year ago last week, in actual fact.

02:05:18 - 02:05:24

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Sorry, my brief has got an error in it and it says 22 on my brief.

02:05:25 - 02:05:42

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Right, fair enough. So you weren't there when most of it happened, but nevertheless, it's a pretty good stain on the department, isn't it? 10 billion pounds worth of PPE written off and just 70 million recovered. That's a pretty good stain on the department, isn't it?

02:05:42 - 02:07:21

Samantha Jones

The approach that the Commissioner took to check the robustness of the approach that the department took at the time to set up the contract dissolution unit, forgive me, literally going, and as he himself said, no stone was left unturned to understand exactly what happened contract by contract, separating out where there was fraud, potential fraud, and separating out where we could potentially recover. So I think I don't want to undermine the point that you're making, of course, but the department moved very fast when it recognized the scale of the issue that it had and also developed, as you will know, this term, the TAP approach, which is to understand what was needed from a supply and demand perspective. So under the speed that the department was working, putting in place the right processes and then really, really importantly, recovering as much as we possibly could. I also just want to make the point that we have learned the lessons from working with the authority themselves in terms of having champions around fraud for every contract that we review. We have a board across the Department of Health, making sure people are trained and understand what they should be looking for.

So a difficult start, but moved very fast in terms of the opportunities to recover.

02:07:20 - 02:08:27

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Had awarded over 8,000 contracts for goods and services such as PPE and professional services in response to the pandemic with a value of 18 billion. And somebody was signing off those contracts, they must have understood the volume of stuff that was coming into this country. So why was it, and we've heard from lots, we've done a lot of work on this, pallets, containers were stuck wherever you could put them on farmland. A lot of them were unopened and eventually that stuff was either burnt or it went to landfill. Surely it's just basic contract management that you would go and find each contract, assess what was in the contract so at least you knew whether you had received what the contract specified.

Well, I appreciate the gloss you're trying to put on it.

It might have been a little bit more inventive to actually open some of these parcels and just see what was inside and what the quality was like. It just seems as though the whole management of this, I know you were acting at speed, I understand this, I understand the department was under huge pressure at the time, but it must have just occurred to somebody that this contract management needed to be done a little bit better.

02:08:27 - 02:09:29

Samantha Jones

So if, it wasn't the gloss that I was putting on chair, I wasn't being facetious around it, I was stating what the counter-fraud commissioner himself had said, so I wasn't trying to, forgive me if that's how it came across. There is definitely lessons around the contract management and the supply chain approach that was taken, definitely. The PPE cell that was then subsequently set up to try and understand, make sure that we learn, we could actually get the PPE out to where it needed to get to. Definitely lessons that could have been learned and moved in a faster and a different way. But what I would say is that of, there was 97% volume of the PPE procured was actually remained usable.

So whilst it was going through the challenges on the supply chain delivery in the way that you described, the stuff that was ordered and getting to, was still usable, continued to be so, so we were deploying it.

02:09:29 - 02:09:58

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

So I made the point in the previous panel that the even greater tragedy about all this was that there were times during the pandemic when social care settings almost ran out of this PPE. And even more so, surely some of it could have been given to other countries around the world, but you didn't know what was there because you hadn't been in and inspected. So it was a tragedy on behalf of the department, but it was an even bigger tragedy that some of this stuff couldn't have been used elsewhere, wasn't it?

02:09:58 - 02:10:51

Samantha Jones

I feel this very keenly as well personally, I was running clinical services through the pandemic, including working with social care very closely. So in terms of the speed of getting the right PPE to the right people, definitely lessons that could be learned, no question about it. Everybody was doing their up, doing their best at a time of quite significant pressure, understanding what it exactly was that was required. There were definitely mistakes made around the modelling assumptions, no question about it, and we've covered that. And I do not sit here as the department saying we got it right at all.

What I am saying is that the commitment that has been shown and was shown and continues to be shown in terms of recovery of where perhaps there has been fraud or possible fraud and also in terms of learning around contracts and how one would do contract management is definitely in place.

02:10:51 - 02:11:28

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Okay. In order to try and understand what happened, I asked this question in the previous panel. Our report of November 2022, and I quote from the summary, the future of PPE program remains uncertain. In April 2022, Supply Chain Coordination Limited, SCCL, took over responsibility for the program. However, it is unclear how exactly responsibilities and roles are split between itself and the department and the already delayed PPE strategy paper is still to emerge.

Can you give any light on that? If not, I'd be more than happy if you wrote to us.

02:11:28 - 02:11:42

Samantha Jones

Thank you, I'd like to do that if you're comfortable with that. The cell that I described, the PPE cell, became a mixture of the two things, so I'll make sure that we cover that back to you.

02:11:42 - 02:12:31

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Very kind. I just want to move on to the report itself, which is basically what this hearing's all about. And he says, transparency is an essential tool for preventing fraudulent or improper behavior, while a lack of transparency may fuel public perceptions of impropriety, even where decisions are fair. Emergency spending increases the need for transparency. Is that one of the lessons you've learned?

There was a whole issue about contracts not being posted on time on Contracts Finder and so on and so forth. Is that something absolutely that the department has tightened up on now, and are these lessons that have to be learned in future pandemics?

02:12:32 - 02:12:47

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Great. Very good indeed. Well done, we're making very good progress. Thanks. So, we then move on, please, to is there any scope for further recovery of taxpayers' money, or have we got to the end?

02:12:47 - 02:13:55

Samantha Jones

I'll hand over to Elizabeth. I don't think we would ever say we got to the end, because where there is a possibility, we will absolutely follow it very, very, very, very robustly. And as the Commissioner said, we have quite a vociferous, I think is that the right word, team, who will not hesitate if there is any kind of suspicion of anything. But we are also, being in the answer that was previously given, making sure that it is best value for taxpayer to pursue every contract, because it might not be the case, and we have to weigh that up. And we did go through with the Commissioner every contract, including and also with our HMRC colleagues, every contract that there was to see whether we should pursue it.

So I'm confident that we went through the right process with colleagues from outside of the department, including the Commissioner and also HMRC, to assess the likelihood of success in any context. Should, of course, there be anything else that we believe is a possibility, we will continue to do so.

02:13:55 - 02:14:04

Elizabeth O'Mahony

Just to add, outstanding in terms of contract issues, we are down to five contracts and three suppliers. So that work will continue for those.

02:14:04 - 02:14:47

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you. Very helpful, Elizabeth. I'd now like to move on to you, Steven, if I could, please, and talk about these Bounce Back Business Loans. The committee's done a lot on PPE, but it's also done a lot on Bounce Back Business Loans and try and learn some of the lessons that have to be learned. And there's still an awful lot of money out there not recovered.

One of the things that puzzles me most about the Bounce Back Business Loans is why did the government guarantee 100% of the money, thus there was no incentive for the banks to recover it, or indeed to make sure that they did some better job on due diligence before they handed out the money?

02:14:47 - 02:15:26

Steven Greenwood

I think ultimately, the decision taken at the time by ministers was that the guarantee was the way in which it, given the scale and the speed at which these loans needed to flow, that was the sort of cover that the lenders needed. As I've sort of said, we didn't absolve the lenders of all responsibility, actually. You know, there were some checks done up front, sort of know your customer checks, they were still required. And then the guarantee agreement has set out the sort of subsequent assurance activity that needs to be undertaken by lenders, which is audited by the British Business Bank.

02:15:26 - 02:15:43

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

So, I mean, how much, I mean, you've still got huge amount of money that you estimate is still outstanding. Let me ask you the same question I've just asked the Permanent Secretary of the DHSC, how much money do you still expect to recover?

02:15:43 - 02:16:25

Steven Greenwood

So we don't have a, there's not, there's not a figure. I think what we're trying to take here is a sort of balanced and proportionate approach, a bit like has just been discussed. I think, you know, there is still lots of value in pursuing those most egregious cases. Now, they won't necessarily return a financial return, but I think it's really important that we pursue those justice imperatives, and particularly things like director disqualification, actually. You know, that is a way of taking bad actors out of the system.

I would say though that compulsory liquidations, the letter writing campaign, the pay-for powers, we do think there is some scope there for us to increase the rate of recoveries actually into the autumn, as particularly as those powers actually...

02:16:25 - 02:16:41

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

The Commissioner was making that clear in the previous hearing, if you heard that. And it does seem to be a powerful tool that, if you can't liquidate your company until the loan is paid off, that's a very useful measure to be, to encourage people to pay them off.

02:16:41 - 02:17:13

Steven Greenwood

Exactly. The dissolution objections process, for example, you know, I think that has been a really effective mechanism actually. We've recovered, or sort of seen 200, I think it's about 260 million pounds worth of benefits back into the, back into repayment because of that mechanism. So I think there are things that we can do, and there are certain areas where we're sort of doubling down to try and push a bit more recovery out. But it is hard.

I'm not going to say it's easy to get all this money back, but we do think there are certain areas that show some promise of return.

02:17:13 - 02:17:32

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

The Commissioner in the previous hearing was playing some store by disqualification of directors, which you have just alluded to. It's a non-criminal threshold that you have to pass, and they are disqualified for six to 15 years. So it is quite a hefty sanction. What more can you do in that respect?

02:17:32 - 02:18:02

Steven Greenwood

Well, I think, so we're doing part of the funding actually we got from the Treasury on the back of the Commissioner's work is a test and learn pilot around director disqualifications. So actually we're looking at whether, with the Insolvency Service, we can use technology and other sort of investigation methods to speed up the rate of disqualifications, because actually the disqualification process does take quite a bit of time. The hypothesis of the test and learn being if we can move quicker, we can potentially just disqualify more, more individuals.

02:18:02 - 02:18:12

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you very much. So what lessons have you learning, what are you taking forward from all of this, particularly the Commissioner's report?

02:18:12 - 02:19:16

Steven Greenwood

So could I give sort of I think probably three points for DBT as a whole actually, and you know, I sort of wear the hat of responsibility for all of counter-fraud in DBT as well now. I think preparedness, and two things I'd say there. We have a really good established emergency response structure now in DBT, which includes counter-fraud, my counter-fraud team embedded into that structure. We have our playbooks as part of that as well. So we actually have a specific grants and a finance playbook, and they act as frameworks effectively to say if you are going to mobilize emergency schemes, be they grants or loans, these are some of the things that you should do.

Data sharing, I think is a great example of this actually. One of the real challenges in the schemes is the lack of sort of data sharing arrangements that were put in at the beginning. That's made it really hard subsequently for sort of various analytics, for us to get information from local authorities, etc. So actually we have template data sharing agreements as part of that pack. So it's a framework to help officials move quickly and put advice to ministers.

02:19:16 - 02:19:24

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Does that data sharing include HMRC, DWP, local authorities? Are you able to share data with all government departments?

02:19:24 - 02:19:55

Steven Greenwood

So it would depend on the nature of the crisis and what we were doing.

If I take local authorities for example, you know, in our grants playbook, one of our assumptions is that you might use local authorities again as a delivery mechanism. Our playbook sets out the types of data sharing protocols that we need to have in place in the grant funding agreement and a template grant funding agreement from day one, because that is one of our big lessons learned actually, that the local authorities, you know, the way the information was shared back with the department has made it quite difficult for us to continue our own counter-fraud activity in that space.

02:19:55 - 02:20:07

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Well, huge emergency powers, you could do virtually anything you liked while the emergency powers were in place. So lack of powers during the actual pandemic itself shouldn't have been an issue.

02:20:07 - 02:21:47

Steven Greenwood

I think it's more about learning about the, you know, how we as a department would take action, actually. I think that's what it's trying to set out, the framework for these are the decisions, you know, this is what you should remember to have in place. So I think, you know, in terms of crisis preparedness, I think we have made a big step forward as a department. If I also could just highlight two more, which would be capability, actually, and I think, you know, I believe this committee has looked into sort of the bounce back loans and grants before and, you know, actually there was a fairly small team in BEIS of counter-fraud professionals. We've grown that team.

We've also established my directorate actually, which is about professionals who are, you know, able to deliver schemes at pace and have a load of experience. And then we've got the Public Sector Fraud Authority, and I think Janet sort of talked about them earlier. I think that has actually put a step change in how we think about counter-fraud in government. And then finally, in some ways I would say probably most importantly, is about in DBT we have tried really hard to embed our sort of counter-fraud mitigations in our business as usual processes. So, you know, example being all cases for grants, new grant schemes over a million pounds or business cases over twenty million going through our investment committee now have to have an initial fraud impact assessment.

So right at the beginning of that design, the counter-fraud professionals from my team, sometimes involving PSFA as well, are getting in this. So I feel like there's still more to do, actually, as well. I think I take the challenge actually, and the Commissioner's highlighted some of those things in his report. But I feel like we've made a good step forward and we have definitely tried to embed those lessons into both business as usual but also future preparedness.

02:21:47 - 02:21:58

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Well done. Well, we will no doubt come back to lessons learned and future preparedness for pandemics, but that's a good progress. Thank you. Elizabeth, what lessons have you learned?

02:21:58 - 02:22:37

Elizabeth O'Mahony

I think we've touched on some of them, so it's around emergency preparedness and making sure we've got the capability and the capacity, and it's broader than just health. So for us on PPE, we now have a PPE stockpile which we continuously replenish with a variety of products and sizes. We've got much better supply and demand data, both through to a local organizational level which we didn't have previously to support decision making, which is very transparent. And I think those are the main things, the stockpiles, the emergency preparedness and the data requirements, I would say, yeah.

02:22:37 - 02:22:46

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Well done. Thank you. I mean, I don't want to lose, I'm going to move to your right, or my left, your right, my right, Samantha, but anything you want to add to Elizabeth's reply?

02:22:46 - 02:23:23

Samantha Jones

Just to add, I think I referenced earlier that we have similar in terms of any investment over a certain amount has a fraud assessment. We've also got counter-fraud champions across DHSC working with NHS England. We've also got the number of people trained in counter-fraud higher than it was previously. And making sure that, I don't want to overplay, but you know, making sure that we follow where there's every opportunity to recruit, recoup, recover. I'm sorry, it's been a long day, I apologize.

Recover any opportunity.

02:23:23 - 02:23:39

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Brilliant. Janet, you're already pretty tight on all of this stuff. Is there any lessons you're taking forward? And particularly, are you sort of giving lessons to people like DWP, because it does seem to me there's a lot of synergy there between what you do and what they do.

02:23:39 - 02:24:04

Janet Alexander

Yeah, I mean, I think that obviously some of the recommendations reflect kind of existing practice in HMRC. And I think we've touched on it at this hearing, that it's data sharing, I think, and we haven't really waited for the Commissioner's report. We've already taken action on data sharing, so we're much more proactive with DBT, much more proactive with DHSC. And it makes a difference. It absolutely makes a difference.

02:24:04 - 02:24:11

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Chris, what lessons have you learned, and in particular, how quickly can this local audit office start to come to your assistance?

02:24:11 - 02:25:25

Chris Jones

So, similar to Steven actually, the department's counter-fraud approach, we've invested in that and it's developed significantly since the pandemic. It's similar types of controls in terms of business cases and requirements on senior responsible owners of our significant projects to consider fraud upfront, reducing those fraud risks kind of upstream rather than reacting to them. I said earlier, we've since delivered other emergency schemes, such as in response to the energy price crisis in 2022, where we have built in further counter-fraud measures through our work with local government. And we clearly recognize that we don't know enough as we perhaps need to know about the capability and capacity in the sector and we'll rectify that as well. The local audit office, as you rightly point out, is a really important part of the next phase of this.

As I say, it's up and running imminently with a new chair in place and being staffed up kind of as we speak. So they will be fully online from the end of this year and I would expect them to be supporting this work as soon as they can.

02:25:25 - 02:25:45

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Are you working actively with the Public Sector Fraud Authority, as Steven's just mentioned, so that all new schemes, if you suddenly ask local authorities tomorrow to give out some grants for this, that, or the other, you have consulted the Public Sector Fraud Authority and designed in as best you can measures to try and prevent fraud?

02:25:45 - 02:26:06

Chris Jones

We've had really good support from PSFA in working through our fraud mechanisms. So yes, if a new scheme is novel, if the fraud risks are high because it is not using established mechanisms or established oversight procedures, then absolutely counter-fraud measures would be part of the design of that.

02:26:06 - 02:26:08

Speaker 94

Sarah Olney, please.

02:26:08 - 02:26:37

Sarah Olney

Thank you, Chair. Just to Steven. A lot of the companies that received bounce back loans, and according to the report, as much as 48% of the loans will not be repaid, but a lot of that is due to do with companies winding up before the repayment was due. What progress has the department made in recovering moneys where businesses have been wound up?

02:26:37 - 02:27:39

Steven Greenwood

So I think this is very challenging, ultimately. As you say, where a company has failed through genuine reasons, actually, part of the design, one of the challenges in the scheme design actually is there are no sort of personal guarantees. That's why we introduced the dissolution objections process and as I say, I think that has been an effective mechanism actually in trying to recover money, you know, 264 million of benefits so far, because we stop those companies dissolving before they go. Ultimately, though, you know, there are big numbers here and these companies, you know, if they have legitimately failed, we will try our recovery activity, but there's only so much that we can do. One of the things that I think the Commissioner has recommended that we look at and we're going to look at over the summer and probably talk to ministers about it in the autumn is actually, you know, to what extent maybe some of those companies in the dissolution objections process that have genuinely failed, whether actually, you know, we might look to resolve the status of those companies.

02:27:39 - 02:27:44

Sarah Olney

So the ones that you've blocked from dissolving but can't pay back, what is the plan for those?

02:27:44 - 02:27:57

Steven Greenwood

So we're currently working through the options. As I say, I think part of it is actually linked to data sharing. So we are pulling together data sets to look at actually, you know, are there other ways that they can repay? So actually, you know, the dissolution...

02:27:57 - 02:28:14

Sarah Olney

Do you have, do you have any powers for, you mentioned how there were no personal guarantees originally. Do you have any powers to be able to change that so that where you've got companies that don't have any assets and can't repay your loan, but the individuals involved, are you, are you able to...?

02:28:14 - 02:28:24

Steven Greenwood

I don't believe, I mean, I can confirm that for you, but I don't believe we are in the way that the schemes were set up, actually. The nature of the sort of limited liability company...

02:28:24 - 02:28:44

Sarah Olney

So you could have someone who's got personal, considerable personal wealth, but the particular entity that the loan was made to now has no assets. But you're preventing that company from dissolving. Yes. But actually you have no power whatsoever to compel any of the individuals involved to surrender any of their personal...?

02:28:44 - 02:28:47

Speaker 97

I believe that's correct. I can confirm that for the committee, but I believe that's correct.

02:28:47 - 02:29:06

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

If you could write to us about that, because if the banks were lending this money, they probably would have asked for a personal guarantee. So, unless you can give me an answer now, would it be part of your strategy if you ever did something similar in future to demand personal guarantees?

02:29:06 - 02:29:34

Steven Greenwood

I mean, ultimately, I think that's, that would be a decision for ministers based on the, you know, nature of the situation. These loans were set up to move quickly at pace to a broad, to a broad subset, you know, sector of businesses, small businesses. We, it's something that we've sort of considered and actually that is one of the choices also alongside, you know, do you want to target a particular sector actually or do a broad, do a broad brush approach? But I think ultimately it's a decision for ministers to take.

02:29:34 - 02:29:55

Sarah Olney

Are there other steps that companies are taking to avoid repayment? Not obviously they're being blocked from being dissolved, but the ones that are still trading that aren't making repayments, are there other ways around repayment that they are exploiting, other little loopholes?

02:29:55 - 02:30:08

Steven Greenwood

Not that I'm particularly aware of. As I say, I think actually the, you know, there is a story of the majority of businesses are actually either have repaid or are repaying on schedule. We think that those that where they have stopped repaying and we have...

02:30:08 - 02:30:14

Speaker 96

Up to 48% of the loans won't be repaid, so only just the majority.

02:30:14 - 02:30:24

Steven Greenwood

We think that, you know, where we have paid out the guarantee, the analysis that we've got does suggest the majority of those companies are genuine, genuine business failures that probably can't repay.

02:30:24 - 02:30:57

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

So when did you take those powers to stop companies going bankrupt if they hadn't paid the loans? Because one of our earlier hearings, we heard about the dreadful word phoenixism, I hope I pronounced this correctly, which is basically when a so-called sound company goes into bankruptcy and then immediately forms an almost identical company with no assets. And that was quite prevalent when we, when we first examined this matter in July 2022.

02:30:57 - 02:31:12

Steven Greenwood

I'll have to write back to the committee with the exact date that we introduced it. But that is exactly what it's trying to, to stop effectively, or one of the things it's trying to stop, that this sort of company dissolves and then it sort of pops up, you know, a few, a few months later.

02:31:12 - 02:31:18

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Yeah, I guess it was post-July 2022 because it's the first time I've heard of it in doing the research for this hearing.

02:31:18 - 02:31:21

Speaker 95

Very happy to provide more information on that process.

02:31:21 - 02:31:57

Geoffrey Robert Clifton-Brown

Thank you very much. Well, I'm going to bring this hearing to a close unless there's any final word that any of you want to say. It's been an interesting hearing. We will examine your evidence very carefully. Thank you, Permanent Secretary and others.

An uncorrected version of our transcript will be available in the coming days. We will produce a report with recommendations, which I hope you'll study carefully. And I guess that aspects of all this we will come back to. But thank you again very much for coming this afternoon and all your evidence. Order.