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International Development Committee Actual start House of Commons
Follow its sittingsAbdouraouf Gnon-Konde
And then of course countries like Chad. We are lucky to have the representative Patrice with us. And then Central Africa Republic region, as well as Congo DRC with the whole complexity that we all know when it comes to Congo DRC, Ebola, malaria, cholera, as well as the conflict in the eastern part of the country. So out of that statistic, it's important to mention that it's about 82% of women and children trapped in that displacement. The average duration of displacement in the region is around 15 years, 20 years.
So you will agree with me that this is an element that indicates that displacement in the region goes far beyond the humanitarian portfolio. The internal-external aspects which make it very compelling, the border intervention, the social cohesion, the pressure on the local communities, pressure on the host government, the whole pressure on the asylum system. Because as we respond to the need of all these displaced population and the host communities, it's important to ensure that those member states keep their obligation when it comes to asylum, access to international protection. So this is basically maybe just another statistic, struggling a lot when it comes to the young people access to education. 62% of the total population of refugee children aged to go to school are out of school.
So this is a challenge. And all of this is happening in a context where we see political instability, where we see pressure with the climate change effects, where we see economic hardship, food insecurity.
So, not easy in that region, if I can put it in one word.
Monica Harding
The figures that you are giving us are kind of huge and astonishing. It's quite difficult, I think, to see it in any context. So, I guess my question to you is, where do you see this going?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
I think the trajectory will depend on how do we act now.
And this is why I feel so privileged to be in front of this august committee to really thank FCDO and the UK for the support that they have given to that region, not only in Chad, but beyond Chad. But this is the moment, I feel like this is a tipping point where we all need to come together, understand the baseline, the data that we have, and the need for us to really work hand in hand. We can't continue to work in isolation: the humanitarian actors on one side, development entities on the other side, government trying whatever they can, you know, to respond to the need, local communities sometimes feel abandoned because they don't see the support that, you know, they require, the private sector which also needs to understand that there is a space for them to be present in a practical manner to support all this effort. So to answer your question, it's a simple one, but difficult if we don't act now, then unfortunately situation will just, you know, be a bit complicated.
90% of the displacement is happening within the region. You can see it through the IDP figure that I have just shared with you. We have few individuals who, you know, are compelled to take a way further, you know, away from, from the region. But my fear is that if we don't act sufficiently to address the need, then we will see more and more people leaving all these border areas trying to reach, you know, places where they believe that they can get access to many other opportunities.
Monica Harding
And can I also put to you that we asked a senior director from the Foreign Office why there were cuts to aid and development in the Sahel? One of his answers to the question was, well, look, for example, the French have put in a lot of money to the Sahel for a long period of time and nothing's worked. So it was almost as if to say nothing will ever work. So my question to you is, what has not worked so far and what is different now? How should it work?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
I think if you look at the way that we were responding to the need in the Sahel, let me just take Sahel for instance.
I remember when I look at, because I was UNHCR representative in Burkina Faso in 2021, so I saw it for myself, the level of resources that we had to deal with 1 million IDPs. When I compare it with the level of resources that we have been entrusted in 2024, I think it's a day and night. And the numbers have increased. So meaning that we can't continue to only respond to the need of those who have fled. It's important to look at how do we stabilize.
So for us, maybe this is a way, this is where we need to understand each other when it comes to stabilization, working with local communities, bringing back agency to those communities, the displaced and the host communities, because sometimes we tend to forget that the first responders are the communities.
So how do we restore back agencies to those communities? How do we rebuild the local systems? And those are the kind of things that I see today. I was just recently a month ago in Mali and Burkina Faso, was pleased to see how communities themselves are reinventing new ways of addressing, you know, the challenges they're confronted with. So we need to listen to the communities.
This is why data is so important and this is one of the area in which FCDO is supporting us a lot to understand through the data the need, the pattern and see exactly how can we then, you know, influence the intervention. So I think we can't continue doing things that are not, you know, yielding result. This is the time when we need to really reinvent a new way of engaging in the Sahel and across the region.
Monica Harding
How easy is regional coordination across the Sahelian states? How easy is regional coordination across the Sahel and across the various states?
Patrice Ahouansou
Across the Sahel. No, thank you. Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Madam, for this, for this question. I will first of all start with the coordination within Chad and then the coordination between Chad and the, and the, and the Sahel countries in terms of activities and in terms of also cross-border response.
Chad, as you know, is facing multiple crises. Conflict in neighboring countries, security conflict, armed conflict, security issue, armed conflict, climate crisis as well, and also food insecurity. And I'm sure Marc will talk more about the food insecurity. And of course, all this triggering forced displacement. But what is important here is how this forced displacement is provoking human shock.
Let's say three level of shocks. We have the human shock. We have the the demographic shocks. And we have also the territorial shocks. With the human shock, we are seeing, you know, refugees, IDPs, host communities in very dire situations.
Women and girls paying, you know, heavy price. And many of them, especially the children, who are sacrificing, let's say their childhood because the circumstances of the conflict, you know, is putting them then or are putting them in a situation where they have to be, you know, head of household, a role they are not supposed to play at their age. Demographic shock because we are seeing refugees, IDPs and returnees representing the majority in most of the areas. For instance, the Sudanese refugees in the eastern part of Chad, one, we have one in three person in eastern part of Chad is a refugee.
One in three. So this shows you the shock in terms of demography and the shock also in terms of territory because all the territorial setting that was pre-existing before the conflict has changed in the context where decentralization has been actioned by the Chadian government, but this need to look into or take into account the presence of the refugees in order to, you know, to have a proper administrative setup. So these are the three level of shocks. But facing this, we really need to coordinate better with the different neighboring countries.
For instance, coordination between Chad and Sudan is through the cross-border activities to ensure that we are not only providing for refugees, but the capacity is also extended to the internal displaced people within within Sudan. Because the inaction in Sudan will trigger more displacement into Chad. That is why there is this coordination between the two the two teams, agencies, NGOs as well as local authorities to make sure that a the cross-border response can be provided. Between Chad and and and let's say Cameroon and also Central Africa Republic and also Nigeria.
Between Chad and Nigeria, what we we put in place is first of all thanks to thanks to thanks to FCDO with the protection monitoring because once again all comes to data. Because to better coordinate you need data to understand the trend of the movement and to understand also the cross-border, you know, movement and and and also to be able to do cross-border analysis. So we have also this coordination in place between Chad and Nigeria and this help us to assess the situation in the in the places of origin of refugees, Sudanese refugees living in in Chad. What is the situation in the places of origin? And this we are doing it thanks to the data collection and data analysis tool that for which FCDO is supporting.
So we are coordinating also at that level.
The same thing with Central African Republic, where we have more than 140,000 refugees from Central African Republic living in Chad. Right now we are discussing how to support their return, because in the midst of all this situation, we have also, let's say, a pocket of hope in terms of return. And this is what CAR and all the stakeholders in Central African Republic are doing in all this development pole to see what kind of investment can be made in CAR so that return is sustainable.
True, we have tools to analyze, to understand the the the priorities in the places of origin. There are some key priority projects, but once again, it comes to implementation of these projects to make sure that when people return, they don't come back. So that the reintegration is effective and the return is sustainable. So coordination with all these countries is is is very essential. But most importantly is also the coordination within Chad.
Because we are today at a crossroads where some of the mistakes, you know, made collectively in let's say in 2003 shouldn't be made anymore. I think this is the narrative that we all have, we all agree that for the first crisis of Sudan in 2003, there have not been proper investment, development investment in in refugee hosting areas. How do we correct that? It should be first of all through coordination from the start. Coordination under the leadership of the government.
And for the first time, the government, the UN agencies, the NGOs, the the diplomatic representation, all the donors, we sit together and agree on a coordination model. All this to to make sure that the government is taking the leadership. We are there as UN agencies and NGOs to support the implementation of the new model of coordination. And this coordination is being done through the line ministries so that refugees, host communities, IDPs, they are integrated in the national development plan and in the provincial development plan. So this is the the way we are we are really coordinating at all levels.
Monica Harding
That's very helpful. Thank you, Patrice. Abdouraouf, if I could come back to you, and you you touched on this already.
With 24 million people estimated to need humanitarian assistance and protection in the region this year, but only 8.2 million prioritized by UN agencies for urgent support, what are the risks of leaving those needs unmet?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
We see it already happening with the cuts, the reduction of humanitarian funding that we have experienced in the region. 50% reduction of humanitarian funding in 2025. When it comes to development support, ODA, a reduction close to approximately 70% across across the region. So, I mean, the first point, we can only see, you know, the aggravation of what I was mentioning, the access to education.
I mean, we see, you know, it becoming difficult for children to continue to have access to, you know, education system. And then the other dimension I can also mention is when it comes to registration. We don't have the capacity, governments, you know, are not also having the capacity to register individuals, you know, in the national database. So this is one of the risks that I also see. And I mean, the pathway towards solution agenda, I mean, if we are not investing, because this is not aid, this is investment.
But how do we make it happen? And as one of my colleagues used to say, there's no humanitarian solution to humanitarian problems.
So for us, this is a call that, you know, we have reached a limit in terms of the model, the current model, where we systematically repeat, you know, the same humanitarian aid. Something new need to come, to come in addition to what we are used to do, is the investment. So investment by opening space to international financial institutions. This is what we are doing, working closely with the World Bank, African Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, and working also with some foundations like Mastercard Foundation. Actually, Mastercard Foundation is helping us a lot, working and structuring our engagement when it comes to localization, working with the communities.
We have received some support since last year to really build the capacity of close to 300 local organizations led by women in that region. So I think definitely if the cut remains where they are, we will only see the situation in a very bad situation. I mean, the situation will be very bad, not only for the communities and the individuals, but also for the receiving countries.
Monica Harding
Thank you. It struck me when I was in the camps actually and on the Chad-Sudan border, we were very interested in the women and girls and the violence that they had experienced. But it was felt that there was nobody actually there to be able to ask them the questions because the resources were so stretched. So it was impossible to go after atrocity prevention or actually accountability because there was no one to actually ask the questions of the women. So I think that probably puts into what you're saying.
Can I come to you please, Marc? Could you outline the operational difficulties of only receiving short-term reactive funding from international partners?
Marc Regnault de la Mothe
Yes, absolutely. Good afternoon and thank you again for the opportunity to intervene today. So first and foremost, maybe let me focus on the food security in the Sahel. So we have 9.7 million people that are facing food security in 2026 in the Sahel. So it is the drivers of food security have already been mentioned by my colleagues, which I salute.
We have a combination of conflict, of displacement, of climate change and of economic pressures. So it is both severe and structural at the same time.
So the needs are great. Again, Sahel, 9.7 million people that are in food insecurity and the resources are reducing. We also have longer-term trends. So we have population growth. We have climate change, which is going to impact the Sahel in particular because there's a 1.5 degrees difference in terms of average temperatures that are forecasted for the Sahel.
And we also have El Niño.
So El Niño is forecasted to be quite severe in the next season, so first half of 2027. And in the whole of West and Central Africa region, 6 million more people are going to experience food insecurity because of El Niño. So additional challenges. We have also the impact of the Hormuz Strait crisis of the Middle East. Why?
Because there is an increase in food prices, an increase in fuel prices, and an increase in all the inputs that are needed to sustain food production. The other factor that you mentioned, and thank you for the question, is the decreased investment from donors. So how do we do to face this? We have to prioritize.
And the prioritization means assisting those that are most vulnerable and trying to assist them as well with durable solutions. And I wanted to come to that to say that it is not all doom and gloom because there are solutions, there are possibilities to invest for the UK, for donors, in longer-term solutions. For example, in the resilience program that we have across the Sahel, called the Integrated Resilience Program, we managed in the last years to restore degraded land, more than 300,000 hectares, assisting a cumulative number of 8 million people across the Sahel. And this really has a lot of impact in the long term. It helps to avoid and to reduce humanitarian needs.
It helps to reduce migration. It helps to reduce coping mechanisms and it also helps to support human capital because there's not only land restoration and the the green coverage which is coming back to the degraded lands of the Sahel, there is also children going back to school, there is also social protection systems that are being put in place again. So there is a place for investment and there is place for making sure that families and communities want to stay where they are because if they have livelihood opportunities they will not need to migrate, they will not need to be displaced.
David Mundell
Thank you.
Marc, can I ask you to outline the prioritization challenges for the World Food Programme as a result of reduced funding?
Marc Regnault de la Mothe
Yeah, it is a great challenge because we are in a context of needs that are very substantial, and the reduced funding that we are receiving obliges us to cut down on many programs that are vital for people. I'm not speaking only about humanitarian assistance, about nutrition programs. Another figure that we didn't mention is that there are more than 10 million people that are, 10 million children, sorry, that are malnourished in the region. That's another program on which we have to reduce.
We have to reduce the number of people we're assisting, assisting 4 million less people than we were planning to. So these are big, substantial cuts that have an impact and that basically make it so that the negative coping strategies that have been mentioned by my colleagues unfortunately also come back in these communities where we had to cut and that we're not able to assist anymore. So as I was saying, 4 million less people that we can assist across the Sahel. So that's quite a, that's quite an impact and of course it's very difficult to face it.
We face it with prioritizing the resources and making sure that we have more impact on the most acute needs. We do so also by working together as agencies. So with the UNHCR, which is here, we conduct joint assessments. We target the resources to the same refugees, the same IDPs, not only with open-ended and endless assistance, but with durable solutions based on vulnerability.
And this is extremely important because it also helps us to reduce cost, to have cost efficiencies and coordination and working together to make sure that every dollar, every pound, every euro that is invested is really invested in the best possible way. Because we know the resources are less, we have to make sure that they are directed to long-term solutions, to national systems and to coordinated actions that really reassure voters, really reassure those that provide the funding that their funding and their assistance is used in the best possible way. So we do less, we do more with less resources and we try to do it better in a more concentrated and a more efficient way.
Marc Regnault de la Mothe
No, we can't. We can do cost efficiency as much as we want, but if the funding is too reduced, there's only so much that cost efficiency can do. There are also needs that have to be met and the needs are effectively very important. So the reduction in funding has an impact.
David Mundell
And are there other organisations that have any capacity to pick up the shortfall from your reduction in funding?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
Well, difficult, because I mean we all live in the same situation. NGOs, local structures, and UN entities, we are all, you know, confronted with the same challenge. Even host countries as well, country of origin, country of, you know, as Patrice was explaining in the context of CAR, countries of return, countries of origin, countries of destination.
So it's a, it's a difficult moment for all of us. So I think this is where, as I was saying, this is not the time and the luxury for anyone of us to work, you know, in isolation. We really need to understand exactly what are the opportunities, what are the resources, and what are the goals. And based on the trust, you know, and coordination, in a very well coordination manner, how can we yield the impact of, you know, the reduced resources that we have? And as Marc was saying, I can just take Marc, the example of Burkina Faso where together with WFP, UNICEF, we have set up what we call the emergency response team where we join up together, together with OCHA.
In case there is a displacement quickly, we can, you know, mutualize and then respond to the need.
So for us, we can't expect, you know, other entities or, you know, to to come up and then, you know, take take the shock. We are all living through the same realities. This is a difficult moment for the humanitarian community.
David Mundell
Marc, how how do you predict that local populations will cope in the coming months and years without access to the food they require?
Marc Regnault de la Mothe
Well, the coping mechanisms can be quite severe, and one of them is migration. Nobody wants to migrate from their communities if their livelihood is ensured and if they have land to till, if they have food to eat. When people don't have food, they don't have solutions to solve their problems, they need to pull their children out of school. They need to look for livelihoods elsewhere, they need to migrate. So that's one impact that of course we are all concerned with, and that's one of the main coping strategies that unfortunately people have to take.
The other ones I mentioned is cutting on their children's education, cutting on health expenses, cutting on investments, so sometimes decapitalizing, meaning selling your goats, selling your seeds, consuming your seeds, so not being able to invest in your future anymore. And when you cannot invest in your future, of course life looks bleak and you need to look for a better life elsewhere. That's one of the drivers of displacement, that's one of the drivers of food insecurity. And of course with the medium and longer term trends of climate change, of El Niño, of conflicts, of higher food prices and fuel prices, the situation is not looking good.
But there's also a hopeful solution, which is to make sure that the engagement of the UK and other donors remains, that the resources are pooled in the sense that successful programs and successful resilience solutions are the solutions that the governments together convene and decide where are the best investment for their funding and where do they make the most impact. One important thing is the long-term commitment and to make sure that funding for these programs that are long-term is there and is sustained. This is essential if we want to have some of these gains that I was mentioning, because the intermittent funding that changes year to year and that only gives, you know, temporary solution to problems is not going to solve the issue, especially if there's less.
So really long-term commitment, joined, joining forces with the other members of the international community is absolutely essential. Thank you.
David Mundell
You've mentioned El Niño and there are predictions of severe dry conditions as a result between November this year and January next year. So do you have contingency plans in place for that?
Marc Regnault de la Mothe
Yes, there are contingency plans for El Niño and maybe one thing that we should mention is that it's not only dry spell and dry weather, it's also too much rain. And when the land is not ready and is degraded, the rain instead of being a positive factor for the agriculture production becomes a danger, it creates floods, it washes away whatever remains of the fertile land that is there.
So that's why these resilience and land restoration interventions are so essential. In terms of El Niño contingency, yes, the contingency plans are there to assist more people, but the contingency plans also need to be funded. So it will be, there will be augmented intervention, but the augmented intervention can only take place if the funding is there to support it.
David Mundell
And Patrice, does the UNHCR have contingency plans for these El Niño events?
Patrice Ahouansou
We, our contingency planning is, is based on the, for instance in Chad, is based on the displacement from, from Sudan and also the displacement within Chad, especially in the Lake Chad region where we have more than 250,000 internally displaced people. For us, once again, what is important is which role is the government playing in all this, you know, in putting together the contingency planning. And this comes to the shift that we are operating as well. In the past, we will see all UN actors and NGOs sitting and working on a contingency planning without really the government leadership. This has completely changed now.
The government is taking the lead. We are supporting them to finalize a contingency. This is exactly what we did for the Sudan situation and the same thing for the for the IDPs, internally displaced people in the Lake region. To make sure that the solution from the start is not only a language that we are speaking as as a UN agency or NGOs, but the government also is speaking the same language. How the displacement areas are targeted for government projects, for instance.
So this is the conversation that we are we are having in in Chad and WFP, UNHCR, we are playing a very critical role in terms of resilience program in the eastern part through the initiative that we call Aguina, WFP, UNHCR, IOM joining, you know, together to make sure that, you know, the lands that are degraded are regenerated and accessible for agriculture.
But once again, doing this means that we can't only rely on humanitarian fund. That is why we are doing our best to make sure that all the key donors, and the UK being one of the key donors, can also see the ability or the capacity to use the development fund as well as the climate fund in those areas in order to expect that we can scale up all these initiatives and expect that we will have also tangible impact for more people. Because at the end of the day, what we want is to break the dependency on humanitarian aid.
And to be able to do it, we need to value all the capacities that refugees are coming with, all the capacities that IDPs have, and invest in those capacities so that they can take care of themselves in the future. So we are also changing the model, the way we are operating, but this can only be sustainable if, you know, humanitarian fund, development fund, and climate fund are also, you know, accessible. Yes.
Sam Rushworth
Thanks. Could we carry on talking about displacement for a minute, Abdouraouf?
Um, could you share with us how displacement across the multiple countries in the region is going to complicate the work of UNHCR?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
No, I can give you a concrete example. I remember when I was assuming this function of regional bureau director for West and Central Africa in Dakar, that was in July 2023, where the first days of, you know, of when I was assuming this function, we were hearing news about refoulement at the border between Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso. Then the refoulement was also taking place in a very tense relationship between those countries. And you will recall the shift between the three Sahelian countries and the regional economic body, ECOWAS.
And then of course they have created the Alliance des États du Sahel. And as I was saying, the displacement pattern in the region, you see people being displaced first as IDP, then after as refugees. Then they come back as a returnee. If they don't find opportunity to settle, what happens? They go again as IDP, then they cross again as a refugees.
And if they are tired, then they decide, maybe it's not worth staying here, I have to go. So for us, how do we address solution opportunities, improvement of the protection environment?
We can only do it through humanitarian diplomacy and regional cooperation. And this is what we have done between the Sahelian countries and the Gulf of Guinea countries by engaging, by establishing what we call the Lomé Dialogue. Lomé Dialogue that has enabled us to invite all these countries in Lomé, countries like Burkina Faso, sitting in the same room just like here with Côte d'Ivoire, with Togo, with Ghana, despite the political division, agree to discuss how best they can improve protection of the civilians, how best they can collaborate to maintain the minimum principle in terms of engagement with these civilian populations.
And then I'm proud to say after two, three years of sustained engagement with that humanitarian diplomacy, a month ago we met again in Lomé and we were able to sign a tripartite agreement between Burkina Faso, Togo, Burkina Faso, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana. Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, we were not able to sign because there are still some elements that we are dealing with. It's a process. We need to be patient and then hopefully that signature will take place before the end of the year.
So that gives you, you know, the complexity that comes with the border engagement within a very complex, you know, political environment.
Sam Rushworth
Just to follow up that, just to test my understanding. What I'm hearing is obviously that there is conflict in the region, but that possibly one of the biggest drivers of displacement is actually people returning to discover that their home, their land is inhabited by somebody else, that they've got no livelihood to go back to, and therefore they're becoming displaced for a second or third time. Is that correct?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
It's absolutely correct. That's why we say that return is not just a cross-border movement. Return requires investment. Return requires people to have opportunity to have access to services. If children were in a displacement, but at least they were going to school, you ask them to go back and there is no school.
So they won't stay. They will go.
They will leave again. So how do we make all this return much more sustainable? It's through investment. So in the region, this is what we are trying to do with our partners like WFP, UNICEF, others, of course understanding that with the reduced humanitarian resources that we are all confronted with, we'll need to create space and opportunities for much more development opportunities, much more development financing, much more, you know, investment coming from the private sector.
But we can't do it alone. And this is where I think that the UK is uniquely placed. When I see the way that you are engaged in Chad with the government, with the UN system, with the NGOs, with the other, you know, donors. So I think we need that kind of capacity. And I also talk about the data.
So data will underpin the way that we understand all this pattern and complexity so that we can come, we can all come together and then understand how best can we push the pathway towards solution.
Sam Rushworth
And so to some extent then I guess that the challenges are around having robust enough legal systems, land registration, mediation between people that are in conflict at a local level. And sort of departure from that question a little, how many forcibly displaced people do you estimate will attempt to then just leave the Sahel and travel to Europe?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
We have some data. I mean, when I look at what happened at the border between Sudan and Chad last year, we have an estimate of 12,000, 12, 13,000 who have left, who have left Chad and then went to Libya.
Went to Libya?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
Libya, to Libya. And then we have also some, you know, indication in terms of estimate how many Sudanese have also, you know, left to Tunisia. I think that number has increased maybe six or seven times.
And then we know that there are some Sudanese in Chad who are also leaving and trying to transit through the Lake Chad, reaching Agadez as well. And then last week, during the Executive Committee meeting with the Cameroonian authorities, they told us that they are now seeing Sudanese leaving Chad and coming to Cameroon as well.
Speaker 17
So it's becoming a wider and wider area that they're getting further away.
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
Absolutely, absolutely, absolutely. This is why stabilization is key. How do we stabilize those people close to their, you know, to their country of origin?
Sam Rushworth
Are you expected the numbers of refugees sort of fleeing further north into Europe to increase, or do you feel that you're seeing the reverse, that actually some of the programs are starting to work?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
I mean, if you look at some of the data that, you know, have been collected, you will have the impression that it's reducing. But actually, I would say the routes are just changing.
The routes are dynamic. If there is more control on one route, then people will just look at other alternatives. And by the time we catch up and then understand the data there, maybe it's too late. You see? So I'm saying that the only way we can address it, as Marc was insisting on it, is investment within local communities, giving opportunities in terms of jobs, access to social services.
We can only do it if we work closely by aligning our intervention with the national priorities. Government leadership is key. We can't do it without government. So how do we make it happen in those regions?
Sam Rushworth
Okay, Patrice, how many refugees, how many more refugees from Sudan could Chad accommodate?
How many more?
Patrice Ahouansou
Be careful. It's very difficult to give an exact number, but the only thing I can say is the population of refugees in Chad has tripled. You know, it has tripled because before the ongoing conflict in Sudan, because the conflict is still ongoing, unfortunately, we were talking about 400,000 Sudanese refugees. Only Sudanese refugees. Now, from 400,000, we are talking about 1.3 million Sudanese refugees.
That's from 15th of April to date, 1.3 million. On top of that, we have the Central African refugees, we have the Nigerian refugees, all this bringing the number of refugees to 1.5 million. But something that is very, you know, that is important to highlight is the solidarity, despite, you know, all the internal or domestic issues that Chad might have, is the solidarity and the generosity that the country, not only the government, but also the people, you know, are demonstrating, are showing. We, I mean, I tell you a story. Last, I mean, last year, no, this year, in January, when our High Commissioner visited Chad, he met the head of state.
And one of the issues that the Head of State raised was, we are afraid about, I mean, we are very, we know that there might be a spillover of the conflict, you know, from from Sudan to Chad. But no matter what will happen, we will not close our border. That was the message from the Head of State. And for us, it's it's reassuring that despite all the situation, Chad said the border will will still be open. And this we can say this has been translated concretely in the in the asylum law.
Sam Rushworth
So Chad's dealing with quite quite a rapid population growth from three different sides. And could you show us sort of how how are refugees included in service provision in Chad?
Patrice Ahouansou
How refugees are included. Thanks. No, right now what we are working on together with authorities and all the UN agencies is to, you know, prioritize three areas where inclusion should be effective, three sectors: water, health, education. There have been a lot of progress, but we need to do more. But Chad cannot do more alone.
Chad will do more thanks to, you know, the international solidarity. For instance, in for education, all the refugees, you know, are using Chadian schools. All the refugees are using Chadian curriculum.
Sam Rushworth
I was going to ask that. So are they living predominantly in camps or are they just integrating, are they mixing in?
Patrice Ahouansou
We have both. We have those in camps, we have those living in villages as well with the host communities. So this is the first level of inclusion. But in terms of services, we have refugees and Chadians going to the same school. Even if the school is in a village or the school is in a camp, we have host community coming in the camp and using the same facilities.
So all the schools are recognized as Chadian schools, using Chadian curriculum, using refugee teachers and Chadian teachers.
Because refugees come with a lot of capacities and many teachers among the refugee community. And using also the same, the same teachers, the same curriculum, but the next level would be how the teachers, in order to make this inclusion effective, how the teachers are given, you know, a contract, not necessarily as civil servant, but on a contractual basis they are being paid by the Chadian government. Refugee teachers. Refugee teachers. It's not yet the case, but the dialogue has started with the authorities to see how can this be effective.
Yeah. You know, because the legislation is very conducive, but this has to be accompanied not only by us, but also by international, by the donors. The same thing for health, you know, the health centers, the same health centers are used by refugees and host communities. Water system, same thing.
Patrice Ahouansou
If we don't do that, it will create tension. Because without sharing, having one system, because the idea is to have one system for all. If you have two parallel systems, it will bring tension because don't forget that we are also in areas where there have not been enough development investment. Thanks to humanitarian funding, we are putting services in place, but these services have to benefit both refugees and host communities.
Sam Rushworth
Is there a sense then actually that the community that's receiving refugees, because you're choosing to integrate and those refugees by and large as you say they come with skills and talents and they are working and serving, that actually the communities have benefited from having refugees living amongst them?
Patrice Ahouansou
There is a huge benefit for having, I mean, you will even see some head of village saying, "Okay, I want refugees to be hosted in my village."
Speaker 21
Oh really? So the villages are actually saying, "Please bring some to us."
Patrice Ahouansou
Because they can see the dividend of bringing refugees. But once again, this can only be sustainable if we invest in the system. Not only we invest in individuals, we should invest in services, in system, so that the system is unique, and invest also in the territories. Because you remember I was talking about the territorial shock that the influx is bringing. So how do we invest in territories to ensure that we are talking about one area?
We are not talking about refugee camp and village, but we are talking about one geographic unit where, you know, there is connection between the city and the village, and there is a connection between the village and the camp.
This is the model we are promoting. Because, and this cannot be done only with the budgetary space from Chad, because this is a country that is hit by multiple crises and I don't think they have enough budgetary space, you know, to do this huge investment. That is why the international solidarity, you know, remains essential so that the inclusion can be more efficient and effective, you know, for all the population.
Sam Rushworth
No, it sounds like an interesting model. Just a final question from me, just wondering about the replicability of that model elsewhere, because what you're describing seems a relatively unique example of how to actually build a good relationship between host and refugee.
Did you want to come in on that?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
No, I mean, this is exactly what we are trying to do across the region with WFP, with UNICEF, with our colleagues from DCO. Even if I take the example of the Central Sahel, Marc, you will recall the nine flagships that, you know, we have developed jointly with, you know, those authorities. You know, it's about the energy, the food security system, the education system, the cross-border, you know, dynamics and the nexus, you know, approach and the energy, to name just few of them. So this is exactly the same pattern.
And this is why I think this is the only way where as a UN entities we believe that, you know, we can demonstrate our added value in this complex environment. We need to come together. We need to work together. We need to put our heads together and make sure that we understand where are the challenges but opportunities. And as I was saying, one of the lever is the localization agenda, working with the communities because they are the most, you know, impacted by all these situation.
And then as we do it, ensuring that the government remains, you know, in the coordination and at the center of this kind of initiative. This requires policy reforms. It requires a space for international financial institutions.
And when we engage with African Development Bank, World Bank, it's not money coming to UNHCR, but money put at the disposal of the authorities so that they have the required capacity to really invest in the long-term prospect. This is the only way how stabilization will become a reality in that region.
Tracy Gilbert
Thanks, Chair. A slight change of topic, a little bit. I was going to move on to engagement with international actors. So I'll come to you first, Abdouraouf. Do countries such as China, Turkey, and Russia approach development and humanitarian partnerships differently across the Sahel than Western nations do?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
I can use an example of, you know, engagement with some of the countries that you just mentioned in Central African Republic. I've seen this is the first time that China, for instance, has shown, you know, interest in being part of what Patrice was describing as return hub or development hub, but through the private sector, you know, engagement, not money coming from from from the foreign office or, you know, development cooperation.
So this is one of the concrete examples I can see where China in the region has indicated, you know, that they can be, you know, part of that kind of private sector solution, you know, agenda.
Tracy Gilbert
Thank you. And to Patrice, in terms of future development, is it actually possible to undertake effective development programming at such a time when there's so much instability and insecurity across the Sahel?
Patrice Ahouansou
No, I mean, you know, today in those areas affected by displacement or those areas also, you know, receiving forcibly displaced people, we already have development projects.
We already have development projects, be it in infrastructure, roads, energy, telecommunication, to ensure that the environment is conducive, you know, for other partners to feel comfortable to invest in those areas. That is one thing. The second thing is in those displacement areas, the profile of the refugees or the IDPs, you know, encourage also to invest because they are not only recipient of humanitarian aid, and they shouldn't be seen only as recipient of humanitarian aid, because these are people who come with a lot of capacities.
So how do we invest in those areas to maximize, you know, the potential that they have? For instance, in Chad, we have in the, in the refugee community about 1,000, you know, health workers, doctors, midwives, nurses, more than 1,000 lawyers who were working as, as lawyers in, in Sudan and who needs opportunity, more than 2,000 teachers and entrepreneurs. How do we support them to, to register their business? So these areas should not only be seen as displacement areas, they should be seen as investment areas. How do we invest there?
And that is why, yes, my question to you is, my answer to you is yes, we should invest in those areas, helping refugees, you know, to value first of all their capacities, their competencies, helping them to, to establish small businesses, to exercise as lawyers.
And this is the only way they can contribute to the local economy, you know, as taxpayers and give back also to the community that has hosted them. And we can't do it without the private sector. And we need the private sector for such engagement so that the investment in the business model is well thought about.
Tracy Gilbert
Thank you. Can I come back to Abdouraouf again? What are the challenges in undertaking development programming in countries with poor human rights records?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
For us, it's clear that there's no development if there's no respect to human rights as well. So we can't separate, you know, development with the human rights.
I mean development should yield, you know, tangible results in the improvement of the enjoyment of the human rights of the individuals. So this is part of the conversation that we are having with most of, you know, the member states in the region that I'm covering. So we can't separate the two. And as a protection lead agency, the work that we do somehow contribute to improve, you know, the environment of the protection, meaning the environment for the people to really enjoy, you know, the human rights.
This is the work that we are doing as we engage with most of these governments in the region.
Speaker 25
Okay. Thank you. Marc, you indicated you wanted to come in there, Marc.
Marc Regnault de la Mothe
Yeah, thank you. I just wanted to come in again on the access. The UK has been absolutely key and strategic in supporting access negotiations in the region, in the Sahel region, by convening other donors, other governments to make sure that we have continued access to communities. This is also important when we speak about humanitarian access through UNHAS, which is the common humanitarian air services that WFP is managing and that supports the whole humanitarian communities in so many isolated areas that the UK has also been and can continue funding because access continues to be a challenge. That's one point that I wanted to raise.
And not only through funding, but also through engagement and humanitarian diplomacy.
And we really encourage the UK to continue playing that role. I also wanted to stress more on the social cohesion and absolutely the results that have already been outlined are there. The interventions in resilience and the joint interventions, they do increase social cohesion. And one last point I wanted to make, which is important to correct in a way, is that it's not a choice between humanitarian funding and development funding. Both are important.
Humanitarian for the short term and the development and resilience for the longer term. So we're not advocating for one or the other because both are part of the solution. Thank you.
Thank you.
Monica Harding
Can I, can I just come back on other actors, other state actors? So, given the cuts from the US, from the UK, from Germany to aid in the Sahel, that's opened up a space which you talked of before, which Tracy was talking of, where Russia and China might move in. Are you seeing that very deliberately? Are you seeing that in the work that you do and in the countries in which you're working, Abdouraouf?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
Not really. I mean, what I see is that member states are coming to us and then asking how collectively can we look for other financing opportunities?
So they are not talking about, you know, funding, but financing opportunities. And this is through the Lomé dialogue example that I've just shared with you as of next year. These are the kind of, you know, conversations that we are going to have with those countries. So what is key for them is the resilience of the communities, the resilience of the national institutions in this complex environment. And they are looking at, you know, diversification of, you know, financing opportunities.
And this is why across the region, for the past two years, we are really engaging with this kind of event, which is called the round table with private sector. We did one in Nigeria, in Lagos, just recently with FCDO.
I think it was in February this year. There is another one coming in Chad on the 24th, 25th of November. And then we also organized one in Central Africa. So that gives indication that we are also trying to see how we can play a catalytic role as we support these governments to look at, you know, the financing opportunity. Of course, when you have the World Bank, there is the windows for host communities and the IDA, you know, for IDA window for host communities and refugees, it is there.
But with the African Development Bank, for instance, in Chad, they have been supporting us with some resilience funding as well.
But we need to multiply, diversify and increase, you know, such opportunity. I'm also happy to see that entities like BMZ in Chad are now, you know, financing some resilience activities, but this need to be put at scale across the region. It's not just one one country. As I was saying, displacement is regional. Displacement is comes with the cross-border reality.
And we need to make sure that as we save life, Marc, this is what you were saying, as we save life, we don't forget the solution opportunity. But solutions comes with investment.
David Mundell
Thank you. Okay. And just to bring our session to a close, I just want to ask each of you a sort of short question really about data collection and the monitoring that you do in relation to to your work.
So starting with you, Patrice, how does that work? Do you, how do you collect data and monitor what is happening?
Patrice Ahouansou
No, thank you. We have many set of data that we collect. Data for to understand the population trend, data we do it through partners, local partners. We do that through local partners. We do that also through communities directly, refugees and host communities, to understand really the trend of movement.
But there is also a set of data that we collect directly to measure the impact of the activities. We do it also through studies, through universities. And finally, a set of data we collect with the government.
With the government. And this is very key because the data we collect with the government, the idea is to make sure that this data is integrated in the government system. So that when the planning is being done by the government, the forcibly displaced population are not excluded. They are already in the data and using the government also key criteria. And ultimately, is to have, for instance, the refugees and the IDPs in the government social registry.
Because this is the way to make sure that all the safety net programs that the government is implementing can target refugees, host communities, and other forcibly displaced people.
David Mundell
And Mark, what do you think could be done to better monitor emerging risks so that predictive actions can be taken? Do you think there's something that could be done in that regard?
Marc Regnault de la Mothe
Yes, absolutely. So we have a system called the IPC, which is basically the system that collects data on food security. And this is done jointly with FAO, it's done jointly with the governments, with NGOs. There's a national consensus that draws on the data that is collected in the field.
And there is a single set of drivers and an overall figure that comes out and is agreed upon by everybody, and then also including donors. So funding for this IPC system is paramount because it really allows not only WFP but everybody to really monitor the trend yearly and also according to the agricultural seasons. So there's a series that can be used to see how the trend is going and also where the trend is going. It also allows to make predictions, and this is also has been done if we look at the forecast for the next months through Agrimet with UK funding, actually.
So there are funding windows that have been used to to predict meteorological data that allows us for example to understand what's the impact of El Niño in the next months. So there are systems that can be supported to make sure that we continue monitoring food security and monitoring impact of future shocks.
David Mundell
Thank you. And Abdouraouf, just finally, do you think that UNHCR has enough access to data on issues like displacement, gender-based violence and other humanitarian need?
Abdouraouf Gnon-Konde
Yeah, no, I think certainly there are, you know, some efforts to be sustained. But when you look at the type and the quantity, the quality of the data that we have collected, at least from my position as a regional bureau director, I find it very useful to facilitate the dialogue with a wide range of actors, member states, other UN entities, international financial institutions. And we use all these data to really underpin the partnership and also move towards what I was referring as a solution pathway. So I think we can be proud of what we have done so far. And then we also have a center established with the World Bank that really help us to look at, you know, the socio-economic data that could be collected as we look at the inclusion within national plans.
So I think, yeah, quite, you know, happy with what we have, but certainly there is room for improvement. Thanks a lot.
David Mundell
Thank you. I thank each of you for your evidence this afternoon.
It's greatly appreciated. And we'll move now to our second panel who is, who are going to join us virtually. Thank you, gentlemen.
Welcome to our second panel of witnesses on our first day of our inquiry into the UK and the Sahel. Our witnesses are joining us virtually and I'd like to ask both Vanessa and Yann to introduce themselves for the purpose of the record. So Vanessa, perhaps if we start with you.
Vanessa Willems
Hello, thank you so much for the invitation. My name is Vanessa Willems. I am the advocacy and policy adviser ad interim for the FONGA, the forum of regional NGOs at regional level for West and Central Africa. Nice to meet you. Over to you, Yann.
Speaker 27
Yeah, and hello, nice to meet you and yeah, thank you for your invitation. I'm Yann Faivre. I'm the executive director of the Danish Refugee Council for West Africa, North Africa and Latin America.
I'm based in Dakar for several years, this is where we have our regional hub covering those operations.
David Mundell
Thank you. Well, I'll begin, Vanessa, by asking you about the fact that humanitarian access is increasingly constrained by both insecurity and government-imposed restrictions. Which of these do you think presents the greatest practical obstacle to delivering assistance in Central Sahel?
Vanessa Willems
Thank you very much for this question. I guess it depends which country we're talking about. Recently, we've received a report from two organizations that are member to the forum, and they've documented over 200 incidents that took place in 2023, incidents of, you know, impeding access on the ground.
What we see is that in Burkina Faso, for example, it is mostly security that is impeding humanitarian access, whereas in a country like Niger, it is actually bureaucratic and administrative impediments that are the primary cause of challenges that actors on the ground are facing to access people in need. In Mali, the the balance is a bit more even between the two countries, the two types, two categories of of incidents. Would you like me to go into more details on on this?
David Mundell
I think if you're able to give us a sort of general, you you've touched on some specifics, it's sort of general a general impression of of what of the situation, I think that would be helpful.
Vanessa Willems
Okay, thank you.
So what type of incidents are we talking about? If you're talking about Burkina Faso, for example, a recent example that we faced in 2026 is the Banque du Trésor, its rough translation would be Treasury Bank. We've been asked by the authorities to put the money that's meant to support the humanitarian response, the projects, within the Treasury Bank. When what we see with this is this measure that is not necessarily at odds with humanitarian principles, the way it was implemented, the rapidity with which it was implemented, led to significant challenges for the humanitarian actors on the ground.
For example, we did not have access to to liquidity quickly enough. We didn't see our payments being done quickly enough, so that slowed down the purchase of different items. We did not see the payments of humanitarian staff taking place quickly enough either, so that led to other significant challenges, and all of that slowed down the humanitarian response. In a context like Niger, the kind of challenges that we're facing is more the authorization to to access the grounds that are delivered by the authorities.
They are either slowed down, for the most part it's actually delays in providing those authorizations, but sometimes we're also facing some refusals. In Niger, we also face some, and that's particularly national NGOs that report those kind of challenges, it's with, you know, the exemptions for the customs and so on. The administrative process is too slow and the documents that need to be provided by the authorities are too slow, and so that also leads to some challenges for them to justify, you know, their expenses with the donors. In Mali, a recent example that has taken our attention has been, for example, the 10% taxes that the authorities wanted to impose on the humanitarian response.
It required a lot of conversation between the authorities and the humanitarian community, and it led to an exemption that was provided by the authorities a few months back. I think what those examples tell us is that we're witnessing within the speech of the authorities an increase of their desire to express their sovereignty. They want to have more leadership on the humanitarian response, they want to have more oversight on the humanitarian response, and they want the humanitarian response to be more aligned with their national priorities. To be very clear, NGOs on the ground don't have any issues with sovereignty of state, we absolutely respect that.
But the way the reforms are taken and being implemented, the measures that are adopted, can lead to significant operational challenges on the ground, just like as I described with the BDT, as we call it, the Bank of the Treasury. This also teaches us something very important, is that dialogue is absolutely key to keep the trust between the actors. We need a sustained dialogue. We need to build the trust with those actors. We need to be solution-oriented and we need to be supported in building that trust and that dialogue space.
Now you may ask, like, what does this mean for an actor such as the UK?
I think what's the ways you could support us is by helping us to create that space. To give you a very specific example that's will be coming very soon on the table. You may be aware that the authorities of the Central Sahel, the AES authorities, have been hosting a forum, a humanitarian forum back in August 2026. During that forum they adopted, they took for resolution to develop a humanitarian policy. As humanitarian actors we see this humanitarian policy for the AES countries as an opportunity to engage with them and to dialogue with them.
We see this as an opportunity to put measures in the policy that could for example facilitate cross-border humanitarian responses.
But we also see it equally important that we are part of the discussions, that we're being consulted in the process to set up those policies, so we can raise any concerns or any suggestions to make sure that the humanitarian response is as fluid and as effective as possible. More generally speaking, I think humanitarian diplomacy is definitely a way where an actor such as the UK could support us on the field. We need your support to keep the dialogue with the authorities to help resolve solutions. But there's maybe four points that I could share with you about the way this humanitarian diplomacy should be conducted, and this is based on a recent experience.
First, what we do see is that when humanitarian diplomacy conducted by diplomatic actors is coordinated, it's more efficient when it's coordinated amongst them. A really recent example of that would be in Chad, for example, where the authorities also decided to put on the table this idea of, they floated around, let's say it that way, this idea of putting a tax on the humanitarian response. We received strong support from the donors. They put down on paper their position on that and shared it with the authorities, and they coordinated among themselves what their responses would be, and that was extremely helpful. Another point to have in mind is that humanitarian diplomacy is the most effective when it's actually coordinated and discussed and grounded in the operational realities of the field actors.
Vanessa Willems
It means that before your representatives go to the field, before they engage with the authorities, you could have like conversation pre-briefing with the NGOs that are operating on the ground. You could have meeting with them when you meet, you could receive like reports from us to support your engagement with the authorities. The third thing that we have witnessed, we've observed is that humanitarian policy is also diplomacy, excuse me, is also most efficient when it's driven and guided by humanitarian principles.
And the third, the fourth point to keep in mind with humanitarian diplomacy is that it is helpful to have humanitarian, to have diplomatic actors supporting us. But we have to keep in mind that the vast majority of access issues are actually resolved by humanitarian actors operating themselves on the ground with, you know, their direct engagement with the different actors on the ground. And so what we need to do is to keep investing in their capacity to do so and the collective capacity to do so as well, such as supporting the forums at country level. Thank you so much for that question. Please let me know if I need to clarify any point.
David Mundell
But the only point I wanted just to raise on that, but I mean in terms of diplomatic actors in the wider sense, are there not other actors such as Russia and China, for example, who might want different outcomes and therefore their diplomatic actions with the host governments might be different from ours?
Vanessa Willems
It's an interesting question. So when an actor such as the FONGA reaches out to different diplomatic actors across the world to support, we do assess how they can be supportive. And I don't have a specific response about China or about Russia, but we've identified other stakeholders across the region which we need their support. For example, Turkey. We do know that they're selling the drones to, they're probably not the only ones, but they're selling drones to the authorities across the three central Sahel countries.
Those drones are then used after for, you know, military purposes, but they represent an increasing challenge for our teams on the ground. They we we are worried about the incidents those that they can represent against the the humanitarian community, although it's a collateral damage and never a direct target, but we we are worried about that and we are worried as well for, you know, the the impact they can have obviously on the protection of civilians. So humanitarian diplomacy and engagement with stakeholders such as Turkey is absolutely essential for us to to make sure that they are aware of the risk that, you know, when they sell those those warfare instruments, I think is the language, to to the authorities, they make sure that they put everything in place to safeguard the protection of the civilians and the aid workers on the ground.
So I know it's not exactly the stakeholder you were aiming for, but it's just to say that when we engage and we look at support, we also look at different sets of stakeholders, not just the European ones. We also look at the diplomatic actors within the region. I think a really interesting lesson we took away from, you know, the political transition in Niger back in 2023 was the influence on access that actors such as ECOWAS or even Togo or Benin had on our capacity to respond on the ground.
And so we do try to have engagement directly with them. Our relationship today, I wouldn't say is as strong as what we have with an actor such as the UK or the European Union, but we're definitely building those relationships with them. And I think that's also where you could have a role, is to help us build those relationships and promoting, you know, IHL with them and the importance of humanitarian access with them as well. Thank you.
David Mundell
Thank you. Yann, can I ask you how the UK can ensure that its security and counter-terrorism partnerships in the Sahel do not undermine perceptions of humanitarian neutrality or put aid workers at greater risk?
Speaker 27
Thank you very much. Thank you for this question. It's quite a big question, actually.
Definitely, those activities are very sensitive to the context in which we are operating. I would say that definitely we can connect the implementation of some stabilization plan and counter-violence, counter-terrorist activities in some areas and the difference we feel from the population or even from the authorities or the armed groups, the way they see us, the way they accept us, the way they consider humanitarian workers. So definitely, it can, under some circumstances, put at risk the humanitarian workers or the totality of our program in some cases.
So I would say that definitely to to answer straight to your question, the key point is really to ensure that those programs are made in a way that they preserve the neutrality, the independence of of the humanitarian workers and the humanitarian action in general. There is a clear need of coordination from those from those programs with the humanitarian actors to make sure and to be able to assess the risk that one is generating for the other. Although they are necessary in some context and can be part of a global solution, there's a need to make sure that the three operations can be implemented jointly, otherwise to consider maybe those those activities to be to be implemented more on a sequential manner.
Monica Harding
Thank you. Can I start with you, Vanessa, and then come to Yann? In the context of funding cuts to the Sahel, which programs or interventions are most critical to protect from further cuts?
Vanessa Willems
Thank you for that question. It's actually a tough one. I think it's not so much about which one you should protect, it's more about which approach you should adopt to keep supporting the humanitarian response in country. And I think one guiding principle that we should have in mind is that the response must be needs-based response. So how do we define the needs?
We need to have assessments that are conducted in an independent manner on the ground to assess those needs, but also in a way that includes the communities that are directly impacted by the conflict or the climate change and that results in humanitarian needs. We need them to be involved in identifying the needs, prioritizing the needs, and ideally into the design of the response as well. So I think that's the key principle to have in mind when you think about what should be preserved, it's an approach. I think what you need as well is to make sure that the kind of funding that you provide allows flexibility for the response, for the very simple fact that the needs that we assess today might not be the exact same as the needs that we will find on the ground tomorrow. When you have a displacement of thousands of people from one day to the next, the needs are obviously changing from one day to the next.
So we need a flexible funding mechanism. We also need to have a funding mechanism that allows a multi-sectoral response and a multi-year response so we can address also some of the causes of the humanitarian needs and build the resilience of the population for tomorrow. But yeah, maybe you have some elements you would like to share on this as well.
Speaker 27
Yeah, maybe, maybe you highlighted the principles to be respected in general. Maybe a couple of more specific dimensions related to the cuts, of course, have been impacting a lot the very vulnerable population, the most at-risk groups in the society.
So, in addition to all the principles that Vanessa just shared, I would say that there's certainly an importance for us and for UK as well to focus on IDPs, particularly in remote and insecure areas. To keep focusing on the host communities. There is a particularity in Sahel, either we speak about Central Sahel or Chad, is that we are having IDPs and refugees in host communities that are potentially poorer than the people they host. It's very much the case in Chad, and that could generate further destabilization around the initial area of crisis. Women, girls, children have been extremely affected because, of course, some programs in some areas were totally cut.
I'm speaking in particular about the GBV, the gender-based violence programming, that have been in some areas totally forgotten.
So they need to be as well kept at the center of the attention. And definitely people with disabilities, older people, like usually that are among the most vulnerables. And finally, there is a particular look and intention to keep on the question of the returnees and people going back to communities. We see in Sahel, in some countries in Sahel in particular, some precipitation, some high speed in the way some returnees are returned, if you like, that are not really made in a sustainable way. So definitely there's some attention to be paid there as well.
Monica Harding
Thank you.
What are the reductions in international aid, how are they affecting local civil society organisations in the Sahel to deliver services and respond to communities' needs? So what is the impact of the aid cuts on the work that you're doing? Vanessa, do you want to take that one?
Vanessa Willems
I don't know if I want to start off, if Yann you actually want to start with the impact it had on the...
Speaker 27
On the DRC, I can if you want start by the impact it had on our organisation and then if you want to share some elements common with the other humanitarian organisations in the region. The impact has been extremely important and is still important.
We have been in the past two years reducing our workforce worldwide by a quarter, by 25%. We have been in some areas cutting down some activities, not on the base of the end of the needs, not on the ends of an achieved sustainability, but just on the base of the reduction of the funds or even sometimes the disappearing of those funds. So the impact has been very important. It has been very important for communities that all of a sudden we had to let on their own in some areas of the continent. We had to close down offices to, and then because the access was pretty much connected to the proximity, and then to give up with the coverage of some geographies in Burkina Faso in particular, in Mali as well.
We we have been in the same time preparing ourselves to make sure that we could have a strong impact and continue to accompany the the key population we were we were engaged with in the last years. We did engage a lot in a localization agenda. We hear very often that the localization is is very often going with a cost reduction etc etc. Finally what we saw mainly as a as a great interest or we were already involved in localization before for some local acceptance and and local context analysis dimensions. But we we found out since the cut the cut that we were going faster on some sustainability agenda with local actors than than we would go without.
So we have been working a lot on creating spaces for local actors, not spaces of funding only, but making sure that they were participating more obviously to the humanitarian agenda, to the humanitarian decision, to the programming and the design of our interventions. You certainly heard about the Sahel Regional Fund that we created and are still hosting in DRC in the region and created in collaboration with FCDO. This fund is now serving some windows of funding exclusively reserved for local actors in Central Sahel and Chad. Local organizations are members of the board, making sure, piloting the, participating to the coordination of the fund.
So it's some of the impacts that the cut had. After, there is, it has been of course what we use to call the prioritization. I'm not very comfortable with speaking about prioritization because the indirect message is always the same, is that we have been letting down what was not a priority, which is not the case. We have been making a prioritization among choices that we did before that were already priorities because the region is extremely sensitive, weak, and exposed to conflict, to climate change, displacement. We work also on the migration agenda, etc.
So we had to make choices among finally elements that were from equal priorities.
And the choices were very much driven by the way that the fundings are now for a big part addressed to the humanitarian community with already targeted geographies, very narrow targeting geographies. So that has been much more some choices have been made more on this basis rather than on a needs base that Vanessa was calling for a few minutes ago. That's mainly how the funds have been impacting the work of DRC and how DRC is supporting its target beneficiaries in the region.
Vanessa Willems
Thank you, Yann.
Maybe beyond what what you just said as well, what came to my mind while you were talking was the impact in the in the protection sector and the local organizations that are engaged in the response, the community-based organizations. What was interesting to note shortly after the the massive and abrupt cut took place in 2021 is that local organizations that had been trained, had been empowered to provide a humanitarian response to address the protection needs of including of women and girls on the field, were in the first time still capable to to provide that response. But what was strongly impacted quite quickly was the referral mechanism towards the protection services provided by other stakeholders on the ground. A year down the road, the picture is slightly evolving.
I heard reports of, you know, the women and girls-led organization in countries such as Burkina Faso being particularly impacted by the funding cuts and in a more difficult position to provide their response. But overall, if you look at the protection sector, a recent note that was published by the regional protection working group that is based in Dakar, they identified a severe reduction of the amount of humanitarian workers that are engaged into the humanitarian response. I'm trying to look at the number for the Central Sahel and what we've seen is that they had 310 organizations supporting the response in 2024 and this came down to 232 in 2025. So that's a reduction by nearly a quarter in of amount of stakeholders providing a protection response within a single year.
So I think that's indeed a dreadful impact that we witness on the field. Thank you.
Sam Rushworth
Thank you. Yeah, I'm how effective is the Sahel Regional Fund at meeting both immediate and longer-term humanitarian needs in the region?
Speaker 27
I think the Sahel Regional Fund, and it's not only my voice bringing it, I would say that we had a lot of involvement from the FONGA together with us. The Sahel Regional Fund is led, if you like, by a collective of several NGOs and INGOs together under the presidency of one of them.
So the feedback we have from the assessments and the feedback we have from the partners is that the efficiency of the Sahel Regional Fund is really, really at a high level. That the delays in dealing with some calls and problems, the reactivity in front of some emerging crises, I'm having in mind the cholera one in Chad not such a long time ago, the way the good donorship principles that were particularly committed to at the Grand Bargain are respected. So generally I would say that we see a Sahel Regional Fund extremely efficient on the way it takes care and responds to the needs of the partners, international as national.
I see a Sahel Response Fund that is extremely effective in the trust building that Vanessa was mentioning with the authorities in this part of the world. There is a co-ownership that is maybe from the different governments we see in Niger and Burkina, where very often extremely surprised to see the interest that those administrations are positioning on the Sahel Regional Fund. And the efficiency in terms of immediate financial numbers is that the Sahel Regional Fund is functioning, if you like, with 12% only management cost, which is extremely limited in the industry. So the part of the funding going directly for implementation is high.
The efficiency can be considered as definitely there as well. And then I would say that there is also a secondary effect in terms of efficiency of the Sahel Regional Fund. The secondary effect is to enrich and to bring more diversity in the segment of the pooled funds. The fact that in some areas you have more than one pooled fund operating and that it generates some comparison, that it generates some common interest, some exchanges, some joint learning processes, makes of course that the performance of all the pooled funds are increased.
So in terms of indirect efficiency, I would I would keep in mind the fact that this Sahel Regional Fund being a new, not such a new player because now it's four five years that it does exist, but being a new a new kind of architecture brick in the funding landscape if you like, the the generates a lot of of benefits on other sides as well.
Sam Rushworth
Thank you, yeah, and and that chimes with what we've heard, 90% of beneficiaries report satisfaction with assistance received through the Sahel Regional Fund. Are there any lessons that you think the FCDO could draw from this model of delivery?
Speaker 27
Yes, definitely, 90% as you say, which is very high and we are extremely satisfied with that. I would say that there are certainly some good lessons that FCDO can take and I'm sure that the team in Dakar already took note of some of them. The SRF is providing a real evidence that localized action can be scaled responsibly when accompanied by a strong governance and an appropriate risk sharing. So that is the demonstration that definitely we can do. The SRF is demonstrating that the early implication of local actors in the funding mechanism is possible and that actually it can provide a lot of contextual relevance.
It provides sustainability in the concept. So definitely it gives also a meaningful voice to most of those local actors that are finding in the SAF a very interesting regional space and forum to express themselves.
Sam Rushworth
Thank you. Now you moved on actually to where I was going to move the conversation already, so well done, which is around the 25% of the fund that supports local partners, which in contexts such as the Sahel is obviously really important because they have a reach beyond where many of the sort of larger international NGOs are able to reach. Vanessa, I'll ask you this question.
Sort of how meaningful do you think that that transfer of power is in practice? So the use of the fund to support local actors, if you're seeing any kind of practice-based examples of where that funding is both able to, I suppose, use grassroots voices, be more locally designed, be more responsive, have better reach?
Vanessa Willems
Thank you. We actually see DSRF as an essential tool to meet the engagement of the Grand Bargain, but also to meet the engagement of Tom Fletcher within the humanitarian reset, where he says that the response should be as local as possible and as international as needed. A tool such as DSRF provides the opportunity for fixing the money, the way it goes.
It helps local actors to have not only a word to say within the governance, the way this mechanism, the fund is managed, identifying the needs, setting the priorities and designing the response, but it also helps them beyond that to build their own capacities, to provide, you know, the mentoring that they need to keep responding. And beyond the 25%, I think one element that's really important is the 7% of support costs that are cascaded to the national partners on the ground. This is absolutely essential because we tend to think that because we go local, it's going to be cheaper, but the reality on the field is that local organizations also need support costs.
They need to have offices, they need to have access to internet, they need to have, you know, a security management framework to provide, you know, to ensure the security of their own staff, etc., etc. So I think this, this system is absolutely essential. The beauty of it as well, beyond the, the main envelope, is, is the catalytic envelopes that are available and that allow to, to fund, you know, NGO forums on the ground and the collective engagement, you know, that they have, but also the way that it provides funding for innovations, such as the barometer, for example. It is a project that was led from the, from the regional level and that allows us to, it is a tool that allows us to assess, you know, the progress that we've made on the localization agenda since the Grand Bargain was adopted in 2016. Um, yeah.
Thank you.
Sam Rushworth
Thanks very much.
I'm just going to look to the chair. We've got two more questions, but I'm conscious of the importance of the 21 and 22.
Sam Rushworth
Okay, yeah, so just quick answers on these because we've got some other important questions to ask. I think I'm going to jump straight to 20, actually. So the fund operates across Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, but displacement, food insecurity, and conflict often cross national borders. So how effectively does the regional model address these cross-border challenges? Like Yann, if you want to.
Speaker 27
Yes, sure.
Just a small additional element to your previous question. Indeed, 25% of the funds of the SRF are dedicated to the local window and can be accessed directly by local actors. But the international window is as well aiming at consortia that have national partners inside. So they can bring with us some organizations that are a bit less strong, if you like, to benefit from some experience and start to build that capacity. And if you put all in all together, it's almost a third of the SRF that ends up being operationalized by local actors.
So it's 25 directly plus the indirect part through international consortia, 33, 31, 31%. Coming back to your question, how it does operate, it was really a key element when the SAF board, the SAF board at the time of the SOM that was created five years ago and that called for a regional response to a regional crisis. And that at the end we could set up only some country-based pool funds that were looking at the crisis one by one. So we thought that having a regional solution would be really a complement, complementing those country-based pool funds and enabling some cross-border activities, enabling some more agile as well evolution of the funding from one country to the other one depending of the evolution of the crisis and taking into consideration as well the fact that the access in Sahel has never been totally lost.
So there are some areas that are not accessible during a certain time, but some others are, and the ones that were not accessible before are becoming back accessible. And the SAF proved to be a good tool as well for consortium to manage that and to be able to focus in another area while an area was not accessible and focus back on it. So the SAF has been really enhancing this regional approach, having a regional fund management unit. So the SAF is managed at the regional level, taking into account regional calls, but at the same time is totally embedded in the national context and requirements.
So the very local particularities are taken into account, consolidated at the regional. What is very interesting is that the SRF promotes a regional advocacy, which is in many countries of the region the only way to really realize some advocacy. The SRF through its regional coordination generates as well some spaces for lessons learned and with international and with national actors cross-border, if you like, from one region to another.
Sam Rushworth
Thanks, Yann. And sorry to cut you off. That is really interesting and it's a helpful response. I'm just conscious that Tracy's got a couple of important questions for you as well.
David Mundell
Thank you, Sam. So, Tracy, to conclude our session, Tracy has some questions on women, girls, and children.
Tracy Gilbert
Thank you, Chair. How effectively are humanitarian development programs addressing the underlying economic causes of gender-based violence? Can I come to Yann first on this?
Speaker 27
Yes, of course. As I mentioned previously, the funding cuts have been seen in some regions in Sahel impacting a lot gender-based violence programs. Although women and girls are among the most vulnerable and most at risk according to our risk assessment, protection risk assessment, are really the person we need to focus on. Having a geographic logic, a geographic approach with the remaining funds is not always taking care of all the needs all across the board.
So to be very honest, there are some regions today in Sahel where actually women and girls that are at risk are not benefiting from the support they should be benefiting and that they were benefiting before. There have been somehow the forgotten elements in the so-called prioritization exercise that we had to do to focus our existing means elsewhere. So the impact is huge. The support to women-led organizations is probably less visible in Sahel today than it is in some other regions of the world, although we know very well that the conditions of living and even the global indicators of the GII index, if you like, show it. The conditions of living of women and girls in Sahel are among the most difficult currently and for years in the region.
So that's a key issue for us.
We keep them systematically at the heart of the protection risk analysis that we implement locally. We keep, when it comes to the SRF, gender-based violence programs as very important in the areas where we publish the call. And we keep as well, you know, we have some protection monitoring activities around the region where we monitor the cases of people denied from their rights or victim from violence. And we don't do protection monitoring alone. We usually do it systematically with some response attached through individual protection assistance that we provide.
So all women and girls that we meet along our programs that are victim of gender-based violence or other type of rights denial, we answer to those dispositive.
Vanessa Willems
Sorry, just maybe to complete on a quick point the response provided by Yann. The protection monitoring system is one of the severe impacts that we've seen from the funding cuts last year. The monitoring system is clearly jeopardized and we have increasing difficulty in monitoring, you know, the needs in the on the field.
So if an investment needs to be made and something needs to be protected, it's it's this monitoring system as well because without that it's difficult to provide a good response to the needs of the of the women and girls on the field. Thank you.
Tracy Gilbert
Thank you. Just on that, Vanessa, how should international donors balance pursuing long-term programs on gender equality with supporting initiatives such as girls' education that may have greater political acceptance?
Speaker 27
We we we can go both. I can start and then if you want to to complement. Just to say that actually that's a key issue and the fact that we have an assistance that is getting reduced wildly is is bringing most of all to consider and to declare that life-saving is essential.
And it's true that life-saving is essential, and we want to keep all the life-saving elements as a priority and use the funds we have for that. The point, and that's very sensitive when it comes to girls and women, and you highlight the access to education, but even before, all the conditions before accessing to that education in proper conditions, the life-saving activities are not properly responding to all the root causes of those issues: economic, social, safety, physical challenges that are encountered. So definitely, I would connect that with the previous question, thinking that there is a need for keeping a long-term activity, if you like, a long-term priority connected to the immediate humanitarian funding when it comes to those protection activities and particularly of this target population.
Tracy Gilbert
I'm just to follow that a little bit. How are the funding cuts and restrictions, can you tell us a little bit about funding cuts and restrictions on civic space affecting local civic society organizations' ability to support women and girls, particularly where they're in rural and conflict-affected communities?
Tracy Gilbert
Whoever feels most appropriate to answer is fine, whichever one you think.
Speaker 27
How it is affecting, I can share with you, and I'm sure Vanessa you have that in mind as well.
I can share with you that last week we had communicated in, for Burkina Faso only, the list of ten local organisations that are closing down due to the funding cuts. So we have a lot of small organisations that were extremely instrumental on the way we were answering to some of those issues, and women's organisations are among those organisations that are usually answered by those funding, that are closing, losing their premises, losing dynamics. So this is really the way it is directly affected. A second way of direct implication on those programming is the fact that we have much less frontline staff than we used to have.
So the detection in some communities where actually those problems might be not considered as problems so obvious or priority one, we have much more less frontline staff and volunteers from our partners as well going from village to village. So our identification capacity is certainly less than it used to be in the past.
Tracy Gilbert
And finally to you both, could disengaging from development cooperation in response to human rights violations further restrict opportunities for civil society and women's organisations, do you think? I'll come to Vanessa first on this one.
Speaker 43
I'm sorry, could you repeat the question because I didn't understand it.
Tracy Gilbert
Okay, could disengaging from development cooperation in response to human rights violations further restrict the opportunities for civil society and women's organizations? So stepping away from certain organizations, would that, how would that land, what would that look like on the ground for women's organizations?
Vanessa Willems
I don't have any other elements than what Yann already shared to share, so I don't know if you do, Yann.
Speaker 27
Yeah, if the question, if I well understood the question, if the idea is to see how do we address human rights violation and what is the response we can we can bring across our programming in Central Sahel, I would say that most of them, when they are identified and they are taken in charge by the teams of DRC or the partners of DRC or the partners of the Sahel Regional Fund, most of them are referred and dealt with with the authorities. And that is usually the the way it goes. And basically, I know that very often the question of human rights is needed to be dealt at the central level and and we need a central commitment. But when it comes to individual cases, most of the time we deal it with the local authorities at the very local level where where the violation occurred. And the response is very often provided by the technical the technical services from the region.
So I don't know if it responds to your question, but that's the way it takes place in most of our activities.
David Mundell
Okay, can I thank you both, Yann and Vanessa, for your time this afternoon in contributing to our inquiry into the UK and the Sahel. And I'm concluding this evidence session and I'm drawing our meeting to a formal close. Order, order.
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