Defence Committee

27 October 2026

Defence Committee Actual start House of Commons

Follow its sittings
23:02 - 24:32
Speaker 1
Order, order.  I call to order today's House of Commons Defence Committee one-off evidence session on Defence Medical Services. 

I'm very pleased to say that we have with us two very esteemed individuals with a great deal of experience in Defence Medical Services, namely Lieutenant General retired Martin Bricknell, who is the former Surgeon General of the UK Armed Forces back in 2018-2019.  And also we're very, very pleased to have with us Major General retired Timothy Hodgetts, who was also the former Surgeon General of the UK Armed Forces, as well as being the chair of the NATO Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in 2021 to 2024.  Gents, we'll get on with the questioning very, very soon, but I also want to very warmly welcome our newly elected member of the House of Commons Defence Committee, the honourable member for Dunfermline and Dollar, Graham Downie.  Graham, a very, very warm welcome to you. 

Right, without further ado, we've got two different panels today, so we have one hour with yourselves.  There's a lot of ground to cover, so please do try to be as succinct as possible because there's quite a lot of ground to cover in the next hour.  And without further ado, I'd like to ask my colleague Lincoln Jopp to kickstart the questioning. 
24:32 - 24:48
Speaker 2
General, thank you very much indeed for your time today.  When General Sir Richard Barrons was in front of us in July, I think it was, he described Defence Medical Services as the most hollowed-out bit of defence.  How would you describe the current state of Defence Medical Services? 
24:48 - 25:54
Speaker 3
I'll start and then Tim will fill in, and we'll balance this out between organisational aspects, which I will focus on, and Tim will talk about clinical. 

I had the privilege of serving on the SDR panel for the Defence Medical Services.  And we wanted to put on record that the UK Defence Medical Services had been hollowed out as a result of a series of pressures on the Ministry of Defence over the past decade and a half.  And that because of the unique nature of the relationship between the military medical services and the civilian medical services, it's possible to take that as a saving in peace, but it means your foundational baseline if you need to expand and mobilise is at risk. 

So from an organizational perspective, I would suggest it's a capacity rather than a capability dimension, but Tim will probably pick up on some specific aspects of risk. 
25:54 - 27:20
Speaker 4
Thank you.  So there are five principal risks I would say for casualties at scale and duration in the contested environment of war.  And we came to this conclusion after scrutiny within the NATO setting and codified in detail what the risk was across the whole of the NATO alliance.  And what we'll find is that there are broad risks across the alliance, but they vary in each individual country.  But they do fit into five main categories. 

So the first would be medical evacuation: having enough protected vehicles to get patients from the point of wounding to timely surgery.  Now we can mitigate that in part by advances in prolonged field care when evacuation is delayed. 

But be under no illusion, when medevac is not effective, avoidable deaths will occur and we have to accept poorer outcomes.  And indeed, the majority of avoidable deaths happen in pre-hospital care, not hospital care, so the focus has to be what happens far forward.  The second is around mass casualty planning and it demands the military theater-level medical evacuation plan.  But we have to have a core focus within that plan to return to duty at every possible opportunity as we evacuate.  The further away you get from the front line, the harder it is to get people back to the fight. 

27:20 - 28:48

Timothy Hodgetts

And we also need to recognize that the principles are different to conventional civilian major incident planning and we have to address enduring high numbers.

The third issue is medical logistics. And what COVID taught us, and we've seen it from previous military conflicts, is that just-in-time logistics don't work. And that means we have to hold more stock, and we need decisions and action on what to further onshore or nearshore in terms of critical consumable items. The fourth is around regulatory and legal considerations, and we need the necessary freedoms in place ahead of conflict to support innovation at pace, but also to be able to credential clinicians in a multinational setting, and multinationality buys out some of our medical risk, and also to use allied blood and drugs on each other's patients.

But also remember that the enemy will not follow the law of armed conflict, so we have to change our tactics to take account for that. And finally, it's workforce, and I know we're probably going to go into more detail about workforce, but we simply don't have the existing military medical capacity to deal concurrently with medical force preparation at scale, medical training at scale, and the predicted casualty estimates.

28:48 - 29:16

Lincoln Jopp

Culturally, when you were doing the stuff for the SDR, what was your sense? I mean, logistics is always, you know, amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics and all that, and then they think about the medical paragraph. To what extent, I mean, to what extent did you get a sense that this was in any way, you know, in the SDR, that people would like to consider this problem or not?

29:16 - 29:59

Martin Bricknell

So the actual document was obviously published by the department, and the chapter on the medical services had the key points that we as a panel recommended to the department. So in terms of the record, I would argue that the department contained in the SDR the key points that we put across. The challenge, of course, is the delivery and the difficult choices that the department has against all the pressures for money.

And obviously we now can't speak for the department, but we can perhaps highlight areas that might be worth considering if you wish to ask for the department's response.

29:59 - 30:06

Lincoln Jopp

And forgive my ignorance, it always used to be the DMS used to be under StratCom, C-SOC, whatever you want to call it. Is it is that still the case?

30:06 - 30:51

Martin Bricknell

Yes, so so some of the culture change has happened. The headquarters is now the Defence Medical Command and it is definitely under the C-SOC. And certainly we can see evidence that they're trying to shift the behaviours to give the Defence Medical Command authority over the whole of the defence medical enterprise. And you could argue that when compared with NATO other NATO countries, we are a little bit further behind in this cultural shift from distribution across four commands to a medical command actually owning the whole enterprise.

30:51 - 30:52

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Picture, brilliant. Thank you very much.

30:52 - 30:53

On to Mike Martin.

30:53 - 31:08

Michael Peter Martin

Thanks Tanman, and thanks for your time today. And so just going into workforce in more detail, what specific, I mean pinch point's probably an understatement, but where are the shortages? What are the critical shortages?

31:08 - 32:32

Martin Bricknell

Um, if I'm asked first just from the organisational perspective. So medical in defence absolutely should be the exemplar of the whole force model, taking a balance between the cost of active duty, the value benefit of reserve service, plus also the civilian workforce that provides the underpinning foundations for the generation of the force through defence primary healthcare.

But inevitably there ends up being difficulty around money, attribution of posts, balance of risk, recruiting, and then finally getting the total balance between the active duty or regular, the reserve, and civilian workforce. And indeed one of the points we wanted to make in the SDR is potentially the opportunity to consider the commercial sector as an additional sector rather than purely the NHS, and I know that the second part of the session is going to consider that. So over 150 years there's always difficulty in recruiting and retaining into the regular force.

And Tim will probably now pick up some points around the individual pinch point trades that then turn into capability risks.

32:32 - 35:34

Timothy Hodgetts

Thanks Martin, and building on those comments, just to highlight at the start that the majority of defence medical capability is invested in its people, not in expensive platforms. It's in the hands and the minds of our clinicians, and that's reflected in how the DMS budget is allocated, which is mostly on people. And it's why we've accrued vulnerability over time to operational delivery when serial savings have de-enriched, civilianised, or actually deleted operational clinical positions. Now, I think there's two key priorities. The first is a central priority around ensuring that our people are used as flexibly as possible and to their maximum competence.

So this is about optimising our current workflow, and also that we get to full deployability as quickly as possible for those who have been injured or who are sick.

So on the first point, flexibility, I've got two positives and one critical pinch point to identify. The first positive is that in November 2024, the largest structural change in the Army Medical Services for 125 years concluded when we actually launched the Royal Army Medical Service and it was three corps into one: the Royal Army Medical Corps, the Royal Army Dental Corps, and the Queen Alexandra Royal Army Nursing Corps. And that was not driven by cost savings. It was driven by ensuring that we could have the best workforce opportunity and adaptability and flexibility for operations where appointments in the future could be on competence rather than on cap badge.

Now, I have to declare a bias and conflict of interest because I have been the Master General for the last four years and overseen that process. But the second positive is that we have at the moment a further contemporary revolution in combat casualty care, very much driven within the army, to empower soldiers and vocational medics with additional skills to sustain life in that longer period it's going to take to get to surgery. And the enhancement in the DIP of 20 million for that, and I'm sure we'll come back to the DIP, is really welcome, but it only supports rollout to a proportion of the existing army. A critical pinch point, and there is more than one, but I would say that this is really important to be addressed early, is surgeons.

If we are saying we have to get medevac right to get to the surgeon as quickly as possible, we've got to have enough surgeons available to then treat the patient. And across the DMS currently, there are around a dozen consultant trauma and orthopedic surgeons. But there are three times that number within higher training. So we're going to have to do things differently in the future, and rather than just reliant on a consultant-delivered model, that we do exploit the ability to use our higher trainees to give additional capacity.

35:34 - 35:44

Speaker 7

What's the lead time to create an orthopedic surgeon, and if you had another model that was, let's call it the different model that you're advocating, what's the lead time to get to that?

35:44 - 37:28

Timothy Hodgetts

And it is different for different clinical specialties, but we've got medical school, we've got foundation years, and then we've got specialist training. So for a surgeon, it's a total of about 15 years.

For a GP, it's about 10 years, and for some of the other specialties, maybe 13 or 14 years. So it's a long time to start from scratch to develop that capability. So just paired with that employment flexibility and adaptability is getting people back to full deployability, the medically downgraded, the medically non-deployable or partially deployable. And there is evidence of effect here that Defence Primary Healthcare, DPHC, has championed multiple new clinical pathways in the last couple of years, and it has been able to reduce a number of the NHS waits.

It's got money from the individual services independently and I think from the next financial year that's going to be centralised. But to give you an example of numerical evidence which the NHS has from its further faster Armed Forces initiative, the ear, nose and throat surgery waiting times, which is one of our pinch points to get through outpatients and surgery, has reduced from around 17 weeks to 12 weeks in a six-month period. So that's a really good improvement. And for trauma and orthopaedic care, which is a lot of our musculoskeletal injury of the large joints, that's dropped from around 14 weeks to around 10 weeks. So there's definite progress in getting the sick and injured back to full deployability faster than we've been able to achieve in the past.

37:28 - 37:38

Michael Peter Martin

This would be wholly inadequate in large-scale combat operations.

Is there anything, you know, this sort of sponsored reserve model, can that help us out in terms of backfilling?

37:38 - 38:15

Martin Bricknell

So, in the SDSR we recommended that the department develops a workforce plan for the Defence Medical Services, which hasn't yet been published. But I think it would be really interesting to see the extent to which the department's now taking this whole force, including sponsored reserves proposition, to look at how the nation's health workforce can be balanced across all of the different uses and where the military component sits into this whole national health workforce enterprise.

38:15 - 38:17

Speaker 8

Is this coming, this document?

38:17 - 38:17

Speaker 9

I mean, that's a question for the department.

I don't know.

38:19 - 38:42

Timothy Hodgetts

But I would concur about the sponsored reserves model, that there's a real opportunity to consider building clinical teams, whether it's in organisations, perhaps such as ISOS to follow on the next panel, or in institutions such as the NHS, to give us functional additional teams that might reinforce some of our reservist hospitals.

38:42 - 38:45

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you very much. On to Michelle Scogham.

38:45 - 39:06

Michelle Scrogham

Thank you, Chair. Obviously we saw the impact of COVID and the pressure that put the NHS under.

But if we're talking about a large-scale combat operation, what planning and preparation would you like to see put in place now to avoid that undue pressure being put on the NHS with the DMS reservists being called up?

39:06 - 40:51

Martin Bricknell

So, the department has been doing quite a lot of collaborative work, or cross-department, and just three weeks ago there was a major sort of concept development exercise that involved many partners. We also have to put this into perspective. You know, the NHS in overall capacity terms is huge. And so the military demand signal is unlikely to be significant in total terms of total demand to require anything more than the changes we saw in COVID. But there will be pinch point areas, such as burns and plastics.

What I would say is, compared to our NATO allies, we perhaps are less advanced in either regulatory terms or in terms of actual conducting training exercises. So we have seen France, Germany, the Baltic states, we've seen Norway conducting live exercises moving military casualties and rehearsing how they would be absorbed into the civilian sector. We haven't yet seen that from a UK perspective, but as a sort of demonstration of national intent and indeed part of the deterrence information campaign, just showing that the country is capable of handling military casualties might be a significant part of deterrence as well as preparing for military operations.

40:51 - 45:04

Timothy Hodgetts

Yeah, so I'd like to pick up three clinical related issues which are around collaboration on the clinical guidelines to treat patients, on data integration and then perhaps on research and development collaborations within the military-civilian enterprise. Martin's referred to RAMP, the reception arrangements for military patients, which is about how we would distribute casualties across the NHS, which the NHS would take the lead on. But that's not about how casualties would be treated when the civilian clinicians may actually be quite unfamiliar with blast, ballistic and burn injury when we spread the casualties far and wide.

But here, actually, we are ahead of the curve because in 2017, we collaborated in Birmingham, the military and the NHS within the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine, to come up with NHS major incident and mass casualty treatment guidelines. And we took the military's clinical guidelines for operations, which had been developed from 2003 and then serially enhanced. And we took that as the baseline. And then NHS EPRR, Emergency Preparedness, Response and Resilience, distributed those guidelines to every acute trust. So there's no excuse to say we haven't actually thought about how we're going to treat such patients.

And indeed, from 2023, those guidelines with the approval of the NHS were made available to NATO allies to draw down on if required. But I lecture regularly around the country about medical preparedness for war.

And when I ask the audience, how many of you have seen and are familiar with these NHS guidelines, very few hands go up. So I am reminded of what Rommel said in the Second World War, that the British have some of the best doctrine in the world, but it's fortunate for us their officers don't read it. So it is really important that although we've produced these guidelines, people actually read them and exercise them. But I am really conscious of there being enough white space within the NHS, which runs so operationally hot, to be able to run exercises like we run in the military. Second point was about data and the requirement for data from point of injury all the way through the clinical pathway into the NHS and beyond into rehabilitation.

When I'm asked what made the biggest difference to the extraordinary outcomes that we got in Iraq and Afghanistan, it wasn't an individual clinical intervention, it was the data. And there's no reason why we can't collect good data in the future. It's not about scale. It's not about the fact that it has to go across the whole country. It's about having the right architecture that can then draw down that data and we can use modern tools such as AI to actually interrogate that data in real time and give us the necessary reporting and trends that we would need to see and share with both the civilian and the military community to continuously drive quality improvement.

And the third aspect I wanted to cover was about research and development and the relationships that we have between our Defence Medical Services, academics, and the wider civilian academic community. And I think sustaining our military academic footprint in Birmingham is critical if we're going to be able to improve outcomes even if we start from a lower point than before, there's no reason why we can't continue to improve outcomes through the next conflict. It's what's happened in every conflict in the last hundred years, the outcome at the end of the conflict is better than outcome at the beginning of the conflict. And we have some really reassuring research partnerships, for example with the Medical Research Council to develop a a joint centre of excellence, centre of research excellence for blood, and a very strong multi-site partnership for the University of Birmingham for blast traumatic brain injury.

I could identify others, but I'll pause there.

45:04 - 45:47

Michelle Scrogham

Concise would be better, we are quite time-limited. I was going to ask about strengthening cooperation between MOD and Department of Health. It sounds like that's quite a weak point at the moment. We've only got a few areas in the country where we actually operate in our hospitals. What do you think expanding that would do to the service to actually get that message across to the rest of our hospital footprint, and also to maybe bolster some of the gaps in areas within the NHS too, to be able to draw on the expertise that we've got in Defence Medical Services and vice versa?

45:46 - 46:43

Martin Bricknell

So in the SDR we recommended consideration of some form of enterprise board that would look beyond the Department of Health and beyond the Ministry of Defence in something similar to a Defence Medical Board that the US has as an example. So our concern was how this integration was actually presented from a strategic perspective so that between departments there would be shared commitment. There's a lot of I would say very positive things happening but the challenge is of course getting government departments to have shared agendas and then transferring that all the way down to individual NHS trusts through the architecture of the NHS and you might want to pick that up.

46:43 - 47:12

Timothy Hodgetts

Just on the clinical side, I think there's absolutely a role of medical schools and royal colleges in picking up how the civilian clinical community can have increased understanding of having to treat casualties of war injury. And I would also highlight that the British Medical Association, yes, you'll be very familiar with its role as a union, but it has a very strong history of developing the military medical ethical framework for use in war, and it's definitely taken leadership on that.

47:12 - 47:34

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Brilliant. Thank you very much. Right, I will reiterate what I said at the outset. We only have half an hour left. There is a significant amount of ground to cover.

My request to your good selves would be to be as succinct as possible, because otherwise many of those areas will not be covered within the next half hour. Right, on to Jesse Norman.

47:34 - 47:53

Alexander Jesse Norman

Thanks, Chair. Obviously, if you've got additional testimony, you can just send it to us.

You don't have to cover everything in oral testimony now. If the BMA is involved, we can be sure they'll go on strike within a few days of the declaration of war. What is the, which are the three leading or four leading clinical centers for dealing with military-related injuries in the UK?

47:53 - 47:54

Want to start?

47:54 - 48:35

Timothy Hodgetts

So, over the last 25 years, we've very much invested in Birmingham within the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine. But we have specific substantial clusters of uniformed personnel in other Joint Hospital Group facilities such as James Cook in Middlesbrough. Then we have the Plymouth-based hospital. We've got quite a lot of people in Frimley Park. We have people in Oxford.

Now, of course, in conflict, we would be drawing very quickly on our regular staff and we would be deploying them, so we would have to consider the impact on those facilities where those people are now.

48:35 - 48:52

Alexander Jesse Norman

No kidding. Okay, thanks. You've talked about the great success of the treatment of injured servicemen and women in Iraq and Afghanistan. What was the maximum number of people who were affected and injured at the peak moments of those conflicts?

48:52 - 48:59

Timothy Hodgetts

So it was small scale. I did four tours of Iraq, three tours of Afghanistan. I can't necessarily give you a specific number.

48:59 - 49:03

Speaker 13

Was it 2,000, 500? Give me some sense of scale.

49:03 - 49:15

Timothy Hodgetts

Okay, so a very substantial burst of casualties would have been 10 casualties at a time.

That would have tipped us probably into major incident mode in the 25-bedded field hospital in Camp Bastion.

49:15 - 49:22

Alexander Jesse Norman

Right, so if we get anywhere near anything that could be remotely hot, we're going to be overwhelmed given the scale that you're discussing.

49:22 - 49:35

Timothy Hodgetts

Yes, and I can cite what the German Surgeon General has said because it's in the public domain, but Germany is preparing to deal with a thousand troop casualties per day.

49:35 - 49:42

Alexander Jesse Norman

Incremental per day. So a thousand day one, 2,000 day two, minus whatever the ones they've managed to return to service.

49:42 - 49:43

A thousand per day.

49:43 - 49:50

Alexander Jesse Norman

Yeah. So there'd be an extra one, but the sum will be going up by a thousand minus the ones they've managed to return to service.

49:50 - 49:56

Timothy Hodgetts

Yes. And that does not take account of the civilian casualties.

49:56 - 50:36

Alexander Jesse Norman

Those are military casualties, and if you are fighting on your own soil or if you're within reach of indirect fire, then you're going to be taking civilian casualties too. Drones are flying over, people are being hit, it's they're not as accurate as you might like, they're possibly being targeted more randomly than you might like, the rules of war aren't being obeyed, lots of people are getting hurt. Obviously the difference between that scale of planning and the scale that you've talked about in Iraq and Afghanistan is at least one order, possibly two, three orders of magnitude. What is the, what preparation have you done in case we do end up with hundreds of servicemen and women being injured every day?

50:36 - 50:43

Martin Bricknell

I think that should be asked to the department, both the Ministry of Defence and the NHS.

50:43 - 50:49

Speaker 15

Put it this way, what did you see when you were doing work on the review about the department's plans?

50:49 - 51:06

Martin Bricknell

So at the point of the SDSR, it was more a conversation of what was intended to happen in terms of planning.

In terms of what's now in the public domain, I don't think we yet see a plan. What we have seen is a lot of work to plan to develop a plan.

51:06 - 51:08

Speaker 17

Encouraging.

51:08 - 51:18

Martin Bricknell

Well, again, I can't, we can't speak for the departments, but if you then look at our other NATO allies, they are probably further ahead with an explicit...

51:18 - 51:23

Speaker 18

And you've benchmarked this with those other major NATO allies, have you, along the lines of the German experience?

51:23 - 51:24

So in the public domain...

51:24 - 51:28

Speaker 16

So you know how far short we are, at least privately, even if not in the public domain.

51:28 - 51:37

Martin Bricknell

Well, in the public domain, we can see that they've been conducting physical exercises to test systems. We haven't seen in the public domain...

51:37 - 51:54

Alexander Jesse Norman

So any comparison with Iraq and Afghanistan, however brilliant the achievements then, actually is mad, because it's at least two orders of magnitude smaller in those conflicts than what we would be expecting to see in the kinds of scenarios we're talking about. It's just a false optimism. That would be the worry.

51:54 - 51:59

Martin Bricknell

This is why we are discussing capacity rather than capability.

51:59 - 52:27

Alexander Jesse Norman

Final question: what do we do to improve national awareness of this problem? You've talked about running some casualty exercises within the NHS or elsewhere, within local government. Obviously local government's got a potential role as well. The last Prime Minister completely failed to talk about a national conversation. We've now seen the Defence Secretary starting to do that.

What's your view on how we get people thinking about this seriously?

52:27 - 52:48

Timothy Hodgetts

Well, I think this is a start.

We're exposing the key issues here. And if I can just say that privately, we do know exactly what the capability shortfalls are, because we codified that at a classified level and presented it within the medical manifesto and the medical action plan. So that's absolutely known. Just as a yardstick, I would say that—

52:48 - 52:55

Alexander Jesse Norman

So you're on a kind of screaming red alert, given the difference we're talking about, but you're doing it as it were at a classified level rather than in public with us.

52:55 - 53:34

Timothy Hodgetts

Yes. So, but what I would say publicly is that the capacity of our deployable hospital capability has shrunk to perhaps 10% of what it was in the end of the Cold War and even into Operation Granby in 1990. That the unit of currency before was 400 to 800 bedded field hospitals in the British Army of the Rhine.

And then in Iraq in 2003, we put out 500 beds. And today our unit of currency is a 48-bed field hospital that can be disaggregated into smaller units if required, because we adapted to counter-insurgency operations.

53:34 - 53:37

Speaker 19

Thank you very much. On to Graham Downie.

53:37 - 54:07

Graeme James Downie

Thank you very much and thank you both for taking the time this morning. I want to pick up some of the points Jesse was talking about but expand a little bit into how prepared DMS would be to evacuate and repatriate in a world where you're not going to have air superiority and where helicopter support is unlikely to be available, again very different from what the case was in Afghanistan. Where is the levels of planning or awareness that you're aware of inside the department on how that would happen?

54:07 - 54:59

Martin Bricknell

So back to what we tried to raise in the SDR, we were concerned about theatre-level medical capacity.

And it might be helpful for the department to show even graphically how a casualty would move from the point of wounding on the eastern edge of Europe to arrive at a port of disembarkation in the UK. Because we do know clearly that the work to handle the casualties when they arrive in the UK is in train, but there's quite a few hundred miles between the ports of disembarkation here and the points at which our casualties would be injured.

And there would be some multinational collaboration across NATO.

54:59 - 55:24

Graeme James Downie

I want to pick up on that actually because you mentioned in the introduction about collaboration around blood and drugs of allies. When you talk about us being at different levels of preparedness from our NATO allies, are we impacted by being perhaps further behind when it comes to that collaboration of blood and drugs if you're moving say from Eastern Europe to Western Europe as a mid-stopping point before coming back to the UK?

55:24 - 55:52

Martin Bricknell

So from a regulatory perspective, the UK is fully integrated in the discussions with the NATO countries. Part of the challenge is most of the regulation is actually in the EU frame rather than the NATO frame. And so the actual negotiation around regulation needs to embrace discussion about regulation in the EU alongside working within NATO itself.

55:52 - 55:58

Graeme James Downie

You're saying we shouldn't think of this purely as a NATO issue, but that has to be an EU discussion as well.

55:58 - 57:18

Timothy Hodgetts

It does. And indeed there are derogations within EU policy for movement of casualties, blood, drugs across EU partner nation borders. But I know that we've been looking at how we actually sort of access those derogations as well. But in terms of sort of where the vulnerabilities are or the frictions are in that pathway from point of wounding back to home, have we got enough of the right CASEVAC vehicles? So CASEVAC, casualty evacuation, is moving the casualty without ongoing medical treatment.

So that would be your unmanned vehicles. Then you're into the MEDEVAC. So that's your armoured ambulances and your protected mobility.

Moving back through the European continent, you'll get to a strategic hub and we need to project forward and pull our casualties back to the UK. So how would we be using ambulance trains, ambulance buses, ferries to get casualties from a channel port back to the UK, or sailing Eurostar into St Pancras and offloading a large number of casualties to then redistribute? So we've got to think of all of these elements in that theatre medical plan and particularly not just focus on the ramp, the reception arrangements when they get back to the UK.

57:18 - 57:44

Graeme James Downie

No, just and I want to just pick up one further point from earlier on. You mentioned the exercises that are taking place in Birmingham and some of the other sites around England.

Not to just be the Scottish guy on the committee, but is there discussions with NHS Scotland and Scottish Government about similar arrangements being held in Scotland? Again, with that kind of mass, large-scale conflict event, presumably you'd want, you'd need to distribute more around the UK.

57:44 - 57:53

Timothy Hodgetts

I can't give you the evidence of that definitively, but I know from speaking to colleagues that there is engagement with the devolved administrations.

57:53 - 57:54

Thank you.

57:54 - 57:55

Mr. Derek Twigg.

57:55 - 58:02

Derek Twigg

Just a quick one from Graham's. So basically drone warfare has changed the complete nature of how we deal with casualties in the future, is that correct?

58:02 - 58:36

Timothy Hodgetts

Yes. And particularly it's identified the vulnerability of any facility that puts a red cross on top. And no longer will we set up in a field flying a red cross. We'll have to look for hard cover, we'll have to look for dispersion and smaller units that are more mobile because that's what gives us protection.

But there is a flip side, that aggregation gives you sophistication. When you disperse into smaller bits, you lose that sophistication and the ability to treat as effectively.

58:36 - 59:08

Derek Twigg

Can I just also just clarify one other thing, because you said based on the German figures there was a thousand casualties. So if it was 500 or 300, depending on the severity of casualties each day, basically is it your view that given the state of the NHS and the capacity issues and the pressure on it, that basically a decision would have to be made by governments about whether priority is given to treating wounded service personnel or civilians back in the NHS, because otherwise the whole thing would collapse? Is what's your view about that?

59:08 - 59:29

Martin Bricknell

Well, we saw with COVID that when we understood we needed to look after the whole system, actually we reinforced the social care component to get patients out of hospital so that you had more capacity at the front end. Well, I think many of the observations from COVID can apply and then we just need to adjust the clinical services according to the needs of the system.

59:29 - 59:43

Derek Twigg

But basically there's no way in terms of trauma and urgent medical need that you're going to be able to maintain that level of casualties and the NHS at the same time. Unless all your reservists would have to be called up on that basis surely.

59:43 - 01:00:00

Speaker 22

There is a health enterprise risk clearly, that if the NHS has to take more military patients and the NHS also, you will have to take if not everyone, most of the reservists in the NHS to deal with the casualties that you've got on the front line never mind back in England.

01:00:00 - 01:00:21

Timothy Hodgetts

Yes, so there's two issues there. It's the taking the staff out, but also the NHS making the decision it has to treat those military patients, therefore it cannot treat all of the civilian patients. But we know from COVID that that has a risk, and that cardiac patients and cancer patients suffer.

01:00:21 - 01:00:43

Derek Twigg

Okay, so and just quickly, very finally on that side of things, that we haven't discussed the mental health casualties, so PTSD, breakdown, and severe anxiety. Is any work being done on the number of casualties that we'll have to deal with and how we're going to do that? Again, we haven't got a lot of time, but I just wonder is work going on and is there somewhere we can have that information?

01:00:43 - 01:00:57

Timothy Hodgetts

We know that about 20 to 30 percent of DNBI, disease non-battle injury casualties, will be mental health related. So there's a very significant number that has to be managed.

And the aim would be, if possible, to deal with those as far forward as we can.

01:00:57 - 01:00:59

Speaker 23

Have you done any war gaming about the number of casualties on that basis?

01:00:59 - 01:01:02

Timothy Hodgetts

I can't answer that without having to investigate.

01:01:02 - 01:01:14

Derek Twigg

Okay, so maybe you could let us know. So, what will the lead command model enable DMS to do differently and what problems will it not resolve?

01:01:14 - 01:02:44

Martin Bricknell

So, again by reference to our NATO allies, most NATO allies have a much more powerful central defense or joint medical command that has authorities across the enterprise.

This was one of the SDR recommendations, and the department has announced that the change the names so it's now Defense Medical Command, and they are now working out the meaning of lead command and what that means in terms of authorities. I think the most important element of that is ensuring that the aggregated risk across the whole of defense's health enterprise is properly presented so that balance investment decisions are balanced against all the other forms of risk in defense.

And then being able to, again, make choices in regard for things like investing in protected ambulances so that you can actually collect the battle, collect casualties off the battlefield versus, you know, any other element of the armor protection that the army needs on the battlefield. So we would hope that with the lead command model, it gives more authority to actually direct the way in which the military medical services are run.

01:02:44 - 01:03:01

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you, Roger. I want to ask you about the NATO medical action plan. So based on the information that's available to yourselves, what tangible progress has the UK made against that and where are the largest remaining gaps?

01:03:00 - 01:03:52

Timothy Hodgetts

Right, so firstly the history of the medical action plan because this was under my chairmanship within COMEDS, that after we had identified and codified that risk across the alliance, we pushed forward through NATO headquarters the medical manifesto, which was signed off by heads of state and government in the Washington summit in July 2024. And then the supporting detail of the plan behind the medical manifesto, which has become known as the medical action plan, was signed off by NATO at the summit in the Netherlands in 2025. So that's the history behind it. And then all NATO nations are expected to address the weaknesses within their country against around 30 lines of activity within the medical action plan.

01:03:52 - 01:03:55

Speaker 24

So very concisely, what progress has the UK made on that?

01:03:55 - 01:04:32

Timothy Hodgetts

So there has been a parliamentary question asked about that and the response to that was that MOD has identified activity in all five themes, which are the five areas of risk that I identified as set out in the action plan, and the assessment provides the basis for cohering and prioritizing activity.

So that's the official answer. But what I would say is that the specifics of where there's difficulty in closing with those lines of activity isn't in the public domain and would be a valuable avenue for this committee to explore.

01:04:32 - 01:04:36

Speaker 25

In your opinion, what are the largest gaps then? What are the largest gaps? That's what we're interested in.

01:04:36 - 01:04:49

Timothy Hodgetts

So against those five themes that I've already identified, so medical evacuation, enough platforms, enough hospital infrastructure and... Martin?

01:04:49 - 01:04:52

Speaker 26

Essentially it's capacity across the whole system.

01:04:52 - 01:05:03

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Okay. And Generals, what lessons can the UK draw from our other NATO allies in preparing both our civilian and military health structures?

01:05:04 - 01:06:14

Martin Bricknell

I think it would be interesting to compare just how much money other countries have put into their military medical services. As an example, Germany has announced a 750 million euro project to procure protected medical infrastructure. 570, not 750. Sorry, 570. So for the forward medical services to put them into protected containers so that if they are attacked by a drone they've got more defense.

Australia has culminated a program called JP 2060 which was completely refreshing their military medical services and that was a 420 million dollar upgrade program.

Canada's announced a 75 million dollar investment into partnership between Canadian blood services and the Canadian Armed Forces. The Estonians have announced 150 million euro project to develop modular medical systems for forward medical services. So, as a sort of order of magnitude, it would look as though our NATO allies are investing a significant amount of money into their military medical services.

01:06:14 - 01:06:24

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Taking it a lot more seriously than us. Right, before we bring things to a close, I want to bring in three more members as well in terms of the questioning as well. Mike Martin.

01:06:24 - 01:06:34

Michael Peter Martin

Thanks.

Is there an opportunity for casual sharing, casualty sharing across NATO, so where we treat each other's casualties, and what would that look like?

01:06:34 - 01:07:38

Timothy Hodgetts

Well, absolutely. And it's what we have done in previous operations and what would happen in future operations, particularly where there's overlap of areas of operations. There's also opportunity for multinationality within our field medical treatment facilities to buy out risk. Now, medical provision is a national responsibility, but we've learned in the last 30 years that multinationality works. So where we might be deliberately planning a medical treatment facility, perhaps in the enhanced force vigilance area of Estonia where we're lead framework nation, there are other troop-contributing nations who might provide medical capability to a framework nation British facility.

And that then perhaps would give us in pinch-point specialties some freedom of maneuver elsewhere.

So we need to think about multinationality and yes we will be treating each other's patients, which is why at the core of NATO is interoperability in terms of the equipment and the guidelines that we use.

01:07:38 - 01:07:52

Ian Roome

Thank you. Can I ask do you think that the investment in defense medical services meets the requirements of the SDSR?

01:07:52 - 01:08:44

Martin Bricknell

Well the only real announcement was in the defense investment plan, which is 50 million pounds over four years and I've just given you some reference points.

The bit from an SDSR perspective that we didn't see was any investment into the primary healthcare infrastructure, which was specifically mentioned in the SDSR chapter. And I would just highlight that the Care Quality Commission, which reviews medical services in the UK in defense as well as in the wider NHS, has made some significant observations about the quality of the infrastructure in the defense primary healthcare network. So I was surprised not to see anything at all about that. But in terms of the allocation of the money for the 15 million, I'll hand that over to Tim.

01:08:44 - 01:10:38

Timothy Hodgetts

Yeah, so it's very welcome in terms of a good start, 10 million infrastructure, and then the other 40 million is about improving outcomes far forward. But what I identify isn't there in terms of clinical capability for the next conflict, I usefully remember as non-C ABCDE.

So the non-C is non-compressible hemorrhage. The money for tranexamic acid auto-injectors, great, but we still need the surgeons to be able to do the operations. And the next big development that will disrupt outcomes in pre-hospital care will be from non-compressible hemorrhage in the abdomen, in the chest, in the head. That's what we need research and development investment to do. The A is about antimicrobial resistance.

We are fighting a war in effectively a post-antibiotic era. World War I was pre-antibiotic, but now we've got so much antibiotic resistance, we need the solutions, the phage technology, new antimicrobials to be fighting that antimicrobial resistance. The B is about blood far forward, and there's a lot being done about that and a really good relationship between DMS and NHS Blood and Transplant. The C, though, is about cold injury mitigation.

Where we've been the last 25 years is hot. All of the likely scenarios for where Russia may go next is cold. It's the Baltics and the High North, so we need to adjust our equipment, our guidelines to be able to effectively manage patients in that very difficult situation. The D is about data, I've already covered that, point of wounding through the through to the NHS, and the E I've already covered, which is the right evacuation platforms to get the patient to surgery in as timely manner as possible.

01:10:38 - 01:10:48

Ian Roome

Can I ask you just a follow-up from that is how does Defence Medical Services facilities compare to the NHS equivalent?

01:10:48 - 01:11:34

Martin Bricknell

What I can't do is do more than just highlight the Care Quality Commission report that this year also reviewed how there's been progress over the last seven or eight years. And the Care Quality Commission does highlight that there's been quite a lot of organizational progress, but no real investment across the infrastructure. There have been a number of medical centers that have been newly built, but if taken across the entire infrastructure requirement, there are some significant risks in terms of the quality of the primary care center.

01:11:34 - 01:11:48

Ian Roome

And given the Armed Forces Covenant, which the MOD is saying now they're bringing into law, do you think that we are failing service personnel with the facilities that we're treating them in?

01:11:48 - 01:11:56

Martin Bricknell

I would think that some visibility of the money allocated to do that would help provide some reassurance.

01:11:56 - 01:12:13

Ian Roome

And has there ever been an analysis of service personnel in getting them back to fighting fitness over recruiting a new service personnel to do the role?

01:12:13 - 01:12:37

Martin Bricknell

So what we do know, using the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey, is how much members of the Armed Forces value their access to healthcare and access to dental care.

And in covenant terms, it's really important to maintain that confidence of armed forces personnel in the health service and dental services that they have access to.

01:12:37 - 01:13:08

Timothy Hodgetts

I don't know whether you're intimating about medical employment standards there, but there's been very detailed work and two cohort studies, and it was published in January 2021, so may need review now, into the amount of risk, medical risk, that was being taken within medical employment standards. Was it enough risk? And in fact, the conclusion at that point, when the guidelines had changed a lot, was that we were taking as much risk as we possibly could at that time. But that will need reviewing in light of the sort of current geopolitical situation.

01:13:08 - 01:13:11

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you very much. On to Emma Lewell-Buck.

01:13:11 - 01:13:23

Emma Lewell

Thank you, Chair. Morning. Just a quick one from me. I'm just going back to the NATO medical action plan. Just in terms of identifying the addressed weaknesses, where do we rank alongside our allies in that?

01:13:23 - 01:13:40

Timothy Hodgetts

Well, it's very variable across each country depending on what risks are being carried. So it's a bit sort of comparing apples with pears. What I can say is that if you look across the alliance, there are issues within each contributing nation that need to be addressed.

01:13:40 - 01:13:45

Emma Lewell

So you wouldn't be able to say whether we're like bottom, middle, top in terms of addressing that?

01:13:45 - 01:14:04

Timothy Hodgetts

Well, I think Martin's identified where we are now in terms of investment in modernising our infrastructure. So ten million for hospital infrastructure over four years compared to the hundreds of millions that Germany, Australia and other countries are investing.

01:14:04 - 01:14:15

Emma Lewell

So, you know, there's lots of talk, isn't there, about a potential attack on NATO by Russia by 2030?

So how ready do you think we are, and what is it we need to do more to be ready?

01:14:15 - 01:14:42

Timothy Hodgetts

So if we had to go out the door today, we would go out with an effective force. But the issue is the volume of patients that you might be presented with. But, you know, we are ready to go out and fight. I wouldn't be in any hesitation to say that. But what we lack is the capacity if we had to do this at huge scale.

01:14:42 - 01:14:55

Emma Lewell

In terms of defence medical readiness, what is the thing that worries you the most if there was an attack and we had to act? I know we'd be ready and we'd go out, but what is it that causes you the most concern?

01:14:55 - 01:15:08

Martin Bricknell

So we highlighted in the SDR the concern about theatre medical capacity. And what hasn't been put into the public domain is any response to that concern.

01:15:08 - 01:15:10

Speaker 34

But you have seen that response?

01:15:10 - 01:15:14

Martin Bricknell

Um, for the department to explain what it might be.

01:15:14 - 01:15:18

Speaker 35

So so it exists but just not in the public domain.

01:15:18 - 01:15:20

Speaker 33

Um, I can't speak for the department.

01:15:20 - 01:15:23

Speaker 32

All right. Okay, I'll leave it there. Thanks.

01:15:23 - 01:17:42

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you very much. Generals, as I mentioned before we started the session, that there is a lot of ground to cover within an hour. Obviously we wouldn't have been able to draw upon all of your esteemed experiences, so we would be very, very grateful if there is anything that you feel that we have missed out in this session for you to send that across to us in writing, because that could then inform our future deliberations. And with that, I thank you once again for taking out your valuable time and I'll call to order very briefly before we begin our second panel. Order, order.

Order, order. The House of Commons Defence Committee evidence session on the Defence Medical Services. We've just concluded on our first panel and I am now very, very pleased to welcome our panelists for the second hour, namely Dr. Darren Mann, who is a visiting fellow at King's College London. A very warm welcome to yourself.

We also have with us Dr. Katie Geary, who is a senior medical director at the International SOS. And also it's a pleasure to welcome Ed Button, who is a managing director for Government Services International at the International SOS. Ladies and gents, given that we've only got an hour, so we're going to crack straight ahead with the questioning, beginning with Jesse Norman.

01:17:42 - 01:18:31

Alexander Jesse Norman

Thank you very much indeed, Chairman. Thank you very much indeed for coming. You'll have heard the previous session and some of the revelations coming out of that. Dr. Mann, just starting if I may with you, one of the questions that was asked was about different nature of and location of conflict. So if we go back to the present experience that is happening in Ukraine, what are the kinds of lessons that DMS ought to be taking out at clinical level from those combat injuries?

Has it been pursuing them? Is it looking at how people have been hurt, both civilians and and also serving soldiers? Do you think is it on top of the different context of warfare and the implications that would have for casualties?

01:18:31 - 01:18:55

Darren Mann

Yes, thank you. I think the context is well known because Ukrainian forces and civilian authorities have made those circumstances perfectly clear. In fact, not at the clinical level though. Oh, well you can keep going, sorry. No, I actually I think at the clinical level, yes, you can find live videos streaming online, you can see the consequences.

01:18:55 - 01:19:01

Alexander Jesse Norman

So our people have been in touch with their medical counterparts in Ukraine to understand what the nature of those stresses and effects are?

01:19:01 - 01:19:12

Darren Mann

Well, absolutely, and there have been integrated training programs between the two, information cross-exchange, and as you know, in hospitals where casualties have been evacuated to, some of our own personnel...

01:19:12 - 01:19:17

Speaker 39

We train their medical doctors, they also train our medical doctors in the armed forces, because obviously it's a two-way flow now?

01:19:17 - 01:19:24

Darren Mann

It's bidirectional, and whoever is most current does the training. That would be the Ukrainians.

01:19:24 - 01:19:27

Speaker 37

So what are the lessons that we're drawing from that, do you think?

01:19:27 - 01:19:40

Darren Mann

I think the fundamental lessons are that the protections that we assumed would apply historically to medical treatment facilities and medical staff no longer do apply. So the circumstances...

01:19:40 - 01:19:43

Speaker 38

You mean the rules of war are different? They would be subject to attack in the same way?

01:19:43 - 01:19:53

Darren Mann

I think that's that's the interpretation that you can draw that the traditional conventions, norms of war that we've come to rely on are no longer no longer in place.

01:19:53 - 01:20:02

Alexander Jesse Norman

That would apply imply a much more aggressive ruggedization or protection of some of the near front medical services that we'd be deploying.

01:20:02 - 01:20:40

Darren Mann

A change in the way that medical support is provided, a change in the amount of time that medical support needs to be provided in the field, a loss of ability to transport the injured through the air now, so road transport is routine followed by rail transport significantly, 80% or so of casualties ultimately transferred by rail, which means you have to adapt your rail facilities, the ability to perform surgery on a train. The whole point as has been made by the generals earlier today is that time is not a resource, time is your intervention for saving life on the battlefield.

01:20:40 - 01:20:51

Alexander Jesse Norman

And obviously as you go further north, the constraints change more and adaptation is further required, is that right?

01:20:51 - 01:21:28

Darren Mann

Yes, but then so is the desolation and the desperation because the consequences of prolonged in-field care are that certain life-saving measures that you apply that ordinarily were meant to be temporary, for example tourniquet application, that becomes now a life-saving procedure and a concept of what many of us are calling a silver medal mindset now comes into play. The idea you could put a tourniquet on to save someone's life from catastrophic bleeding and then expect to remove that tourniquet and save the limb, that's probably not going to be applicable in this situation.

01:21:28 - 01:21:31

Alexander Jesse Norman

But you're doing the best you can under extremely adverse circumstances.

01:21:31 - 01:21:32

According to the conditions.

01:21:32 - 01:21:46

Alexander Jesse Norman

Okay, thanks. Just turning if I may to Dr Geary and Mr Button. Obviously tactical combat casualty care procedures, what adaptations would you expect to see in the light of Ukraine? Is that something you've thought about at all?

01:21:46 - 01:22:38

Katie Geary

Yeah, absolutely. I think what Ukraine teaches us is the distribution of injuries is different. What we took certainly during Afghanistan and Iraq, that CASEVAC was part of your established casualty care pathway is now no longer, it's a constraint. And so your treatment, your application, your ethics has to be moved far forward. And so you're much more brutal, your application to war surgery etc has to be further forward.

As Dr. Mann has said, it's a dispersed environment because the normal rules of war don't apply. And so actually then where your front, your forward operating base might be and your field surgical unit might be, that is also...

01:22:38 - 01:22:48

Alexander Jesse Norman

So, so if you're right, we'd be talking about a move from a kind of piecework approach to casualty treatment towards an industrialized approach to casualty treatment. Is that right?

01:22:49 - 01:22:53

Speaker 41

Okay, that's a completely different mindset. Are we remotely prepared for that?

01:22:53 - 01:22:55

Speaker 42

I will defer to my colleague.

01:22:55 - 01:22:59

Speaker 44

I think I can't speak for Defence Medical Services.

01:22:59 - 01:23:10

Alexander Jesse Norman

But you can speak about the UK. What's your evaluation from an International SOS standpoint? International evaluation of the UK across the NHS and the military, how many out of ten? Where are we? Give me some sense.

01:23:10 - 01:23:14

Speaker 43

I don't think we're prepared, is the short answer.

So way off the pace?

01:23:14 - 01:23:28

Ed Button

I believe we are. If I compare it to what we see amongst our other clients across NATO, United States, the Australians, NATO Five Eyes, they are far further forward in every aspect of this in preparedness.

01:23:28 - 01:23:37

Alexander Jesse Norman

I mean, I'm dying to ask a question back to Dr Mann about the comparison with COVID, where we were woefully ill-prepared for the wrong disease. I don't know if there's something you want to comment on there.

01:23:37 - 01:23:57

Darren Mann

Well, I think that one major comparator is that we knew COVID was coming, just as we knew a pandemic was coming, and we understand that there is a general realised threat of a war coming. So it's our opportunity now to prepare for that. I believe that there are several areas of wilful blindness that we need to address.

01:23:57 - 01:24:09

Alexander Jesse Norman

So current politicians and leaders across the NHS and the other authorities could be held responsible by a Heather Hallett-type future inquiry for failing to prepare.

That's essentially what you're saying.

01:24:09 - 01:24:15

Darren Mann

Well, I wouldn't want to be in the position where our efforts are examined in the after-event. I would like to look at our efforts now.

01:24:15 - 01:24:20

Speaker 48

No, I understand. I'm just trying to get a sense of the magnitude of the problem. Thank you.

01:24:20 - 01:24:22

Speaker 46

Thank you very much. Emma Lewell-Buck.

01:24:22 - 01:24:46

Emma Lewell

Thanks very much, Chair. Good morning, all. I mean, you've just been speaking with my colleague Jesse there about how war has changed and the difficulties that poses for Defence Medical Services. How equipped do you think UK's Defence Medical Services are for dealing with that, and what do you think they would do in the event of an attack on medical infrastructure?

01:24:46 - 01:25:09

Ed Button

I think if I answer it this way, which is it's already been talked about in the previous panel around capacity.

That is where the issue is. That is not unique to the UK. That is everyone in continental Europe and across the world. The answer to capacity is a system of systems approach, and that is not what we're seeing at the moment. I think there are pockets of excellence within DMS who want that to happen.

There isn't the funding to get there.

01:25:09 - 01:25:59

Darren Mann

I'd like to expand on that and say what I think is key is the whole-of-nation approach, whole-of-society approach. And I believe that the responsibility of government is to integrate across the capabilities open to us. We spend a lot of time talking about Defence Medical Services. They obviously have a key role, particularly in the in-theatre piece. We've talked about the NHS and how those two elements adapt and integrate themselves through the reception arrangements.

But I believe the independent sector in this country and the private sector, and not just the private healthcare sector, but the sectors that hold the transport systems, the ferries, the ships, the planes, the trains. None of that's owned by government. None of that's owned by Defence. And there are capabilities there that I believe at the moment are invisible to planning.

01:25:59 - 01:26:06

Speaker 50

Who in government should be grasping the nettle here and doing all that coordination work? Whose responsibility do you think that is?

01:26:06 - 01:26:14

Darren Mann

Well, in the absence of a Minister for War, my belief is that it should be the Cabinet Office through the Civil Contingencies.

01:26:14 - 01:26:19

Speaker 49

And are you seeing any of that preparation work being done?

Are you confident?

01:26:19 - 01:26:52

Darren Mann

I think that there are, there is awareness around it. You will be aware that the UK Health Security Agency held a major exercise a few months ago which modeled exactly what you described: missile attacks on hospitals to create mass casualties, a cyber attack on the red-amber-green traffic light system itself to develop hundreds of casualties, and a war breaking out in Europe developing hundreds of casualties, all that descending. Representatives from core government departments were there. They have the visibility.

01:26:52 - 01:28:11

Katie Geary

If I may, health is devolved, but EPRR is a sort of reserved, isn't it? And so I think what's happening at the moment is some of it is falling between the cracks. I know Scotland is actually exercising RAMP, it is part of RAMP now, I happened to sit on a Scottish resilience panel earlier in the year. So there are pockets within the NHS that are coming to the table. As Ed said, there are pockets in the DMS.

But also this is whole systems. And if we just looked at something like antimicrobial resistance, what happens in the battlefield is exported to the host nation health. So we need to think about what happens externally will come to bear on host nations. And so there is some thinking that has to be done, I think, at government level about how do all of these departments get together to think what's the best way to create resilience in the UK as a whole, including devolved nations, that support the DMS to do the extraordinary things that they do with a lean force and use the private sector to augment where we can do it. And we have got 41 years of it of doing it, you know.

01:28:11 - 01:28:15

Speaker 51

Do you think the Defence Readiness Bill should be the vehicle for some of this?

01:28:15 - 01:28:44

Katie Geary

I think it's a talking point to start the discussions and to accelerate to the plan and the preparedness, but you're not going to be able to respond unless you've got a common language, a common focus, you've started your training and you're exercising to deliver. And we have to start talking about the hard truths that the reality of the Ukrainian war had a massive impact, is having a massive impact on the population.

01:28:44 - 01:30:06

Darren Mann

Could I come in there because I think the Defence Readiness Bill is our key opportunity to address some of these very, very visible needs.

For example, I think COVID showed us it's very expensive to buy your way out of trouble. So arrangements that you could put in place to lease, hire, otherwise put service level agreements in place during peacetime, you'll get better reliability and you'll get a better price than you will if you turn up when the disaster has struck. So arrangements through the private sector, independent sector providers are open now that will look very different once the whole world's calling on them. The second point I think for the Defence Readiness Bill is around the healthcare workforce and the regulations that apply to it. And I'm thinking now particularly of the professional regulators, the GMC, Nursing Council, Allied Healthcare.

If you remember in COVID, medical staff were asked to take on work outside of their normal areas of expertise under challenging circumstances. At the same time they were told to observe the regulations at all times and to stay within their competency.

And they were reminded to make sure their medical indemnity insurance was in place. That's completely incompatible with the need of a whole-of-system approach to warfare casualty management.

01:30:06 - 01:30:09

Speaker 53

Helpful, thank you.

01:30:09 - 01:30:12

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you very much. On to Mike Martin.

01:30:12 - 01:30:23

Michael Peter Martin

Two very quick ones. On the Defence Readiness Bill, do you think we should include stipulations within that around the requisitioning of transport for casualty evac, so trains and planes and all the rest?

Okay, good, you're nodding, just for the record.

01:30:23 - 01:30:36

Darren Mann

Well, I'm nodding for the record, but I think requisition is a strong term to use. And I think with some, yes, agreed, but I think that for government to get the best deal, you could make those arrangements in advance rather than seek and requisition.

01:30:36 - 01:30:42

Speaker 54

I mean, arguably requisitioning would be the best deal, depending on the level of compensation I'd be. And we'll see.

01:30:42 - 01:30:52

Ed Button

I think from this, it all comes back to capacity. So getting upstream of it, yes, so in answer to your question, I would wholeheartedly agree multimodal transport is going to be part of the solution, get ahead of it.

01:30:52 - 01:31:17

Michael Peter Martin

And you need a whole bunch of national security exemptions around health and safety, you know, are people acting within their competencies? Yeah. You just need to make it work as well. And again, all of you are nodding as well, just for the transcript. And then Dr. Mann, if I may, you said in an answer to Jesse earlier that there are several areas of willful blindness when it comes to Defence Medical Services.

Could you just list what those areas of willful blindness are?

01:31:17 - 01:32:56

Darren Mann

Yeah. I don't think these apply only to Defence Medical Services. I'm thinking of the entire healthcare estate and structure and staffing for the nation.

So, for example, let's look at the healthcare estate. We've talked about the NHS and its conditions of work, conditions of occupancy. Let's now consider the private healthcare sector, private hospitals. NHS perhaps 100,000 beds, private hospitals perhaps 10% of that, about 8,000 beds. When those hospitals were, when their service capacity was reserved in COVID, only 1% of those 8,000 beds was ever utilized for COVID.

The same for the Nightingale hospitals actually, which was a constructed capacity. The management of that bed state and that occupancy should be visible on a single display, single dashboard, single visibility status. I believe there's blindness to that.

The same for staff, but it's the other way around. Many staff would be double counted because of course many staff working in the NHS will also work in the private sector. Then we've got the regulars going out, the reserves going out, potentially a sponsored reserve coming in. In previous wars, we had a war medical committee that accounted for every single medically qualified person in this country to understand where they were, what they were doing, and what would they do in the event of hostilities. We have blindness around that.

01:32:56 - 01:33:02

Michael Peter Martin

And you'd think it'd be easier now with the IT systems that we have, whereas they were doing it on clipboards.

01:33:02 - 01:33:05

Speaker 55

We have an opportunity to make it all visible now.

01:33:05 - 01:33:12

Michael Peter Martin

Data to enable us to drive the operational response and make it most efficient would summarize your...

Yeah.

Yeah. Thank you.

01:33:12 - 01:33:18

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Great, thank you very much. Let's now move on to the role of commercial providers and voluntary organizations, starting off with Gareth Downie.

01:33:18 - 01:33:48

Graeme James Downie

Thank you very much, to actually pick up on some of those themes as well. Dr. Mann, something that happens across public services, we thought don't worry, the voluntary sector or the private sector will take care of that, but without an understanding of what they actually deliver, and I suspect we see willful blindness in that area as well. Can you outline exactly what you think commercial providers or voluntary organizations can offer in a large-scale conflict and, crucially, what can they not offer? So, Ed, probably best to start with you.

01:33:48 - 01:34:59

Ed Button

So, yeah, so if I look at how we integrate with other NATO partners and what they ask of us. So as an organization, we do three things: we coordinate care, which is movement of people; we deliver care, hands-on care; we do training, doctrine development. Three very simple things.

But what we offer to them and the way they use us is effectively as a partner. We're not commerce, we're not industry, we're not treated as such. We're treated as a true partner and we're integrated to augment their blind spots. And that is what I think industry can do. When I talk of industry, the medical industry is slightly different to many others in the sort of defence sector.

I, you know, I talk from previous experience. The way I believe that industry should be looked at to help solve this capacity problem is through the system of systems approach.

If you were to look at a soldier getting wounded in Eastern Europe somewhere and all the way back to recovery and then return to fight, there is no one element that's going to solve that entire chain. You are going to have to integrate a variety of different capabilities from both the private sector and the public sector, including defense, in order to make that work in the most efficient manner.

01:34:59 - 01:35:17

Graeme James Downie

We heard in the last session that the problem was capacity as well, and you talked there about, you know, the role of the private or voluntary sector to fill in those blind spots. Do you feel you have adequate engagement with government to know where you would plug in to those areas effectively in the event of a large-scale conflict?

01:35:17 - 01:35:25

Ed Button

If I talk just to DMS, yes, absolutely, we have the conversation with them, they know what we can provide.

01:35:25 - 01:35:27

Graeme James Downie

I sense a "but" coming.

01:35:27 - 01:36:18

Ed Button

Well predicted. The problem is then actually translating that into contracting for some sort of capability or having the capability to draw on that capacity, that excess capacity. That is where the bind is.

If I compare it to what, you know, I have 304 individual government agencies as customers as far east as Australia and as far west as the UK. Every single one of them is ahead of where we are in terms of the planning, the understanding of what we can offer, how we integrate, and we are part of that planning process. It's not that Defence Med don't want to do it, it's that something is stopping them and it's probably around finances and the ability for J8 Commercial to get in the way and say, oh, you can't do that. And if we don't get ahead of it now, you're going to be too late because resource is finite, especially in the medical space, and everyone's going to be competing for the same thing.

01:36:18 - 01:36:27

Graeme James Downie

So they don't— would it be fair to say they don't know the right question to ask? We know where the blind spot is, we know we need it, but we don't know if we need 100, 200, 5, 10, 20 or what?

01:36:27 - 01:36:37

Ed Button

I think they know the right questions.

I think we... in the previous session it was very clear what the UK has outlined in the DIP versus peer competitors, and we're a long way off the mark.

01:36:37 - 01:36:39

Speaker 56

Right. Dr Mann, anything you'd like to add?

01:36:39 - 01:37:32

Darren Mann

I'd like to go beyond that though. Of course International SOS is a recognized and a refined provider, but I think the scale, potential scale of casualties that we're talking about... now we understand that for the UK the ramp large number is about 400 a day. None of us should underestimate of course the impact of that on an individual. 400 is current operating number. Germany as we hear is operating at 1,000 a day.

I believe that those numbers would completely overwhelm even a very capable provider. So I think we have to think in a different way. I'm looking at the major logistics providers, the people that own the shipping containers. I'm looking at the ferry companies. Who's asking the hospital ships, the Mercy ships, where are they going to be?

Who's asking the major ferry providers? Who's asking the airframe manufacturers, many of whom of course as we know are based in Europe? It's a different scale.

01:37:32 - 01:37:53

Graeme James Downie

Just before the chair's eyes kind of drilling into the side of my head as well, to flip that slightly on its head again, we saw during COVID the reliance on local voluntary charitable who just filled in and jumped in because that's what they do. To what extent are we able to plan that grassroots level as well, or is that something that we would just kind of assume as well?

01:37:53 - 01:38:08

Ed Button

I wouldn't be able to speak accurately to that, so I won't. What I would say is this is all about preparation. So until you go out and ask that key question of the local volunteering organization and someone is coordinating that, you're not going to know the true answer.

01:38:08 - 01:38:11

Speaker 57

Thank you, Chair. Can we move on to Michelle Scroggan?

01:38:11 - 01:38:27

Michelle Scrogham

Thank you, Chair. I'd just like to ask, because we were talking about capacity, how dependent is your provision on the reservists that would be called up and disappear under the normal circumstances?

01:38:27 - 01:39:13

Ed Button

So broadly speaking, it's not. So while of course we have reservists, and I sit here being one myself in terms of as a veteran, I'm sure I'd be called up probably to the pointy end of it rather than the medical end. But this is about the balance of risk, right? And so for any commercial organization, relying solely on UK reservists to deliver our capabilities is not what we do.

So what it does talk to, though, is a very valid point in terms of talking to other nations and getting ahead around, right, in order to fulfil the criteria or fulfil the staffing that's going to be required at scale, you're going to have to make, not necessarily a compromise, but you're going to have to make regulatory changes to allow that to happen.

01:39:13 - 01:39:18

Michelle Scrogham

Are you saying that mobilisation wouldn't have any effect on your capacity?

01:39:18 - 01:39:21

Speaker 59

Not significant.

01:39:21 - 01:39:24

Speaker 58

Okay. Thank you, Chair. I'll allow us to move on.

01:39:24 - 01:39:48

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Right. Thank you very much. I just wanted to come to your good selves in terms of the work of International SOS. Now, in the event of an Article 5 conflict, how would your organisation, Mr Button, manage effectively delivery of multiple contracts to both the UK and our NATO allies? How would that actually operate on the ground?

01:39:48 - 01:40:42

Ed Button

So the way we interact or what we're asked to do by different nations differs.

So the Department of War, what we do for them is very different to what we currently do for the UK MOD. The short answer is that is about a balance of load balancing our capacity and capability. Until that point is triggered, I wouldn't be able to give you an absolute sort of answer as to how we would do it, but I can give you the reassurances and the absolute planning knowledge that we have the capacity to execute every single commercial contract we have. And the way I think you should be looking at it is this comes back to my point of system of systems. This isn't about us providing medical staffing, this is about the coordination of care into existing network hospitals.

It's not like we provide the whole solution. We are part of the solution, sometimes the coordination and sometimes the staffing.

01:40:42 - 01:40:45

Speaker 60

Right, and Dr Geary, would you like to add anything to that?

01:40:45 - 01:41:28

Katie Geary

So I also think there's a timing element here. Because there is although we can say that we can deliver on every contract currently, there will be a finite end to the number of contracts given a even extra EU resource pool of medical personnel. So there is a time to plan, a time to train, a time to exercise and a time to deliver. And the longer there's a delay to acknowledge the fact that we should be a little bit further ahead in the UK, that delay costs access to additional resources.

01:41:28 - 01:41:30

Speaker 62

And I think that would be right to say.

01:41:30 - 01:41:56

Ed Button

I agree. There's a, this all comes to sort of getting ahead of it and getting upstream of the actual ask, because if the UK sort of follows a pattern of acting when it's too late, the resource constraints from a hospital ship to a container, you're at the back of the line, and then it's too late. And you're not getting the outcomes that you're going to require for both from a moral component, the duty of care component, and then force regeneration component.

01:41:56 - 01:42:06

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Okay, so it basically depends on how quickly our government mobilizes to prioritize, otherwise we will definitely be at the back of the queue.

01:42:06 - 01:42:26

Ed Button

Everyone's going to be after the same resource. What I think actually should be happening is the full integration of various elements of industry into the conversation now, because the sooner you talk, the sooner you can make educated decisions, and part of that is then balancing the risk of where the resource is going to come from.

01:42:26 - 01:42:58

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Dr. Mann, I wanted to bring your perspective into this.

We've got commercial providers and there are voluntary organizations. We saw, for example, voluntary organizations like Help for Heroes during both Afghanistan and Iraq. They provided not only physical rehabilitation, but also mental health services to injured personnel. So how would you compare and contrast, and how would you envisage the role of both of these distinct entities in the event of a conflict?

01:42:58 - 01:43:26

Darren Mann

I think that we should return to a whole-of-society approach.

What we do understand for where mental health support is concerned, many people find comfort in the ability to talk with people that understand what they've been through, that understand what they've seen, that have had a shared experience perhaps. So that allows you, I think, to segregate this into different deliverables. But ultimately everyone's experience will resonate.

01:43:26 - 01:43:48

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

I agree with yourself in terms of the whole of society approach. As the Finns and Estonians, the Defence Committee were out there, we were very, very impressed with that concept of total security. But in terms of the role of voluntary organisations, what sort of emphasis could be placed on them in the event of a conflict, or do you think it would be more towards commercial providers?

01:43:48 - 01:44:25

Darren Mann

No, no, I think there's a huge role for the voluntary sector.

In fact, if you speak to St John's Ambulance, if you speak to the British Red Cross, if you speak to some of the service volunteer organisations, you'll hear that for many of them it's hard for them to find a link point into government to understand how to actually set out and to cohere what they're able to deliver. Admittedly, some of those organisations have been witnesses to some of the exercises that we've heard discussed, but they've not been integral to the exercises, which is what requires cohering centrally.

01:44:25 - 01:44:33

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Right, thank you very much. Right, let's now move on to the medical supply chain resilience and other issues with Mike Martin.

01:44:33 - 01:44:50

Michael Peter Martin

I wanted to dig into stockpiles, so pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, blood. Maybe just start off with where are we on that as a nation and as a military? Dr Kate, you're nodding, so do you want to...?

01:44:50 - 01:45:37

Katie Geary

Well, I... yeah, I mean, blood stocks are always a cause of concern, aren't they?

There's always calls going out. If you look at, if you take the German numbers for how many casualties and the percentage of blood stocks, you would deplete the UK blood stocks, which by the way are managed per devolved nation, so we don't have a centralized blood stock, 25% per day. But that, so this is an issue. And General Hodgetts mentioned that as one of the research, defense medical research issues. It is one of paramount importance.

01:45:37 - 01:45:44

Michael Peter Martin

There would be an appeal, everyone would give blood, but would we have enough medical equipment to get it all out?

01:45:44 - 01:47:02

Ed Button

Yeah, I mean, I think there's a tendency to focus on the sort of COVID experience, being a hostage of the last kind of time we saw this as a nation, which is we didn't have enough masks, gowns. That is one component part of exactly of the full thing. Where I think our weaknesses lie, blood I think is actually being addressed as best DMS can in terms of blood far forward, frozen plasma, freeze-dried plasma rather, and I believe there's money within the DIP to help address that. Where I think the constraining factor is, is that by the time everyone needs a stretcher, a litter, all of the other ancillary medical equipment that's actually going to move people back from the front line, that is probably where we're short.

I would imagine under the current arrangements, certainly there's been parliamentary questions asked about it around whether the current contract that's held to provide clinical equipment to DMS is working or not. I suggest it probably isn't. But I think that, you know, where the attention needs to be pulled at the moment is what is going to be required and how on earth are they going to get it? Because I can't see a contractual mechanism for them to get that at the moment, or even understanding the magnitude of the issue in terms of supply chain lead times, critical equipment.

01:47:02 - 01:47:11

Michael Peter Martin

How many, how many days' worth of medical supplies would you say we should hold? I mean, with ammunition you're meant to hold three months' worth. Is that what we're talking about?

01:47:11 - 01:47:13

Ed Button

I'm not a doctor, so I'm going to take the fifth on that one.

01:47:13 - 01:49:13

Darren Mann

Perhaps I'll come in there because my career as a trauma surgeon was interrupted by COVID and I was medical director for the Cabinet Office Personal Protective Equipment cell for three years.

So I know what a stockpile that's not been kept in date looks like. And I know what a stockpile that's not been kept in order looks like. Managing whichever catastrophe you're managing, you need to understand is there a sovereign ownership piece around this? So to what degree do you need sovereign solutions? Stockpiles, yes, admittedly, we know much of the equipment that we relied on in COVID, and much that would be relied on for casualty management, and pieces of equipment, they'll save lives, but they're made of plastic and rubber and glue, they're made in the Far East.

And we would be faced with the same supply disruption in the event of a war now as we were for COVID.

So the place for sovereign supply, actual sovereign manufacture is something that needs to be looked at. The case for getting ahead of it now, sovereign import and stockpiling, but how much can you stockpile for? 120 days typically and then you need to have your service level agreements or home manufacturing coming in. The other thing, especially on supply chain resilience, is that each sector of critical national infrastructure currently has its own supply chain assurance system. None of them speak across each other.

So there's no way of knowing if there's capacity in one sector that you might be able to use in another or, worse, if all of the checks were called in at the same time, that all the individual sectors are pulling up and there might be the same individual suppliers underneath it. So a sovereign supply architecture and a standard around it to give the UK whole of nation visibility now would be very timely.

01:49:13 - 01:49:16

Speaker 66

Very interesting point. Thank you very much.

01:49:16 - 01:49:22

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you. On to Michelle Scroggan.

01:49:22 - 01:49:38

Michelle Scrogham

Just to take you back, you were saying that at the start of the outbreak of COVID, you were in charge of trying to source and provide PPE. Can you give us a very brief overview of what your worst day on that job looked like?

01:49:43 - 01:50:22

Darren Mann

The worst feature of that was recognizing that where there were gaps through failure to order, you could recognize what was visible to you and set about to correct it. But when what you actually had on the shelves proved to be out of date and required to be brought back to life through what's called a relifing exercise, tested to see if it was still safe to use, and waiting for those tests to come back and knowing that there was no alternative at that time, those were the worst few, worst few days.

01:50:22 - 01:50:22

Michelle Scrogham

What would you say we should be taking as the biggest piece of knowledge from that now? What is the most appropriate?

What was the...

01:50:32 - 01:51:21

Darren Mann

Decide what you need. Order it early. Maintain it in date. Rotate it into use so you don't just keep, for example, clinical equipment actually, it's got a very good use case around it. You stockpile according to your predicted timeline, but you rotate that equipment as far as is possible through operational use either within our own healthcare systems or potentially amongst allies and continue to replace it, maintain it, and have an accountable person for it.

I left that job thinking that we need the equivalent of a His Majesty's Inspector of Prisons, a His Majesty's Inspector of PPE to report to Parliament on PPE stockpile levels for the next pandemic, but we can talk about that perhaps in another committee.

01:51:21 - 01:51:24

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you very much. Right, on to Derek Twigg.

01:51:24 - 01:51:53

Derek Twigg

Yep, I mean to some extent you've partly answered the question because I mean I think you've made it very clear that we have a real problem with domestic resilience, and this is one of the key lessons going back to COVID, and that's really worrying in that sense. I mean, can I just ask you, do you think going back to 2019 and today, and given your particular role, and this committee if you think it would be helpful, that we have significantly moved forward from then?

01:51:53 - 01:51:59

Darren Mann

Not really, no. I think the conversation has just started. National conversation.

01:51:59 - 01:52:15

Derek Twigg

Which is worrying. Going off on domestic resilience, can I just ask about in that case then, wasn't complex regulation part of the problem, and is that changed, is that still a barrier, is that still a concern?

01:52:15 - 01:52:20

Darren Mann

So, regulations can be part of the problem and they can also be part of the solution.

01:52:20 - 01:52:21

Which is it at the moment then?

01:52:21 - 01:52:51

Darren Mann

Right. General Hodgetts referred to this as derogation. Derogation allows you to, in a calculated and titrated way, relax your regulations to meet the needs of the moment. We've heard how drugs, blood products can be used interoperationally between NATO allies. The EU did it for COVID when derogation allowed personal protective equipment that was manufactured in another country to another standard to be used here.

01:52:51 - 01:52:58

Derek Twigg

But have you seen, have you heard of any change in, in other words, trying to look at that and, and actually make regulation or deregulation work better than it did in 2020 for instance?

01:52:58 - 01:53:02

Darren Mann

Not meaningfully, but I think that's what the Defence Readiness Bill should be for.

01:53:02 - 01:53:13

Derek Twigg

Okay. And what about procurement systems, the complexity of them?

Do you think any significant progress has been made since 2020 on that?

01:53:13 - 01:53:48

Darren Mann

Well, I think we've seen within the military the introduction of the National Armaments Director group to try to unravel some of the complexity around defence procurement. But we saw of course what happened in COVID if you suspend some of your public sector resourcing rules and then find direct awards as the only route open to you, you only get to dance with who's on the dance floor. That leads to its own problems. So getting ahead of the problem is what gives us the opportunity.

01:53:48 - 01:53:52

Derek Twigg

Which is what you keep coming back to. So basically we're not getting ahead of the problem.

01:53:52 - 01:54:14

Ed Button

That's it.

Yeah, it is. It's all about being upstream of this in a way that your allies are, or our allies are. We're not quite on the base. I think when it comes to medical supplies, the question I'd ask DMS is under the current LCST contract and the next generation of FDSS contract, which is the MOD's buying power, are they getting what they need in a timely manner?

01:54:14 - 01:54:56

Derek Twigg

So just finally, I'm sorry, I'll come back to my earlier question to the panel. And again, you touched on it. I mean, we talk about a thousand casualties from the German estimate, or say five hundred. I mean, the ability of the healthcare system to cope with the pressures, and I'll put the same question, the pressures that they have to do today, which they're not, because we've still got corridor care, we've got major, you know, delays.

Were surely if that number of casualties and the majority if not all of the reservists would have to be called up, then clearly a decision would have to be taken on who gets priority for treatment, wouldn't it? And that would mean that in wartime that service personnel would be given priority.

01:54:56 - 01:56:58

Darren Mann

Let's talk about that, because again there's an important national conversation to have around this, and essentially we are reflecting on where can reformation work and where is transformation needed. And I like to use the analogy of a parachute. You've jumped out the plane, you've got your parachute, you're coming down, it's stretched out, the fabric's a bit old, it's been reused a couple of times, you're not sure who packed it. That's the NHS as it's working at the moment. Now you get a rip in your parachute and you're thinking, oh well I hope I'll get down okay, I've not speeded up too fast.

Then there's another rip. Reformation would be you trying to stitch the holes in that parachute as you're going down and hoping your descent's going to be controlled.

Transformation is to recognize that tightening up the NHS, redeploying people, putting more people in corridors, putting a temporary thing in the car park, that's not going to work. What we probably need to do to consider, in my view, for the scales that we might be talking about, 500 people a day, every day, for as many days as you can imagine, I think we probably need transformation, and that is reimagining a wartime healthcare system with an honest conversation, including the priorities that you've talked about. If you're in an existential war, your first job is to win the war. That means I would argue medical treatment of service personnel and returning them to whatever capability that they have that they can contribute is the priority.

And I'm almost thinking of not two tiers, but two channels of healthcare. One, and it might even go through the private sector estate, because the beds are there and only 1% of them were used in COVID. We might redeploy clinical staff, use those for the military, use whatever else you need from the NHS, but maintain a public service through what is available to you in the established system. So I think what's needed is a transformation to a wartime healthcare system, not a reformation.

01:56:58 - 01:59:12

Katie Geary

Yeah, I was following on from that. I think it's a whole cultural ethical shift, because I think even in the military, I have a serving son and a serving husband.

Part of the culture is still, and I think somebody touched on the military covenant, that healthcare will get to you and you will be returned, you know, to home. The reality of Ukraine is that in Afghanistan, Iraq, we saved pretty much everybody that we said was T1, i.e. you need immediate care now, we can evacuate. Ukraine is saying T1 you're doomed, T4 you're doomed. We need to be thinking about palliative care in the battlefield. T2, T3, which are walking wounded and less sort of walking wounded, we can care for.

It is a big ethical cultural shift for the military to think about. And it's a big cultural shift for the, I think for society to start thinking about. And within that comes your question, which is well put and I think is something that we need to be thinking about, is who are the priorities when it comes to a war footing?

What are the priorities in terms of societal support to that? And maybe that's where the voluntary or third sector comes in. Where is the buddy-buddy self-first aid? Where is well-being at home? Where is home support?

You know, all of those great things that have been talked about in NHS transformation. How can we help accelerate that? And we go back to the system of systems, that actually war footing means getting your NHS and your home support fit, getting your military fit, and bringing in your voluntary sector and not industry in the round, but bespoke elements of industry such as, you know, your healthcare access, your logistics where it's needed to help start that transformation as Dr. Mann's talked about about where we need to get.

It's a completely different way of viewing things that we need to be honest and open about, I think.

01:59:12 - 01:59:24

Ed Button

And that only works, the interoperability, interchangeability, and augmentation, it only works if you exercise it, or plan it, exercise, train in it, and get ahead of it. Otherwise, you're knitting things together at the last moment.

01:59:24 - 01:59:26

Speaker 69

Thank you very much. Graham Downie.

01:59:26 - 01:59:52

Graeme James Downie

Just a very short question, just picking up on that, Dr. Geary. We've seen the government over the last week talk about what people should prepare for in different things. Would it be helpful if the government also considered training, essentially, as part of your preparedness, you should consider basic medical training? And if so, what kind of things would that look like?

Where's the best place for government to say you should be prepared to be able to do the following things?

01:59:52 - 02:01:21

Katie Geary

Yes, so I would answer that two ways. One, if you look at Iceland stats, other supermarkets are available, but they sold out of all of their, I think, baked beans, goods, and water. So there's been a massive society response to that. I think society are actually a little bit more aware and open than we give them credit for. The second thing, Holland is always awake to the situation that most of their dykes, they have to pump water six meters up to prevent half that country flooding.

So they are always looking at societal capital, society resilience, and they live with these emergency packs. Now that's been heightened since the Russian-Ukrainian war because of the threat for stability of electrical supplies. Because that means that some of those pumps may fail. And so the decision has been where do we let flood, where do we support in terms of homeland defense, and where do we put the boats. So that society's been talking about it.

And I think, yes, there is a responsibility for the government to go out and start having open, non-panic-forming discussions about this is what we should do. But I think also the government needs to lead by example, potentially.

02:01:21 - 02:01:34

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you. Well, thank you very much. Right, to come onto our last section, we wanted to discuss also about medical research and innovation priorities.

To lead the charge on that is Ian Levy.

02:01:34 - 02:02:17

Ian Roome

The Defence Medical Research Strategy sets out six themes, from combat casualty care, fitness to operate, mental health, infection, and so on. The real-life test to me would be whether research translates rapidly into capabilities that saves lives on the battlefield. So, which two or three research priorities would you accelerate immediately to deliver the greatest improvement in casualty survival and operational effectiveness? And what are the principal barriers to preventing promising research from reaching the front lines?

02:02:17 - 02:02:18

Speaker 70

Whoever wants to take that.

02:02:18 - 02:03:08

Darren Mann

Well, my first, my first priority would be those that reflect the changes on the battlefield for injured persons, and that is their requirement to be managed for a prolonged period of time at the point of wounding. What can be managed far forward? What, what can be delivered in the event that you're unable to move a casualty back through the chain? What can you take forwards to the casualty? What systems are available to you to, to deliver either equipment, people, or information to, to help them?

And under what, under what circumstances do, do you accept that you may have exhausted your resource allocation to certain severely injured persons where the greater good for the greater number would be recognized by deploying those elsewhere?

02:03:08 - 02:03:56

Ed Button

If I looked at this comparing it to other people that we deal with, other governments, TCCC, so Tactical Casualty Combat Care, has become the priority. I.e. you're upskilling to the extent that one, one of our clients we're training 80,000 people over a 12-month period. So that's how serious that they are seeing the requirement and that's a decision they made. That is not a huge capital investment for them, but it is significantly, you know, has the potential to make significant impact. If you look at this statistically and you go back to Afghanistan, if I give you this, the 75th Ranger Regiment in the US trained their entire regiment with in TCCC.

Their death rate dropped by 12%. Oh sorry, 10%. So there is a tangible output to that, so.

02:03:56 - 02:05:56

Katie Geary

If I may, so there's something about survivability.

And these are, I know a lot of the studies out of Ukraine are retrospective, observational, there is problems with data. And again, General Hodgetts referred back to data integrity. But survivability is a very interesting marker of success. And maybe in a large-scale combat operation, we need to be talking about functional return of functionality, which is not linked to survivability. So that's an interesting disaggregation of those.

And maybe return to front line is a different marker there. In short, antimicrobial resistance is going to be a big problem because of battlefield contamination, principally gram-negatives, not gram-positives. But the point that where we should be doing some research is point-of-care testing for the resistant strains.

Now that has use not only on the battlefield, but actually at the bedside in NHS hospitals. That is something that could have direct transferability. Blood is certainly something. Forward diagnostics, and it's not really mentioned in the defense research strategy, is about reach-back telemedicine and some of those early opportunities to enhance skills of your front-line troops to do damage limitation, damage control surgery far forward when your evacuation chains are in excess of 12 hours on average.

So I'd say that. The point about why do we not get research into practice is in part regulation, in part because it's not sponsored, it's not adapted. And so if you've got a commitment to research for a reason and you had a pathway at the beginning of the research, it's more likely to come to fruition.

02:05:56 - 02:06:06

Ian Roome

Just exploring on the barriers, the actual problems of getting research actually implemented, who would you say is accountable for the overall system?

02:06:06 - 02:06:42

Katie Geary

Well, I think that's the issue, there isn't a single accountability. As in many things, you know, if it falls under public procurement, you've got NICE in the UK, you've got to get funding. If it's a novel way of doing things, you've got to get policies, you might have to get Royal College to accept it. So there's various routes.

I think this goes back to derogation or sponsored route at the beginning when you set your research.

02:06:42 - 02:07:31

Ian Roome

Okay, if I may, just your thinking at the moment, and obviously you've got experience of Defence Medical Services. What do you think are the comparables between the Defence Medical Services and the civil medical services? Do you think that we are doing enough to provide good quality medical care to our service personnel, as and I'm talking specifically around the Armed Forces Covenant now? And we've heard earlier from the earlier panel about the improvements required, recommended from the CQC, for example.

So I'd just like to take your get your experience on what you think needs to be done and and what the comparables are between the civilians and those serving. Be honest.

02:07:31 - 02:08:14

Katie Geary

Yeah, okay, I will start by saying I think there are individuals who work extremely hard in both the DMS and in the NHS to deliver exceptional care on an individual basis. I think the systems that they work in often let them down. I think sometimes the system thinking prevents a rapid acceleration of good ideas and innovation.

And the leanness of the DMS prevents it from doing good stuff at capacity in an enduring fashion.

02:08:14 - 02:08:16

Speaker 72

Right, okay.

02:08:16 - 02:08:55

Darren Mann

Oh, I think that as Dr. Geary said, there are motivated, highly motivated, committed professionals that are providing, I think, overall a very high standard of care, consistent with the standards available in this country given the constraints that we face. But I note that if you think about the floor and the ceiling of the Armed Forces Covenant, what would the floor be? The floor would be that you should not be disadvantaged because of your Armed Forces membership, and that seems to me to be a pretty low floor when you look at the ceiling that could be achieved.

02:08:55 - 02:09:41

Ian Roome

And just on one further point, what do you think, some research that I've done is the comparables around pay, particularly around consultants and doctors and the pay comparables?

So at one time the gap was quite high, that if you did military service, you know, it was quite a lucrative profession to go into. And this is around retention of personnel. And I'm just wanting your views about what the government should be thinking of going forward, the Ministry of Defence, around the pay levels, because are we in danger of losing trained medical personnel to go into civilian professional careers, sorry, rather than Ministry of Defence work?

02:09:41 - 02:10:28

Ed Button

I think logically you're always going to run that risk.

I wouldn't be able to speak accurately to any pay disparity, but that's always going to be a risk. I think actually what should be looked at is a systemic much wider issue, it's not about money, it's about the entire piece and are we standing up and giving what our serving personnel signed up to from a housing, benefits, the way you're treated as a veteran, and I'd argue the answer is no. So I don't think it's just about money, I think you need to probably look at the component parts that would retain highly trained medical staff. Pay is probably a significant part of it, but look at the wrap-around, and I think that's not just in Defence Med, that's a well-publicised issue across Defence.

02:10:28 - 02:10:52

Darren Mann

Well, I think most people stay for the purpose, not the pay. Acknowledged, of course, that people in regular roles will have certain constraints according to their promotional level.

For medics that are reservists, and that of course is the majority, there are, there are opportunities open to them to, to supplement their NHS income if they so, if they so wish to, and their service pay of course is, is separate.

02:10:52 - 02:11:30

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you. Thank you very much. And just to wrap things up at the end, look, we as a committee wanted to have this session on Defence Medical Services because we not only want to gain knowledge ourselves as a committee, but we also wanted to focus hearts and minds on what has been termed as the most hollowed-out part of defence.

So given that you've got the ear of the Ministry of Defence or government, what action would you like to see from the government regarding defence medical services and the defence medical system and when? Dr Mann?

02:11:30 - 02:11:46

Darren Mann

I would like to see a clearer organ responsible for integration from defence medical to the NHS and across to the independent and voluntary sector to cohere a national wartime medical plan.

02:11:47 - 02:12:17

Ed Button

I think I'll answer your last bit which is when, which is now, you're already a little bit too late. I think it's the support to DMS from a fiscal point of view to allow them to actually get on and make these enact change. And the biggest change is don't look at industry or the commercial sector as a horrible thing, look at it as part of the solution. And the sooner the MOD writ large and DMS do that, the better the chance of the right outcomes for patients.

02:12:17 - 02:12:19

Speaker 73

And Dr Geary?

02:12:19 - 02:13:03

Katie Geary

You haven't left me much to say. I do think it's an honest review of what we have currently as a function, including the gaps, which are manifold unfortunately, against the projected requirement if we were faced, when we're faced, with a Ukraine-type situation. And then where do they want to get to support that? And then absolutely as Ed says, who is best there to support that, because not all the cost should fall to the full element to the DMS.

02:13:03 - 02:13:25

Tanmanjeet Dhesi

Thank you very much, Dr. Geary, Mr. Button, Dr. Mann. Thank you so much for taking out your invaluable time to inform our committee session on Defence Medical Services.

I think it's been very thought-provoking and no doubt will have led many to focus in on DMS. But with that, I call to order today's session. Order.

Ask anything about this video — I analyse its transcript to answer.