Lords Grand Committee

15 October 2026

Lords Grand Committee House of Lords

Follow its sittings
00:05 - 00:13
Speaker 1
I'll now start the motion for debate, UK and EU competition laws, Lord Lansley. 
00:13 - 07:41
Speaker 2
My Lords, I'm very grateful to have this opportunity to bring forward a debate on the cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union in the application of our respective competition laws, the subject of the agreement that we are noting today.  Our competition regime is based on rules established while we were members of the European Union.  I go back quite a long way on legislation on competition, so way back in 1998, when I was a member of the standing committee on the Competition Bill, I moved an amendment on the definition of vertical agreements and their relationship to block exemptions.  Nigel Griffiths, then the Labour DTI minister, said, "I might agree with this amendment, but I can't accept it.  We are waiting on the European Commission, including a definition that was unacceptable to the Commission would therefore be jumping the gun." 

Post-Brexit, we can at least determine our own competition regime, but there are very good reasons, not least in promoting investment in this country, for having a constructive engagement with the European Commission in how our two regimes address common issues.  The treaty agreed in February is a very welcome mechanism to support that cooperation.  We in this Parliament have completed our scrutiny, the European Parliament on the 16th of September approved it, and we await the European Council approval so it can come into force about a month thereafter.  The cooperation that it provides for is not the same as our former membership of the European Competition Network, but it does have a number of positive elements.  These include the mutual notification of an enforcement activity which is likely to affect the other's important interests, and the ability to share information. 

In the latter respect, it will be important in practice for the companies who consent to the sharing of their information to be clear whether and how their information may form part of the evidence which the other authority will use in their consideration or determination of a case.  There is already cooperation between the authorities.  The merger case of Safran and Collins, for example, showed evidence of cooperation requiring divestiture of the former's existing North American business as it acquired in North America those of Collins Aerospace.  The three authorities in this case, the Department of Justice in America, the Commission, and the CMA for us, respectively used judicial enforcement in the American case, conditional clearance in the Commission's case, and binding undertakings from the CMA, three different mechanisms, but actually one could see that they were all directed towards the same structural remedy.  Of course, differences in relevant markets can lead to differing remedies. 

In the merger of Vandemoortele and Delifrance, both the Commission and our CMA identified the risks to competition in what's called frozen laminated dough products, which I think of as frozen croissants, but the European Commission required the sale of two plants in France, while the CMA required the sale of the plant in Worcester. 

Differences in approach were, however, highlighted some three years ago by the Microsoft and Activision merger case.  The European Commission looked to enforceable access obligations to support future competition in cloud gaming, but the CMA required the cloud gaming rights to be sold to Ubisoft as a stronger protection.  So we may see divergent views in future, but these cooperation provisions should ensure that each takes the other's interests fully into account and they should be operating more nearly to a shared evidence base.  So why have I initiated this debate?  Because the cooperation in the treaty does not extend to the digital markets competition regime. 

The Digital Markets Act in the European Union and the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act in this country are the relevant pieces of legislation and are not part of the agreement that's been reached between the two between the two jurisdictions.  They are excluded because the treaty base for the DMA, Digital Markets Act, is an internal market one, not a competition one under articles 101 or 102 of the treaty.  I should declare an interest.  Following my participation in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act debates back in 2023 and 4, I thought it important for us not to fire and forget, as they might say in the armed services, not to fire and forget, but to follow through on how the new digital markets regime is being implemented.  My colleagues at Low Associates, with whom I've had a registered interest, assisted me and we convened a number of discussions, including one on the 1st of October last year and one on the 1st of October this year, both in Brussels, about how the two digital competition regimes are working and including representatives from DG Comp from the Commission and the Digital Markets Unit of the CMA and indeed leading companies and challenger businesses as well as experts. 

This showed again that there is ongoing cooperation and engagement between the two authorities, but it is nonetheless, I think, instructive to compare and contrast.  Both are intended to be ex-ante pro-competitive, i.e. that where companies acquire significant market power, their behavior in the market should be the subject of scrutiny and be consistent with the principles and where necessary specific requirements which would maintain effective competition and maximize consumer benefits.  This is needed because, as the Furman review for our Treasury here concluded, traditional competition remedies were moving too slowly to maintain competition in such fast-moving technology sectors.  The way the regimes, however, have shared objectives, the way they go about them are different.  The DMA for the Commission sets largely quantitative criteria for their designation of gatekeeper platforms. 

They have concluded such reviews on average in two months, with seven companies designated in relation to 23 core platform services.  I should note that the the iPadOS scrutiny took eight months on the part of the Commission because it did not meet the quantitative thresholds and therefore required a qualitative investigation.  Our DMCC looks to investigate whether a company has significant market status, is essentially a qualitative process and has taken on average nine months, so two months versus nine months.  The DMA has a list of obligations to be applied to a gatekeeper platform.  The DMCC has a set of principles from which conduct requirements may be applied. 

The degree of prescription in the DMA is clear. 

07:41 - 15:49

Andrew Lansley

For example, it has five specific data obligations about processing data, against self-preferencing using data acquired, about data portability, access to data for users, and access to competing search engines. The DMCC has only one, that the significant market status companies should, and I quote, "not use data unfairly", end quote. We can nonetheless see a positive example of alignment, including in this respect, in that the CMA's choice of conduct requirement for Google Search, announced in June this year, on data portability is aligned with the obligation under the DMA. The CMA was clear that Google could comply in this country by making DMA-compliant API available to UK users on the same terms and to the same standard as in the European Union. Comparisons between the two regimes are limited as yet.

The DMA has been in force for nearly four years. It is over three years since the first gatekeepers were designated under the DMA. The DMCC has been in force for less than two years, and the first SMS designations were only a year ago. So in this country we have yet to see how far-reaching the use of conduct requirements will be. We have seen that the CMA are using their flexibilities to enter into voluntary agreements, as with AWS on cloud services, instead of designation.

Well, I should note, the Commission too are using some flexibilities in their agreement with booking.com, although actually the gatekeeper designation remains in place. We have yet to see whether and in what circumstances the CMA chooses to use pro-competition interventions in relation to the companies with SMS designation. This is available where the authority has, and I quote, "reasonable grounds to consider that a factor or combination of factors relating to a relevant digital activity may be having an adverse effect on competition". I was led to wonder why is this measure in the Act? If there is an adverse effect on competition, a market investigation is available under competition law.

Or why would the CMA not tackle the issue through its wide-ranging power to impose a conduct requirement? One reason may be that if a conduct requirement is used and the company is in breach of the requirement, it may claim that the benefits outweigh the detriment from the breach, it's called the countervailing benefits exemption, and the CMA may wish to use pro-competition interventions to avoid such a potential route for the company. We don't know, we haven't been in this situation yet. The European Commission does not entertain such an exemption from its obligations. We should be cautious about the use of the countervailing benefits exemption, as monopolists always can demonstrate short-term benefits to consumers, but at the cost of long-term loss of competitive gains, of innovation, and of market entry.

As one who took part in the scrutiny of the Bill, I am not clear that the ex-ante pro-competition regime in this country is yet being used in the way we intended. I expected that an ex-ante regime would mean that the conduct requirements would generally be applied to SMS companies, by agreement wherever possible, providing a tailored but relatively comprehensive operating model for how that company relates to its users, competitors, and customers. Not one that is necessarily imposed because there is, and only because there is evidence of harm to which a remedy must be applied, but generally in order to avoid any adverse effect on competition arising, that's the principle of an ex-ante approach.

That is not in practice how the companies nor indeed the CMA appear to be thinking. They continue to regard SMS designation as tantamount to a finding of dominance in a market and a conduct requirement they appear to think is needed only where a remedy must be applied implying of course that there is a harm to which that remedy relates. This is only a very partial application of ex ante regulatory principles. I expected more and more rapid designation of SMS companies. The way I think of it is if it looks like an elephant it is an elephant and we might as well agree it's an elephant quite quickly.

The investigative process to determine that Google has significant market status in relation to general search services took nine months. It's an admirably thorough piece of work but it still only told us what we already knew. And in those nine months the exceptional growth in access to AI materially altered how Google responded to search and of course the CMA had to extend their study to include the AI overview. And indeed the use of standalone AI assistants is now materially changing the shape of that market. So indeed the prospect of a five-year forward look as the as the act envisages is really increasingly unrealistic.

In the Commission the definition of platforms does actually include virtual assistants and we will have to see if this is a sufficient fit for the development of AI services. Although the DMA is often characterized as rigid the pace at which the Commission are able to designate their willingness to interpret obligations and undertakings and their follow-through in enforcement all suggest elements for potential comparison between the two regimes. That said the DMCC should be recognized as a work in progress. The DMA following its review by the Commission this year and they judged it to be fit for purpose should be seen as an established regime. Our CMA is guided by reference to their four Ps: pace, predictability, proportionality and process.

In its implementation of the DMCC's ex ante competition regime a new and challenging responsibility I would suggest that the CMA should look constructively at how the the Commission's regime under the DMA achieves more pace and indeed more predictability. But also they should ask and indeed challenge the Commission's approach. Does it pay a price in terms of incentives to investment and growth? Does it deliver the optimum benefits to consumers? The CMA can and should be ready to think without prior assumptions other than their statutory requirement about both the designation process and the application of conduct requirements.

And the European Commission I hope should be fully aware of the risks that an ex ante regime unless applied with flexibility proportionality and clear process will inhibit investment and innovation by those market leaders who continue to be among the primary sources of future economic growth. Both regimes are building and learning. The issues they are dealing with are of great significance. We have not even begun to assess whether the ex ante regime is preventing what are called killer acquisitions of new and innovative market entrants. That is why I regard the benefits of cooperation between our CMA and the European Commission are at least as important in this context as it is in the application of competition law which is the subject of this agreement and treaty.

That is why I call on the government to seek through the Trade and Cooperation Agreement to secure further agreements relating to cooperation in the application of rules aimed at maintaining effective competition and consumer benefits in digital markets. My Lord thank you once again for this opportunity.

I look forward to our short debate. I beg to move that we take note of this treaty.

15:49 - 15:54

Speaker 1

The question is that this motion be agreed to.

15:54 - 23:51

Alex Alexander Carlile

My Lord, it's a real pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. He is expert, experienced and rightly much admired for his distinction and he's opened this debate showing that expertise and experience and distinction. I should declare a past interest. For eight years I was one of the chairs, part-time chairs of the Competition Appeal Tribunal and in my profession as a barrister I take a close interest in collective actions and the availability of competition proceedings in the United Kingdom which are a very important part of our service economy. We're referring to what I regard as a practical, sensible and proportionate agreement which has now been reached.

It does not surrender any British sovereignty. It does not, does not bind the European, the United Kingdom to European competition rules. There is a great similarity between our competition rules and the European Union's, but we're not bound by them in law, nor does it diminish the authority of our CMA or of the UK courts, including the Competition Appeal Tribunal. What it does is recognize a simple reality that modern markets do not stop at national borders. That, the evidence of that is most clear in the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland.

I happen to be, to have the privilege of being the chair of the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee of this House, the Northern Ireland Select Committee. And I have a plea to the minister in relation to this process and this debate. And it is that we should be assured that every effort will be made to ensure that no further complexities are applied to Northern Ireland businesses as a result of this agreement because believe me, if you look at our last committee report, you will see how complex some businesses are dealing, how complexity affects the way businesses deal with competition in the United Kingdom where Northern Ireland is involved. Of course, it's a truism, isn't it, that businesses that operate in the United Kingdom increasingly trade and invest and compete across the whole European continent. So we're dealing with major mergers, some referred to by Lord Lansley, cartels, abuses of market power and anti-competitive practices.

And the importance of those at root is that they frequently affect consumers and small and big businesses on both sides of the channel. So when you find that regulators are investigating precisely the same conduct in various countries, it must be in the public interest that they should be able to communicate effectively, coordinate where appropriate and avoid unnecessary duplication. And that is especially so where there is the possibility of a remedy that can be achieved without resort to the complexities that arise under the conflict of laws as we lawyers call it. The agreement we're considering here creates a framework for that cooperation. It enables the relevant authorities to notify one another of investigations that may affect their interests, to coordinate the enforcement activity where it's appropriate and to exchange information subject to robust safeguards of confidentiality and due process.

In the context of digital markets competition and that regime, I believe that that should be the subject of a separate agreement because there are very complex, different issues that need to be considered there. But that agreement could take its cues from this agreement. For example, I take some interest professionally in what are called standard essential patents, SEPs. An SEP is a patent that protects technology that's required to implement an industry-wide technical standard. Now, that sentence refers actually to a huge raft of industry: telecoms, consumer electronics, connected vehicles, that's vehicles connected to the internet like most of the vehicles we drive today, and the internet of things.

And those who have a standard ethical essential patent have to commit themselves to what is called a FRAND commitment, a fair and reasonable and non-discriminatory agreement that ensures that they have the advantage of their patent, but the consumers do not have to pay through the nose. The practical result is that, for example, in a car that's connected to the internet, there's a one-off fee paid when the car is built of something like 20, 25 pounds that guarantees that you can use your cruise control and everything else you have for life in that car. It's very important and we need to think about that. But the alternative to this agreement would be less efficient enforcement, greater regulatory uncertainty, increased costs for businesses and for taxpayers alike. Parallel investigations conducted in isolation risk inconsistent outcomes, unnecessary expense and avoidable delays, and the delays in this country are short compared with most other countries we're talking about.

Cartels do not respect national boundaries, fraud is neither patriotic nor passive, dominant firms operate internationally, digital markets are global in character and regulators therefore require mechanisms for cooperation if they are to remain effective. Some may fear that any agreement with the European Union inevitably represents a step backwards from Brexit. Although I'm not an enthusiast of Brexit, indeed the exact opposite, I do not share the view that I've just stated, that it represents a step backwards from Brexit. Indeed, as Brexit was claimed to be the United Kingdom's ability to govern itself, this agreement is part of giving the United Kingdom the ability to govern itself. It's an exercise of that very sovereignty that we all cherish, whether we're pro or anti-Brexit.

A sovereign nation is entirely free to enter into cooperative agreements that advance its national interest. So one of the things we have from this agreement is we retain independence but we are not isolated. It means we can choose our partnerships in a manner that benefits our citizens and our economy. Importantly, the agreement preserves the regulatory autonomy of all parties. Decisions remain in the hands of the United Kingdom authorities applying UK law and EU authorities applying EU law.

There is no supranational decision-making involved and there is no obligation to reach the same conclusions if we don't want to. It simply gives us the opportunity to work better, joined-up thinking, joined-up working, cooperation on what is sometimes an extraordinarily complex subject, both factually, technically and indeed legally as well.

So, my Lords, in a world where economic activity is increasingly interconnected, effective regulation requires dialogue, coordination, and mutual respect between trusted partners. This agreement, in my view, achieves just that.

23:51 - 34:31

Malcolm Bruce

My Lords, I'm genuinely grateful to both noble Lords for their technical knowledge and introducing this debate, because I freely admit this is an area, much as I believe very strongly in effective competition law, that I'm not an expert in. But the first thing, of course, when one reads the report from the European Committee, is all they've done is read the report themselves and given us no guidance at all, whereas the two noble Lords have given us a very clear presentation of what we're about. It's voluntary. It's non-controversial in those practical purposes because it's not enforceable, but it's based on a genuine goodwill and a partnership to try and make our relationships work. And the context we have at the moment, of course, is Brexit or no Brexit, the EU remains our biggest trading partner, and the basis on which we trade now is of mutual importance for us to get access and for them not to discriminate against us and vice versa.

So whether you're for or against Brexit, we need to have rules for trading across the entire market. And this is a practical step based on a voluntary agreement that has already been in place. I did try to look around and find how many examples under the existing situation there were of this kind of cooperation. There are a few. One with the motor trade, one with the pharmaceuticals, and reference, of course, to digital, which I'll come back to.

But not very many, which suggests that we're still working fairly well with our European partners, and the main trading companies understand the rules and probably apply them. But you need to have rules enforceability where there are breaches or threats of breaches. I was slightly taken aback about the need in the light of this for companies to be prepared for dawn raids and how they should react to them, of which there've been one or two, I think, in this context, but they've obviously applied more widely. So I think when one has said that, there's just a few points that I would wish to raise and maybe if the Minister's replying, if she can give any examples of where this has already worked and how it might work more effectively, it would, certainly from my point of view, be helpful. But I think the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, quite rightly said part of the reason for this is for investment purposes.

And again, our investment opportunities are in a very dynamic state at the present time. Our relationship with the United States is extremely fraught in many ways, at sort of business-to-business, company-to-company, market-to-market level, it still works and hopefully will continue to work. But it is being interfered with at the top and by major players in a very disruptive way, which has implications for the UK's own ability to attract investment or to fail to attract investment. And the question we have to ask is to what extent are we prepared to compromise our own independence in order to attract investment on terms which are unfavorable or less favorable than we would like, which in my view reinforces the need for us to reset our relationship with the EU because they are more trusted partners, whatever one might worry about delay and bureaucracy, we understand each other much better and we're on the same page. And it may not be quite relevant to this debate, but it does concern me, particularly in the digital context, that we're talking about three or four individuals whose personal wealth is the same as a medium-sized country.

A point I saw two days ago was individually any one of them could end world hunger with their own resources. That doesn't appear to be what motivates them or mobilizes them. And that what worries me is what they do want to do with their wealth in many ways is to use it powerfully to interfere in markets or to pressure markets or to blackmail markets. And we need to have a robust but flexible competition arrangement that enables us to operate within those markets, to attract investment within those markets, but to protect our own interests. And it will not be surprising for noble lords to me to say this is a step in the right direction in terms of reset.

But in many ways, of course, and I take the point that Lord Carlile made, but had we not left the EU, we wouldn't have needed this. It has possibly given us a bit of space we didn't have. I think the bigger picture, if we ever get back to the single market, which I certainly would hope, the customs union, ultimately full membership of the European Union, is the extent to which some of the space that we have enabled to create during Brexit justifies us not re-entering a very close relationship with the EU in terms of how do the the compromises and the benefits. And indeed to what extent can we negotiate a relationship which takes some account of those changes. Because my lords, my own dealings with the EU in a whole variety of different circumstances when we were members was that the UK were actually innovators to the benefit of the EU.

And it's one of the reasons why they miss us right now because we we were prepared to sort of not quite go along with the centralist conventional wisdom and challenge it. It was one of the reasons why many of the smaller countries, the Benelux, the Scandinavian countries, were so fraught when we left because they saw us as championing that against what they saw as a as a French-German, possibly Italian sort of dominance. And that balance has gone. But that aside, it seems to to me that if you're in business in the UK and 40 plus percent of your export market is across the channel, you have to conform in any case to the rules and regulations that apply to be part of that market. What you want is to ensure that the rules are mutually enforced and fairly enforced both here and there.

And this agreement seems to be designed to ensure that that is the case as far as competition is concerned. I think the one of the problems of the last few years, however, is very, very many small and medium-sized businesses will probably regard this agreement as of no relevance to them because they've stopped trading in the EU because of the technical difficulties. People might have said before Brexit, oh, it was bureaucratic. But actually, if we were in the EU, the bureaucracy was negotiated at senior level and as a company trading within the EU, it was assumed that you were conforming to the rules and you didn't have to prove it. Now you have to prove it, which if you're a big corporation, you can probably do at some expense.

But if you're a small medium-sized business, it's just too much trouble, it's too costly, so you just don't do it. And I think that's one of the reasons we have suffered as a result. So I think I would simply want to say to the to the minister, given it's voluntary, given it's unenforceable, first of all, what has the experience of the arrangement we've had up until now taught us about how it will actually work and any one or two examples where it has been applied and how it's been applied. And if I can perhaps just come back to the digital space because I have I'm a member of the International Relations and Defence Committee and we're in the middle of a an inquiry into multilateralism in the changing world and we're having a sub-inquiry into the role of AI in multilateralism. And I take and the point that Lord Lansley made was things are moving at terrifying pace.

And it's very difficult to know how any rules or regulations are going to work because they're ahead of the game. And on two counts, one, the technology that's being developed, I mean, obviously you have the extreme instance of taking over the world and killing us all.

But you also have the people creating these things do not know necessarily what they're creating or who will use it, good or bad. I mean, so an awful lot of companies are already using AI. And it may be using it in ways that are hugely beneficial. Indeed, I think it was suggested in the previous quarterly growth figures that one of the reasons they were slightly higher than expected was the productivity bonuses from the application of AI. But at the same time, they could be used for anti-competitive reasons or extreme competitive advantage.

And it's therefore one of the reasons why I agree with Lord Carlyle, we almost certainly need a separate agreement in the digital space. But it is a case in my view that we have a real problem. I mean, in the sense that 98% of AI innovation is being driven by the United States. A very small bit, significant small bit by China. And actually the UK is third, although that was pointed out being equivalent to being the third Gallagher brother in practical terms.

But it is innovative and it is well-targeted and it does give us some advantage in a small way. But it doesn't give us any leverage in the market of where what's happening elsewhere. So I do believe it's really important that we have a separate agreement. I just worry how we can possibly get it in place fast enough. And indeed, having got it in place, how it can work in a way that takes account of the pace of development which is implied.

So actually, funny enough, the strength of this agreement is its weakness. That is its strength, namely it's flexible, it's unenforceable, but it's based on a genuine understanding of each other's aspirations and a genuine requirement to work together to ensure that all the parties know that there is an effective competition space and that there are parties who work together to ensure that it's enforced. And I just repeat, if the minister can give some practical examples, I think that would enlighten us. I did try to find one or two and I was slightly disappointed. All I was told is there's an agreement and I got every different aspect of what this agreement was, but not actually how specifically it might be applied or even actual examples or theoretical examples so that we can better understand in practical terms from a business point of view what this will mean, either what it might threaten them with, hopefully not too much, and what it might provide them as an opportunity.

So if the minister can answer those questions, I'd much appreciate.

34:31 - 45:54

David Hunt

My Lords, we're all very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley not only for securing this debate, but also for delivering what I found to be one of the most impressive speeches I've heard on this subject, displaying a wide knowledge not only of the background, but also the way ahead, which is really what this debate should be all about. And I'm very grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlyle of Berriew for introducing me to standard essential patents. Wow. I think we were all blown away by his expertise in this area. We've always regarded him as an eminent lawyer, but I hadn't quite appreciated the extent to which he'd moved on a much wider stage.

So let me make clear that we on these benches support effective international cooperation in the enforcement of competition law. And I agree with Lord Bruce of Bennachie that we need to hear from the government with some clear examples of why indeed this whole, this new agreement is going to operate in practice. Where anti-competitive behavior affects consumers and businesses across borders, competition authorities must be able to work together. Effective competition is essential if we are to have confidence in our economy, and it also encourages investment and innovation. And I pause here to reflect on the words of Lord Bruce of Bennachie.

We in this country are proud to have some of the most brilliant scientists in the world. We have won more Nobel prizes than the rest of Europe put together. And of course, when I, a few years ago, when I was involved as cabinet minister for science, we launched the World Wide Web, which had been thought up by the most brilliant young 18-year-old Cambridge undergraduate operating in CERN, the Large Hadron Collider. And we thought, I'd say to Lord Bruce, we thought at the time that things were moving so fast, they were almost out of control with the development of the internet. I was the first minister to receive a mobile phone, and I could hardly carry it because it was so heavy.

Things do move on, but it's very important to have effective competition because that, that is essential to the sort of confidence we can have about the future, and it encourages investment and innovation. It also gives consumers greater choice and ensures that businesses succeed because they offer better products and services. This agreement makes a number of practical changes intended to achieve just that. In particular, where the UK and EU competition authorities are pursuing the same or related enforcement activities, they will now have a formal framework through which they can coordinate those activities. And I would be grateful if the noble baroness, the minister, could clarify exactly how the government expects this to operate in practice.

And let's look back to some of the suggestions that have been made during this debate. One objective should surely be to reduce unnecessary duplication. Yet greater cooperation between regulators could in some circumstances also make it easier for parallel investigations to take place. A business operating both in the United Kingdom and the European Union could still face two investigations, two sets of information requests, and potentially different remedies. So could the minister therefore say what safeguards there are to ensure that this agreement genuinely reduces duplication and regulatory burdens rather than simply facilitating parallel enforcement by different authorities?

Now Article 3 states that a competition authority should notify the authorities of the other party where enforcement activity is likely to affect the other party's important interests, I quote. Yet as I understand it, important interests is not defined in the agreement. That leaves an obvious question for businesses and their legal advisers. What factors will the CMA or European authorities take into account when deciding that an important interest has been engaged? Does the government intend either independently or jointly with the European Union to publish criteria or guidance explaining exactly how that test will operate?

Much of the UK competition policy of course sits outside this agreement. But this debate takes place against a much wider question about the direction of competition policy in this country. Competition policy has to protect consumers and tackle genuine anti-competitive behavior. But it must also recognize that Britain is competing internationally for capital, entrepreneurs and innovative businesses. Now the government themselves have instructed the CMA to give greater consideration to growth and investment.

The CMA's report last year, as my noble friend pointed out, outlined the four Ps: pace, predictability, proportionality and process, and says that its objective is to create a regulatory environment which attracts investment and gives businesses confidence. This is so important in the area that we're discussing. Technology is expanding fast. I acknowledge that. The noble lord is quite right, it's moving at pace.

Now the CMA now exercises significant powers over some of the world's largest and most innovative companies. The Digital Markets Competition and Consumers Act 2024 gave it an extensive new regulatory regime alongside its existing merger and competition powers. So the government, I believe, do need to be able to demonstrate that the cumulative effect of these powers is supporting rather than deterring investment in the United Kingdom. What assessment has the government made of the impact of the DMCC Act and the CMA's digital market regime on investment, innovation and business confidence in the UK? Similarly, have ministers reviewed whether the CMA's existing merger control powers are appropriately calibrated to the government's stated objective, which I hope we all share, of making Britain one of the best places in the world in which to invest?

Last year the CMA acknowledged, and I quote, UK law gives us an unusually broad jurisdiction by international standards. This can create uncertainty over whether we will review a particular deal or not, end of quote.

We saw only last week the government intervene in the BT TalkTalk transaction on public interest grounds under the Enterprise Act 2002, citing the continuity of telecommunications services. There may well be exceptional circumstances in which such intervention is justified, but the Act also allows governments to specify new public interest considerations. We should therefore be very careful that the public interest does not gradually become a cover for the political interest. The CMA itself has previously warned that a repoliticization of merger control could well undermine business confidence. So what assessment has the government made of the risk that expanding ministerial intervention powers could create uncertainty, raise the regulatory risk attached to investing in the UK, and ultimately deter investment?

Finally, the government did announce a Competition Reform Bill in the King's Speech in May. We were told that it would make competition investigations faster and more predictable, reduce unnecessary burdens on businesses, and strengthen accountability. Well, we're now in October, and that bill has still not been introduced. So finally, could the noble Baroness the Minister tell the committee exactly when the Competition Reform Bill will be laid before Parliament, and whether the government remains committed to the reforms that were announced in the King's Speech? We have raised a whole range of questions, and we all now look forward to the Minister's reply.

45:54 - 01:00:03

Speaker 11

My Lords, I am very pleased to respond for the government, and I thank the noble Lord Lansley for securing this debate and to all noble Lords who have contributed today on such an important topic. I was trying to list each of your experiences in this, which are highly extensive, your expertise and knowledge, and then I realized I would use far too many of my potentially 20 minutes. But I have known two of you, sorry, beg your pardon for using that word, I've known two noble Lords for some years and two other noble Lords more recently, and I'm getting to know your expertise even better. So I feel in very august company in responding, and I'm hoping that I can have covered all of your points. If for any reason at the end of my 20 minutes, particularly I think with the noble Lord Lord Hunt's extensive list of particular queries, there are any outstanding, I will of course write to noble Lords accordingly, but I'll try and cover as many as I can.

The United Kingdom and the European Union are close neighbors and major trading partners. We share an interest in ensuring that markets are open, competitive, and fair, and that anti-competitive conduct does not harm consumers or hold back innovative business. This is particularly important as our economies continue to adapt to technological change, including the opportunities and challenges presented by digital and AI-enabled markets mentioned by, in particular, noble Lord Bruce.

In an increasingly interconnected global economy, conduct and transactions often cross borders and affect several jurisdictions at once. Effective enforcement therefore depends not only on strong domestic regimes, but on practical cooperation between competition authorities. That is why the government negotiated the UK-EU Competition Cooperation Agreement, signed in Brussels on the 25th of February, as Noble Lords are aware, this year. The agreement is the first supplementary agreement to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement to have been signed since that agreement entered into force in 2021. It delivers on the commitment of Article 361 of the TCA, which provides for a separate framework for cooperation on competition matters.

It is also the UK's first ever international cooperation agreement, marking an important step in the government's ambition to deepen cooperation with international partners on competition on issues of shared interest. The agreement will facilitate enhanced dialogue and operational cooperation between the Competition and Markets Authority, the European Commission, and the national competition authorities of EU member states. This is the EU's first so-called umbrella agreement, which extends the cooperation framework to the EU member states' national competition authorities. In practice, this means competition authorities will be better able to coordinate where they are investigating similar or parallel cases. They will be able to notify one another of relevant enforcement activity, cooperate on investigations into cross-border anti-competitive practices, and will give careful consideration of each other's important interests.

This matters because closer cooperation can make enforcement more timely, coherent, and effective. It can help avoid unnecessary duplication for authorities and businesses, so clearly outlined by the Noble Lord Hunt of Wirral. And ultimately, it can support more effective action to address harms, protect consumers, and promote fair and dynamic markets. My Lords, this agreement also supports the government's mission to deliver economic growth. Effective competition in dynamic markets drives investment, innovation, productivity, and ultimately growth.

It strengthens the conditions for sustainable economic growth and delivers long-term benefits for businesses and consumers. The government has set out its priorities and expectations for the Competition and Markets Authority through its strategic steer. This emphasizes the importance of considering action taken by competition and consumer protection authorities internationally, and where appropriate, ensuring that parallel regulatory action is timely, coherent, and avoids unnecessary duplication. This agreement will be an important tool in supporting those objectives. Noble Lords will rightly expect cooperation of this kind to be accompanied by appropriate safeguards.

The agreement is clear that each authority will continue to apply its own competition law and take its own decisions that reflect its important interests. It creates a framework for cooperation where that is helpful and appropriate, while fully respecting the independence of each authority and its enforcement activities. Any information sharing will remain subject to domestic law. The agreement also contains clear protections governing confidentiality, onward disclosure, and the purposes for which information may be used. These safeguards help ensure that cooperation can take place in a way that provides certainty and reassurance for businesses while protecting confidential information and respecting the independence of each authority.

Noble Lords raised the question of why the agreement does not include digital competition within its scope. At this stage, the priority has been to establish and bring into force a practical cooperation agreement that delivers tangible benefits for competition enforcement and consumers. Noble Lords will be aware that the UK's digital markets regime only came into force in January 2025, after negotiations for the UK-EU competition cooperation agreement concluded. It is right that the regime is given time to bed in domestically and that experience is gained of its operation in practice before it is included in a formal cooperation agreement. Furthermore, it is not unusual for the EU to adopt a phased approach to international cooperation agreements, where a first agreement establishes the foundation for cooperation with more advanced cooperation considered later as relationships mature and practical experience is gained.

Indeed, this has been the approach taken by the EU with other key partners, such as Canada. The agreement should therefore be seen as a foundation rather than an end point. This is why the agreement includes a review clause which provides an opportunity for both parties to consider whether cooperation should develop further in future. Since signing, the agreement was laid before Parliament on the 15th of April and the United Kingdom's parliamentary scrutiny process concluded on the 10th of June. The European Parliament has since given its consent and the agreement is progressing through the European Union's remaining procedures.

We look forward to the necessary steps being completed so that the agreement can enter into force. The agreement also gives us an opportunity to look ahead. It commits the parties to initiate a joint review within two years of entry into force and establishes a framework through which cooperation can continue to develop over time. As markets evolve, it is important that authorities are able to maintain a constructive dialogue and share expertise where that supports effective enforcement and better outcomes for consumers and businesses. Digital markets is naturally one example where the UK and the EU share the objective of promoting competition, supporting innovation, and delivering better outcomes for businesses and consumers.

On the question of why around the timing with the EU on digital competition, Noble Lords should be reassured that there is already close working between the UK and the EU in this, both as competition authorities and policy makers. The CMA and the European Commission maintain a close dialogue on competition matters, including digital markets. There are also existing opportunities for the UK government and the EU to discuss digital competition established under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, as well as wider discussions through the G7 or OECD. Just this morning, UK and EU officials met through the Trade Specialised Committee, where they had the opportunity to discuss level playing field issues, including competition and digital competition policy. On whether we are again on digital competition domestically, the government's position is that the UK is very active in this space.

Since the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act came into force, the CMA has made significant progress in implementing the new regime. Over the past year, the CMA has concluded three strategic market status investigations, designated Google in search and both Apple and Google in mobile ecosystems, imposing remedies and launched a further SMS investigation into Microsoft's business software and cloud services.

In search, the CMA has already imposed conduct requirements relating to publisher controls, fair ranking of search results, and data portability. Notably, the publisher controls remedies are a world first and gives publishers greater control over how their content is used in AI-generated summaries. In mobile ecosystems, the CMA has secured commitments from Apple and Google relating to app review processes and data use, while also consulting on measures relating to Apple Store steering and access to NFC functionality support to support competition and innovation. In cloud services, the CMA has secured commitments from Amazon and Microsoft to improve interoperability and switching, while continuing to investigate competition concerns in business software and cloudware. The regime is already proving its worth in terms of both speed to impact and resilience to future developments in this fast-moving area.

As a number of noble lords have highlighted today, competition challenges increasingly have an international dimension. This agreement does not seek to make our respective regimes identical, nor should it. Rather, it ensures that independent authorities are able to work together more effectively where there is a shared interest in doing so. So in sum, this agreement represents an important step forward in competition cooperation between the UK and the EU. It provides a practical framework for closer engagement between our competition authorities, supports more effective enforcement in cross-border markets, and establishes a strong foundation on which cooperation can continue to develop in the future.

Noble lords have also raised a number of specific issues, and I would like to turn to some of those points. Lord Carlisle, in terms of complexity for business in Northern Ireland, our intention is that the competition and cooperation agreement will reduce complexity for businesses operating in Northern Ireland through, for example, less duplicative requests for information. I have a detailed answer on standard essential patents, but I'd be very happy to write to the noble lord to save a little time on that, but obviously as the noble lord might expect, it's all good news in terms of response to you to noble lord. To the noble lord Bruce, on advantages that the noble lord was interested in, theoretically this agreement could have real advantages for business subject to, for example, a merger investigation in both the UK and EU, which could include a reduction in costs and duplicative requests for information, which was also a concern for the noble lord Hunt of Wirral, greater predictability in outcomes, and coordinated enforcement. And further, the noble lord Bruce asked about how will the UK's digital market regime be able to adapt to developments in AI.

I've touched a little bit on AI before now, but the UK's tools under the digital markets regime are intended to be flexible to address competition issues as digital and AI markets evolve. For example, the CMA's publisher control conduct requirement in Google Search is a world first, allowing publishers to opt out of their content being used to power AI features, and the CMA will act in areas which will have the greatest benefits for UK markets and consumers. On the some of the detailed questions from the noble lord Hunt of Wirral, on important interests, this term is not defined in the agreement to give respective competition authorities the flexibility to consider what enforcement activities may affect the important interests of the other party on a case-by-case basis.

I'm hoping that the majority of the other more general questions that the noble Lord had were covered in my earlier remarks. Anything not, I have obviously committed to ensuring that the noble Lord and others can receive any further detail on specific questions and issues that came up. And so, in conclusion, my Lords, just to repeat...

01:00:03 - 01:00:30

David Hunt

I'm sorry. If I may, it would be a great relief to us all if the noble Baroness could tell us when the competition reform bill is going to be laid before Parliament. Just a rough idea. And also, is the government still committed to those commitments put forward at the time of the King's speech?

01:00:30 - 01:00:57

Speaker 11

The Prime Minister has been clear that he will honor the manifesto and is committed. It's simply a matter of parliamentary time. And so I don't have any more detailed information to provide at this moment, but I'm aware, I know that it's the... the department is pressing to ensure that there is parliamentary time available and that is going through the usual appropriate channels.

01:00:57 - 01:01:17

Alex Alexander Carlile

Before the noble lady sits down and just picking up Lord Hunt's point, could she pass a message through her officials that there will be deep frustration if when such a bill appears, it does not resolve what is known as the Packard problem, which she and her officials will understand fully.

01:01:17 - 01:02:59

Speaker 11

Thank you to noble Lords, to the noble Lord Carlyle. I am aware of the issues that he is mentioning and that again is absolutely in both officials' minds and ministers' minds and we are on it, if I can say. I was going to remark once again about the privilege really that I feel having listened to you all with your Lord Bruce's extensive practical experiences, Lord Hunt as a former minister. I loved the idea of the very first mobile phone and I look forward to seeing the pictorial evidence at some point because that would be quite amusing to see how big the mobile phones were in those days and all the extensive knowledge. And obviously, the noble Lord Carlyle with both his Northern Ireland and his competition tribunal extensive experience as well.

And on Lord Lansley, the noble Lord Lansley, the fact that you were speaking about these issues in 1998 is humbling. I don't... I can't put it any higher than that. So I do thank you all. I think today's debate has demonstrated the breadth of our shared interest in ensuring that competition works effectively for businesses and consumers. And this agreement provides a strong foundation for closer cooperation with our European partners while preserving the independence of our respective competition regimes.

It's a positive step in its own right, but it's also part of a wider constructive UK-EU relationship and the government looks forward to building on that cooperation in the years ahead.

01:02:59 - 01:04:09

Andrew Lansley

My Lords, it's been a only a short debate, but I thought one that's very full of content and indeed interesting and indeed entertaining contributions. I'm most grateful to noble Lords who have taken part and for their support for the discussion of these issues. When we're not contemplating legislation, we very rarely have an opportunity to talk about these issues. And unlike some other legislatures who seem to be revisiting competition policy constantly and trying to... trying to influence the executive. We hand the... we hand the legislation over to the executive and then sometimes, as I said in my speech, we fire and forget.

And I think it's really important, the issues behind this subject are so important, it's really vital that we take every opportunity to try and bring them forward. In the noble Lord Lord Carlyle did refer to standard essential patents. He will recall, I think, that we did cover a little bit of these issues in the Product Safety Bill. In my conversations with the Intellectual Property Office since, I am hopeful that the government will respond before the end of the year.

01:04:09 - 01:04:10

They have responded.

01:04:10 - 01:04:11

They have responded?

01:04:12 - 01:09:08

Andrew Lansley

Oh, yesterday. Well, my noble Lord is ahead of me. So that is a very good basis on which I think we can bring these issues back. Frankly, the European Union is in bulk. The Commission has withdrawn their proposals, the European Parliament is challenging that in the European Court, so they can't make progress.

I think we should actually think it's incumbent on us to try and lead the way. So I hope I hope we shall be able to have a constructive debate, if necessary outside the formal processes of Parliament, but a constructive debate about how we can take steps forward. The noble friend the noble Lord Lord Bruce, I think there is an interesting example, the Saffron and Collins one I referred to is an interesting example of cooperation. And I hope we can see that different jurisdictions doing things in their own terms differently, but with the same objective and as it happens the same remedy. And I think that's a good a very good example of the way in which I hope this kind of cooperation will proceed in the in the months and years ahead.

The noble lady was I think very positive about the possibility of taking forward cooperation by phases. Of course, the legislative base from the European Union's point of view for this agreement doesn't extend into the Digital Markets Act. So we may need to think about something new under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement rather than simply an extension of this agreement. But I do hope that we will put that into the into the mix for when is it, the 20th of November, the many things that I hope will form part of a positive reset in inverted commas. The noble Lord Lord Bruce was talking about oh, my noble friend Lord Hunt was talking about investment and innovation and the balance.

And the Competition Reform Act Bill when it comes presumably will be directed very much to this point, the balance between promoting investment and growth and ensuring that we maintain effective competition. I did say in my in my opening remarks, monopolists have always been able to demonstrate short-term benefits to consumers. The problem is that they they kill long-term investment and innovation because they kill market entry on the part of others. And market entry is absolutely critical in this. The Furman Review was very clear that there had been many, literally very many acquisitions of startup and innovative companies in the digital space by the by the leading market players.

We're just not it's not we haven't had an SMS designation here long enough to be able to see how far this new regime through the notification procedures under the DMCC will enable intervention to ensure that market entrants are able to succeed in digital markets. And it is fundamentally an interface between the digital competition regime and the conventional competition regime, because the notification under the DMCC leads directly into merger reference under the Enterprise Act, on which standing committee I was honored to serve back in 2002 as well.

But the point is, you know, we do want to, this is, the competition bit of digital competition and conventional competition can't be disentangled. They are all part of the same thing, and it will be really important to see the cooperation under this agreement hopefully working to help to support the scrutiny of merger references in the digital age. Final thing, the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, talked about the power and wealth of the tech magnates. They are, as it were, the railway barons of the modern age. The noble Lord will recall that I think we should hope that there is a bit of a kind of sense of Andrew Carnegie about this, who, although you might argue about his desire to maximize profit and the way he went about it, his purpose was to maximize profit so he could deploy that money for the public interest, not least in Dunfermline, if I recall correctly.

And I hope, and there is a bit of the Carnegie philosophy about some tech leaders, not all. But it is really important that if this is a new golden age of, you know, they're not railway barons or creating Standard Oil or US Steel, but they are creating the companies which are dominating our industry today. And I hope that we do find that we have some of that. But let's remember, the golden age led to the antitrust legislation in America in the early part of the 20th century. Here in the 21st century, we have to make sure that our antitrust and pro-competition regime is equally as effective as that was in preventing the abuse of dominance.

01:09:08 - 01:09:36

Speaker 14

So I hope, I did move the motion, and I hope... I'm so sorry to ask the noble Lord to give way for a moment. I just want to do a correction. The Competition Reform Bill was mentioned in the King's Speech, not in the manifesto. I just wanted to correct that for the record.

Noble Lord's apologies, Lord Lansley. Absolutely. Thank you very, thank, I thank the Minister very much for that. And I thank all the noble Lords who've taken part in this short debate, and I hope we will have the opportunity in future to take forward some of these important issues.

01:09:36 - 01:09:48

Speaker 13

The question is that this motion be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. To the contrary, not content. The contents have it. That completes the business before the Grand Committee today.

The Committee is adjourned.