National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
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National Security Strategy (Joint Committee) Actual start House of Lords
Follow its sittingsWill Marshall
It used to be, prior to Planet, you would have a few satellites, but we were the first to build a satellite constellation over a hundred. We maintain over two hundred in orbit and in doing that, that's a resilient... At the beginning of the Ukraine war, the Viasat system got jammed very quickly, but Starlink was operable. Some of the individual earth imaging satellites got dazzled, but our system of hundreds of satellites was resilient and has continued to operate every time, every day throughout the war. The second piece is working closely with national governments on specific threats that are coming to our fleet, like we work with US Cyber Command and get intelligence from them about what threats could be happening, especially state threats.
And the third level is being able to rapidly reconstitute satellites.
We have rapid launches. We were meant to have another launch today, it just got postponed due to weather in the Cape today, but generally we're launching about four, five launches per year, typically about 50 new satellites per year, iterating those capabilities. We can build about 40 satellites per week. It's the most prolific system alongside SpaceX's Starlink in being able to build satellites very quickly, about 40 per week, such that we can reconstitute those satellites very quickly in the event of something more catastrophic. So that's how we tackle it.
We also try to be good actors in the broader field. I did some of my work at NASA on orbital space debris, and so we were the first to do open standards of publishing satellite positions so that we could coordinate and ensure no collisions between satellites, keeping the satellites really low so that they do not create long-term space debris.
Why am I saying all these things? Well, primarily because when the UK faces questions of space resilience, I think it needs to move into these kind of directions. That is, proliferated fleets, looking at how how you can one of the ways to do that is to do hybrid capabilities, that is, a mix of tapping commercial systems and building sovereign systems. And that can be done very quickly as we have done with Ukraine. For example, Ukraine asked us to build some and operate some satellites directly for its sovereign as well as tapping our data feeds, and we were able to put their first satellite in space in two months after the contract.
And we just did something very similar for Sweden. So now you can get sovereignty, and that is control of the satellites, and speed, and that used to be something that you could sort of have to choose one or the other. So I believe that the UK could tap these sorts of ways of tracking and having more resilient systems by leaning into proliferated architectures, and that that's very affordable these days as Ukraine has proved.
So numbers count.
Speaker 6
Okay. Okay. And just on the space strategy, just the UK space strategy, just a very brief response on that.
Will Marshall
Look, I think the... Yes, so I would say the biggest missing piece of that is where is the urgency? So all of the right kinds of direction, but what is the timeline? A lot of countries are grappling with the question of sovereignty. What does sovereign mean?
I think it means, or it should mean, having the systems that you need when you need them. Okay? And, um, but at the minute, the UK is on a course to build systems that are very long. For example, the ISTARI program is building systems that may take until 2035 to build a system. Systems that are fully national and sovereign, but that give their capabilities seven years too late aren't sovereign at all, they're just stupid.
I mean, honestly, that's what's going to happen in the present course.
And just want to, just because I want to move on to colleagues on the panel, you said how many months it took to deliver the... Two months for Sweden. Sweden was four months from zero, a contract to a first sovereign, that means it was owned by Sweden and is going to be operated by Sweden. Okay. So four months.
Very interesting. Okay. Jessie.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
Yes, thank you. That was very interesting. So I think from my perspective, I speak, it's really the focus is on cybersecurity of space infrastructure. Now you may or may not have heard, you probably have, you're probably aware of the cyberattacks that impacted M&S, the cyberattack that impacted Jaguar Land Rover, the impact that these cyberattacks had on the individual companies, but then also the knock-on effects that these attacks had as well, including, was it, I've got here somewhere, nearly kind of two billion cost to the UK economy from the Jaguar Land Rover attack. So cyberattacks are becoming more of a reality.
And this is for infrastructure outside of space. We can see that they are affecting companies.
M&S couldn't deliver online orders for a very long time. Why am I talking about this on a space resilience panel? Because what you may not realize is that space infrastructure, a lot of what we've just heard, is just as vulnerable to cyber attacks. Now space infrastructure, you often think about it in terms of the ground, in terms of satellites up there in space, you might think about the user segment as well and then launch.
All of these different parts of space systems have clear and very worrying vulnerabilities. And actually, it's becoming easier and easier for cyberattacks to be conducted against space systems, partly because they are becoming more accessible. So the number of people, organisations who are able to develop satellite systems is growing enormously at the moment and has been for the last kind of five to 10, 15 years. But also, cyberattacks are becoming easier with tools such as AI, which I can mention more on later. But essentially, we're encountering this situation in which our space systems are becoming more vulnerable.
There are more of them. They're becoming more open. More people are learning about space because they're doing things in space. And that means if they learn about the technical system, they can also learn about how to attack it and the vulnerabilities. So we're getting to this situation in which we're seeing more and more cyber threats affect critical infrastructure and in particular affect space infrastructure.
But actually, if we see more cyberattacks affect the space infrastructure on which we all rely on, then then it could become very concerning. One of the things that really worries me about cyber threats is that they exploit unknown vulnerabilities.
So you don't know where your cyber, you know, where your adversary is going to target. You don't know where specifically they're going to come in, where is your weak point within your organization. Nobody really knows that, which is why it's it's such a tricky point to tackle. So I think that the the kind of mysterious nature of the the beginning of cyber attacks and the way in which they could impact space systems is a worry.
Speaker 7
And do you think the space strategy addresses that, the government's space strategy?
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
I I would agree on the point about urgency. I think that this is a much bigger problem than the space strategy really depicts. I think that there are some nice...
Matt Western
Ah, understand. But you don't see any evidence in the space strategy per se that you think they get it as they do get it across government.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
I think that there are some aspects. So there's in the space strategy, there's a recognition of the multidimensional threat to space systems. So cyberattacks don't exist by themselves as a threat to space. Space weather is a concern, debris, all of these different threats. So I think there's recognition of that.
There's also a willingness to tackle the threat collectively. This is good. I think that space is vast, our dependence on space is vast, and therefore all of the organisations which are dependent on space should be included when you're thinking about threats to space, and I include the supply chain in that as well because they are. So I think that's good. The things that I think really it's missing is championing what the UK is saying and doing specifically about the cybersecurity of space.
Now, I may be wrong here, but I think that when I looked up the word "cyber" in the UK space strategy, it came up six times, no more than ten. And this is quite worrying for me from my cyber background, because I know that cybersecurity is one of the major threats against space systems, especially when it comes to the ground, which is also on the ground and extremely vulnerable. But I can go into more into that later.
Speaker 8
Just in terms of time, I'm sorry. If you could move on very quickly, because I want to bring in Julia as well.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
Right. My last line on this point in terms of the national space strategy is that I think that there are other countries which are better articulating what they are doing about cybersecurity and space, and therefore demonstrating how seriously they take the issue of securing space.
Such as?
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
Oh, sorry, which countries? So if you look to France, they've got a space cybersecurity center.
They have central infrastructure which fosters collaboration, which articulates very clearly France is a country that has infrastructure dedicated to space cybersecurity. We have bits and pieces distributed all around different organizations in the UK, but they don't come together in one central infrastructure. CySpace plays a role in that, but that's a network, that's not a central government infrastructure. And another one is Germany, who very clearly state guidance for securing space systems. And I just mean this in a very literal sense in terms of what's available online.
You look up, they have pages and pages dedicated to space cybersecurity.
Matt Western
We could talk about this for the rest of the afternoon, I'm sure. Dr. Julia Balm.
Julia Balm
Right, so I'll echo a lot of what's been said already.
I suppose I'll start with sort of a broad threat landscape picture and then I'll go into the NSS and how it tackles it. But I think sort of generally, the greatest vulnerability that we're facing at the moment is that our increased dependence on space systems is not matched necessarily with enough investment or urgency and that we don't necessarily have enough response options at this given time. And sort of the pinpoint for that would be that it's both in terms of day-to-day services, but also when it comes to defense, and I'll also unpack that later. Statistically, 18% of the UK's GDP depends on satellite services. We know that for a day lost of satellite systems, space systems, it would be 1.4 billion pounds.
And the National Preparedness Commission estimated that space underpins approximately 450 billion pounds of wider economic activity. So we know that we depend heavily on space and we're only sort of growing in that. We've got approximately 12,000 operational satellites in orbit. The estimate is that that's going to increase to approximately 60,000 by 2030.
So we're talking about proliferation both sort of on a horizontal and vertical level. But yes, so when we're just discussing vulnerability, we're looking at the loss of these space systems. And as was sort of mentioned earlier, how do we actually measure those cascading effects across not only the space sector, but also all sectors that space impacts? A disruption to a satellite service can propagate and it can affect several sectors simultaneously. So the key question I think that we really are sort of trying to poke at now is are we designing space systems really to withstand disruption for either a short period of time or at a period of time that's incredibly relevant, say we are under attack, or for a longer period of time?
And do we have enough contingencies to also allow for continued access to that space service, whether provided by ourselves or by our allies?
So I think that's really the threat picture that I would paint. Moving on to the space strategy and how we've addressed that, I would probably begin by saying there's a real question of accountability because of that. When we look at space and how sort of a new domain cross-sits across multiple departments, it's really hard to place that responsibility and who's accountable for say when a service goes down or is lost. We've got obviously DBAS, MOD, even the National Armaments Director Group and, you know, all trying to work together on the defense elements, but then we're talking about sort of the cascading effects across other departments that are not necessarily waving sort of a space flag or even a defense protect and defend flag or mission. So that dispersed responsibility can also be a strength, but in some ways it really is something that we have to focus on for cohesivity.
In the National Space Strategy, there's that one-government approach that's been pitched. I think in follow-through and seeing that really be implemented would be great, but it's it's incredibly difficult for a domain like space, which has challenges of classification issues, to be able to share that information at a timely manner, we say sort of at the speed of relevance, within the UK, but also then to our allies in order to be effective at reconstituting.
Matt Western
Thank you very much for that. Lord Sewell, you want to come in, I think, briefly. No, you're okay. Lord Godson, you want to come in briefly.
Tanmanjeet Dhesi
Thank you very much, Chair.
Let's move on to hostile activity in space. And Mr. Marshall, if I can start off with your good self. To what extent are adversaries able and willing to disrupt space-based infrastructure that the UK is heavily reliant on? And in answering your question, if you could point to some evidence of what we've seen to date.
Will Marshall
Yeah, so obviously I think Ukraine again serves as the best example, which is where very bespoke few satellite systems were taken out by the Russians, jammed. And I think that the same would happen for UK capabilities in a situation like that. Look, this increasingly hybrid world where we're living with Russia doesn't look like—I mean, hybrid, I don't think does it justice.
Russia's going to take action on systems if they think that they are supporting Ukraine. We personally at Planet, myself personally and the whole company, are on their bad actors list and we're constantly trying to ensure that we're resilient against their attacks. I think the UK can't assume it's going to be, so that's why I was emphasizing the proliferated nature of this. The OneWeb system, for example, is a good example of how you get a proliferated system, but we don't have that in the ISR space. In fact, in the ISR domain, the UK mainly relies on the US, which doesn't always, isn't always there, but the commercial systems can be ready to provide that very quickly.
So I would say the most important aspect of it is leaning into these next-generation capabilities, which are by their very nature more resilient, and which the UK hasn't really leant into as yet.
Tanmanjeet Dhesi
Yeah, and I fully hear the point that you've made just now and previously on sovereign capabilities, and we've seen how Starlink being slowed down and restricted for Ukraine, the devastating impact that that has had. But if I can move on to yourself, Ms Hamill-Stewart, what do you think in terms of space-based infrastructure and the threats or disruption to that?
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
So I think that we're already seeing attacks to military ground infrastructure. So you'll be aware of the RAF Fairford incident and other kind of intrusions that we're seeing into ground defense infrastructure in the UK. Granted, it's not space yet, but it might be space next.
And I think that example that you mentioned with Ukraine is a really good one. It makes me think about the cyberattack against Viasat, which took place just before Russia invaded Ukraine back in 2022. And they specifically targeted Viasat's KA-SAT network in order to disrupt the communications of the Ukrainian military because they knew that that's what the Ukrainian military were using to communicate, and it put them on the back foot just before Russia invaded Ukraine. And this is quite well known amongst...
Preemptively.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
Yes, yes, preemptively, and it was with a political motivation. What's even more worrying about that case is that it ended up having wide implications as well, if you're not already aware of it.
It ended up impacting thousands of European internet broadband, satellite internet broadband users as well, including critical infrastructure. So I think cyberattacks like this demonstrate that not only is space infrastructure vulnerable, but as the UK becomes more and more involved in these military conflicts, we're already seeing evidence of the UK's defense and military being targeted in this way, physical access as well as cyberattacks. Why do we worry about physical access when it comes to space? We worry because the ground infrastructure is that central controlling, monitoring aspect of the entire kind of constellation and then the other dependent services. So the ground infrastructure of space systems cannot be underestimated in terms of its importance.
It also happens to be the most physically accessible. If you know where it is, then you know where to find it, you know how to potentially try and try and target it. Another thing that the UK's doing at the moment is potentially demonstrating some vulnerabilities which could be exploited.
One of those is very well known, is the disruption of NATS. So if you were trying to get a flight in the last kind of few weeks, you will have been disrupted because of this air traffic control architecture being disrupted by some tiny minute error which resulted in, you know, many flights disrupted. Somebody told me that Heathrow Airport was chock-a-block full of passengers. This is disruption. And I think that cyberattacks to space is especially concerning because when it comes to space, as mentioned, it's got all of these dependent industries that could be affected.
Airports could also be affected by disruption to space because airplanes need GPS to take off and land accurately. But it's most worrying because cyberattacks, including to space, especially to space, can really demonstrate an approach of a state, of a nation state, an adversarial nation state, to try and undermine trust in things working well.
And space is extremely important. We can't really afford for it to be disrupted just to demonstrate what people can do. And one of the reasons for that is all of these dependent sectors. I mean, if you look at the finance sector, it needs the timing that is provided by space services. So we're really at a very critical point where we're extremely dependent on space, but we're also demonstrating these key vulnerabilities in military architecture, which could then be transferable to the space domain, which, to be honest, worries me quite a lot.
Tanmanjeet Dhesi
Thank you very much. Dr. Balm, given what we've just heard, what sort of hostile threats in space should we be most concerned about, both sub-threshold and in the event of conflict?
Julia Balm
So I think it's incredibly important to look at the effects of sort of low-cost agitation and how that can have an outsized effect in the space domain. So like spoofing and jamming, certain actors can employ agitation tactics more easily than others. And I'd sort of position the fact that there's nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in space, where our space infrastructure is inherently linked to our nuclear infrastructure as well with C2. So the ability to escalate and de-escalate is quite distinct. I would also point to a couple of threats that I'm currently watching from the last week or so.
Right.
Julia Balm
Russia's satellite Cosmos 2612 on October 15th adjusted its orbital inclination to follow an ICEYE satellite, ICEYE-X36, to be approximately 26 meters away from it, which is incredibly close if you know the space domain. This maneuvering into or across low Earth orbit into a coplanar orbit is something that we don't usually see because it's extremely expensive to use fuel on such a maneuver, but this has only happened recently and it could be a signaling of some sort of intentions from Russia or it could be something that might amount to something related to a kinetic attack or even an electronic attack. On Sunday, just yesterday, there was an attempted arson of a SpaceX Starlink base in Lithuania, which sort of mimics what we've seen a couple of weeks ago back in Bulgaria and in Poland. And we talked about space-based infrastructure being under attack, but it's really important to look at the links alongside ground-based segments where it might actually be those low-cost agitation tactics of sort of burning a building that contains those receivers as as some way to gain sort of an outsized impact.
Tanmanjeet Dhesi
Okay.
Mr. Marshall, if I can come to yourself, what do you think we should be most concerned about in terms of hostile threats in space?
Will Marshall
Well again, I mean, you would have to look at all the systems the UK relies on and which ones are most vulnerable to this. But but the UK at the present has is is for a lot of its intelligence services completely reliant on the US. The US just turned some of these systems off for Ukraine. It's done it multiple times. The reliance on just that partnership is extreme in the intelligence domain, which is one of the key things that space is doing.
And which is why, I mean, 80% of Ukraine's satellite imagery comes from Planet and we have been there every single day for them. And the reason it's different from the Starlink situation is that we work directly with Ukraine. Our contract is with Ukraine government, not with the US government in the case of Starlink.
I think you've got to choose your partners wisely. You've got to have systems that are proliferated and you've got to have ways of working with multiple actors so that you're resilient. I think that that's possible. And then most of all, you've got to invest in systems that are sovereign. So I can't identify the specific ones that are most vulnerable at this second.
We could go do some research and come back to you on what I would think are the most vulnerable systems.
But generally the UK hasn't got almost any proliferated architectures that it could leverage today, even though they're readily available from companies that could provide that.
Tanmanjeet Dhesi
Yeah, please do send that information through. And lastly, if I may come back to yourself, Ms. Hamill-Stewart, on how much risk actually comes from potential cyberattacks aimed at satellite infrastructure?
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
So, a lot, because you can look at the potential kind of implications. There have been a number of attacks which I included in a paper I wrote, research that I did quite a few years ago. And there are attacks that have happened that were intercepted, but attackers were making their way through ground infrastructure to that kind of important admin kind of management kind of section. How can cyber risks escalate? There are many ways in which cyber risks can escalate.
If you're worried about satellites in particular, you might worry about, let's take it out of the defense context and think about a university spinoff, an individual organization that's got maybe a CubeSat in space. There's just a few students, it's a small company, they don't have loads of governance to manage their cybersecurity. They get intercepted and an attacker manages to gain, somehow gain control of their satellite. That's something that you really want to worry about because then they could, they could, I mean, in a really worst-case scenario, they could then crash it or collide it with another satellite. And then the implications of debris, you know, as well.
So I think that the cyber risks, they sound like they're virtual, they sound a bit kind of science fiction, but two points on that. Firstly, they can be cyber-physical. And cyber-physical threats has been a well-known, you know, topic area for many decades.
If you look at Stuxnet as one indication of this, you know, back on an attack on a nuclear plant many years ago. But also, they have the physical implications such as gradually changing the controls, coming in and understanding how infrastructure works, and then that gives you the information to then come back and conduct a stronger attack later. I mean, at the moment, I would say that quite often attackers probably, especially the kind of nation-state level attackers, have the capabilities to do more disruption than they are doing right now. And therefore, it's something to worry about because they probably have those capabilities, but they're just not doing it yet, they haven't decided to do it yet.
And the other thing that I would mention there is that hundreds of cyber attacks to space infrastructure are being reported through reports such as the CSIS, which I can provide more information on at a later time. Threats like ransomware, all of these cyber attacks that we're seeing to terrestrial infrastructure is also impacting space. And this worries us because we need it, so indeed attacks on ground stations, physical attacks on ground stations as well.
Dean Godson
Thank you, Chair. Just in the waning seconds of your presence, Mr. Marshall, if I... I've got a few more minutes, so don't worry too much. Like the UN peace talks, you can stop the clocks, you see, so we can beat the deadline. Just interested in, obviously you've flagged up the dangers of Ukraine, Baltics and so on, Russia being the obvious thing, but I just wonder whether you'd reflect a little more and indeed your colleagues, just who are the other threats from?
Speaker 14
Where, who, who are the dark horses? Just having been in Japan and just listening to the impact on them of China obviously and so on. I'd just like you to reflect in a little more detail on your latest assessment of those dangers.
Will Marshall
Yeah, I mean I would first jump to China, but also this increasing collaboration with Iran and other countries that might have lower risk thresholds to take action against systems. Because at least China has a lot to depend on on space, whereas Iran very little, you know? And so maybe they could use one another and work together in partnership in a way that is pretty destructive. The West is generally more dependent on its space assets than other countries. Russia pushed into a corner may do extreme things like, you know, as reported about the nuclear weapon capabilities that they have.
And something like that going off in space would be extraordinarily destructive for the entire space sector and all of the economy and security systems that depend on that.
But I would actually take this question rather in the direction that Jessie was talking about to do with cyber. I think the threats that we're going to see come down the line are going to be primarily AI-enabled cyber threats that exploit vulnerabilities that we didn't even know were there, just like we're seeing on conventional systems. And in fact, let me just take this opportunity to say that I'm compelled to say that I think this body and and this House should be spending far more time, it's priority number one, two, and three, on regulating AI. AI is at a point where its runaway capabilities that we just don't know how to control. We're already seeing them hack out of our containment systems during testing.
This is this is a threat to space as and everything else.
Just give me a couple of seconds to tell you, the systems that are hacking out like Hugging Face are now coordinating between hundreds of agents. One of the other things they're doing is specializing. Those agents are specializing so that they can pass things off. Coordination and specialization is exactly what distinguished humans from the rest of the animal kingdom that led to our dominance over them. We are at a point where in the last two years, we sit in Silicon Valley in the middle of the AI triangle with Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI, and we feel in the middle of that.
And space has a role to play, by the way, because we can provide satellite data that will up-level AI systems to have physical world understanding. That can be very helpful for security.
But where we're going next, in the last two years, we've seen a thousand-X improvement in the capabilities of LLMs, large language models. They've gone from just being able to roughly say a few sentences to being able to, literally a couple of weeks ago, win Fields Medal-level mathematics overnight. We're going to get another thousand-X in the next two years. We have no idea how to control that. And there are narrow risks to do with cyber threats that we are seeing today, the ability of AI systems to build bioweapons, and we've got to stop them.
But we've actually got a more generic control risk that I think people are just not understanding in the political debate. Everything about AI is about, are we going to lose jobs, are there threats to our cybersecurity, things like this, but we're facing a much bigger moment. We're facing an existential moment of whether or not we're going to give over control. Alan Turing in 1952 said that we will inevitably lose control, especially when they start coordinating, which is exactly the moment we're at.
And that was in 1952. I just say this because space, like every other domain, is going to be attacked by these systems. I think we will ex- I would expect that we will see more hugging faces that make hugging face look like a walk in the park, and they could attack our space infrastructure, but they could attack any infrastructure. And if we don't get our handle on managing AI risk, and I think this Parliament and this country can do stuff about that. The UK's AI Security Institute can be part of a verification system.
We with our satellite data can be tracking all of those data centers to know where to put those on-ground inspections. It is possible to verify AI treaties. We need clear guardrails and we need to then actually slow down the pace of development if we're going to be wise with this technology. At the present clip, there's no way we're going to be wise. We will see open source technologies doing hacks soon, I think, that will shock the world based on Chinese systems.
And I think that those could attack space infrastructure, they could attack any infrastructure. That should be priority number one, two, and number three for this Parliament until we get it fixed. And I know at the minute there's some sense that we can't slow down, but it is absolutely necessary to do that. It's the only way to be wise. And the Overton window is changing on that very rapidly.
It would be inconceivable to think about any sort of controls on AI just six months ago in the United States, but that has changed very rapidly. And you wait a few weeks or months from now, we're going to see events that will make, that will change the Overton window again, such that it becomes possible to really talk about proper controls on AI. So I agree with Jessie that that's the primary vector you need to be thinking about. Forget nation states. Russia and China are going to be small fry compared with cyber threats because of AI capabilities that are far more powerful than anything we've dealt with before.
So that's the trumping consideration for this and every other committee in this House.
Yes.
On that bombshell.
I suppose we can.
Paul Boateng
But an area which your company is well placed to assist us with because you're headquartered in the United States, you have satellite manufacturing operations in Germany, and you have an office here in London. And in the light of that, what's your take on the risks that we should be concerned about to supply chains for the assembly and deployment of satellites? And do you see potential, whilst the sovereign state is of significance, do you see potential for closer cooperation between the UK and the EU in this area?
Can we continue to rely on the United States in the way we do, to the extent we have in the past, given where the US is on so many issues at the moment? And you referred yourself to the experience you've had in the Ukraine. Can you help us with that?
Will Marshall
Yeah, well, firstly, I definitely think that the UK should be working in close collaboration with the EU, its most natural partner in security matters, given geography is the geography it is. And space is definitely part of that. And so I think the UK should really lean into those systems that it could share.
In preference to the US?
Will Marshall
Well, I, that's, I think it should do both ways. I mean, look, the US and Europe have a huge amount of alignment, especially against emerging threats between Russia, China, Iran, North Korea.
So I think it should actually work more with Europe. We've already rid our supply chains of any components that are from China and things like that. But our components come from all over Europe, all over the US, and we assemble the satellites both in California and in, in, in Germany. And those systems are dependent on supply chains that are all in there. But those aren't the vulnerabilities.
The vulnerabilities are how does the system work and is it vulnerable in space? And are those systems there when you need them? And I think, yes, in that context, the UK should be strong partners with other countries. And again, let's distinguish between the work with other countries. Ukraine lost Starlink because it was getting it via the United States government.
It didn't lose Planet because we are working directly with Ukraine.
The UK can take a lesson from that.
Yes.
Will Marshall
Well, I mean, I again, I refer back to the cyber threat. I think it's the biggest one that we face today because those things are going to emerge so fast.
Yes.
Paul Boateng
Suppose the US took a view that they didn't actually much like what you were doing. You're headquartered there, you're subject to regulation there. Couldn't they make life extremely difficult for you, as they have done through the banking sector and in a number of other areas?
Will Marshall
It's a very good question.
I think that is why we have started building up more capacities here in Europe so that we can provide capabilities to European countries that are independent of that. So by manufacturing, we have ground stations here in the UK, in other countries in Europe, and mission control systems here in Europe so that we, and then what we just did with Sweden, for example, is we're actually transitioning, we build and launch the satellite and then we transfer it to their control. So this is not subject to the US at all. By the way, most of our satellites aren't subject to shutter control because they're just lower resolution than the cap. But the point is you can have your own sovereign systems that are not under the jurisdiction.
They are national systems under national jurisdiction.
In other words, it doesn't.
Will Marshall
No, it doesn't in the necessary urgency. And again, this can happen really fast. The way the US changed the space sector was that NASA started putting 20% of the budget towards new players. 20% of the launch budget.
Sorry?
Speaker 21
You've gone to Germany to manufacture. Is that because Germany's done a similar thing?
Will Marshall
Well, they're certainly, we've been in Germany for over a dozen, 10 years after we acquired a small company there called RapidEye. And we have our mission control systems there, so we had a technical base to build on. Also, I hate to say it, but they're in the EU and we want to go after EU business. And if you're outside the EU, you have a much smaller probability of that and it's still in trade discussions.
So we obviously are going to put our biggest eggs in the biggest baskets. But we wanted to have an independent capacity to build, launch and operate our satellites. And this is not to despite the US. We're continuing to do that. We actually just doubled our manufacturing capacities in the United States as well.
There's so much demand from so many countries to have sovereign eyes. It's the first thing when you realize that the US may be backing out and saying, "Hey, you take more ownership." The first thing you want is more better eyes on what's going on so you can understand your threat environment, which primarily Europe has relied on the US for, and to be able to more accurately use the systems that you have. Ukraine has an information advantage because satellites have given it an information advantage against a conventional disadvantage.
And so we can provide that to Europe very, very quickly, to UK and the rest of Europe.
Paul Boateng
Thank you. I'm afraid I'm going to have to move us along. Dr. Balm, just if you can help us with this. How can we, and this is a defense-related question where you've done so much interesting work, how can we better protect ourselves in the UK in terms of our ground-based infrastructure and assets, both sub-threshold and in possible times of war?
Julia Balm
That's a great question. And I think to sort of tack on to exactly what Will was saying, I think it's important to look at the long pedigree of data-sharing agreements between the UK and the US that have historically existed and continue to exist.
And I think sort of the post-Brexit strategy is for the UK to remain its strategic autonomy, but also those transatlantic and European partnerships in sort of how they plug in. So my answer to that would actually be, I think what is really key is diversity as our resilience strategy. That we sort of make sure that we are able to reconstitute our assets because we've got so many alliance structures, bilaterally, multilaterally. There's a brilliant Kensington Treaty between the UK and Germany, and hopefully there's an MOU coming out in early 2027 with that. But we've got these strong partnerships that allow us to reconstitute our assets relatively quickly.
So I guess sort of a short answer on that is I think we really have to sort of embed ourselves within these allied structures.
We've got NATO, sort of this NATO-first posture that was announced with the Strategic Defence Review, but also making sure that we're at the table when something like the EU Space Act was written, but also the next sort of EU developments when the EU is tasking, with the EU Commission tasking, sort of defence developments in Europe, that we are at the table for those conversations to make sure that we are involved in the security architecture.
Paul Boateng
If I can pressure you on your knowledge of our ground-based infrastructure, where we launch things from, where we hold important technology, to what extent in your view is that safe, given what we've seen in recent times, that non-state actors or people operating on behalf of states can create enormous damage in ways that quite frankly we didn't anticipate?
Julia Balm
I suppose the loss of access to our spaceports, the one that we are investing in with the National Space Strategy is SaxaVord, which would allow us to reach polar orbits. One of the key risks is that we're no longer really able to reach equatorial orbits with a high-density payload.
So a really heavy payload would have to be launched through key allies like the US, where Falcon 9 provided us the ability to launch Tyche. We were also sort of planning on Juno and Oberon being launched with Falcon 9, but they're no longer accepting delivery slots post-2028. So losing our ability to access key slots. Now we will be able to access with SaxaVord a certain amount of space infrastructure, but it won't fully reconstitute. And the other option, the alternative, is Ariane 6, but that cost is not similar to Falcon.
Speaker 23
It is actually far more expensive, but also it doesn't sort of, it's not a reusable rocket.
And it doesn't have the capacity.
Helen Maguire
Thank you, Chair. And now we're going to move on to the UK's favorite topic, weather, but space weather.
So I wondered if the National Risk Register has said that the risk of severe space weather is between 5 to 25 percent and that it would have a significant impact. So I wondered if you agreed with that assessment and if you could perhaps describe to us what that impact would look like.
Julia Balm
Yes, just for some context I can provide. So the sun is active for periods of 11 years at a time, and we're currently situated right in the middle of that 11-year cycle, and that will be ending by the end of the decade. But because it's so active, it means it's really unpredictable. And so the timeline that we get for knowing that there's going to be a geomagnetic storm or radio interference can be either from sort of some data released weeks prior to hours, but even 30 minutes before. And when it comes to radio frequency interference, we don't really know the impact of that until it happens.
The event that sort of you're citing would be similar to the Carrington event, which was in 1859. And that was the most geo— that was the most intense geomagnetic storm on record, and we haven't faced anything similar to that. Obviously, we didn't have a satellite in orbit in 1859, so the effects of which would be really serious today. The problem now, as I mentioned, we're in this active solar sort of flare cycle, is that we— we struggle to be able to attribute whether that's a sort of natural threat or a man-made threat. So say, for example, there's interference in a satellite, which impacts our atmosphere, so our atmospheric drag, can we attribute that necessarily to being something that was a hostile activity with— with hostile intent, or was that something natural?
And we're— we're seeing that up until the end of— up to 2030.
Helen Maguire
And I— and I guess I just wanted to understand a little bit further is— is the difference between what might happen from space weather and hostile, but you said there could be some similarities.
So could you perhaps explain what some of the differences might be as well and just expand on that slightly?
Julia Balm
I can just give something brief and then I'll pass it on. But essentially, it allows for a degree of ambiguity actually, because it's a similar thing that happened with Starlink that was already mentioned by Will. When the loss of service happened in Ukraine, there's a degree of plausible deniability to say, oh, well, this is an this is something that we could not predict, this is something that we had no control over, it was actually a natural impact. And it's hard to verify that. It's kind of like if you know those locks that you put on your baggage when you go to travel and it dings with a little pop-up when TSA has opened the lock, we don't have anything on a satellite currently that sort of announces that you've been intentionally jammed or directly attacked, because it's impossible really to dictate whether or not that was a natural impact or not.
Will Marshall
I would only just say that these things are far from academic. During this solar maximum, part of the challenge was that the academic literature in this area didn't predict how big it was going to be. It ended up being more than twice as active as the normal 11-year period. So you have this 11-year period of activities, but this one went up almost twice as much. And so no one really predicted that.
And so people were operating their satellites too low because it excites the upper atmosphere, increases drag. So I have colleagues that lost two-thirds of their satellites. Two satellite companies lost two-thirds of their satellites in the first year because their propulsion system wasn't able to go up fast enough, so they got pulled down.
It's great that satellites are operating really low because it means they're naturally clearing from a space debris standpoint and it also increases resolution for a given telescope or what have you. So a lot of Earth imaging systems operate quite low and yeah, if you don't predict it, you can really lose fleets of satellites very quickly. There's none of that was intentional except for if you prescribe free will to the sun, but yeah, it was but it was it had a big effect.
Helen Maguire
And further to that point, what can your company do or what can the UK do to mitigate against the risks to satellites from adverse space weather?
Will Marshall
Well, I think the first thing is actually doing slightly better at the modeling.
So since then, we've actually updated some models that do perhaps predict these higher events. A second thing is radiation hardening. I mean, we really, for the nuclear weapons potential threat, I think we really should be leaning at eventually having radiation hardening of commercial systems, which, you know, Ukraine is pretty dependent on very commercial systems. It's not just that they're dependent on space, it's mainly that they're dependent on commercial space. As I said, we're 80% of the imagery being provided for them and something similar with Starlink on the comms side.
Those systems aren't radiation hardened like the GPS systems against a potential nuclear blast. It's actually not that hard.
It's an R&D project, but it's hard to expect the companies to just do that on their own for a hypothetical event that's a geopolitical thing, right? I think the country should come in and say, we'll help you with your R&D, share some know-how on how to do that so you can integrate that into your systems so they're less vulnerable at a system level to those radiation events. And that would help both the natural events and things like a nuke explosion in space. But I'd better go. Thank you so much and I'll leave a few cards here if anyone needs to contact me.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
Just to mention on the point there regarding whether it is a space weather event or whether it's a cyber event, from the cyber perspective, it's much less humiliating to say that we don't know the source of this problem.
And as has been alluded to, the implications of a cyber event can look very similar to space weather. So I think from a cyber perspective, you'll often see in the news that companies have encountered some kind of issue, but you won't as often say, we know that it was a cyberattack, this vulnerability was exploited. And actually access to that information about cyberattacks that happen in itself is a major issue. Yes, I just wanted to mention that.
Speaker 28
Thank you. Lord Arbuthnot. You want to come in? Can't hear you at the moment.
Speaker 27
Yes, thank you very much. Sorry about that, having difficulty unmuting. Can I come back to the 5 to 25% chance of the of a solar flare?
The Carrington event, which you mentioned, Dr. Balm, was originally classified as a one in one hundred year event until someone in government realized that it had happened more than a hundred years ago, and so they reclassified it as a one in two hundred year event. Does the same sort of magical thinking apply to the five to twenty-five percent chance of there being serious damage from adverse space weather in the risk register? And what is that figure based on? It's a wide range in itself, but is it accurate?
Julia Balm
I just can briefly caution against adding probability to catastrophe. I think there's something that we need to be quite hesitant about when we start putting percentages behind things like the Carrington event, but also like Kessler syndrome, quantifying Kessler or quantifying the red line in which we're no longer able to operate in space. I think once you've put a number on that, we can sort of walk ourselves close to it, or once you've sort of quantified or put a statistic next to the Carrington event, then we can sort of relax ourselves and relax our defenses against it. So I would just I would caution against it, and I would also cite it's very similar actually to deterrence. We don't recognize that there's been a failure until or you don't recognize sort of the the structure of deterrence until there's a failure.
And it's very similar in the sense that we sort of have to experience failures, readjust ourselves, and make sure that we have a sort of degree of risk baked into our sort of portfolios to to be able to adapt to adapt to them.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
Thank you. I would build upon that and I would say that actually, I would agree, you know, trying to put a figure on it, trying to say, you know, when will it happen? Any kind of meteorologist will tell you that you can't predict when a major space weather event will happen. You know, it's hard to predict. And I think that actually, whether it is a space weather event or whether it is a cyberattack, whether it's come through the supply chain, whether it was an error, the impact will be the same because of our dependence on space.
And I think resilience comes to having plans in place, expecting these major catastrophes to happen. What are we going to do when that constellation is knocked out? What are we going to do when we lose GPS or lose an equivalent or lose Skynet? What are we going to do?
I think having those resilience plans is really important. You have to kind of expect these attacks to happen. When it comes to cyberattacks, you know, what are we going to do? Are we going to wait for a major cyberattack to happen against Skynet? You know, is that what we're going to... I think it would be better to prepare for it and to have plans in place which also include mapping out of those dependent sectors and which sectors are going to struggle and how, you know, which kind of manufacturing sectors or wider will struggle if we see a disruption to space.
If I go back to the Jaguar Land Rover attack, you know, there was manufacturing that was stopped. People didn't have work because they couldn't keep on manufacturing, they couldn't keep the processes going because of the cyberattack.
These knock-on effects on the economy are really significant. And I think one of the ways in which you can be resilient is by having a, is by recognizing that there are lots of capabilities in the UK, in academia especially, which doesn't get mentioned enough in the context of cyber in the UK space strategy. There's a lot of capabilities in the UK in cyber and in space which could be leveraged and could be applied to the defense domain, could be pivoted into space and apply to helping to secure space and also, you know, help with the radiation hardening and other aspects that we've just heard about. But I think that there needs to be more support for individual companies to gain things like security clearance, understand what space even is directly from the government. And this could help to grow the space cyber and space security ecosystem in the UK.
Matt Western
And perhaps you could write to us just as a committee on elaborating on that point about how we can use academia more to cover the point you just raised. Lord Sedwill.
Speaker 34
Yeah, thank you. Sorry, yeah, you need to unmute us rather than us tapping away at the screen. That's the I think been the problem for myself and Lord Arbuthnot. Okay. Just a really quick point because you've answered most of what we were going to cover in this section.
We've heard from you about distributed approaches to satellites, all of the changes we ought to make potentially in the future, cyber, space weather and all the rest of it. Just briefly, the existing estate, if you like, of satellites, how vulnerable are they and can they be retrofitted to have any of these resilience capabilities you've been describing?
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
I'm glad that you've mentioned that because I think it's one of the elephants in the room is the fact that we're talking about, well, when you talk about securing space, especially from the cyber perspective, you, you know, and you talk about AI, you talk about the mechanisms that are being added to space to satellites today, you talk about hardening them more for weather events.
This completely disregards all of the thousands of satellites that are already up there in orbit, that are travelling sometimes at thousands of miles an hour, that you'd have to be very clever to gain physical access to and to retrofit any kind of measures onto. One of the big vulnerabilities of space, of satellites in particular, is that you can't walk around a satellite in the same way as you would a water treatment centre. You can't check for blinking lights and you definitely can't, you definitely can't add lots of things onto them. Even the ones, the satellites which are being developed now and being deployed, there are limits. They can't be extremely heavy and that's why there are discussions about, for example, orbital data centres and how they would actually be deployed, because there's still currently a limit on the compute that can exist on satellites in space.
So there's there are many vulnerable satellites already, and the threats and the risks that we're discussing in this room today will no doubt change, and in another 10 or 15 years, it could be that AI evolves in in this major way, which I I agree with Will on, or it could be another threat that emerges, because threats always emerge. You know, satellites that are being deployed or developed now, there are more abilities to upload software and to do more with them, but the satellites that are already up there in orbit, you just have to try and detect. And I think it really goes back to that point of resilience. What are you going to do when they are disrupted, rather than trying to do trying to rely on the measures that you've adopted to ensure that you've done everything you can to stop them from being intercepted? At the end of the day, we can't stop a space weather event from affecting them.
And so having the resilience in place and knowing how society would continue without critical space systems is is a really important aspect of this conversation.
Julia Balm
If I might just quickly add, and this sort of goes back to the first question slightly about looking at the space strategy. One of the four key technology areas identified there was in-orbit assembly and manufacturing. I think we are some years away from manufacturing as a component, but one large component of ISAM is rendezvous and proximity operations, RPO. And this allows us to be able to not necessarily walk around satellites, but be able to sort of adjust and update them. There's this sort of development of like gas stations in orbit, but I think the manufacturing moving into orbit is a natural development and it was a good step in the right direction to see that sort of recognized in the space strategy.
Speaker 34
So I can see- I can see that it- it should be possible, noting the physical limitations, from now on to be able to put satellites up that cover all of our requirements, that have the ability to have software etc. updated and are therefore designed to be more resilient, recognizing there are limits on that. How big a task would it be to essentially either retrofit or update or replace the functions that we already rely upon for satellites which have been- being put up there for decades? I mean, it seems to me that- that we can put up the Gucci new ones that work very well and are more resilient, but what about the old ones? What- how big a task would it be to replace them or- or- or retrofit them? Is it- is it even conceivable?
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
I mean, if you think about the scale of satellites, you think about how, as mentioned, this technology is we're not there yet. And then you think about how many satellites there are, and then you have to position them and you have to get to each one. It's not like going up to a car parked in a car park. It's like going up to a, you know, to the UK and trying to find where is each satellite being positioned is, you know, as if randomly all over the UK.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
To retro to retrospectively fit measures onto all of the satellites, I would say that's, the academic mind would say not entirely inconceivable, but extremely challenging.
Speaker 34
So this is what I'm just trying to this is what I'm just really trying to get to is we can talk about what we should do in the future, but we have a we have an existing estate that we have to consider on which we are completely dependent and your earlier points about wargaming resilience, what happens when they're knocked out are really well made because if we can't do anything about those, then that dependence is going to continue for the foreseeable future. Is that correct?
Julia Balm
Absolutely. And in terms of cost, if I may just to just to mention about the space strategy, it was announced to have 7.8 billion pounds attached to that strategy, but much of that was already pre-committed funds sort of packaged within it. Yes. It's a relatively modest budget actually. If we compare ourselves to where Germany is, they announced 35 billion euros to be spent by that 2030 deadline as well.
The lion's share of investment in the UK will be spent between 2030 and 2035. And so there's to some degree an assumption that we're going to have this large industrial, booming industry that's going to be able to deliver between the year 2030 and 2035, that will be able to be kept up to the year 2030 when that delivery is made.
Speaker 34
Uh, thank you. Yeah, there's a great deal going to happen between 2030 and 2035, it would seem, across almost everything for which this committee has oversight responsibility. So it's clearly going to be a golden period. Can I just quickly ask, institutionally, machinery of government changes, mergers, all of that, how well set up are we to deliver this?
Julia Balm
It's difficult. I think there's been a move with the one-government approach, but I mean, I myself struggle to identify the right person to go to, either within government or even Main Building. The seats don't remain hot for long, to guess sort of put it kindly.
But it's something that has been changing around quite a bit. I think there's been a lot of positive direction when we look at the National Armament Director Group and how Rupert Pearce has a space background coming from Inmarsat. I think that there have been movements that have been going in the right direction, but being able to see them pay off is going to take slightly longer time. I'm optimistic about a one-government approach and this cohesivity, but I would like to sort of cite that the UK Space Agency sort of moved back into the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology in April and then got sort of moved into DSIT shortly after. And now there's a co-director model.
And this all has happened within a really relatively small timeframe where there's been reshuffles of key people and key positions within that organisation itself. And that's just the UK Space Agency.
So I think there's positive steps in the right direction when we talk about cohesivity, but it's an incredibly difficult task to actually deliver on. And much of the space sector in the UK is sort of backed by either mavericks or it's quite personality-based where somebody really cares about a specific type of development in the domain and carries it forward.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
No, of course. I would echo that. And I think so one of the exercises that CySpace did last year was we went round and did a capability mapping exercise and looked at different capabilities all around the UK from down in Cheltenham down up to, sorry, all the way up to Scotland and Northern Ireland as well. And in each of these regions, we looked at what are the, you know, what are the capabilities, what do we have to deliver space and space security and space cyber in this specific region? And one of the problems that kept on coming up again and again was the fragmentation.
The lack of clear guidance. I'm not necessarily asking you to create a set of requirements specific to space, but just to provide a cohesive, clear idea of kind of what is space security, what is needed to ensure space security, and also guidance for how companies can participate in the space system. Because I think that in order to deliver this, you need more manpower, as it were, womanpower, but you also need it not just within government, you need to have that collaboration. If I look at cybersecurity and space and the current collaboration, it's not extensive. What I see across government and industry, the information flow is not extensive.
And therefore mechanisms are needed which allow industry to support this, because there are capabilities.
And I think there are certain barriers that get in the way, for example of smaller companies engaging and supporting such strategies. And one of those is security clearances, you know, adhering to the different security standards with defense. And I think if you lower those barriers and you make it easier for companies to work with government to help deliver on this strategy, on these suggestions that we're making, then you'll realize that we have significantly more capacity than you might think, rather than relying solely on, by the way, brilliant UK Space Agency team alone. It needs to be a collaborative effort, but then that comes with more funding probably, in order to incentivize people to kind of work together, but also more infrastructure. And I'm sure we'll hear more of that in a second about relating to the trade bodies.
I think we have capacity, but there needs to be more collaboration as well.
Matt Western
Very good. So just to revisit that last previous point about the systems that are out there that, as Lord Sewell was saying, may have been out there for decades. So we have these legacy systems, if we thought about it as a sort of computing software that is running half of government departments. These are satellites or networks of satellites which are more vulnerable to attack. Has there been an audit done, do you know, by government to establish what that legacy estate looks like and what needs to be done to update it or upgrade it to make it more secure?
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
I don't have that, but I would be happy to try and find it. But this does also demonstrate one of those barriers of collaborating with and gaining data from the government in that I would need to be cleared to a certain level even to have that conversation.
Matt Western
Right. Like doing an audit of what's out there and understanding where the dependencies are and so on.
Jessie Hamill-Stewart
I'm happy to include that when I write back about the academia. I'll do as much as I can to understand whether an audit has taken place.
Matt Western
Well, thank you in advance for that. If I can thank you both, thank Will in his absence officially for his participation as well. Really appreciate it. It's been an excellent session, very informative. So thanks for now and we will suspend temporarily while we change panels.
Thank you.
Order, order. We return to our inquiry with our second panel today as part of our session on space resilience. Can I ask panelists just to introduce themselves from my left, your right?
Elizabeth Seward
Good afternoon, good evening. I'm Elizabeth Seward. I'm the CEO of Supersharp. We're a spin-out company from the University of Cambridge.
We're now 38 people and we build thermal infrared space telescopes. My background, though, is working for BAE Systems and Airbus Defence and Space.
Stephanie Ayres
I'm Stephanie Ayres. I'm the head of policy at the UKspace trade association.
Robert Atchison
And Robert Atchison, managing director of ClearSpace UK, but previously space instructor in UK Space Command.
Matt Western
Terrific. Well, look, thank you for being patient, hanging on. We are running obviously slightly over, but if you can help give us distilled and as concise answers as possible, that would be very helpful as always. So let me just kick off really in terms of looking at the threat which we covered earlier.
We talked about the UK space strategy that was published on the, I think it was the 8th of September. How, how did you read it in terms of the, the ambition from, from within it and what it is committed to? You've heard some of the responses we've just heard. What are your observations? Perhaps Elizabeth you could start.
Elizabeth Seward
Yes, thank you. Um, I mean it was very welcome. Um, it was a sort of very well-rounded piece of work. It included civil and defense together, not quite the first time, but certainly the most coherent that we've seen it. From a personal perspective, it did put Earth observation back as a priority, which had been dropped in the one before, but is something that we have a significant reliance on, and so that was very good to see.
It is a strategy, and as such it sets out what we want to do, but it doesn't have the implementation alongside it of how do we get there and how do we do it. So there is definitely more work to be done. I see it as a good grounding and a good step one, but we have to keep going on how do we deliver that now, what timescales. It had budgets assigned, and you heard from the previous panel the comparison to Germany. So not significantly more than we were already spending, and a lot of that is going to Skynet and the upgrade of our military communication system, but still very welcome that we are going in the right direction.
Elizabeth Seward
I mean, nobody is matching Germany. 35 billion euros for their space program is a significant investment. But we are seven something, so we are very far behind that. And we're not spending it...
Elizabeth Seward
That's a good question. I don't have that figure to hand. Steph might when we get there. But France, I believe, are spending more than us still. And we're not spending much of that money until 2030 onwards, and so we're still doing the small programs and the step-by-step approach at the minute when we just need to be going faster.
And we have a lot of capability in the country that we could be using and we could be delivering for the national good.
Elizabeth Seward
Yes. I mean, we as a startup are on that sort of path to commercialization.
So we have our first two satellites launching next year and we have got there through excellent support from the UK Space Agency and the grant funding. And we're hitting that commercialization gap of now we're looking to sell them and to target government contracts here and abroad. But the sort of pot of money that we're looking at are not going to emerge for another three or four years and we are ready in the next six months.
Stephanie Ayres
Yes, we also welcome the strategy because it is the first time that they've tried to cohere across some government departments. And it's they've recognized that it's not just a scientific endeavor. It is actually a fundamental enabler of national security, economic growth, and the functioning in a modern society.
And the government is right to seek a more strategically focused approach and to, you know, recognize the importance of sovereign capabilities. However, the UK has many of the ingredients, but the delivery, I'm less confident about that. There wasn't much in there about the detail of how it's going to be delivered. And I do think we need to remember that this was a strategy for spending 7.8 billion pounds that had already been identified, allocated, secured. It wasn't a strategy that was going out into beyond 2030.
It was a lot of the money was going to be spent 2030-2035, but other nations are making their plans into 2040. And actually we are, but through the ESA lens, and that is a different thing.
And to talk about the French, I mean they have their own national space budget which I think is around just a little bit in excess of ours, but they spend the same amount again through ESA, whereas we don't. We spend a very our 7.8 covers also our ESA contribution.
Stephanie Ayres
Yes. And we are we used to be number four in in ESA spending and now we're number five. So we're actually going in the wrong direction with ESA spending. But as I say, this this particular strategy is looking at the the money that has been allocated and also for this spending review. Going forward, we would expect the MOD and and the Space Agency to work together to look to secure more funding along the lines of our peer nations to to deliver the strategy.
And and I would like to see more resilience planning in a future strategy. I think this one doesn't sufficiently cover that.
Stephanie Ayres
I think the priorities for now are clear, and it's to put us on a footing towards another place. And as far as that goes, it's successful. I would, I think the, you know, to Will's point made earlier on, the clear and present dangers now are slightly different and they will evolve as well. So I would like to see the strategy evolve to meet that. I would also like to see other government departments brought into the strategy because currently DEFRA, DESNZ, etc., they're not represented.
It's merely a strategy for Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade and the MOD.
Robert Atchison
Um, so I would say from my view, and I would echo everything that's already been said, but I see the green shoots of like grand strategy and the UK returning to it, um, in terms of, uh, its viewpoint, as Stephanie said, going past 2035. We we have clear KPIs to 2030, so I have the privilege of holding the UK active debris removal contract in ClearSpace UK, and so we are going to deorbit two satellites with the launch scheduled for 2029 from SaxaVord, which gives the UK as one nation in the world a full circle of capability: launch, operate, deorbit, and then potentially refuel as well, noting there's a dependency on on wider architecture.
But I do, I would come back to the space strategy is welcome in that it brings the national defense and civil space weather strategy together into one, which I think from a coherence, command and control at the start of any operation is critical from my previous life in the military. But then I also think sort of linking to that national resilience and what that looks like is so multifaceted. And I would say just from a previous life, our potential adversaries, the state sort of Russia, they train their military to operate without space. They accept that from the word go. And so I think having served in Afghanistan and places like that, we were heavily reliant on unencrypted GPS.
There was encrypted GPS for other things, but I do believe that when we come to these operations, we either have an assumption that we track and we assume, or we follow through and say we are going to fight for space and whatever that means.
Claire Tyler
Yes, thank you.
I'd just like to pursue this issue of government support and involvement, please. So could you say whether you feel that the investment, and clearly we've already heard that it's not on the same scale as a number of other countries, and the reforms in the space industry which are set out in the strategy, do they give you confidence that the UK will be able to build a sufficient space resilience and capability, that's both civilian and military? And could I just ask, in answering, could you just reflect briefly on the point which came across very strongly in the first panel about over-reliance on the US and whether you feel that we should be pivoting our investment more towards Europe and the UK industry?
Elizabeth Seward
Shall I kick off? Thank you. And I'll pick up on a question of the previous panel, which was could we retrofit all of our assets?
The UK doesn't have very many sovereign satellites that it owns and controls. We have four military communication satellites in the Skynet system. We have, I think it's now three Earth observation satellites. Potentially there are some more classified ones, except I'm not even sure that there are, but there may now be one or two. But we have a handful, potentially two handfuls of satellites.
So we really don't have very much infrastructure to secure or to retrofit, and that also means that we don't have very much to rely on if we lose access to everything else. I think Mr. Marshall made a good point about numbers count. That's very true, and we in the UK do not have them.
But it's not just numbers, it's also mixing data sources, different actors, different types of data. So Planet has optical systems, what you would take on your iPhone camera. There's radar available, which we can build in the UK and they have done so from the Airbus site in Portsmouth, but we don't today. My company's building thermal infrared, and those are just the three layers that you need for Earth observation. Then we've got communications and GPS, the timing and navigation system.
And so we have access to many of these through our allies. We have the ability to buy them commercially. But we don't as the UK have a sort of resilience plan and strategy of which ones we need to employ at which time and where can we get that priority access to.
And so resilience is all about what do we need to be able to rely on, as Rob said. And then who owns that? Who owns that capability? Who owns that delivery? What level of service do we need operationally and if there is some sort of problem?
What's the minimum we can operate successfully at? And I think those are the questions that we haven't asked ourselves yet as a nation and they're the ones that you have the challenge of answering in your report. And we are here to help you do that. But do I think as a country we can do it? Absolutely.
We have some world-leading capability in this country. We have amazing large-scale satellite manufacturing in the Airbus plants.
We have small companies growing, ClearSpace with its new contract, and others around the country. And we're really, really good at university spin-outs and building new technologies and doing R&D. We're not very good at getting those to commercialization, at supporting them through scale, and we don't have very many government contracts to actually use this amazing tech that we produce.
Stephanie Ayres
Um, I would like to build on what Elizabeth said because I think, and I'm going to actually call for, and I think we did in the submission, along with an audit, what we think for industry is that we need to have a sort of a national space resilience exercise and industrial preparedness program. It needs to be connected through the Cabinet Office and through Defense and BEIS, as well as, you know, sort of trade bodies and other relevant associations.
And it should have four elements. There should be some national dependency mapping, like Liz has described. We need to identify our critical services, their dependencies on space. And we've got to remember that all of our critical national infrastructure, including the grid, etc., all absolutely rely on space-enabled services. So they have to be mapped.
We need to map the vulnerabilities, the alternative provision, including second and third order dependencies.
We have all sorts of international allies and partners in that mix that we need to be aware of. They're probably good, but we need to establish that. We need to do scenario-based wargaming where we look at the loss of PNT or Satcom or Earth observation or ground infrastructure or spectrum and the data integrity, but we need to look at them under different durations and different threat conditions because something that goes out for a couple of hours is very different to something that goes out for weeks and might need to have a spacecraft put up to replace it. The third thing we need is industrial mobilization planning. We need to establish what industry can deliver in 72 hours, in 30 days, 6 months and beyond, including supply chains, personnel, launch capacity and manufacturing.
And commercial operators need pre-arranged pre-agreed arrangements covering prioritization, compensation, liability, etc, etc. I mean, the first time we use these integrated things should not be during a crisis. And then fourthly, we need the investment feedback. Where do we have gaps?
What do we need to invest in? And where do we need to go to your point with the US versus the EU, where do we go to get the help? Because what we don't want to do is replicate what the United States and Europe are doing. It would be unaffordable, it'd be unnecessary. But instead what we should be doing is identifying where the UK needs genuine autonomy and where it can develop distinctive capabilities that make us indispensable to those allies.
Because, you know, that is a very strategic thing for us.
We don't want to be replicating capabilities that lie elsewhere. And I would just say on the numbers of things we're looking at here, so NSOC, our National Space Operations Centre, tracks around 811 UK assets in space all the time. Now, of those, 640-something, I think, are OneWeb satellites, of which we own only 16%. Eutelsat and the French own the rest. So actually, the challenge of us auditing, you know, what we've actually got in space and working out what to do with it is not as big as it may sound, I don't think.
What we've... the challenge is going to come when we try and work out what to do about that. And that's Rob's job: repair, replenish, remove.
Are you sure?
Claire Tyler
Okay then. And in a word, can any of you just say, just in a sentence, would it be helpful for the government to be more interventionist in this area?
Speaker 58
Well, I fear there might be some overlap, Chairman, but I just want to carry on with this theme of developing resilient capabilities the government's developing and basically how can the government ensure that UK-based companies are best able to contribute to developing UK sovereign capability in space. Open to all three of you if you want to answer.
We know the government need to help, I'm taking that, but how best, what's the best way the government can help?
Robert Atchison
So I think one really positive thing is their Tech and Growth Alliance that's just been spun up, started up, which seeks to take IP that has been essentially put on the shelf from the Ministry of Defence. So this is previous pounds that have been spent and then it's got to a technology readiness level and now they're, we're seeking to commercialise that. Those pathways and that help is really important, particularly for the SMEs that spin out of it. The anchor contract, I can, I am very privileged to be able to say that I have an anchor contract from UK Space Agency to go and do active debris removal. But we are also keenly aware that that is, it's more than the contract, it's about establishing an industrial base from which we can grow from and then work, for example, with Elizabeth and others to put those sorts of sensors on there.
The one thing that I, I think I would just sort of add maybe to answer a previous question a little bit in terms of how we do this. We as the United Kingdom should probably be quite select in what we say our strengths and weaknesses are.
There is always space, and this is my military hat, for deception. And we as a nation, as Elizabeth said, will never have the, nor should we be replicating, but we can divert other people's attention to areas we want them to look at, which gives us freedom. And that could be the industrial base, but that could also be from a strategic perspective. And the UK's overseas territories are a great asset that I don't think we make full use of.
Stephanie Ayres
Well, I would just say that the UK Space Agency has a very good Unlocking Space For program. And it basically, that's where they do intervene and help other government departments, for example, you know, recognize space and use space.
But there are a number of things that we as industry ask for from government, such as predictable pipelines, you know, access to defense procurement, which is very problematic for space companies, small space companies. We want some more targeted scale-up finance and the protection of international market access. The EU Space Act and the Made in Europe efforts at the moment are really damaging us, and we need the government to lean into that. And then we need some strategic supplier assessments so that there are some companies, the government has put it in the strategy as around 10 million or able to make 10 million. We think that might be a little bit of a blunt instrument because there may be some companies that need to be helped because of their strategic capabilities rather than their ability to get to 10 million necessarily.
So, so those are the sort of interventions that industry would like to see.
Elizabeth Seward
Yes, I would say procurement and actually purchasing services or hardware or technologies. We do relatively well on grant funding, although I will note that the UK Space Agency grant funding programs are always hugely oversubscribed, which is often given as a isn't this fantastic. But actually it means that there are far more companies who could be doing great things if we had more funding to do so. And one of the consequences for this is the matched funding contributions keeps going up. And so as a small company you only get some sort of 60, 70, 80% of the grant, everything has dropped now to sort of 70.
And so you have to find that extra 30% which means you have to find investors and many of those investors are not British. And so then we lose control of the companies at much earlier stages.
And then when you get to a certain level and you're ready for commercialization, those procurement contracts either don't materialize or take a very long time. And as a sort of a small company with salaries to pay and a runway that you can see the end of, it's a very different situation than if you're a large systems integrator and it's just another project and it gets delayed by a year. And so this slowdown of defense spending with all of the reviews we've been doing has had huge impacts on many of the space companies.
Speaker 58
And we know that the government's looking to develop partnerships to ensure that it has reliable access to critical space-based services in the event of a crisis. Where should they be looking for these partnerships and how should they be looking for them?
Elizabeth Seward
I mean again when it comes to resilience, having that proliferated set of partnerships is also useful.
From my side in Earth observation, we're seeing a very strong push towards the High North and the Canada-Norway-UK alliance. Certainly as a company, I've been having conversations with other companies that it links into the government's strategy. And then Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the sort of the Five Eyes nations. The US is still a strong partner because they have such a wealth of knowledge and capability that we shouldn't discount them at this stage, but they shouldn't be the only one. And so it's kind of about spreading who we're working with and how.
And I just want to add one thing in case you don't come back to it on the cyber note. I know we talked a lot about cyberattacks in space and cyberattacks with satellites and on ground infrastructure, but also companies.
I've sort of talked to colleagues running small companies and we have had a significant number of cyber attacks on my company and also on others because space is seen as so critical. And so it's something that we work with Cyber Essentials Plus and there is some government support, but that would also be a useful area for greater support for critical industries because the how the attacks are happening are becoming so sophisticated and we have to have a constant sort of constant monitoring of who we're talking to and what we're talking to that it, you know, it's quite draining and it takes a lot of effort away from what we should really be doing.
Speaker 60
Thank you. I'm afraid we're nearing time and we're going to cease to be quorate.
Matt Western
Can I just ask you finally, and apologies to colleagues who won't be able to come in now, in the final minute, when it comes to SMEs, and I think Elizabeth, that's your business background, you started from a startup spin-out from maybe the university or research program. Just in two points, just what would, what could the government be doing, what can we do and encourage government to do to ensure that this great innovation culture that we have actually becomes commercialized in the UK? So Elizabeth, just to start, and then Stephanie briefly, and Robert.
Elizabeth Seward
More smaller, faster contracts for small companies with a higher risk appetite and a lower barrier to entry. And more support, and it is increasing massively, but faster into defense and how those small companies can access defense contracts.
Stephanie Ayres
Yeah, I would echo that, but I would also say, you know, continuity of those grants and that funding, no stopping and starting for reviews and, you know, etcetera, etcetera.
Robert Atchison
And then for, I think, using government to champion overseas, so DBT and things like giving us the exploitation route out of the United Kingdom and championing what is best. And then finally, I think the overheads are often what kills SMEs, and security is a big part of that. So having an infrastructure area where the likes of ourselves can go and work from, and you essentially pay for access, clearances are sponsored, and it being a useful location, so not sort of...
Exactly that.
Matt Western
Okay, very interesting. There were other points that we wanted to raise with you. Perhaps we can put them in writing and you could respond, if that would be okay. Sorry we've had to cut the time.
We were planning to finish at six, but we're unable to run over because we're going to cease to be quorate and we have to be for the for the committee. So can I thank you for your time and for the information you shared with us. That concludes our our second panel and today's session. Order, order. Thank you, colleagues.
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