Highways (Financing) Bill

29 October 2026

Highways (Financing) Bill Actual start House of Commons

Follow its sittings
16:38 - 16:40
Speaker 1
This session is now being broadcast. 
16:40 - 17:02
Speaker 6
Before we start to hear from our witnesses, do any members wish to make a declaration of interests in connection with the bill?  We will now hear oral evidence from the Centre for Policy Studies and Britain Remade.  We have until 2:35 for this panel.  Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?  Thank you. 
17:02 - 17:07
Speaker 3
I'm Ben Hopkinson, I'm the head of housing and infrastructure at the Centre for Policy Studies. 
17:07 - 17:13
Speaker 4
I'm Sam Dumitriu, I'm head of policy at the campaign group Britain Remade. 
17:13 - 17:15
Speaker 2
Thank you.  Greg Smith. 
17:15 - 18:07
Speaker 5
Thanks, Ms. Lead.  Good afternoon, gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us this afternoon. 

Clearly this is a bill of two halves, the specific stuff around the Lower Thames Crossing and then a pretty open-ended book for other projects going forward.  Can I have your initial assessment on whether this is the right model to both solve that question on the Lower Thames Crossing and actually getting it built and future trunk road projects that may be required or identified in the country?  Is this the right model?  Is it actually going to deliver value for the motorist and haulage businesses using the scheme?  Do we even know that it's going to deliver to certain metrics? 

No one can give us an answer yet on what the toll would be on the Lower Thames Crossing, for example.  Perhaps Mr. Hopkinson first. 
18:07 - 19:05
Speaker 3
Sure.  Yeah, I think I've got quite serious concerns about the regulated asset base model.  This would certainly be the first time it's been used for roads. 

And the main issue is that there's quite limited incentives for cost control within a regulated asset base.  So if you're the private contractor, you've got significant incentives to increase the capital expenditure on the regulated asset base to make it as large as possible because that means you get as large of a return to your investment as possible.  Now, the organization standing in the way of that would be the Office for Rail and Road in this case.  And they have never overseen a RAB before.  They wouldn't even be able to look at other organizations or regulators who have overseen a RAB for roads because there aren't any internationally. 

19:05 - 19:36

Ben Hopkinson

And we have a better model through concessions.

So France has built more miles of motorway this century than the UK has in total. They've done that through the private sector working through concessions. And under a concession, there are strong incentives for private contractors to keep their costs as low as possible because it directly impacts their bottom line, which is completely the opposite for a RAB model.

19:36 - 19:55

Greg Gregory Smith

Can you just expand on that a little bit as to how the example you've given from France, for example, could either be integrated into this bill or whether this bill just gets it so badly wrong on that front that it's going to end up costing British motorists more?

19:55 - 20:44

Ben Hopkinson

Well, so the bill is focused on a RAB model and delivering that.

So it's a completely different setup to use a concession model. And there's a second challenge with RAB in so far as the DfT doesn't bear really any of the costs either. So that's why you get them doing things like banning diesel construction vehicles for the Lower Thames Crossing. That's a policy goal that they have otherwise that doesn't actually lead to a better overall road. It's a kind of example of everythingism where they've got plenty of different goals and none of those are necessarily delivering the best road project for motorists at a very reasonable cost.

20:44 - 21:09

Greg Gregory Smith

I'll bring you in in just one second. Just on that point of the banning of diesel in the plant to construct the Lower Thames Crossing, do you have an assessment of how much more that will add to the construction cost, which will ultimately come out in the eventual toll that people are charged to use it? And are there any other things you have identified that are going to put the cost up?

21:09 - 22:08

Ben Hopkinson

I don't have a specific number for it, but clearly it's a kind of regulation that might lead to a different form of construction than they would have chosen if they were purely going for value for money. And then across the piece, the Lower Thames Crossing has been racked by planning delays, which I'm sure we're all aware of.

So it was designated a national priority project in 2011, and it took 14 years, 360,000 pages, 300 million pounds to actually get planning approval. And that all adds cost. When it started the project of going through, it was projected to cost about 4 billion pounds. And then international events got in the way, and it's now projected to be over 10 billion. So moving quickly does really save costs, and our slow planning system has been a real driver of added cost here.

22:08 - 22:11

Speaker 8

Thank you. Mr. Dumitriu.

22:11 - 24:33

Sam Dumitriu

I was just going to add, I think cost control is one of the most important issues here, because if you look at road building generally, the big problem in the UK is we have a very large construction cost premium.

So Britain Remade has looked at 345 infrastructure projects across the world, 121 of those were road projects. So the UK on average pays about 65% more to build a given mile of road or railway. It's a bit less for road on average, but when you look at more complicated projects like the Lower Thames Crossing, it tends to creep back up. And if you look at, you know, many people often dismiss our problems around infrastructure as a problem of just too little money going in. But if you look at how much the UK spends on infrastructure, we spend, I think it was over the sort of past five years or so, a period that does include COVID but also includes years either side of it, we spend about £308 per head on government public infrastructure investment.

You'll see in France it's more like 271, in Germany it's about 251. But when you account for this cost premium, we end up getting about £180 worth of what the French or the Germans would get. So that for me is the number one problem. And you look at something like the Lower Thames Crossing, you have seen about £300 million on the planning process. That's if you added together the world's longest road tunnel built in Norway, and you add together also a tunnel built 282 meters under the sea, you'd just about reach that.

You know, they're building much, much more complicated projects for much, much less.

And you can talk about how it's more difficult to build due to UK geographical or geological issues, but fundamentally just those front-loaded costs make it very, very difficult to build anything cost-effectively. And I think because of that, there's a risk that this model essentially is adopted as a way of taking some of those costs off the books without the right level of scrutiny.

24:33 - 25:32

Greg Gregory Smith

That's helpful. And the last question from me is that clearly within this bill, it is predicated on tolls being charged upon completion for use to to create that that payback. Where do you think, you know, you've clearly looked at France, you know, I know from bitter personal experience driving to the Alps at Easter just how much you pay at every toll booth.

Beautiful roads, but hundreds of euros to to travel that sort of distance on a single trip. Where do you think the British tipping point is on how many more roads that that could be either built or there's some concern in this bill road charging could be expanded to other roads through through some of the wording of it. Where's the British tipping point on that where without major change to fuel duty, road fund licenses, etc., the economy would actually bear it?

25:32 - 28:17

Sam Dumitriu

Well, so I think one of the things is that we've seen a lot of major road projects cancelled recently. The road investment strategy, the first one, was much more ambitious than the ones that followed it. Part of that was due to COVID, but now that we're out the other end, we are seeing a reduced ambition in terms of road building. Road maintenance has gone up a bit, which is positive, but at the same time, we're not building those projects. I think it's important to look at which kinds of projects are appropriate for tolling.

Bridges make perfect sense. Tunnels make perfect sense. Things like the big issue is in America what you see is you see lots of additional lanes built where they have their own toll. You probably couldn't do that based on our geography and the amount of road infrastructure we have. When you're adding a superfast lane on a seven-lane motorway, that kind of works.

It doesn't really work here.

But clearly there are lots of bottlenecks and there are lots of opportunities to finance things via tolls. I think the question we have to ask is as fuel duty revenues decline because people switch to EVs, is there going to be the same impetus to put money into the roads? We currently don't get a very fair deal for the motorist in terms of they pay a lot in tax but they don't see the same return in terms of road building, the money tends to go a bit into the general pot.

Now whether that's a question where you want to say hypothecate that revenue, that's one thing, but road user charging does at least get round the question of politicians attempted to use infrastructure money in general and put it towards primary spending, you know, your day-to-day spending, whether that's things on the NHS or, you know, 100 pound here to deal with the cost of living, etc. That means that long-term infrastructure funding does need some way of insulating it from those and so that's the advantage I see of tolling. The problem is, I think motorists will only bear it or accept it if they are confident that they are not being hit by all these other taxes and they are getting something genuinely new in return. I don't see many motorists complain about the Silvertown Tunnel and the Blackwall Tunnel being tolled because they've got new infrastructure and traffic has, well congestion has fallen. I think it would be different if it's a tolling an existing road without a noticeable improvement.

28:17 - 28:18

Speaker 9

Anything to add, Mr. McLennan?

28:18 - 29:42

Ben Hopkinson

Yeah, so I think there's nothing kind of inherently wrong with user-charging. I mean, it's kind of quite sensible that the people who use an infrastructure asset and get the benefits from it pay towards its construction and maintenance. I think the challenge comes in when you look that we already have quite high fuel duty, and it's higher than solely the kind of carbon output combined with what we spend on roads and maintenance. So if fuel duty was solely for mitigating the externalities of carbon emissions combined with upkeep, maintenance, and addition on new roads, it'd be around 35p rather than about 52p as it is now. So fuel duty's already higher than purely what the kind of economic impacts of roads and emissions are.

So if you kept fuel duty where it is, or if you cancelled out this 5p cut that has kind of perennially promised to be scrapped, and you added road user charging on top of that, I think that'd be quite a significant burden for motorists to bear. But ideally you'd see new infrastructure being funded through some form of road user charging, because the people who drive get the benefits from it, and I think that's only fair.

29:42 - 29:45

Speaker 10

Thank you. Minister.

29:45 - 30:26

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Thank you, Ms. Buck. Good afternoon, gentlemen.

Mr. Hopkinson, you've sort of expressed your concerns about the limited incentives for cost control, I think presumably in mainly in the construction part of the scheme, and obviously we're talking here about the Lower Thames Crossing. The Bill does give the ORR sort of the ability to set license conditions on economic allowances, expenditure controls, and actually sort of does provide for the investors to make a reasonable return. Those are safeguards that are set out. Do you not consider those sufficient? Would you like to see something in addition to those?

30:26 - 31:43

Ben Hopkinson

Well, I am well aware that there are safeguards and the regulator is tasked with ensuring that there's not kind of runaway cost control. But the thing is, the ORR has never done this before. No regulator has ever done a RAB for a road before. So there's a real risk there that if they set the return too high, motorists are paying significantly more.

If they set the return too low, then no one's going to want to invest. So while in theory the model makes a lot of sense, I'm a little bit worried about the practicalities of the ORR accidentally setting a rate too high or too low. I know in other sectors where you have rates set by regulators, there's often risks, especially when there are macroeconomic shifts, like higher interest rates, for example. Regulators are sometimes slow to update to that. So there's concerns there, whereas a concession model, as used in France and around the world, I think there are much better incentives there for the contractors to keep costs down because they're the ones bearing it, not the potential motorists.

31:43 - 31:50

Justin Piers Richard Madders

But you would accept in that model, you know, there is no control from the regulator.

31:50 - 32:52

Ben Hopkinson

Well, there is a little bit of control and there's also obviously the market pushback. If they set tolls too high, people simply won't use the new asset. So there, in that circumstance, the private constructor is bearing the revenue risk of setting it too high. And then there's also the model, well, the kind of overall agreement that the concessionaire strikes with the state initially. And then one other concern that I have about the RAB is that there's no, not necessarily a sunset clause.

So in France, it's very common for roads to return to public ownership after about 60 or 70 years.

There's a chance here under the RAB that there's no sunset so they are permanently away from from state ownership. I know that the bill does provide some sunset clauses if they impose them, but that's not the default here. So that is another concern that I have about the RAB model.

32:52 - 33:24

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, as you quite rightly point out, there are a number of opportunities for licenses to be to be terminated. And I'd just suggest that risks on revenue for too high a toll charge would apply equally in this model as they would in concession models. But can I just ask Mr. Dumitriu about the planning delays? Obviously you've set out significant costs and delays on that.

In terms of the Lower Thames Crossing, is it your understanding that those risks are now passed?

33:24 - 35:55

Sam Dumitriu

Well, in some cases, in general it appears so. But you have seen some cases, for example, not in roads, but in energy infrastructure, where you can have a DCO passed, you can have construction underway, but then you can encounter further planning-related delays. So, for example, the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station, most expensive nuclear power station the world will ever see, potentially. That, one of the issues is after spending around seven hundred million pounds on fish mitigations, they are still in the process of trying to get their permit, which unlocks kind of the final phase of construction.

And if they don't get that permit, they then have to apply for a DCO variation. So there can still be planning risk even if you address the sort of upfront challenges. Hopefully some of the changes within the Planning Infrastructure Bill around EDPs, if they start being rolled out much further than the initial pilot, and also changes to judicial review potentially, which can delay some of these things as well. So that's the hope.

In terms of the the point about safeguards, I think one thing to sort of be slightly less pessimistic than Ben, one advantage you have with the ORR that you don't have with say Ofgem or Ofwat is with National Highways you have a state-owned body that has access to cost information. What you tend to see with these other sectors is very is a lot of opaque because it's fundamentally people in industry paying very very expensive economic consultancies to produce very very lengthy PowerPoints to tell you how much something should cost. If you have National Highways building both toll projects funded via a RAB, but you also have you then have that information which should allow you to sort of see through some of the maybe excessive claims around costs that you can see in other sectors. So that is a positive. However, you still have the fundamental problem of the RAB which is you have slightly less of an incentive to keep costs down unless you have very very good information and you have a regulator that's very very on it.

35:55 - 36:01

Speaker 12

Okay, well we hope the bill will address those concerns with us. Ollie Glover.

36:01 - 36:21

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

Thank you, Ms. Lowes. So I think both of your organisations and many others have highlighted how the UK isn't great at delivering infrastructure quickly and efficiently. So do you believe that this bill has the potential to accelerate the delivery of major road projects in its current form?

36:21 - 37:34

Ben Hopkinson

Sure, yeah. So I completely agree that the UK has a kind of long historical challenge with delivering infrastructure cheaply and quickly. We have the highest... well, HS2 is the most expensive railway ever built. Bakerloo line extension will be one of the most expensive underground lines ever built.

Tram lines are double the cost here as in other European countries. We've got the most expensive nuclear power plant ever built. So there is a real long-term failure to build infrastructure quickly and cheaply. On this bill, I think it's good that we're getting private financing in. I think that will help ease some of the burden on the state when we're already pushed up against our fiscal limits.

As I've already mentioned, I have a little bit of concern about the incentive structure here, especially insofar as the private constructor has incentives to escalate costs as much as they can get away with under the ORR. So there are concerns there.

I think a concession model might work a little bit better here.

37:34 - 39:23

Sam Dumitriu

I think one of the important things when it comes to infrastructure delivery is ensuring you have a pipeline of projects, that you know what you're going to be building next and you can plan appropriately. And we have lots of reasons why in the UK those pipelines get knocked about. Sometimes you have a road that you want to build, everyone wants it built, but someone has brought a lawsuit against the road and it's delayed by a year, and that makes planning for that really, really challenging. In one of the other problems is sometimes those delays then mean you get pushed into different funding windows. Treasury can reopen conversations around value for money, particularly when, you know, pretty much every budget someone's trying to squeeze things into the fiscal rules and, you know, moving things from one period to another period, cost-saving measures which are really delays.

Things like that tend to happen and they've happened for, you know, forever basically. Now, one of the things I thought that was really impressive under the last government was the Road Investment Strategy approach, essentially saying, look, we're going to set out a strategic case for all these big roads we want built, we are going to give a pot of money, and then we're going to give a delivery body the freedom to then execute that. Now, their freedom to execute that was slightly constrained by the planning system and all of those delays, but fundamentally that's a very, very good approach. The challenge comes when the money isn't quite there from the public purse, in part because the fiscal situation is tighter, but in part also because different choices are being made. So in that case, private finance can fill the gap and ensure that you have much more of a stable pipeline.

So I'm in favor of that aspect and I think that will speed up delivery.

39:23 - 39:24

Miss Osborne.

39:24 - 40:11

John Tristan Osborne

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. The French model which you've cited as an example as a template, 91% of roads are owned by privatized companies, very different to the UK. They are extremely controversial. Many accuse companies in France of price gouging. We've got concerns around the asset management in terms of the valuations around those.

So you've said that the RAB model isn't a potentially an ideal model, but surely can I ask, is there any element of the RAB model which you could say is better than the French concessionary model? And what teeth would you give the regulator to make it so if we were to go down that road?

So what is missing effectively from the RAB model which would make it a more effective model?

40:11 - 42:54

Ben Hopkinson

It's a good question. I think first off, in the French example, I'm well aware that it's quite expensive to drive on a French motorway. But on the other hand, they've got many, many more miles of motorway. And if it's too expensive, you can take the kind of equivalent of an A-road for a certain journey. But judging by the number of people that drive on a French motorway, people are generally willing to accept the costs, especially given that they've built many more miles of motorway just this century than we have in total.

I think when it comes to the RAB model, the main challenge, I think, and I could be disproven if this works really well, but it's just the sheer uncertainty of whether the ORR is up to the task. I mean, it's never done this before, whether it has the right staff in place. I know that there's already been some concerns about capacity issues within the ORR, also just general commercial experience. I would be concerned if the private sector has kind of large commercial control contract teams and the public sector doesn't have them and is then out-negotiated.

I think that's certainly a possible thing if civil servants aren't able to actually properly push back at price price increases. So the the fundamental incentives in a RAB model I think aren't right for delivering a kind of once one-of-a-kind unique infrastructure. Works a lot better for infrastructure that has like a very clear unit cost. So how much does it cost to lay 100 meters of pipe for example? That's really good because a regulator is clearly able to understand how much 100 meters of pipe costs to lay and then can apply that across its base.

Whereas how much does one Lower Thames Crossing cost? It's really up in the air and some additions that the private contractor will add might seem sensible. They might get away with that.

Certainly having kind of a more environmentally friendly construction process seems on the face of it sensible, but that also adds cost. I'd be reassured that the ORR is up to the task and has the both the capacity and the know-how to actually properly understand the arrangements that it's entering into.

42:54 - 44:58

Sam Dumitriu

Thank you. You mentioned price gouging and I think it's important to work out what the main risks are. So roads are in most cases natural monopolies. And the best thing about being a monopoly is a quiet life. So it's not necessarily that you have all these opportunities to gouge your customers, but it's that the lack of competition means you're not forced to adopt cost-saving measures.

It means you're not forced to become more customer-friendly, etc. So you might have a situation where various people are claiming quite high margins or they're being kind of aggressive in that sense. But the UK kind of in its has the other problem where people aren't as, you know, really on it around cost. They're not working out what the best structure is in terms of ensuring that costs keep falling.

And when it comes to I think Ben's point on one thing that might be a way of resolving this issue, it's probably beyond the scope of this bill and it'd be quite a radical reform. But I've always wondered whether it makes sense for the UK to have Ofgem doing essentially RAB regulation for energy networks, Ofwat doing it for water, ORR potentially doing it for road and rail, Ofcom for telecoms, or whether it makes sense to have a specialist economic regulator who deals with the costs of natural monopoly networks. And that would have a bunch of advantages. Potentially it would resolve some of the revolving door problems that you might see. It would also ensure that there's a similar expertise and a standard approach.

What you don't want is varying approaches between all of these regulators because that probably suggests that they're doing something wrong when you have essentially the same economic problem to solve. But as I say, that would be far beyond the scope of this bill.

44:58 - 45:01

Speaker 16

Thank you. Alison Griffiths.

45:01 - 45:02

Thank you very much, Chair.

45:02 - 46:55

Alison Louise Griffiths

I just wanted to build on some of what the shadow minister was talking about in terms of tipping points, and this is a question for both of you, so feel free to take in whichever order you prefer. But whilst the shadow minister was obviously referring to things like fuel duty, I'm acutely conscious that the cost base of this of the Lower Thames Crossing project is going up and and as yet unknown, and we don't know what the toll is going to be.

And if you have a situation which we do at the moment where diesel is at two pounds a litre, the sustainable version another fifty p on top of that, the costs of the build are going right up, but also the costs that everyday haulage companies and everyday individuals are having to manage within their own household budgets and corporate budgets are going up. If you don't get the, if the cost goes up to a level where actually there isn't the right balance of pricing that is commercially viable for the operator but also absorbable for the family or the business, what happens then?

What examples are... I'm sort of worried about a white elephant across the Thames at the moment, or that in those circumstances that actually in the end all the cost does get absorbed by the taxpayer and this model goes up in smoke. I'm just really keen to hear from you how concerned I should be about that and what alternative models we've seen elsewhere.

46:55 - 47:57

Ben Hopkinson

Well, I think the ultimate backstop is the Exchequer here. Already the Exchequer has had to bear the cost of bringing the Lower Thames Crossing through planning and is expected to spend about 3.1 billion pounds on the Lower Thames Crossing itself before the private investment is actually brought in.

So if there comes a circumstance where the kind of toll isn't paying back what's what's kind of necessary and the concessionaire, or not the concessionaire, the the private body that's financed the road falls into difficulty, it is within the bill the Exchequer is able to top up or provide payments or guarantees or low-cost loans. So the backstop is ultimately the taxpayer combined with higher charges for for motorists on the road.

47:57 - 48:30

Alison Louise Griffiths

So do you think we should actually be putting greater stipulations on how costs are incurred? And again, this is going back to some of what the shadow minister was talking about, that there should be a stipulation within the bill that insists upon, whilst safety is absolutely paramount, that this this road isn't over-specified and that things like the use of sustainable diesel isn't a necessary part of the bill.

Should we be putting that within the bill?

48:30 - 49:08

Ben Hopkinson

I'm not sure if that would be an appropriate thing for the bill itself, but it would definitely be an appropriate thing as we go on and actually are constructing and working with both National Highways and whatever private company wins the contract to be trying to make it as low-cost as possible.

And that's making sure that the Office for Rail and Road is set up properly to be able to oversee the costs that are being put through.

49:08 - 49:58

Sam Dumitriu

No, I was just to say it is worth remembering, however, that there is a... sorry, I always think it is worth remembering, however, that the families who may be paying higher tolls to cross either the Dartford Crossing or the Lower Thames Crossing, that in the absence of a Lower Thames Crossing, they are bearing very, very high costs too. And particularly in terms of freight, we have traffic between two of our major ports, really, really crucial for the whole wider freight economy, really, really big problems there.

So I think it is worth remembering that, you know, these these projects should be made priority and that they do need to get built ultimately.

49:58 - 50:23

Alison Louise Griffiths

So just coming back to something that Ben just said about how he doesn't think that we should be stipulating cost-effectiveness, I'm paraphrasing to be fair, cost-effectiveness within the bill. I think my challenge back on that is why not? Because if I if I sit and look at the effectiveness of regulation in other sectors, you know, I come from a private sector background.

50:23 - 51:04

Emma Lewell

Order, order, that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the committee to ask questions. On behalf of the committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence. Thank you.

We have until 2:55 PM for this panel. Could the witness please introduce themselves for the record.

51:04 - 51:14

Thomas McLennan

Sorry, just sitting down. Hi, I'm Thomas McLennan. I'm Director of Policy and Public Affairs for the British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association.

51:14 - 51:49

Greg Gregory Smith

Mr McLennan. Thank you, Ms Law. Good afternoon. Grateful for you being here this afternoon. Impressed in your bio that your organisation is responsible for a significant number of vehicles on British roads at the moment.

So the obvious opener to that is what is the reaction from your customer base to the change to a RAB model for the Lower Thames Crossing and potentially other projects in the future that might mean more toll roads on the British strategic road network?

51:49 - 53:35

Thomas McLennan

Yeah, thank you for the question. So for wider context, we have over a thousand members and between them they have about 4.6 million vehicles representing about one in ten cars, one in six vans, one in six trucks on UK roads. And our members own those vehicles, but other people use them. And right at the core of the problem with almost any measure or change of this sort of scale is the technical detail. And I perhaps that's not as interesting as the macro questions around how things are funded, etc., but it's what really, really impacts us and everyday users.

And what we've seen with a number of major changes in how road funding and wider funding happens, for example, the EVED scheme, is the technical detail hasn't been considered up front. And that's led to huge stress for the sector and potentially administration bills in the hundreds of millions. So what we want to see in any change of this scale, especially if it's going to encompass an expansion of barrierless charging to more current barriered toll operations, is we want to see that technical detail guardrailed in right from the start. Because at the end of the day, what we really want to see is sort of good user experiences, but also good business experience for both our members and their customers. It's in no one's interest to really have a system which is bureaucratic or challenging, leads to abrasion when you're reducing the barriers for exactly that kind of thing, to reduce abrasion.

But if you're just moving it elsewhere it doesn't really meet its purpose. So what we're very keen to see is make sure that this is as technically guardrailed as possible to make sure that end customers have a good experience.

53:35 - 54:47

Greg Gregory Smith

Okay, within that, I mean we had a question, I don't know whether you heard some of this morning's evidence, we had a question this morning around if you're going to have barrierless tolling, should there be some sort of national scheme where it's a single login as opposed to every scheme having its own charging mechanism?

And in answering that, can you equally give your thoughts on the impact that will have not just on schemes built under the RAB model proposed in this bill, but all of the other road charging we already have? For example, here in London, the congestion charge, it's dressed up as an environmental scheme, but we all know it's just road charging. Equally other schemes that are popping up, arriving at my party conference in Birmingham, asking a passenger in the car to quick panic, look up whether I've got to pay this new clean air zone or whatever it might be. Should it actually, is one of the things you're looking for in that answer something that simplifies the experience for the British motorist across schemes built under this model as well as everything else?

54:47 - 56:01

Thomas McLennan

Short answer, yes. Longer answer is consistency is key, you know, not just from, a lot of the burden in this model and in any of these kind of charging models falls on the registered keeper.

And I think to exactly your point, Greg, of needing a passenger to pay, not everyone has a passenger, right? And you have lots of instances where people don't pay and there're inconsistent lengths of time that you have to make that payment. It might be 24 hours, it might be six days. You might have inconsistent rampings up of charges if you don't pay. It might, you know, how that charging is framed is structured, the portals you can use, it's all, it's all varied.

And the more you can create a sort of national framework for individual specificity, I'm not saying everyone has to be exactly the same in exactly what they're delivering, but you need to have the same guardrails and structure which enables someone to have consistency of experience and enable, you know, fleets to advise their customers who might be running, you know, grocery stores across this country, or it might be a tourist who's arriving at one airport in the north or an airport in the south to be able to train their staff to be able to give consistent advice, consistent experiences.

To have every scheme having its own approach could be deeply challenging, yes.

56:01 - 56:42

Greg Gregory Smith

Okay, my last question to you is clearly, you know, your organization sits across your members who equally supply the vehicles, would be in trouble if the number of vehicles on the road starts going down. Have you done any modeling on where the breaking point, the tipping point, call it what you will, would be in terms of on top of existing fuel duties, this new 3p a mile for battery cars, for road fuel, road fund licenses, etc., where the tipping point would be in terms of the overall volume of additional toll roads that this bill could enable?

56:41 - 57:31

Thomas McLennan

That is a very good question, but I'm afraid we haven't done that modeling, but we definitely can look into it. I think the more pernicious point for us is the more points of friction you have in your usership, the less likely you are to be able to make the usership work for you. And what we've seen, unfortunately, even great measures in London, the level of friction is what's meant that some car club companies have had to fold in the city. It's challenging to operate where you have split, every borough having its own rules, all those interactions being deeply challenging.

So the more consistency and then we can have a sort of strategic vision as to how to deliver within that framework is a much stronger approach to enable the investment from ourselves and from their customers to to be able to keep mobility moving in this country.

57:31 - 57:33

Speaker 20

Grateful. Minister.

57:33 - 57:52

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Good afternoon. So obviously you've said a little bit about how consistency across the country would be helpful for your members. I just wanted to just take you one step back really. Is the sort of principle of barrierless charging something that that your organization would support?

57:52 - 59:18

Thomas McLennan

So we've had very mixed experiences with barrierless charging. So I don't think we can give a a pure version vision on that right now. We've had some use cases where there isn't even the ability currently to transfer liability to someone who has hired a vehicle, the operator doesn't allow it. And then you have other instances where you can do bulk upload, the system works really well and and it's a smooth sailing effectively.

What we always see is that the removal of barriers means a lot more penalty charge notices. And that does obviously make sense because previously you have to pay to get across and then the barrier's removed and lots of people don't pay. And therefore there is a sharp increase in penalty charge notices and all our members have reported that to us. Now, the question is what happens after that? And the inconsistencies mean that you can then have a sort of duplicative effect of enormous administrative burdens on everyone involved which, you know, have to be paid to make that work.

Look, so what we would say is from the get-go, if we're going towards barrierless charging, which we understand has congestion benefits and all that, then you need to do it in a way that you don't just shift that burden of someone paying at the barrier downstream to someone then having to figure out how to transfer liability, how to, you know, chase up removing people's ability to challenge the fines because they've just been paid, you know, all those things we need to look at from the start in the bill and structure it there.

59:18 - 59:27

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Okay. So the regulation-making powers in the bill will hopefully address those concerns if there's adequate consultation as we move forward.

59:27 - 59:46

Thomas McLennan

So I do have a concern that there is too much emphasis in the bill on sort of downstream consultation that we want to see right in the bill a requirement to enable things like the transfer of liability because it hasn't been consistent in the market today. So we need to see that embedded from the start.

59:46 - 59:48

Speaker 22

Thank you. Ollie Glover.

59:48 - 59:50

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

I'm all right, thank you, Chair. Defer to other colleagues.

59:50 - 01:00:37

Emma Lewell

Okay. If there're no further questions from members, can I thank the witness for their evidence and we will move on to the next panel.

Thank you very much. We will now hear oral evidence from the Office of Rail and Road and National Highways. We have until 3:35 for this panel.

Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record?

01:00:37 - 01:00:51

Will Godfrey

Good afternoon, my name's Will Godfrey, I'm Director of Economics, Finance and Markets at the Office of Rail and Road and leading our preparations for the licensing arrangements and regulatory framework that you have under consideration before you today.

01:00:51 - 01:00:58

Matt Palmer

Good afternoon, I'm Matt Palmer, I'm the National Highways Chief Exec for Lower Thames Crossing.

01:00:59 - 01:01:04

Speaker 26

Thank you very much. Good afternoon, gentlemen, appreciate you giving your time today. Can I ask, within the significant new responsibility this Bill would particularly give to the Office of Road and Rail, is the organisation suitably equipped to take on a new licensing regime, particularly in terms of a skill base that has looked at other parts of the world that have gone down a RAB model, or other sectors that have gone down a RAB model, as well as having that interactivity with road users to ensure that this doesn't leave room for...

01:01:56 - 01:02:06

Greg Gregory Smith

I'm not saying anybody would want teething projects, teething difficulties, but we know that that does happen when big change comes about.

01:02:06 - 01:04:03

Will Godfrey

Yeah, so this is, we don't underestimate the significance of this work. This is important work. This is work that I think does build very significantly on the experience that we've got both from rail and from road. So our interactions on the rail side cover both publicly and commercially funded infrastructure managers and operators as well.

And a number of examples I could reference there, but for example the work we do on the price controls for the high speed link down to the Channel Tunnel, interactions with international passenger operators looking to expand operations there. On the road side obviously we've got the experience that we have as the monitor and organization responsible for holding National Highways to account. So we're certainly looking to build on the engineering, economics, finance, operations and also consumer policy experience that we have across both road and rail. I myself started out in economic regulation just over 25 years ago. I've worked in the water sector.

I've worked in telecommunications for a number of years, including overseeing the arrangements that led to the rollout of superfast broadband amongst others. And a number of colleagues have also worked in other sectors spanning aviation as well as water and other sectors.

I think your question about the risk of teething arrangements is obviously well-placed. I'm confident that we've got the lead time here to build in the necessary arrangements and resourcing to get ourselves ready for the new arrangements. I think one of the important things to bear in mind is of course that the regulator's role takes place once a license has been awarded. So any license, for example, for the Lower Thames Crossing, the first such scheme under the as would be enabled by this bill, is one which is some way off yet. And the process for awarding that license is currently sitting with the government.

But we're in discussion with the department around our future resourcing to deliver this work.

01:04:03 - 01:05:18

Greg Gregory Smith

I'm grateful for that answer and it's not a criticism of anyone in the ORR right now. But as we see with so many projects under whatever model they're built, things are unexpected, things don't go according to plan. And often hindsight is that wonderful thing, oh I wish we had just dot dot dot. What preparation work is the ORR doing or what additional resource does the ORR need from government, from the Department for Transport, to be in a position where the Lower Thames Crossing as the guinea pig for this new model won't end with those oh I wish we had dot dot dot questions being asked, which might be very significant for constituents of Mr. Dixon's who might suffer from unintended consequences, much as they clearly from what he's said want the Lower Thames Crossing and that's not a point of political difference, could end up impacting.

Could end up impacted if the regulation and the licensing regime doesn't work as ministers in good faith expect.

01:05:18 - 01:07:12

Will Godfrey

Yeah, I wonder if I could take two parts to that question. So I think one is where we're at with, for example, the Lower Thames Crossing. So I know there's a lot of debate about the risk of cost overruns and so forth, but I think one point I would make is this is not a new project. This is one which is already very significantly advanced. There's been significant work, and perhaps Matt will talk to it in a moment, around preparation, literally the groundwork to get this project ready.

So it's not a completely new project.

That comes with the advantage of, I suppose, if you like, some of those teething issues already happening. In terms of the ORR's capability, so as I say, what we're doing at the moment is we're working closely with the department, looking at the arrangements that might apply to, for example, the licensing arrangements. And I think that's probably one of the important points that I'd want to stress here, which is that the bill as it stands, I think, is enabling and gives us the duties and I think the powers that we would want to see. I think the really important thing for making a lot of these schemes work is that the licensing arrangements are the right ones, that you've got the license conditions in place to properly hold the company to account, to scrutinize their delivery, not just on construction, but also on operation and in respect of their approach to tolling and so forth.

So in terms of having the resource in place to do that, so I'm currently working with a a small team. We're looking at the the suite of skills and capability that we anticipate needing across, for example, corporate finance, around supporting the stakeholder group that is an important part of this of the of the bill, around the engineering and operations capability as well. But as I say, we've got the I'm confident that we've got the lead time to get to get in place the the team that we need and as I say, we're in discussion with the department as to the the resourcing necessary to secure that.

01:07:12 - 01:08:13

Greg Gregory Smith

But within, I mean, you mentioned construction in your answer and this is a question to both of you.

When organizations are considering regulation, licensing, just any factor around the construction of anything at all, but we'll take the Lower Thames Crossing as the example today. Do you need much greater freedom within that to license something along what many would call common sense principles, certainly when it comes to cost control? For example, I think it's all pretty obvious that the banning of diesel in construction plant, for example, is going to make the project more expensive. Where do you actually sit, both from experience of other projects and looking forward, on factors like that where you might actually find yourself in a difficult place between what government wants, what the ultimate licensee wants, and having to find a happy medium on that?

01:08:13 - 01:09:05

Matt Palmer

Shall I start? So, I'm a historic mega-project constructor. I've done many big projects across the world and in the UK.

So let's talk about diesel and the cost of diesel. So it is part of Lower Thames Crossing's requirements which were set in 2022 for us to be constructing to carbon neutral and actually ends up with us being in line with the sixth carbon budget. So that has been a requirement in our project. We have executed it. It is in part of our development consent order.

It is required by now by law and by statutory through the development consent order. And the vast majority of our diesel has been replaced by HVO which we're currently paying one pound seventy for per litre. And so it is a cost that

01:09:05 - 01:09:13

Greg Gregory Smith

Just to confirm that's plus VAT in in to for people watching out there that think diesel's two quid a litre.

01:09:13 - 01:09:30

Matt Palmer

It's one pound seventy. Yeah we pay one pound seventy. Our contractors do not pay VAT on it.

So it is a cost that is is marginally over a current diesel cost, but what we're actually seeing is it, yeah, we ran a competitive process and it was competitively bid on that on that form.

01:09:30 - 01:09:34

Greg Gregory Smith

But it is more expensive than diesel.

01:09:34 - 01:09:54

Matt Palmer

It is comparable to diesel and actually what we're seeing is the total operating cost of some of our equipment, which we're starting to bring out, is cheaper, so the electric equipment is actually cheaper per total operating cost. Which is actually what you'd experience in your EV etc., yeah, that's what the user is using.

01:09:54 - 01:10:03

Greg Gregory Smith

Does the equipment exist out there to build the Lower Thames Crossing purely on battery electric?

01:10:03 - 01:10:07

Speaker 28

No, it doesn't. No, so that's why we're using HVO and electric.

Did you have any comments, Mr. Godfrey?

01:10:07 - 01:10:14

Will Godfrey

So I think Matt has covered the construction side of things. Was there a part in your question around license arrangements?

01:10:15 - 01:11:14

Will Godfrey

So in terms of the construction of this particular project, of course, as I say, the way in which you hold the company to account is in relation to what's in the license. And I think it's important perhaps to draw a distinction between what's in the development consent order and then what's in the license. The regulator's role is not to hold the company to account on the DCO, that remains subject to the separate process for scrutiny and delivery of that.

What the ORR will would be doing under these arrangements is holding the company to account on the on the license itself. The the first, if you like, price control settlement is one that would be set by the department as part of a competition toward the first license. So I think those would set the, should we say, the commercial terms, the expectations around allowed revenue and so forth. Then the ORR would come in as the regulator at the start of the price control, holding the company to account against that, monitoring and scrutinizing the delivery against the the relevant milestones on the construction.

01:11:14 - 01:11:16

Speaker 29

Minister.

01:11:16 - 01:12:06

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Thank you. Good afternoon. So you probably heard the earlier witnesses express a little skepticism about your ability to sort of deal with the potential cost inflation, exaggeration, whatever whatever word you want want to sort of use.

But would you say because this is obviously a project which you've both been involved in from its inception, particularly in terms of construction, you're obviously running the existing crossing so you know what the running costs are, what the maintenance costs are, that the scope for being blinded by PowerPoint for want of a better description is probably more limited than it could be?

01:12:06 - 01:13:41

Matt Palmer

So should I talk about... So Lower Thames Crossing has been developed over the last six years in detail. I think we're now in 2026. Our development consent order fixes that scope very tightly. We can't build any more, we can't build any less.

So the scope is very well known.

We're now running at 90% designed, so we literally are fully designed and it's been competitively bid. So and it is operating, you know, we're currently on site with 3,300 people and operating well against that very defined piece of scope. And it is, I'm afraid, just a simple road. My colleagues back at base will kick me for that, but it is as a project, it's a simple thing to build. We're not building a complex signaling system or a control system for a nuclear power station.

We are just building a simple dumb asset. And so our ability to control that and historically control on road construction is very good. If you then take a similar project, which would be something like Thames Tideway, which is a similar model in terms of a RAB-based model, executed again a simple, and this is no disrespect to the colleagues who built that, but again another simple dumb asset. These are simple projects to build.

They are large, but they are simple and we know how to build them in the UK. So the cost control on it is predominantly driven by the fact that we know what we're building and we know what price it costs.

01:13:41 - 01:14:38

Will Godfrey

I think I'd reiterate the point about the development consent order does tightly define the scope of what's being delivered. And as Matt has said, the project's already well advanced. I think just a few other points to bring out perhaps. I think the importance of getting the cost forecast right, which underpins the, if you like, the allowed revenue for the first control period, that's really, really important. That's the baseline against which you're holding the company to account.

The instruments thereafter are what you specify in the license, and that's really important to get right. So that's not, if you like, stuff that you put in the bill, but it's really important that you get it right in the license, that you've got the right incentives for the privately financed entity to be delivering against that schedule, making sure that the balance and the allocation of risk is right, and making sure that end users are ultimately protected from those risks of cost overruns. But as I say, this is a project that's fairly well advanced already. It's not like we're talking about one from scratch.

01:14:38 - 01:14:41

Emma Lewell

Thank you. Olly Glover.

01:14:41 - 01:15:21

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

Thank you, Ms. Low. Over the decades, we've often heard the wisdom that private finance is better than Treasury because it helps to keep things off the Treasury books and avoid constraints in public sector financing.

But with some of those private finance initiatives, the whole-life cost can end up being quite a lot higher and be a burden to the taxpayer in a different way. So what metrics do you feel the government should use to determine whether alternative finance arrangements deliver better value for money for individual road schemes rather than direct Treasury funding? Yeah, what criteria should there be for deciding that?

01:15:21 - 01:16:21

Will Godfrey

I mean, I think the ORR's role as envisaged under the bill wouldn't be advising on those questions. I think that would be probably more of a question for to address to government.

To address the government, I think one thing I would say about the cost of financing, which is perhaps relevant here, I think it's important to take account of the risk-adjusted cost of financing. You've already made the point about whether things are on balance sheet or not. I think perhaps one other point to bring in is just the perhaps the certainty around the funding and the delivery arrangements. So one of the points I would bring out about RAB-based price controls is that they are a commitment, you know, to a certain cycle of typically five-year reviews in which you set the funding requirements, the price control limits, what's delivered within that period, and you reset each time. But the point is it's not one that then is potentially subject to government reopening the arrangements for the funding, which is sometimes encountered in other publicly funded arrangements.

But I think that's as much as I'm able to say, really. I think it's more of a question for government, that one.

01:16:21 - 01:16:28

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

Any thoughts from you, Mr. Palmer? You're using your rich and wide-ranging career experience.

01:16:28 - 01:17:06

Matt Palmer

I mean, if you talk specifically about Lower Thames Crossing, its strategic case is incredibly strong and it's brought forward by government to be built because of the broader economic benefit for the country.

How then government chooses to fund it, there are a mixture of models. There's been a discussion about concessions and RAB-based models earlier. They all carry the same kind of carrot and stick for driving cost performance, to be honest. And, you know, in the end, it's a decision for government to bring a project forward. Whether it's strategically of that nature, then this bill then allows you to fund it.

01:17:06 - 01:17:47

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

Just a very quick follow-up from something you said earlier, Mr. Godfrey, about the importance of the license and getting that right. Okay, you perhaps can't answer, but maybe let me ask the question in a slightly different way.

With the Railways Bill, there was a debate about how ancillary documents referred to by the bill was quite important to see them alongside the bill as part of considering it, because they do have quite a lot of implications for how the bill would operate in practice. So would you view the license and the also the code that the ORR is stipulated with creating the bill, would you view those as operationally critical to how the bill would actually be implemented in practice?

01:17:47 - 01:19:07

Will Godfrey

I think perhaps one distinction I would draw with the Railways Bill is I think the Railways Bill is so significantly concerned with the creation of Great British Railways, which would be responsible for something like 75% of all traffic on the network, clearly in a, if you like, kind of not quite to the whole market, but very significantly the market. And so therefore the license for that entity I think is of course one where understandably people are really, really keen to see what the arrangements are there. Of course, in the case of the present bill, this is one which is enabling and I suppose economy-wide, where clearly the main project we are talking about currently is the Lower Thames Crossing, but in principle there are a number of other licensed entities that could be out there.

So I think that is one distinction that I would draw. I think as to the essentiality of a particular license therefore to be able to inform scrutiny of a bill, my feeling is this is a bill which gives you as a regulator the kind of duties, functions and powers that you would kind of expect. I think in terms of the, as I say, the license clearly there is work to be done there, but I think one of the advantages, you know, these are licenses that will be put out to competition, to competitive tender. I think that provides a different level of scrutiny from for example the arrangements there is for the Railways Bill in which this is a license which is kind of if you like awarded to GBR as the given entity that would be receiving it.

01:19:07 - 01:19:09

Speaker 31

Mr. Osborne.

01:19:09 - 01:19:49

John Tristan Osborne

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Um the recent independent regulatory review of the ORR gave a section specifically around the Thames Crossing. It indicated that um in 5.5.8 that there are resource concerns. It says there are however likely to be gaps such as those related to construction phase price controls, project specific engineering and commercial expertise. Can I just draw you out because I know you indicated that you said that you had confidence around this. Obviously this report was just published last month.

Can I just get some clarity, are you saying today that that that is not entirely right and that you are confident that those three aspects that they've raised, you're confident will be covered going forward.

01:19:49 - 01:20:39

Will Godfrey

Um well look we we very much welcome I think that that independent review of the ORR. It's always helpful to have that sort of outside in look and scrutiny.

And in terms of those, I think what I'd describe as gaps, the other point that Dr. Richard Judge did bring out was it's not like we're building from scratch. So this is about providing incremental capacity rather than one of starting from scratch. And I think he was right to draw out those as the areas where you would want to make sure that once you have your, you know, once you've got past Royal Assent, once you've got the first license awarded and once you're into the start of the first price control, so if you like a long way from today, that you had those gaps filled. But I think the point I'm making is that I'm reasonably confident from the discussions I've been having with the department about being able to resource to those, as I say, what I would describe as incremental gaps rather than being ones of starting from a blank sheet.

01:20:39 - 01:20:42

Speaker 32

Thank you very much. Thank you.

01:20:42 - 01:20:43

Shivani Raja.

01:20:43 - 01:21:14

Shivani Raja

Thank you, Chair.

I think it's been really clear today that cost control is a crucial element in for the success of this project. I'd like to kind of just understand from you both that should safeguards be in place within the regulatory framework for motorists when there are situations where unexpected charges arise or if there's excessive costs, for example?

01:21:14 - 01:21:16

Speaker 34

Shall I start or do you want to?

01:21:16 - 01:21:17

Nothing's better for you.

01:21:17 - 01:22:58

Will Godfrey

Okay. So I think, you know, at its heart, the regulator's responsibilities here would be about furthering the interest of current and future users.

So I think those are exactly the kind of considerations that would be right at the heart of the way that you approach the regulation, the way you set up the instruments, by which I'm referring there to the license specifically, and then how you hold the company to account against that license. The first set for the first control period, you know, this is a license in the case of the Lower Thames Crossing would be awarded by the department. So I think the particular set of, if you like, sort of tolling structure and level of tolls would be one which is set through the department through that competition for the first license. Thereafter, the way that the ORR operates, so I think, you know, the reference to the code which the ORR will be responsible for creating around the approach to tolling arrangements will clearly be important once you are sort of past that first point. So absolutely take my feeling is the arrangements necessary to provide the protections to end users around, for example, tolling, toll shocks and so on, I think in terms of the enabling legislation to me feel about right.

I think what's really important is is absolutely what's then in the license and of course what what we'd put into the into the code and then in turn obviously how the company company responds to that. So hopefully there's a virtuous circle where you know there's a clear signal of what's expected, we then hold the company to account, they then deliver it and implement it and then we take the feedback from the market. If you're I don't know if you were anticipating perhaps a a different concern but I'll pause there just in case I've not answered your question.

01:22:58 - 01:23:03

Shivani Raja

No no that that's fine yeah. And would you like to add anything to that Mr Palmer?

01:23:03 - 01:23:17

Matt Palmer

I think it's beyond my you know National Highways we're here as an operator and as a constructor. I think the I think Will's probably answered it properly sorry. Thank you.

01:23:17 - 01:23:18

Speaker 35

Mike Reader.

01:23:18 - 01:24:01

Michael Reader

Thank you, Chair. Matt, you've already answered my first couple of questions in that the legal requirement around climate was set in 2022 in the DCO, the original DCO, and that the requirement to use alternative fuels than diesel is not a significant cost driver on a scheme of this scale. But I was wondering, and I'm reflecting on a conversation that you and I have had previously, the cost impact and the impact generally on the project of delays caused by uncertainty in finance, and whether a bill like this coming forward would enable future schemes as well to have certainty of financing arrangements and therefore get to get on site and get delivered quicker. Is that a fair assumption?

01:24:01 - 01:24:57

Matt Palmer

I mean I think all of us recognize that annualized costs on major projects, especially mega projects, is very difficult to deal with. They drive perverse cost behaviors where you're trying to fit through a 12-month window. And government is currently moving with the sort of mega projects piece towards a more envelope-type conversation. This is just another extension of that. You end up with a cost envelope that you're working within, which is with an age-driven timeframe that you have to deliver to, which then allows flexibility to execute, you know, depending on the weather, etc., at the right time.

And it's that flex that you need to be able to execute efficiently. If you're constraining yourself on cost every year for a budget, as an example, which is quite common, it really does drive cost.

So this model does give you that flex that allows you to drive an efficient construction project.

01:24:57 - 01:25:13

Michael Reader

And for those who are concerned that the price of the scheme, capital cost of the scheme continues to rise, and it has risen since I was first involved in it many years ago, what mechanisms have you put in place specifically with your contractors to drive down cost in delivery?

01:25:13 - 01:26:02

Matt Palmer

So the base cost of the scheme, which is the cost without inflation, has been fixed since 2020. This is the great thing about a development consent order, the scope is fixed. We're building the same, we're still building 52 bridges, we're still building 22 kilometers of road, and we're still building 4.3 kilometers of tunnel. That essentially, the cost difference between now and previously is essentially driven by inflation. So you've got great cost control sat there inside the development consent order.

The contract is then our contracts with our contractors then drive to that same scope and that same control. And then they they have a there's a pain gain share on there. So they're driven they they get into pain if they exceed and they get they get incentivized to to deliver below, which is very normal with any project of this scale.

01:26:02 - 01:26:20

Michael Reader

And Will, in I don't know if you've heard earlier evidence, but there's obviously some thoughts around how the ORR needs to scale up and strengthen to deliver this. I mean, have you got any reflections and how what have you fed back to government about what the ORR need to be able to do its role effectively on this project?

01:26:20 - 01:28:04

Will Godfrey

Um, so hopefully my earlier answers go to go to some of that. But I think if if your question's very specifically about the the scope of of what you've just asked of Matt, I think for us what what's important is that the the arrangements both around how what will be LTC Co and its relationship with its contractors and then in turn what it's allowed to charge to end customers is not a simple pass-through type arrangement.

I think that's really, really important. You need to make sure that there are the right, should we say, sort of liability caps in relation to the pain-gain sharing. Are those at the right level? Has LTCO, or any company licensed under these arrangements, let's concentrate on the LTC example, have they got the right incentives to be able to control the relationship with the contractor? And then what, as I say, we need to do is to create, and this would be through the license and the price control arrangements, arrangements in which there remains that discipline to control those costs, so it is not a set of arrangements in which, beyond a certain threshold, if you like, ultimately end users are ultimately on the hook for costs pass-through.

I think the importance that the Bill places around efficiency and economy and that being at the heart of our duties, I think is one that both we would take really, really seriously and very much welcome, because I think it then gives us the authority to be able to, if you like, act on getting to those kind of price control license arrangements. And of course, as I was saying earlier, that said, you know, the first price control arrangement is of course one that would be set through by the Department through that first competition for the first license. But in terms of how we operate on it thereafter, that is absolutely kind of what we would be looking for, which is making sure that there's not just a simple mechanistic pass-through in the event that costs overrun, whether it's for inflation or other cost shocks.

01:28:04 - 01:28:06

Speaker 37

Douglas Lumsden.

01:28:06 - 01:28:25

Douglas Lumsden

Thank you, Chair. We heard from an earlier panel, and what was said was that operator has limited, limited incentives for cost control, and they also said costs off the book without any sort of level of scrutiny. Do you understand what they're talking about in that, or?

01:28:25 - 01:29:14

Will Godfrey

I'll make a start. So I think, I think the without any level of scrutiny is one that I think I would take issue with, certainly as I would see the arrangements working. So we've had good discussions with colleagues at, in fact old colleagues of mine at Ofwat in terms of the arrangements they had, for example, for the Thames Tideway Tunnel. And there, both the rhythm, so by which I mean the frequency of reporting, monitoring, and scrutiny of costs during construction, the importance of having a dependable and expert independent technical assurer on the costs, I think is really, really important to making sure that you've got that right level of visibility and scrutiny. So I think I'd question the nature of sort of unchecked costs.

I'm not denying that cost pressures will arise, but I think that's the whole point of having the arrangements like an independent technical assessor.

01:29:14 - 01:29:23

Douglas Lumsden

And in terms of limited incentives for cost control, is that true or not true? What is the incentive for the operator to keep the costs down?

01:29:23 - 01:29:57

Will Godfrey

So I think the, and maybe I'll go to both costs and schedule actually. So I think there are instruments that you can bring in through a license around, for example, cost-sharing rates, that then mean that, and it was the point I was trying to make earlier, which was you don't necessarily design a price control so that the moment there's a cost shock, it just goes through to end-user prices. So cost-sharing arrangements are one example. You can also bring in thresholds to make sure that the company's incentivized to remain on schedule as well.

01:29:57 - 01:30:04

Douglas Lumsden

And if an operator in the future wasn't making any money, was then going under, who would then step in?

01:30:04 - 01:30:06

Speaker 39

Would it be yourselves or...

01:30:06 - 01:31:27

Will Godfrey

Well, I think the... so before I think we got to that point, I think it's worth bearing in mind whether there are other potential investors willing to buy out the company that was struggling. Because there might be particular reasons as to why it... maybe it wasn't well-managed, maybe it wasn't well-financed. So there is the potential in principle for someone to come in, I think, through normal sort of mergers or acquisitions to come in and take responsibility. In the event that the company is really struggling against a particular settlement, then that is... that is a challenge obviously for a regulator to manage. There are certain provisions in the limit that things ultimately are really pushed, shall we say, to the point of non-recoverability that are envisaged within the... within the Bill.

But I think one of the jobs of the regulator is to, well, first the importance of getting that first price control settlement right. As I say, at the moment that is one being set by the department, but the importance of getting that projection on the allowed costs is really, really key. Get it right at the start. And then through that rhythm of regular monitoring is really, really important to make sure that you, if you like, you anticipate the point. What you don't want to be doing, particularly with a construction project like this, is getting to that point with some element of surprise.

What you need to be doing is keeping that regular rhythm of monitoring and scrutiny to make sure that you can act before you get to that point of the company has, if you like, got nowhere to go.

01:31:26 - 01:31:35

Douglas Lumsden

I guess you could step in and increase the costs and have them earning more to try and keep them in a sustainable footing.

01:31:35 - 01:31:58

Will Godfrey

So at certain points it is possible you, you know, a regulator could introduce things like cost limits beyond which, if you like, there was then a redetermination of a price allowance, but not necessarily one that was a simple cost of overrun by X, therefore tolls increase by the same amount. It wouldn't be an automatic pass-through. It would be subject, as I say, to that efficiency and economy test.

01:31:58 - 01:32:00

Speaker 40

Thank you, Chair. Okay.

01:32:01 - 01:32:42

Jim Dickson

Thank you, Chair. One of the things that's really come through from other witnesses this morning and this afternoon is the need for pace on this project, the fact that the status quo is appalling for my residents, but it's very bad for the economy and very bad for various sectors.

Matt, would you say that the need for us to pass some legislation, then have an equity competition, then appoint the funders, do you think that's slowing down your work to make sure that the project continues so that it does complete on time and hopefully on budget and on spec as well?

01:32:42 - 01:33:34

Matt Palmer

Thank you. And we are moving at pace. We, you know, the Chancellor last at the last autumn budget, not this one, announced funding to get us to private finance and we are well into that. And we are moving at pace. There is a misunderstanding that we haven't started.

We have very definitely started. There's 2,000 people on site. We own, we have 14 square kilometres of land and we're, yeah, there's a lot of mud, I'm afraid, at the moment. But we are moving well and moving at pace.

Our target is to get a tunnel boring machine, which will be the largest in the world at the time, in the ground in 2028, which will line up roughly with when we go to private finance. So it's that and all of that is precluded on the fact that we need obviously the legislation and the bill through to allow us to get the equity to move on thereafter.

01:33:34 - 01:33:48

Jim Dickson

And is this largely the result of having had considerable allocation of Treasury funding already in order to be able to make a start and essentially mobilize and begin the project in the way that you have?

01:33:48 - 01:34:14

Matt Palmer

So yeah, the I mean, the logic of this was that we would, you know, the economic benefit of the scheme is great. Not only solves the problem in the local area, but it's a national level project. So we move at pace, we start the construction, we take a lot of the difficult, time-consuming activities like land assembly, putting plots of land together. And that's what we're doing at the moment. All of that then allows a much more stable platform for investors to come into.

01:34:15 - 01:34:16

Alison Griffiths.

01:34:16 - 01:35:16

Alison Louise Griffiths

Thank you, Chair. I wanted to come back to the question around HVO, sorry, hydrotreated vegetable oil, HVO. Mr. Palmer, you suggested that there was parity stroke comparability in cost between white diesel and HVO. I've spent a little bit of time in the last few minutes looking at Google, Claude, and ChatGPT, and not one of those sources suggests that is the case, unless you count 10 to 30% as comparable, of HVO being 10 to 30% more expensive as comparable.

So I really just wanted to push back on you on that and ask you to be rather more precise about what the additional cost base is of using HVO in construction across the course of this project, both to date and what your estimates are going forwards.

01:35:16 - 01:35:39

Matt Palmer

So in construction in the UK, about two-thirds of our constructors use HVO as standard. So when you bid for a project, you'll find that a number of your constructors bid with HVO as just a, it's just in the costs. And that is the case with Lower Thames Crossing, two-thirds of our contractors bid with HVO.

01:35:39 - 01:35:50

Alison Louise Griffiths

But that's comparing yourself to another contractor. That wasn't what I was asking. I was asking about what your costs were of white diesel versus HVO.

That's a completely different comparison.

01:35:50 - 01:36:02

Matt Palmer

But we've never... so what I'm saying is we went to market and asked them to build us a project. They bid back with HVO as their base bid. We didn't see the cost with diesel, I'm afraid.

01:36:02 - 01:36:09

Alison Louise Griffiths

Okay, so when you said the costs were comparable, actually you didn't know whether that was the case because you hadn't actually gone to market with that.

01:36:09 - 01:36:16

Matt Palmer

We didn't go out with a diesel-based product because the market typically comes forward with an HVO product.

01:36:16 - 01:36:23

Alison Louise Griffiths

Okay, well I just want to correct the record though, that when you say that the costs are comparable, actually they're not.

01:36:23 - 01:36:43

Matt Palmer

Well, comparable is a... well, I think I've explained myself. They're comparable. £1.70 is what we are paying.

I've been clear that that is what we're paying for, yeah, for HVO at the moment.

01:36:43 - 01:37:10

Alison Louise Griffiths

When I've asked each of these sources specifically about construction projects, by the way, I haven't asked them about retail, I've asked them about construction, they have been clear that there are substantial additional costs to using HVO. And I just wanted to make sure that that was clear. Thank you. If there are no further questions from members, can I thank the witnesses for their evidence and we move on to the next panel. Thank you very much.

01:37:41 - 01:38:00

Emma Lewell

Evidence from Wates Construction and John Laing. We have until 10 past 4 for this panel. Could the witnesses please briefly introduce themselves for the record? Could the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?

01:38:00 - 01:38:28

Andrew Truscott

Sorry, I wasn't listening. That was totally rude of me. I'm Andrew Truscott, I'm the CEO of John Laing. Bear with me 30 seconds. So John Laing is a global investor in infrastructure projects.

We're 178-year-old UK business. Our specialism is investing in greenfield projects, by which I mean projects which go through the construction cycle. And we've delivered about 180 greenfield construction projects across the world over the last 25 years.

01:38:28 - 01:38:29

Hello, good afternoon.

01:38:29 - 01:38:48

Roger Forsdyke

My name is Roger Forsdyke. I'm UK Operations Director for Wates Construction. And just by way of introduction, Wates is a business privately owned, incorporated in 1897, and has been working in infrastructure and house building since then.

01:38:48 - 01:39:19

Greg Gregory Smith

Thank you, Ms. Luff. Gentlemen, good afternoon. In terms of the provisions of this Bill, introducing the RAB model for the construction of Lower Thames Crossing and potentially others, and bearing in mind that the Government has been clear that they need to leverage private investment to get the project built, how attractive are the provisions of this Bill to you as private sector entities in the construction world?

Mr Truscott, maybe first.

01:39:19 - 01:40:28

Andrew Truscott

Yeah, I mean, I think we applaud the use of RAB in this regard. Why? I think this is a complicated project and I think just listening to the previous panel, I think the feature of RAB which feels very relevant to LTC is the ability to have intra-cycle changes, subject to the way that in particular traffic is operating in the future. You know, I think it's delivered, and again, I'm purely saying from an investor perspective, so please excuse me, but I think I look at Tideway as a really well-delivered project from an investor perspective and I think a similar model was used there.

And I also think Heathrow, the model used at Heathrow has also been relatively successful. So, you know, being totally transparent, when we first started talking to government about this project, I felt that a more traditional concession model may have been more appropriate. But actually, the way that the project is now being procured, and in particular the addition of the, of the bridge into the project, I think the RAB model looks really very interesting and I would probably argue more attractive from an investor perspective.

01:40:28 - 01:40:45

Greg Gregory Smith

And anything that you would, that you see in this bill that's a red flag for you, that's something that you look at and think, well, if that was only however different, it would be a more attractive prospect to be, for an investability perspective?

01:40:45 - 01:41:46

Andrew Truscott

Yeah, um, uncapped construction cost risk being transferred onto an investor.

No, and I'm being overly simplistic there, so please excuse me. But that is, that's something we wouldn't do, and I would argue that we're a relatively good proxy for investors of our type. So I think there's some work and some thought needs to go into how to manage that cost overrun risk. And, you know, again, just echoing the comments from the previous panel, I think this is a well-thought-through project. You know, again, we applaud the way it's been developed.

I think it's, and hopefully it can be delivered on time and on budget. But I'm afraid of the 180 projects we've delivered, I can probably count on the fingers of one hand how many have. So I think you've got to be prepared as a contractor, as an investor, as government, as all stakeholders, with the expectation that there may be cost overrun. And to ask an investor to take uncapped cost overrun to its account doesn't necessarily mean that it's a terrible outcome. It just means I can't price equity.

01:41:46 - 01:42:08

Greg Gregory Smith

I understand the answer. Clearly you and your company have a lot of experience in terms of big construction, in terms of these sort of big projects. What are the biggest lessons to be learned that we might be able to write into this bill when it does come to cost control?

01:42:08 - 01:42:41

Andrew Truscott

Plan for the worst. Take into account cost and really plan for the worst around cost inflation. We're in and again, cost inflation and it was interesting listening to the Chancellor yesterday, supply chain, budgetary, every element of the supply chain and cost are increasing globally in terms of all these sorts of projects.

So plan for the worst and plan for an expectation that unfortunately, even though it's not the intention, that you will end up with a project that costs more than you expected on day one.

01:42:41 - 01:43:28

Greg Gregory Smith

I understand that, and clearly there are factors that no government, no company, no entity can predict, global conflicts etc. that impact all of that. However, what I'd really like to get from you that can try and help improve this Bill as it goes through Committee and its future stages in Parliament, are the things that actually you can control.

The things that, of all the experience you've got of all those projects that the company has been involved with over the years, what are the things that can be controlled, that you can put in place sensible steps to mitigate against, that could improve this model too?

01:43:28 - 01:44:27

Andrew Truscott

And again, I'm going to focus on cost for a minute, but then I'd love Roger's view as well, because he's at the coalface, I'm just a simple investor from my ivory tower. But what we find is where there are mechanics in the construction process or in the construction phase which incentivise contractors to stick to budget as much as they can. And again, credit to the way that the bill's written and credit to the way LTC is currently being procured, this idea of cost sharing and certain elements of cost being shared between contractor and government and rolled into RAB. I think having those sorts of features that really, no disrespect to Roger, hold the contractor's feet to the fire in terms of cost control are very sensible.

And these projects can be delivered on time and on budget. We are, we've just finished a project in, in Melbourne, North East Link, where we have tunneled under the Yarra. The Yarra is quite a complicated river and we've done it on time and on budget.

01:44:27 - 01:44:46

Greg Gregory Smith

Okay, thank, I think Mr. Forsdyke, that's your cue, sir, to follow up on that. Yeah, I'm, I'm really looking for those practical things from years and years and decades and decades of experience that you and your company have that can improve this.

01:44:46 - 01:46:16

Roger Forsdyke

I think it's responsibility for outcomes and I think Andrew's right, put it where the responsibility lies. And as a contractor, we're only in control of some of the process.

And I often think that that risk is trying to be wholly presented to the contractor when the design, the planning, the procurement is in some other court. So for me, the most important thing is to get the pre-planning done so you don't start before you're ready, because a lot of projects start under pressure without the outcome fully detailed and the scope and the risk apportioned correctly. So I think you need to look at the stages that you need we need to go through so that when we actually put a shovel in the ground the scale and scope is determined. Because cost overruns come from uncertainty in the majority of cases and that uncertainty is often there before we actually start work and it hasn't been properly nailed down to the appropriate party.

So yes, hold the contractor to feet to the fire, but also there are other parties, the designers, the ecology, all of the other things that go into a proper project well delivered, there needs to be some measure of accountability there also and that is often at the other end of the contract. We find that being transferred, not necessarily fully realized into the contractor's risk and I think that's where you get problems and issues.

01:46:16 - 01:47:10

Greg Gregory Smith

So perhaps an example of that that came up in the previous discussion, something that will not be in any contractor's hands is this ruling on no use of diesel in construction plant for this net.

It may well be that the construction sector for perfectly noble environmental reasons has wanted to use HVO or other sustainable fuels in its operation. But from your experience as a contractor, and indeed Mr Truscott as an investor, is it true to say that if the project was allowed to use diesel in construction plant, it would be cheaper than using HVO, and it would be cheaper to the tune of something like 20 to 25 pence per litre on diesel, on the fuel cost?

01:47:10 - 01:47:39

Roger Forsdyke

Potentially. But I think it's this appropriateness. If it's a blanket HVO and there's some plant that some stuff you need to use diesel on, so I think it's appropriateness for me.

There is an uplift in that type of fuel, but if that is something that is a key stakeholder requirement and the public purse can afford it, then it's something that should be done. It's not and those are decisions outside of a contractor's position, but they will definitely...

01:47:39 - 01:47:44

Greg Gregory Smith

I appreciate it's outside the contractor's position, and that's why I came with the question.

01:47:44 - 01:47:52

Roger Forsdyke

But that's not a variable cost to me, that's just an additional cost. The risk comes from variable costs that I can't control.

01:47:52 - 01:48:33

Greg Gregory Smith

But my point within this is that this isn't a concession model. This is a model that we're talking about that has to have a payback from the tolls that are ultimately paid by the motorist, by haulage companies, by small business people running their vans, whatever it might be.

Therefore, it's not a question of can the public purse, can the taxpayer bear it direct from Treasury, it's a question of where does the payback come in terms of the tolling. So if it's cheaper to build in the first place by not using a more expensive fuel, surely that's that's where that question comes.

01:48:33 - 01:48:35

Speaker 46

I think you've answered your own question.

01:48:36 - 01:49:14

Andrew Truscott

I mean the only thing I'd add and this is a little bit naughty, so apologies, is you're building a road. People have diesel cars that drive on the road. And actually one of the things we at John Laing do, we own we own toll roads, we own availability roads all around the world. And we we actually couch our our stage one and stage two emissions on each of our roads with a with a road to net with a path to net zero in 2050. The one thing we cannot control is the vehicles that run on the road which we've built.

So we can control the operations and we can have input into the way that they're built, but ultimately these are polluting events because people drive diesel and petrol cars on them.

01:49:14 - 01:49:16

Speaker 49

Thank you. Minister?

01:49:16 - 01:49:18

Speaker 47

No questions, thank you.

01:49:18 - 01:49:20

Speaker 48

Olly Glover.

01:49:20 - 01:49:43

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

This Bill proposes use of alternative financing models. Do you have any thoughts about the prin- the principles that should be used to make sure that risk is appropriately allocated between government, investors, contractors and the eventual road users to try and keep the project deliverable and affordable, I mean, for all of those parties?

01:49:43 - 01:51:43

Andrew Truscott

No, I think, yeah, thank you. So my, my biggest concern around this project is the ultimate cost to the end user. That is my biggest concern.

And, and actually that's a piece of maths which we all need to collectively get right, because what we can't end up with is a wonderful project which unfortunately saddles the user with an uneconomic toll for the next 50 or 60 years. Um, you know, how can we manage that? We can manage that by obviously trying to keep the cost of construction as low as we possibly can. I think there are other things that we see in our toll roads in our businesses globally, such things as dynamic tolling where, um, you know, we encourage road use by differentiated pricing depending on what time of day, which I'd love to explore with, with government at the right time. We can see differentiation for different types of vehicles.

So I think there's a way of getting the end user's experience to be a little fairer than just a flat toll. And then in terms of the overall cost and delivery, obviously I'm afraid to say the cost of financing at the moment is as high as it's been in my career.

So that is a factor that we've all got to be aware of. And I'm sure you guys all know, sorry, you all know this, but infrastructure is a diversifier in pension fund portfolios. We're a spread to the risk-free investor. Right, so that's how we calculate our return. So unfortunately, as risk-free rates go up, the expectation of the returns for our capital also goes up.

So innovation around how we can deliver, how you can deliver, we can collectively deliver a financing package against that backdrop, which is as cheap and deliverable as possible, is also quite important. How do we do that? Certainty of outcome, high-quality regulation, ensuring that everybody who commits capital understands the limits of their capital and therefore able to calculate their returns accordingly.

01:51:43 - 01:51:45

Speaker 50

Any thoughts from you, Mr. Forsdyke?

01:51:45 - 01:51:54

Roger Forsdyke

Not on the subject of financing, it's outside of my experience. But I think... Well, no, it is outside of my experience.

01:51:54 - 01:51:56

Speaker 51

Thank you. Fair enough. Mr. Osborne.

01:51:56 - 01:52:46

John Tristan Osborne

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. This again links to the independent review I questioned the ORR on this previously. Obviously you're sitting on the other side of the table and you're looking to potentially extract as much as you can from an investor perspective here. So I suppose in terms of you represent one side of the spectrum and the regulator's on the other side, there has to be a working partnership between you both.

Can I ask, obviously the efficiency of a project finance model such as this crossing relies on certainty and predictability for investors and the regulator being there to ensure stability of the regime. Obviously we haven't got a regulator at the moment which manages this. So can I ask where is the investor confidence at the moment around where the ORR is? And do you think that that investor confidence is there for this model to work going forward?

01:52:46 - 01:54:09

Andrew Truscott

I'd slightly reject your first statement if I'm honest. I think as an infrastructure investor, we provide candidly the lowest cost of private capital that is available across the world. So if you're attracting John Laing, if you're attracting people like us, I can guarantee you're getting the lowest cost of equity capital that you can possibly attract. And therefore the risk transfer needs to be accordingly appropriate.

I think, you know, I'll slightly repeat my opening comments. One thing that when we first started interacting with DfT about this project, I was quite nervous about the RAB model. Because, and I'm not a RAB nerd, right? There's lots of RAB nerds, I'm not one. But they can be incredibly complicated.

They can take a huge amount of time to to drill down. There isn't a regulator to there's an awful lot of work that needs to be done. Am I nervous that that's going to take longer than it should do or could do? Yes, I am. But again, credit to DfT and Treasury, they seem to be well on track.

Maybe the better answer to your question is we as investors are going to need absolute certainty, and I mean absolute certainty on what that regulatory model is, who the regulator is, and how that regulation is going to work before we'll put a dollar in. Pound in. Euro, whatever currency you like. Yeah.

01:54:09 - 01:54:10

Alice Griffith.

01:54:10 - 01:55:31

Alison Louise Griffiths

Thank you, Chair.

I just wanted to go back to comments actually that both of you have made previously. Andrew, you said that you can count on one hand the number of projects that finish on time and on budget, and that's despite the extensive experience that you both have. And Roger, you said obviously cost overruns come from uncertainty. I suppose one of the things that from my private, I had a 30-year private sector career, one of the experiences that I had in negotiating contracts was that quite often it was when the customer was creating unrealistic expectations or there was poor procurement taking place, that that often, where you've got a competitive environment trying to win the contract, but quite often that's the case where you end up going back with cost overruns and time overruns.

So I suppose my question is, are there any lessons that as a government we should be learning about how we procure these types of contracts so that we do get the best possible outcome at the best possible price, but without those cost overruns and time overruns?

01:55:31 - 01:56:35

Roger Forsdyke

I'm happy to answer that. I think that's really interesting that you should say from your experience it's the pressure, the commercial pressure that... So the most important thing in the tendering process is to have measurables just beyond single cost. Sorry, am I not...

Measurables beyond just the cost because if it's first past the post you're destined to sort of push the price down to the lowest quality bid and that will often create the problems you're now describing or we've just described earlier. So I think you have to look at how you're going to measure the quality of the tenders, how you're going to measure that in real terms beyond just the actual cost of the lowest. And I don't think that is done effectively, well, regularly. So you do end up with cheap materials, optimistic programming, optimistic budgeting and all of those things just to get to a price that's probably optimistic in the first place. So it does echo a bit of what Andrew said, which is...

Sorry.

01:56:35 - 01:56:45

Alison Louise Griffiths

I was just going to ask, is there anything that can be changed in how those relationships are built with the procurement teams to shift that?

01:56:45 - 01:57:55

Roger Forsdyke

I think so. I think if you have gateways where you build the price through detailed submissions and you can then control the... because you don't want uncontrollable cost and excellent quality, but you do need to create some gateways through the process so you can actually control the quality as you go through. That's my experience, and those sort of two-stage processes do create the best outcomes.

What you then have to do is make sure that there's no undefined scope because the undefined as you cross that line to secured and the responsibility moves to the contractor, at that point you don't want any change. And that's sometimes very hard to achieve, but a really important step that is often, oh well we just need to get started and that pressure of starting will often allow you or the project will start really prematurely before the actual scope is defined. And that's where the optimism bias goes in on the provisional sum might be lines or whatever and then you end up with escalation notwithstanding the delays to actually resolving the issues themselves.

01:57:55 - 01:59:34

Andrew Truscott

So I haven't got a huge amount to add because I think Roger's put it beautifully. I'll just say one thing and he can kick me under the table. Contracting is a hard business. They do billions of dollars of billions of pounds worth of revenue for two to three to four percent margins. It's hard.

And therefore there's little scope in their business models for mistakes, right?

So they will always enter into these sort of projects with an expectation that mistakes aren't don't land at their desk because otherwise these companies go bust and they have done globally. What we've seen and actually again, credit to the way LTC is being procured, I think separating church and state a little bit, so separating equity and financing away from contracting rather than having one single proposal, I think is a way of actually arguably getting more certainty around deliverability than amalgamating all of those elements into one. And where we've seen material cost overruns, it tends to be in the big projects where one single solution is given to a customer. We've been looking at a lot of US projects recently in the road space where single projects, equity, traffic and revenue as well as construction is lumped into one big unit and presented to, sorry excuse me, presented to a customer who then tries to aggregate and always aggregates to lowest cost and that's not always the right solution.

So actually, I think the way, and again, I'm giving my previous panelists an awful lot of credit today, which is wonderful, but I think the way of disaggregating elements could be a way of managing that risk and that risk and cost and delay overrun quite, quite well actually.

01:59:35 - 02:00:24

Jim Dickson

Thank you, Chair. Just want to agree with your one point you made earlier that it's really important that the tolls are kept affordable in every way for the haulage industry, but also for motorists and other, other vehicles.

Presumably one aspect of that will be this being an attractive project which lots of interest is is generated in the market for and therefore we get lots of potential bidders. How would you rank this scheme globally against other similar sized schemes or other, you know, comparable schemes in terms of investor attractiveness? Do you think we're set to have a competitive and, you know, very interested kind of set of players here looking to bid?

02:00:24 - 02:02:08

Andrew Truscott

It's a really good question. And I'll try and keep this brief because I could bore you for about a month on that question. So the short answer is the big attention for the main global contractors, of which there are, let's be honest, a handful, is currently on the US. So the US is undergoing a big program of what they're calling managed lanes projects, which is upgrading existing roadways to be either tolled or semi-tolled or managed.

So you will have, I'm sure, have seen Ferrovial, Cintra, all the big Spanish contractors are very focused on the US. Australia, sporadic, but yes, there are some large projects, not necessarily transportation projects, which are attracting interest from investors and contractors in Australia. In Europe, it's fingers of one hand. And actually, that's where LTC may get more attention as a consequence of the lack of other available opportunities. However, this is a big project.

This is a big equity check. And there will be an awful lot of investors who say, well, certainly I've yet to meet the investor who'll be able to write a single check for the entire amount.

And my guess is that this will come down to pools of consortium of capital, very much like ended up being on Thames Tideway, who come together because the amount of capital required is just so huge. Do I expect it to be competitive? Unfortunately, yes. Will, do I expect you to have 10, 15 single asset bidders all vying to buy 100% of the equity? Not in the slightest.

02:02:08 - 02:02:23

Douglas Lumsden

Thank you, Chair. Andrew, you mentioned earlier, I think you said one of the issues was uncapped cost overruns for the contractor.

What would be the consequence of that? Does it scare some contractors away? Is it just making them under-invest?

02:02:23 - 02:03:00

Andrew Truscott

Not from the contractor's point of view, sorry, if I said contractor I meant investor, apologies. I don't care about the contractors, sorry. Yes, and it's not because we don't understand and price risk, that's what we do for a living. It's just that I can't go to my investment committee and when answer the question, "Okay, Andrew, what's the maximum amount of equity you're going to put in this project and therefore what is the return you're expecting to get on this project?" The answer is, "I don't know."

That is not a conversation I'll, well, it could be a conversation, it would be the last conversation I have with my investment committee.

02:03:00 - 02:03:02

Speaker 52

So what do we need to do to change that to make sure...

02:03:02 - 02:03:47

Andrew Truscott

I think you need to, and again, this is getting well over my skis, so please apologize. But I think being smart around, and I'm not just suggesting this all lands on the country balance sheet, but being smart, whether it's the National Wealth Fund, taking excess risk above a certain threshold and then becoming an equity investor as a consequence, but thinking innovatively about how to cap the number, which I then go to my investment committee and say, this is the amount of capital we'll commit, with any excess being provided by somebody else in exchange for an economic interest, I think would be sensible. But I think probably rather than trying to give answers, I'd say being thoughtful and innovative about how that cap can be constructed is definitely worth putting on the agenda.

02:03:47 - 02:03:51

Speaker 55

Okay. But it doesn't drive away investors as it is just now, does it?

02:03:51 - 02:03:52

I think it will.

02:03:52 - 02:03:55

Speaker 54

Well, okay. So it is something we need to look at urgently.

02:03:55 - 02:04:12

Andrew Truscott

And again, I can't speak for the entire investment community, but I can just repeat what I said earlier on. I think we're fairly typical. I mean, we're brilliant, but I think we're fairly typical. An uncapped equity commitment is almost impossible for us to write.

02:04:12 - 02:04:14

Speaker 53

Thank you, Chair.

02:04:14 - 02:05:02

Emma Lewell

There are no further questions from members.

Can I thank the witnesses for their evidence and we will move on to the next panel. Thank you. We will now hear oral evidence from the Minister and we have until 4:30 for this panel. Could the Minister please briefly introduce himself for the record?

02:05:02 - 02:05:03

Speaker 56

Good afternoon again, Ms. Brock.

02:05:03 - 02:05:09

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Justin Madders, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department for Transport.

02:05:09 - 02:05:11

Speaker 58

Greg Smith.

02:05:11 - 02:06:02

Greg Gregory Smith

Thank you, Ms Lual. Minister, we had this discussion at second reading, but I want to ask you again, having had a few days to reflect on it. You've said very clearly at the dispatch box that you don't want to bring in road pricing, tolling to other roads, but this bill still leaves a little bit of a lawyer's paradise where it could be argued that that power would exist either for you, for the current Secretary of State or any future Secretary of State.

So, will you amend this bill to properly rule out in statutory form, as opposed to a commitment at the dispatch box, this being used to extend tolling, road pricing to other roads?

02:06:02 - 02:08:47

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well look, I think we're pretty clear that it isn't a backdoor to road pricing. If the honorable member has an amendment that he thinks will deal with that, I can assure him that we've gone through extensive discussions with Office of Parliamentary Counsel on this.

I'd refer him to Logistics UK's evidence this morning where they said that they thought the bill was relatively strongly drafted in terms of closing these loopholes. It's probably worth saying that as he will know that the intent of the bill is also important and the statements on the record from myself, both at second reading, probably in bill committee a number of times I imagine, and today will all be relevant should at some point in the future a future Secretary of State want to do something that is clearly outside the scope and intention of the bill. But I'll say it again now for the record that this bill does not provide a backdoor for widespread tolling.

The bill is creating an additional financing option for major strategic road infrastructure, specifically for trunk roads in England. It is deliberately a framework because rather than legislate for one individual project, it's possible there may be more suitable projects in the future. But that does not mean, and I want to be clear, that this will become the default model for road investment. Any future use would need to meet the requirements of the bill and be considered on its own merits. And I think as Steve Gooding from the RAC said this morning, I'm happy to sort of confirm that at the moment there isn't any other schemes that are being considered for use of this bill.

It is important to say the bill as defined narrowly defines when a license can be granted. That it is for a new road, a capacity enhancing improvement, or the continued operation of a road that has been previously licensed under this regime.

This is about major strategic infrastructure. It is not about, as an example the honorable member has put before us, about putting tolls on when a new speed camera or something is being introduced. That clearly is not the case. I think some of the evidence earlier today has also suggested that actually our geographical constraints would make that very difficult anyway, even if that was what we wanted to do, which I'll state again for the record isn't the case.

02:08:47 - 02:09:25

Greg Gregory Smith

Thank you, Minister. I appreciate your clarity and of course you're right, we will explore that further in the line-by-line sessions because I do have genuine concerns that some of the drafting does leave that backdoor open.

If I can ask another question that we didn't get any clarity on in the second reading debate, and I appreciate that this is a decision for future licensing authorities, the ORR, to come to. But what would be an acceptable window for the toll on the Lower Thames Crossing to be?

02:09:25 - 02:10:21

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, I'm afraid I'm going to disappoint him. We're not going to give figures for tolls a nine-year window in advance because that is something that will be part of the ongoing analysis and development of the project, part of the discussions with potential investors. But it will, you know, we're clear that the Bill will set out the framework for how that will work. It is about the economic and efficient costs of provision. It's very clear that we believe tolls must remain affordable and they must represent good value for road users.

Future projects would be undertaken under the same basis. So whilst I can't give him any pounds and pence figures, I can give him those assurances that there will be sufficient restraints in place to ensure that this is not an unlimited blank cheque for increased tolls forevermore.

02:10:21 - 02:11:14

Greg Gregory Smith

And in terms of unlimited blank cheques, can I come to this point of cost control on any project, starting of course with the Lower Thames Crossing? We have heard evidence of other projects that have gone over budget.

We have heard, actually, quite clear evidence that it's quite rare for a project to come in on budget, and I think we can all understand the reasons for that, and it does happen. But within those things that can be controlled, is the Minister willing to look again at some of those things, like a ban on diesel, that does put between 20 and 25 pence per litre additional cost to use HVO over diesel, which will ultimately have a bearing on the whole construction cost of the project?

02:11:14 - 02:11:38

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, I think the first thing to say is that I thought the evidence from National Highways was very clear on this, which they're saying there isn't an increased cost as a result of that. I think it also said very clearly that this was a requirement set in the development consent order in 2022, when the honourable gentleman's party was in government, so I'm not entirely sure where he's going with this.

02:11:38 - 02:12:34

Greg Gregory Smith

Well, we paid our price in 2024 for the mistakes we made. This government's been in power for two and a half years, and the evidence that I put to the representatives from Wates and John Laing just now did confirm that there is a differential in price, that my estimate of looking it up is between 20 and 25 pence a liter difference between white diesel, white diesel and hydrotreated vegetable oil. So given that we're now operating two and a half years into this government and we are looking at significant costs that will ultimately be borne by those that pay a toll to go on the Lower Thames Crossing, I gently and respectfully ask the Minister if he will look at this again to try and get the cost of this project that the opposition do want to see built come down.

02:12:34 - 02:13:20

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, I would gently push back and say that actually, rather than evidence from people who aren't working on the project, rather than evidence from ChatGPT or wherever the source, we had very clear evidence from National Highways that this is not having an overall impact on costs. I'm happy to provide further information. I will ask them to put something in writing about the detail of that. He will be aware, of course, that this Bill is scheme-agnostic, so it's not actually appropriate for such restrictions to be placed on the face of the Bill, but I'm happy to facilitate a further conversation because I understand the honourable member is concerned about that.

02:13:20 - 02:13:22

Speaker 61

I'm grateful.

02:13:22 - 02:13:24

Speaker 60

Jim Dickson.

02:13:24 - 02:14:15

Jim Dickson

Yeah, thank you, Ms Low. Obviously, very strong supporter of this Bill because it enables, as we've heard, major projects such as the Lower Thames Crossing and others to be funded. But the tolling issue is an important one, and just to follow up the question just asked, obviously we can't talk about individual toll levels at all, but we can talk about mechanisms by which reasonable tolls could be set, hopefully affordable tolls for both industry and for individual motorists.

I wonder if the Minister could just enlarge a bit on how the ORR, with the legislation designed and passed by this place, will be able to work on tolls to ensure that they do fit the definition of affordable as far as possible.

02:14:15 - 02:15:01

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, I certainly understand why the honorable member asks that question, but yes, the Bill sets the framework for the RAB model and that will establish, as we've heard, the independent regulator and their remit is very clearly, it's there in the first few clauses of the Bill, to take account of the interest of road users. There will be fair pricing, transparency, and of course long-term sustainability as a result of that. He will be aware as well that there will be a stakeholder group where users will have the opportunity to feed in as well. I think we've got a pretty robust set of reassurances that I hope will satisfy him and his constituents.

02:15:02 - 02:15:25

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

Thank you, Ms. Lewell. One of the witnesses said that one of my questions was best aimed at government, so it would be churlish of me to not avail myself of the opportunity to ask you, Minister. So what metrics should the government use to determine whether alternative financing arrangements deliver better value for money for road infrastructure projects than direct Treasury funding? How is the government thinking about that question?

02:15:25 - 02:16:27

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, I think the first thing to say is that as the Treasury made clear, they're not going to fund the totality of the project. We have to look at other models and obviously there are different views about how that would work.

But if we want to compare this to PFI, which I think has been the major funding source for a number of crossings in recent years, actually costs on a RAB model tend to be lower. Clearly we've got an independent regulator, which as I've explained and we've heard in the evidence, will be able to limit cost recovery to make sure it is economic and efficient. There will be regular requirements set out under the license to review that. And ultimately the government won't be left, as it would be under PFI, with repaying a debt over many years, which might be off the balance sheet but still ends up coming to the taxpayer.

02:16:27 - 02:16:52

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

Okay, well we hope that that will end up being the case because they haven't all ended up marvelously, although you are right to say that some have gone well. So you mentioned the Office of Rail and Road as the regulator.

Why has the Office of Rail and Road been selected as a regulator given the Railways Bill's rather shunted into the siding, some could say? So why the ORR rather than a different kind of regulatory arrangement?

02:16:52 - 02:16:58

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, as this is a road, the Office of Road and Rail seems to be the appropriate regulator.

02:16:58 - 02:17:04

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

Yes, but for rail, which is also in their title, it's diluted with the Railways Bill, so I'm just interested in the different approach.

02:17:04 - 02:17:25

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, there's a different approach because this is a different situation. This is the regulated asset base model, which is about a long-term investment. It is about balancing the interest of users, investors, and actually having a strong regulator who understands the sector, who as we've heard is already working on it. I think it is absolutely the right balance to make sure this delivers for everyone.

02:17:25 - 02:17:35

Guy Nicholas Oliver Glover

Okay, I mean, yes, it's an interesting answer because also railways also have both users and investors, but that's perhaps a debate for another day and I'll happily let other people come in now.

02:17:35 - 02:17:36

Speaker 65

Mr. Osborne.

02:17:36 - 02:18:19

John Tristan Osborne

Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Question on the ORR. So obviously my line of questioning is just around whether the regulator is ready. Obviously we've had the independent report last month. I challenged on some of the, just one particular finding there.

Is the ORR in your position ready for this challenge? Is the regulatory landscape in a firm place where we can solicit investor interest next year? Because again, speaking to the investor spokesperson today, they said that that regulatory certainty was absolutely critical for them. So I just want to get an understanding around the operational capabilities and engagement between DfT, the ORR, and whether or not we will have that structure and that robust regulatory arrangement in place and you're confident about that.

02:18:19 - 02:19:00

Justin Piers Richard Madders

I'm confident about that because that's what this bill intends to do. It sets it out very clearly. And I think that we, I guess we've heard from the investors that actually that sort of clear, transparent framework, that certainty, will be a very attractive opportunity for that long-term investment that we're seeking to deliver. There will be, I think, a need for some additional capability and capacity in the ORR. But I think what we've heard from, you know, I personally, I was very impressed with the evidence we heard today.

I think they're very much on top of this, but there will be much more to be done, and this is what this bill will enable them to do.

02:19:00 - 02:19:04

Speaker 66

Thank you. Douglas Lumsden.

02:19:04 - 02:19:24

Douglas Lumsden

Thank you, Chair. Minister, we heard from the last person that gave evidence, the investor, that he wouldn't be able to invest because of the uncapped cost overrun risks.

Obviously, you heard that as well. Do you think, would you look at it again to make sure that investors aren't sort of scared away by that risk?

02:19:24 - 02:20:06

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, I'm not sort of too familiar with the factors he takes into account with investment, but the advice I've been getting from officials that the soft market testing that's been taking place has actually shown us that there's a lot of interest in this. And I think he did also say in his response that there would be quite a lot of people who would be looking to invest in this. So clearly that conversation is ongoing. I think having the legislation on the statute book will actually help give some more certainty to investors. Clearly one of the reasons why the project has already started is to de-risk it to some extent as well.

So I think all the indicators I'm getting are actually we are putting this in a strong position to attract investment.

02:20:06 - 02:20:10

Douglas Lumsden

So you don't think you'd make any changes after hearing the comments made today?

02:20:10 - 02:20:26

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, I don't think that's something that that would be covered covered by the the bill anyway. But I'll certainly take that away and and see if there is anything to reflect on. But I would I can assure him that the you know this this would not be proceeding if there was if there was no no interest in investment.

02:20:26 - 02:20:28

Speaker 67

Thank you, Chair. Mike Reader.

02:20:28 - 02:20:49

Michael Reader

Thank you, Chair. And Minister, we've heard evidence today that there is a massive amount of competition for major schemes in Europe and that still competition is important to drive down the cost of capital. So do you think that this RAB model is going to help us to secure the best possible deal on the capital for building Lower Thames Crossing?

02:20:49 - 02:21:21

Justin Piers Richard Madders

The obviously, you know, the Treasury decision on how this is going to be funded is driving us in a direction where we've got to secure private investment. I think it does give us the opportunity to give investor certainty over a long period of time. Clearly there are guardrails in there to protect users as well. But as I say, the indications I've had so far is that the long-term nature of this project and the way it's been de-risked so far do make it an attractive proposition.

02:20:49 - 02:20:49

I think it is.

02:21:20 - 02:21:40

Michael Reader

And do you think we have to be careful in the passage of this bill to separate what this bill is about, which is a financing regime and addressing some of the legacy challenges of tolling in the UK, and the construction decisions made by the National Highways in terms of the type of fuel they might use, which is probably the equivalent of less than 1% of the overall construction cost?

02:21:40 - 02:22:06

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, I think as I've probably made clear, the bill is scheme agnostic, so an amendment to require a certain type of fuel would not really help us at all. But look, there's been I think quite a lot of evidence and actually confidence we should take as a committee from the measures that are in place to make sure that costs are kept under control.

02:22:06 - 02:22:45

Michael Reader

And is it fair to say that actually if you look at, we've heard some evidence about I think it's 343 projects that one of the, was it Sam from Britain Remade I think referred to, which include a whole range of projects delivered around the world? And I did a very similar study in 2020 really with a similar number of projects, so I need to look at whether there's a bit of plagiarism going on there in their work.

Actually when you look at road projects in the UK, major road projects, we're actually very good at delivering major road projects. A14, Silvertown Tunnel and various others, we're actually very good in the UK at delivering major infrastructure projects in the highway space on time. So I think people need to have a bit more optimism about the delivery of this project.

02:22:45 - 02:23:19

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Yeah, and I suppose if I could pick up on one of the witnesses and perhaps reference the fact that the road investment strategy which was started by the previous government has actually set us up on a very sustainable model to develop these large projects over a longer term, giving confidence to the supply chain, actually to keep control of costs and to actually deliver on time and within scope. So I think that National Highways are now very, very skilled at doing that and that should give us, give us all confidence.

02:23:19 - 02:23:35

Michael Reader

The Secretary of State did tell the Transport Committee that you would set out the process for setting tolls, which may address some of the concerns around what toll levels might be. Is that still the case and when will we see that during the passage of this bill?

02:23:35 - 02:23:44

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, the tolls will ultimately be part of the license which would be covered by the bill. As I say, there's...

02:23:44 - 02:23:52

Michael Reader

The process for setting them, will we see how they'll be set in terms of the key principles and how that'll be done as the bill progresses?

02:23:52 - 02:24:05

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Well, that will be part of the license conditions, probably a little bit too specific for the bill, but obviously there are safeguards within the bill itself about the things that will need to be considered by the operator.

02:24:05 - 02:24:17

Michael Reader

As the licensing conditions are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, will you set out kind of the core principles of what those licensing principles will be as the bill progresses through Parliament?

02:24:17 - 02:24:19

Justin Piers Richard Madders

Yeah, I'm happy to do that.

02:24:19 - 02:24:21

Speaker 69

Thank you.

02:24:21 - 02:24:42

Emma Lewell

As there are no further questions from members, can I thank the Minister for his evidence, and that brings us to the end of today's session. The committee will meet again at 9:25 a.m. on Tuesday, the 3rd of November, to begin line-by-line consideration of this bill. I invite the government whip to move the adjournment.

02:24:42 - 02:24:46

Speaker 70

I beg to move that further consideration of the bill be now adjourned.

02:24:46 - 02:24:56

Emma Lewell

The question is that further consideration of the bill be now adjourned. As many are of that opinion say aye. To the contrary, no. The ayes have it, the ayes have it. Order, order.

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